Middleton v. Littlejohn

183 S.E. 593, 179 S.C. 88, 1936 S.C. LEXIS 55
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedJanuary 21, 1936
Docket14212
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 183 S.E. 593 (Middleton v. Littlejohn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Middleton v. Littlejohn, 183 S.E. 593, 179 S.C. 88, 1936 S.C. LEXIS 55 (S.C. 1936).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. ChieE Justice Stabler.

This is a controversy without action submitted under Section 668 of the Code of 1932. The petitioner, a resident taxpayer of School District No. 10 of Cherokee County, seeks to have the respondents, the constituted board of trustees, permanently enjoined from issuing certain bonds, the proceeds of which are to be used in the construction of a school building. The agreed case contains the following facts upon which the controversy depends: In 1923, an amendment to *90 Section 5 of Article 10 of the Constitution was ratified (33 Stat. at Large, p. 4), whereby it was provided: “That the limitations imposed by this section shall not apply to School District No. 10, Cherokee County, such school district being hereby expressly authorized to vote bonds to an amount not exceeding $300,000.00, the proceeds of such bonds to be applied solely for school purposes in said district, under such restrictions and limitations as the General Assembly may prescribe, and where the question of incurring such indebtedness is submitted to the qualified electors of said school district, as provided in the Constitution upon the question of bonded indebtedness.”

Pursuant to this amendment, the Legislature passed an Act in 1923 (33 Stat. at Large, p. 567), authorizing and empowering the trustees of School District No. 10 of Cherokee County to issue and sell, for the purposes named in the statute, coupon bonds of the district in an amount not to exceed $300,000.00, provided a majority of the qualified electors of the district, at an election held to determine the question, should vote in favor of the issuance of such bonds. It was also provided, among other things, that the bonds should mature as follows: “Ten thousand thereof ten years from their date and ten thousand each year thereafter until all of said bonds have been retired and paid in full.” Section 5, p. 568. Thereafter, under date of April 1, 1923, bonds of the district in the sum of $300,000.00 were issued and sold; and those of the issue maturing in 1933, 1934, and 1935, aggregating $30,000.00, have been paid, leaving outstanding a bonded indebtedness of $270,000.00. The assessed valuation of property for taxation in the district is $3,159,458.00. The present bonded debt, therefore, while less than that authorized by the amendment of 1923, is in excess of the 8 per cent, constitutional limitation.

In July, 1935, more than one-third of the resident freeholders of the age of twenty-one years and more than one-third of the resident electors of the district presented their *91 signed petition to the board of trustees asking that an election be called for the purpose of submitting to the voters of the district the question of the issuance of bonds in the sum of $30,000.00; the proceeds of same to be used as above indicated. The election was ordered, and the trustees, in pursuance of the result thereof, have sold and are about to issue and deliver bonds in the amount named, “the said bonds having maturities of Fifteen Hundred ($1,500:00) Dollars the first day of October in each of the years 1936 to 1955, inclusive.”

The petitioner makes the following contentions : (1) That no bonds can be issued except as authorized by the Act of 1923, and as the authority conferred by that Act has been exercised in full, the district is now without any power at all to issue additional bonds, although its bonded indebtedness is less than the limit fixed by the constitutional amendment; (2) that the Legislature, having prescribed the restrictions and limitations authorized by the amendment, bonds cannot be issued under the general law, but only, if at all, under authority of additional legislation supplementing the Act of 1923.

This amendment was considered by the Court in Smith v. Littlejohn et al., 151 S. C., 137, 148 S. E., 719, 720. The question there was whether it raised the percentage of the limitation to which the school district might issue bonds— that is to say, to an amount not exceeding the sum of $300,-000.00 in addition to the 8 per cent, limitation.

The Court said:

. “It is obviously clear that under the original provisions of Section 5 of Article 10 of the Constitution, School District No. 10 of Cherokee County could not issue any bonded indebtedness which exceeded 8 per centum of the assessed value of all the taxable property therein. It is evident, too, that the purpose of the General Assembly, and the people of the State, was to change that constitutional provision in so far as that particular school district was concerned.
*92 “The intention of the change sought to be made must be gathered from the language used in the amendment of 1923. The first thing stated in that amendment is ‘that the limitations imposed by’ Section 5 of Article 10 ‘shall not apply to School District No. 10, Cherokee County. * * * ’ Undoubtedly, if the amendment had stopped there, all the limitations found in Section 5 of Article 10 would have been inapplicable to School District No. 10 of Cherokee County, and that district could have issued any amount of bonds authorized by the Legislature, and voted favorably by the qualified electors of the school district. But the amendment went farther. In lieu of the original limitations on School District No. 10, certain language fixing other limitations was inserted. The school district was authorized to vote bonds, but only under certain restrictions, namely: (1) That the bonds should not exceed $300,000.00; (2) that the proceeds of such bonds should be ‘applied solely for school purposes in said district, under such restrictions and limitations as the General Assembly may prescribe’; and (3) that the question of incurring the indebtedness must be submitted to the qualified voters.”

In seeking the real intention of the amendment, the Court commented on the language of other amendments to the same section and article of the Constitution, which had been adopted and put into effect, and arrived at the following conclusion: “Under the authority of the Brice case [116 S. C., 324, 108 S. E., 84], we must hold that the old limitation was ‘absolutely wiped out by the constitutional amendment,’ but a substitute limitation was introduced; that substitute was to the effect, and very plainly so stated, that School District No. 10 could issue bonds, ‘not exceeding $300,000.00.’ ”

We think petitioner’s first contention is without merit. As has been pointed out by this Court (Mc Coll v. Marlboro Graded School District No. 10, 143 S. C., 120, 141 S. E., 265), the obvious purpose of such amendments as the one before us is to enlarge the limita *93 tions placed by the Constitution on the bonded indebtedness of school districts. It is not denied that under the old limitation School District No. 10 of Cherokee County had continuing authority to vote and issue bonds for school purposes, so long as the aggregate amount of all such bonds should not exceed 8 per cent, of the assessed valuation of the taxable property of the district. But, as held in Smith v. Littlejohn, supra,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
183 S.E. 593, 179 S.C. 88, 1936 S.C. LEXIS 55, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/middleton-v-littlejohn-sc-1936.