Miguel Garcia v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 5, 2017
Docket79A04-1610-CR-2290
StatusPublished

This text of Miguel Garcia v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Miguel Garcia v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miguel Garcia v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 05 2017, 8:59 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Timothy P. Broden Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Lafayette, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Katherine Modesitt Cooper Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Miguel Garcia, June 5, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 79A04-1610-CR-2290 v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 79D02-1411-F3-2

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Miguel Garcia (“Garcia”) was convicted in Tippecanoe Superior Court of Level

6 felony criminal confinement and two counts of Level 3 felony robbery. The

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1610-CR-2290 | June 5, 2017 Page 1 of 8 trial court sentenced Garcia to two consecutive terms of nine years on the Level

3 felony convictions and a concurrent two and one-half year sentence on the

Level 6 felony conviction. In his first appeal, Garcia claimed that the trial court

erred by failing to explain why Garcia’s sentences should be served

consecutively. A panel of this court agreed and remanded with instructions that

the trial court either enter concurrent sentences or impose consecutive sentences

supported by appropriate findings. On remand, the trial court chose the latter

option and entered findings to support the imposition of consecutive sentences.

From this order, Garcia appeals and claims that the trial court’s sentence is

inappropriate.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The facts underlying this case were set forth in our memorandum decision in

Garcia’s first appeal as follows:

On November 12, 2014, the State filed an information charging Garcia with ten counts relating to the armed robberies of a Speedway gas station and a Village Pantry convenience store in Lafayette on November 1 and November 5, 2014, respectively. On November 1, Garcia and Jacob Lumbley took cigarettes, money, and the store clerk’s cellular telephone from the Speedway gas station while Lumbl[e]y was armed with a handgun. On November 5, Garcia, Lumbley, and Tiffany Mounts took money and merchandise from the Village Pantry store while Lumbley was armed with a shotgun and Garcia was armed with a knife. During the course of the Village Pantry

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1610-CR-2290 | June 5, 2017 Page 2 of 8 robbery, the robbers ordered the store clerks to lay on the floor until the robbers left. On May 19, 2015, Garcia and the State entered into a plea agreement under which Garcia pleaded guilty to the following charges: Count II, robbery as a Level 3 felony, relating to the November 1 offense; Count VI, robbery as a Level 3 felony, relating to the November 5 offense; and Count VII, criminal confinement as a Level 3 felony, relating to the November 5 offense. In exchange, the State dismissed the remaining counts. Following a sentencing hearing on June 19, the trial court found the following aggravating factors: “the seriousness of the offense; offenses committed within five months of entering community; his criminal history; there were 3 victims; character of Defendant; and he has been disciplined while incarcerated.” The court also found the following mitigating factors: the Defendant pled guilty; he participated in rehabilitative programs while in custody at the County jail; he has shown remorse for his victims; he has drug and alcohol problems and was under the influence of Spice at the time of the commission of the offenses; he has had a somewhat good employment history; and his difficult childhood. The trial court then found that “the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors balance.”

The trial court imposed the nine year advisory sentence upon Garcia for both the Count II and Count VI robbery convictions, with each sentence having eight years executed and one year suspended on supervised probation. The court reduced the Count VII criminal confinement conviction to a Level 6 felony and sentenced Garcia to two and one-half years executed on that count. The trial court ordered that the sentences on Counts VI and VII be served concurrent with one another, but consecutive to the sentence on Count II, for an aggregate sentence of eighteen years, with sixteen years executed in the Department of Correction and two years suspended to probation.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1610-CR-2290 | June 5, 2017 Page 3 of 8 Garcia v. State, No. 79A02-1507-CR-944, slip op. at 1-3 (Garcia I) (Ind. Ct. App.

Mar. 15, 2016) (record citations omitted).

[4] The Garcia I court held that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive

sentences without stating any reasons to support its decision. See id., slip op. at

6 (citing Marcum v. State, 725 N.E.2d 852, 864 (Ind. 2002)). The Garcia I court

chose to remand the case to the trial court “with instructions for the trial court

to reconsider its order of consecutive sentences of eighteen years for the robbery

convictions. On remand, the trial court may either enter concurrent sentences

for the robbery convictions or impose the same consecutive sentences, if the

court supports its sentence with appropriate findings.” Id., slip op. at 7 (citing

Windhorst v. State, 868 N.E.2d 504 (Ind. 2007)).

[5] On remand, the trial court exercised the latter option and entered a new

sentencing order in which it found, with regard to its decision to impose

consecutive sentences, that there were separate offenses committed within a

short period of time from each other, at separate convenience stores, involving a

total of three victims. The trial court then re-imposed its original aggregate

sentence of eighteen years with sixteen years executed and two suspended.

Garcia again appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] In this appeal after remand, Garcia claims only that the sentence imposed by

the trial court is inappropriate. Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana

Constitution authorize independent appellate review and revision of a sentence

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1610-CR-2290 | June 5, 2017 Page 4 of 8 imposed by the trial court. Trainor v. State, 950 N.E.2d 352, 355-56 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2011), trans. denied. This authority is implemented through Indiana

Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that the court on appeal “may revise a

sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s

decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature

of the offense and the character of the offender.”

[7] Still, we must and should exercise deference to a trial court’s sentencing

decision because Rule 7(B) requires us to give “due consideration” to that

decision and because we recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to

its sentencing decisions. Id. Although we have the power to review and revise

sentences, the principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to “leaven

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Related

Cardwell v. State
895 N.E.2d 1219 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2008)
Windhorst v. State
868 N.E.2d 504 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2007)
Childress v. State
848 N.E.2d 1073 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2006)
Cotto v. State
829 N.E.2d 520 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2005)
O'CONNELL v. State
742 N.E.2d 943 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2001)
Marcum v. State
725 N.E.2d 852 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2000)
Fonner v. State
876 N.E.2d 340 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2007)
Trainor v. State
950 N.E.2d 352 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2011)
Fernbach v. State
954 N.E.2d 1080 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2011)
Dennis Vermillion v. State of Indiana
978 N.E.2d 459 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2012)
Brian M. Marley v. State of Indiana
17 N.E.3d 335 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2014)
Donald W. Myers, III. v. State of Indiana
27 N.E.3d 1069 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2015)

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