Middleton v. The City of St. Louis

E.D. Missouri

Middleton v. The City of St. Louis

DecidedApril 28, 2025

Docket4:24-cv-01495

StatusUnknown

This text of Middleton v. The City of St. Louis (Middleton v. The City of St. Louis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Middleton v. The City of St. Louis, (E.D. Mo. 2025).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

KELLY MIDDLETON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 4:24-cv-01495-MTS ) THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Doc. [14]. The Motion is not well taken. Contrary to Defendants’ position, Plaintiff was not required to cite to “binding law in his Complaint.” Doc. [14-1] at 3. It is well settled that a complaint in federal court need not state a legal theory. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam); see also Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 122 F.3d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “matching facts to a legal theory was an aspect of code pleading interred in 1938 with the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure”). Nor was Plaintiff required to plead facts establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.1 Compare Doc. [14-1] at 3–4, and Doc. [22] at 2–4, with Wilson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 850 F.3d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 2017) (“‘[I]t is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case’ under McDonnell Douglas.” (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002))).

1 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Plaintiff needed only to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“[A] complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”). While Plaintiff's Complaint might be somewhat close to the line between possibility and plausibility, it has stated a plausible claim for relief. Cf Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-63 (2007) (noting that a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if “recovery is very remote and unlikely”).? For this reason, the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File out of Time, Doc. [21], is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doc. [14], is DENIED. Dated this 28th day of April 2025. Th MA THEW T. SCHELP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

? Plaintiffs reliance on Strand v. Diversified Collection Services, Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 317 (8th Cir. 2004), for the proposition that a motion to dismiss “should be granted ‘only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show, on the face of the complaint, that there is some insuperable bar to relief?” is misplaced. See Doc. [21-1] at 2. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided Strand years before the Supreme Court’s opinions in Twombly and Iqbal. Strand accurately described the permissive pleading regime of Conley v. Gibson, but Twombly ended that regime. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 42 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-63 (2007); see also Lewis v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 456 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1972) (endorsing Professor Wright’s “insuperable bar to relief’ interpretation of Conley). That proposition from Strand is no longer good law. _2-

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

KELLY MIDDLETON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 4:24-cv-01495-MTS ) THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Doc. [14]. The Motion is not well taken. Contrary to Defendants’ position, Plaintiff was not required to cite to “binding law in his Complaint.” Doc. [14-1] at 3. It is well settled that a complaint in federal court need not state a legal theory. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam); see also Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 122 F.3d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “matching facts to a legal theory was an aspect of code pleading interred in 1938 with the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure”). Nor was Plaintiff required to plead facts establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.1 Compare Doc. [14-1] at 3–4, and Doc. [22] at 2–4, with Wilson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 850 F.3d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 2017) (“‘[I]t is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case’ under McDonnell Douglas.” (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002))).

1 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Plaintiff needed only to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“[A] complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”). While Plaintiff's Complaint might be somewhat close to the line between possibility and plausibility, it has stated a plausible claim for relief. Cf Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-63 (2007) (noting that a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if “recovery is very remote and unlikely”).? For this reason, the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File out of Time, Doc. [21], is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doc. [14], is DENIED. Dated this 28th day of April 2025. Th MA THEW T. SCHELP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

? Plaintiffs reliance on Strand v. Diversified Collection Services, Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 317 (8th Cir. 2004), for the proposition that a motion to dismiss “should be granted ‘only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show, on the face of the complaint, that there is some insuperable bar to relief?” is misplaced. See Doc. [21-1] at 2. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided Strand years before the Supreme Court’s opinions in Twombly and Iqbal. Strand accurately described the permissive pleading regime of Conley v. Gibson, but Twombly ended that regime. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 42 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-63 (2007); see also Lewis v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 456 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1972) (endorsing Professor Wright’s “insuperable bar to relief’ interpretation of Conley). That proposition from Strand is no longer good law. _2-

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