Midfirst Bank v. Clark, K.

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

MIDFIRST BANK : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

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v. :

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KIANI CLARK, AND/OR ANY AND ALL :

CURRENT OCCUPANTS, AND LYDIA M. :

MUNIZ : No. 2200 EDA 2025 :

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APPEAL OF: LYDIA M. MUNIZ :

Appeal from the Order Entered August 13, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No: 240900318

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2026 Appellant, Lydia M. Muniz, appeals pro se from the August 13, 2025, order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Midfirst Bank, in Appellee’s ejectment action against Appellant. We affirm.

The trial court recited the pertinent facts and procedural history in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:

This is an ejectment action concerning the property located at 6208 N. 17th Street, Philadelphia, PA, 19141 (“Property”).

[Appellee] acquired title to the Property by virtue of a deed from the Sheriff of Philadelphia County to [Appellee] that was recorded in the Recorder’s Office of Philadelphia County on August 7, 2024, as Instrument #54328613. The Property was sold at Sheriff’s sale

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

after default judgment was entered against defendant Kiani Clark in the underlying mortgage foreclosure action[…].

[Appellee] filed its complaint in ejectment in this court on September 4, 2024. [Appellee] alleges that [the defendant occupants] occupied the Property without a right to do so, and without claim of title. [Appellee] further claimed that it was entitled to immediate possession of the Property, and that despite demanding possession of the Property, defendants refused to deliver possession. [Appellant] filed an answer to [Appellee’s]

complaint on September 24, 2024. In [Appellant’s] answer, she denied the allegations contained in [Appellee’s] complaint and argued that [Appellee] did not have the right to enforce an action in foreclosure, even though this is an ejectment action.

[Appellee] filed its motion for summary judgment on June 2, 2025. In that motion, [Appellee] argued that it had the right to exclusive and immediate possession [of the Property] by virtue of the Sheriff’s deed. [Appellee] further argued that [Appellant]

had not filed any pleading objecting to the Sheriff’s sale in the underlying foreclosure action, and that [Appellant] received notice of the Sheriff’s sale and notice to vacate. [Appellant] did not respond to [Appellee’s] motion for summary judgment. On August 7, 2025, this court granted [Appellee’s] motion for summary judgment. [Appellant] filed a timely appeal on August 15, 2025.

On August 19, 2025, this Court directed [Appellant] to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal (“Statement”) pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. [Appellant] filed her statement on August 29, 2025. When taken as a whole, [Appellant’s] statement reads similar to a ‘sovereign citizen’ defense. The Statement also raises issues concerning the underlying foreclosure action, which is not at issue here.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/25, at 1-2.

Before we turn to the merits, we address Appellee’s motion to quash this appeal. In that motion, Appellee claims Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

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statement was too vague to preserve any issues. 1 We disagree. The trial court was able to discern and address three issues from Appellant’s concise statement:

1. [Appellant] claims that [Appellee] lacked standing to bring this lawsuit.

2. [The trial court] lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

3. [Appellee’s] suit was barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/25, at 2. Because the trial court discerned these issues and addressed them in an opinion, we conclude that Appellant’s concise statement was not so deficient as to warrant quashal of this appeal. We observe, however, that Appellant’s Pro Se Brief presents six questions which are distinct from the questions the trial court addressed in its opinion (though she does address portions of the three issues above in her brief). Appellant’s Pro Se Brief at 4-5. Because these issues were not included in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and not addressed by the trial court, we deem them waived for purposes of appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

Turning to the merits, we observe:

In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is the same as that applied by the trial court.

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1 Appellant’s August 29, 2025, filing in response to the trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) order was a lengthy document titled “Judicial Notice and Prayer for In Camera – Article III Equity Jurisdiction To the Honorable Court, Sitting as Chancellor in Equity.”

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An appellate court may reverse the entry of a summary judgment only where it finds that the lower court erred in concluding that the matter presented no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is clear that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In making this assessment, we view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. As our inquiry involves solely questions of law, our review is de novo.

Thus, our responsibility as an appellate court is to determine whether the record either establishes that the material facts are undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action, such that there is no issue to be decided by the fact-finder. If there is evidence that would allow a fact-finder to render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then summary judgment should be denied.

Sampathkumar v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 241 A.3d 1122, 1144 (Pa. Super. 2020), appeal denied, 256 A.3d 427 (Pa. 2021).

The trial court explained, in response to Appellant’s challenge to Appellee’s standing to bring this ejectment action, that a party has standing where it can show “a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the subject matter of the litigation.” Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1076 (Pa. Super. 2018), appeal denied, 199 A.3d 340 (Pa. 2018). Further, an ejectment action is an action with respect to real estate filed by a party “who does not possess the land but has a right to possess it, against a defendant who has actual possession.” Becker v. Wishard, 202 A.3d 718, 721 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Appellant argues in her pro se brief that she is the “lawful heir, beneficiary, and trustee of a private family trust created to preserve inherited real property and prevent waste, forfeiture, or unlawful seizure.” Appellant’s

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Pro Se Brief, at 6. But, as noted above, she failed to oppose Appellee’s summary judgment motion, and she failed to come forward with any evidence to either support her own claims or to dispute the validity of Appellee’s duly recorded sheriff’s deed. Further, Appellant acknowledges that she is in possession of the Property. For these reasons, the trial court correctly concluded that Appellee had standing to bring this action in ejectment.

With regard to Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, Appellant explains that she “did not dispute the court’s abstract authority to hear ejectment actions, but whether the legal prerequisites to exercising that authority in this case were satisfied.” Appellant’s Pro Se Brief at 21. In essence, Appellant seeks to challenge what she believes were procedural irregularities in the underlying foreclosure action. Her argument does not implicate the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction:

(a) General rule. — Except where exclusive original jurisdiction of an action or proceeding is by statute or by general rule adopted pursuant to section 503 (relating to reassignment of matters) vested in another court of this Commonwealth, the courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings, including all actions and proceedings heretofore cognizable by law or usage in the courts of common pleas.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 931(a). There is no statute or general rule vesting original jurisdiction over ejectment actions in a court other than the courts of common pleas. The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

Finally, we turn to the equitable estoppel argument.

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The doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents one from doing an act differently than the manner in which another was induced by word or deed to expect. A doctrine sounding in equity, equitable estoppel recognizes that an informal promise implied by one’s words, deeds or representations which leads another to rely justifiably thereon to his own injury or detriment, may be enforced in equity.

Shedden v. Anadarko E. & P. Co., L.P., 136 A.3d 485, 492 (Pa. 2016). Appellant asserted in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement that Appellee’s claims were barred by equitable estoppel, though she failed to explain how. As the trial court put it, “Despite [Appellant’s] assertion, she offers no evidence demonstrating that [Appellee] induced her to rely upon any promise, deeds, or representations. “ Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/25, at 4. Appellant fails to address this issue in her brief. Because Appellant has failed to support her equitable estoppel argument with any legal argument or evidence, it fails.

Finally, we address several requests for relief attached to Appellant’s reply brief. In one, she objects to the characterization of her as a “sovereign citizen.” Appellant’s Pro Se Reply Brief at 4 (pagination ours). Two others request emergency relief with regard to her eviction from the Property. Id. at 5-7, 10-11. Another is styled a “motion to strike pleadings and disqualify [Appellee’s] counsel. Id. at 8. And another is a motion to strike Appellee’s late-filed brief. Id. at 9. Finally, Appellant includes a “Special Cause Coversheet” summarizing the foregoing requests for relief. Id. at 12-13.

Throughout this appeal, Appellant has inundated this Court with requests for relief of various kinds. We already denied Appellant’s application

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for an emergency stay. Order, 2/2/26. Likewise, our Supreme Court, by order of July 22, 2026, denied Appellant’s application for emergency relief. Prior to that, this Court, on December 22, 2025, filed a blanket order denying all of Appellant’s pending applications for relief. In that order, we wrote:

Appellant is cautioned that the filing of further frivolous and/or repetitive applications for relief may result in the imposition of sanctions, including, but not limited to, a directive for this Court’s prothonotary to reject any further filings by Appellant absent permission of this Court.

Order, 12/22/25.

Given the history of this matter, our prothonotary’s office contacted Appellant and asked if she wished to have the items attached to her reply brief treated as applications for relief. Appellant said she did not. As such, the disposition line below will not include an order denying the requested relief. But for the sake of clarity and finality, we note that Appellant does not raise any issue or argument in her reply brief that merits any form of relief. Had she filed the items included in her reply brief as separate applications for relief, we would have denied them all and directed the prothonotary to reject all further filings in accordance with our December 22, 2025, order.

For the reasons set forth above, we deny Appellee’s motion to quash and affirm the trial court’s order.

Order affirmed. Motion to quash denied.

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Date: 8/27/2026