Middletown Home Telephone Co. v. City of Middletown

2 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 455
CourtButler County Probate Court
DecidedNovember 15, 1904
StatusPublished

This text of 2 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 455 (Middletown Home Telephone Co. v. City of Middletown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Butler County Probate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Middletown Home Telephone Co. v. City of Middletown, 2 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 455 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1904).

Opinion

That the said telephone company was organized for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating a line or lines of telephone within the said city of Middletown, in Butler county, Ohio, with its office and principal place of business at Dayton, in Montgomery county, Ohio, by the use of the streets, alleys and public ways, or through public grounds within the limits of the said city of Middletown, Ohio.

That on February 29, 1904, it made application to the city of Middletown, asking that an agreement be entered into between the city of Middletown and the said telephone company [456]*456for the mode of use within the limits of said city of Middle-town, of the streets, alleys, etc., for telephone purposes. And that said application was accompanied with a form of a proposed ordinance, which would have been acceptable to said plaintiff company.

The petition further avers that the city of Middletown, on 'June 10, 1904, passed an ordinance granting to said plaintiff company a franchise authorizing it to construct and operate a telephone system within said city of Middletown, Ohio; and that on June 13, 1904, plaintiff declined and refused to aeeept the same, and so notified the said city of Middletown, Ohio.

These are the material averments of the petition, to which on July 11, 1904, the city of Middletown filed its answer, denying the legal existence of the plaintiff company, and its right to prosecute this action. The issue has heretofore been decided in favor of the plaintiff company, after a full hearing of the evidence on that point.

The answer admits the inability of the plaintiff company and the defendant city to agree as to the mode and manner in which such telephone system should be constructed. And the court now comes to a consideration of the real point of difference between the parties, namely, the manner of construction of said telephone system. Section 3461 upon which plaintiff relies for its authority to bring this action reads as follows:

“Section 3461. When any lands authorized to be appropriated to the use of a company are subject to the easement of a street, alley, public way or other public use, within the limits of any city or village, the mode of use shall be such as shall be agreed upon between the municipal authorities of the city or village and the company; and if they can not agree, or the municipal authorities unreasonably delay to enter into any agreement, the probate court of the county, in a proceeding instituted for the purpose, shall direct in what mode such telegraph line shall be constructed along such street, alley or public way, so as not to incommode the public in the use of the same; but nothing in this section shall be so construed as to authorize any municipal corporation to demand or receive any compensation for the use of a street, alley or public way, beyond what may be necessary to restore the pavement to its former state of usefulness. ’ ’

[457]*457No legal question would now remain for consideration in this ease, were it not for the fact that since the decision on the preliminary questions herein and since this ease was submitted on its merits, the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County, in the ease of The City of Cincinnati v. The Queen City Telephone Company, on error from the probate court, has overruled that court and rendered an opinion, which, coming as it does from a learned judge of a higher court, must be considered as affecting the jurisdictional questions involved here (see 2 N. P. — N. S., p. 349).

The second syllabus reads as follows:

“A probate court has no power under either Section 3461 or any other section of the statutes to grant to a telephone company the right to put its wires underground.”

In this ease, so far as conduits are concerned, the only difference between the parties is the entent to which the underground conduits shall be used. The city, through its officers, contends that a certain portion of its territory shall be exempt from poles and overhead wires; while the company, on the other hand, argues that a much smaller conduit district shall be established. It is therefore agreed that there shall be some conduits, but upon the extent of same and upon some minor questions, the city and telephone company can not agree. If the law is correctly stated by the learned judge in the syllabus above quoted, the court in this ease, having had its jurisdiction invoked for the purpose of settling the dispute as to the extent of underground construction, must say that there will be no underground work, and that all the court can do is to permit an overhead construction, which is entirely foreign to the ideas and desires of either party; and that then the company can put as much of the construction underground as it desired. For, the holding of the court in the Cincinnati case is, that no authority can be granted by a city or probate court to a company to put wires underground except to a company owning and operating an exchange in said city. It will be seen that such a view of the law in this case leads to incongruity and absurdity, [458]*458and, under the rules of construction of statutes, should not be .adopted unless the language of the statute is clearly in support of it, and will admit of no other construction or interpretation— which is the view taken by the court in the case under consideration.

By a process of reasoning, which this court can not adopt as sound, and which does not lead it to the conclusion reached by him, the learned judge finds that the language of the statute is clearly and positively in support of the second syllabus above quoted; and that no authority is given either to a city or probate court to grant to a telephone company not in operation in .such city the right to lay wires underground.

This court is of the opinion that Section 3461, above referred .to, not only gives it jurisdiction over the subject-matter in this case, but also confers upon the court authority to settle the issue involved, and direct a mode in which the telephone lines can be “erected,” “laid,” “constructed,” or suspended, or in any other manner placed along the streets and alleys of the city of Middletown.

■ The court is further of the opinion that said Section 3461 alone embraces the entire law of this case without reference to, dependence upon, or connection with any other section. The language of the section is so clear as to make any exposition difficult, and to the court’s mind unnecessary. In this connection let me again quote a portion of said section:

. “When any lands authorized to be appropriated to the use of .a company are subject to the easement of a street, alley, public way or other public use, within the limits of any city or village, the mode of use shall be such as shall be agreed upon between the municipal authorities of the city or village and the company; and if they can not agree, or the municipal authorities unreasonably delay to enter into any agreement, the probate court of the county, in a proceeding instituted for the purpose, shall direct in what made such telegraph line shall be constructed along such street, alley or public way, so as not to incommode the public in the use of the same. ’ ’

This section clearly means, if it means anything, that the city and the company may agree upon any mode or manner of con[459]

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Bluebook (online)
2 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 455, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/middletown-home-telephone-co-v-city-of-middletown-ohprobctbutler-1904.