Middleton v. Holbrook

Ohio Court of Appeals

Middleton v. Holbrook

2016 Ohio 3387

CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DecidedJune 13, 2016

Docket9-15-47

StatusPublished

Cited by18 cases

This text of 2016 Ohio 3387 (Middleton v. Holbrook) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Middleton v. Holbrook, 2016 Ohio 3387 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).

Pincite

Opinion

[Cite as Middleton v. Holbrook, 2016-Ohio-3387.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY

DOUGLAS MIDDLETON, CASE NO. 9-15-47 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

v.

JOHNATHON L. HOLBROOK, ET AL., OPINION

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 14-CV-0568

Judgment Reversed And Cause Remanded

Date of Decision: June 13, 2016

APPEARANCES:

Jeff Ratliff for Appellant

J. Alan Smith for Appellee Case No. 9-15-47

WILLAMOWSKI, J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Douglas Middleton (“Middleton”), brings this

appeal from the judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Marion County, Ohio,

which entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants-appellees, Jonathon

Holbrook (“Holbrook”) and P.J.’s HVAC, LLC (Collectively “Defendants”). For

the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

{¶2} This case arises out of an accident that occurred on April 11, 2013,

between a vehicle driven by Holbrook, and a bicycle ridden by Middleton. Due to

the fact that only Middleton’s deposition was submitted in support of summary

judgment, the following facts relevant to this case are not in dispute.

{¶3} Middleton is an avid bicycle rider. (Middleton Dep. at 18, Aug. 10,

2015.) On April 11, 2013, at about 3:00 p.m., Middleton was riding his bike

westbound on the sidewalk located on the south side of East1 Church Street in

Marion, Ohio. (Id. at 19, 22, 24.) East Church Street is a one-way street, with all

traffic going east. (Id. at 25-26.) Middleton stopped on the sidewalk when he

approached the intersection of East Church Street and High Street. (Id. at 23.) He

prepared to turn right and cross East Church Street to then continue north on High

Street. (Id. at 23, 47-48, 54-55.) He saw Holbrook in his vehicle, stopped at the

1 Although Middleton testified in his deposition that he was riding on West Church Street, all attached evidence indicates that the events took place at East Church Street. (See Ex. B, C, D.) This inconsistency has no effect on our analysis of the issues discussed in this opinion.

-2- Case No. 9-15-47

stop sign on High Street, going north. (Id. at 23, 25.) Holbrook had arrived at the

intersection before Middleton and was looking westward to his left, at the

eastbound traffic, in the direction opposite from Middleton. (Id. at 23-25, 28.)

Middleton did not know whether Holbrook had a turn signal on. (Id. at 27-28.)

Middleton waited for Holbrook, who continued to look the other way. (Id. at 24,

28, 62.) After a couple of minutes, Middleton got on his bike and started to cross

East Church Street. (Id. at 24, 26, 28.) Middleton had already entered the street

when he saw Holbrook pull out and make a right turn into East Church Street. (Id.

at 29-30.) Middleton yelled out to the driver, “you’re going to hit me.” (Id. at

29, 83.) It was too late and Holbrook’s vehicle collided with Middleton, causing

injury. (Id. at 24, 29-30.) There was no marked crosswalk where Middleton was

crossing East Church Street. (Id. at 73.)

{¶4} Middleton filed a complaint for damages alleging a negligence claim

against Holbrook and a respondeat superior claim against P.J.’s HVAC as

Holbrook’s employer at the time of the accident. (See R. at 1.) Defendants took a

deposition of Middleton and after that, they moved for summary judgment. (See

R. at 19.) In their motion, Defendants argued that Middleton was negligent per se

and that Holbrook was not negligent because it was not foreseeable to him to

expect Middleton on the road. (Id.) They further argued that Middleton’s own

negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. (Id.) In opposition to

Defendants’ motion, Middleton argued that Holbrook was negligent and that his

-3- Case No. 9-15-47

negligence was the proximate cause of Middleton’s damages. (R. at 23.) He

further contended that his own negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause of

the injuries he sustained. (Id.) In the alternative, he asserted that the jury should

resolve the issues of proximate causation and comparative negligence. (Id.)

Defendants filed a reply, arguing that Holbrook had no duty to look for and yield

to drivers violating his right of way. (R. at 24.) At issue in the trial court was also

Middleton’s claim for respondeat superior. As a result of the trial court’s ruling

that claim was dismissed, and it is not directly at issue on appeal.

{¶5} Granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, the trial court

reasoned that it was “undisputed” that Middleton failed to yield the right-of-way to

Holbrook “and that this was a proximate cause of the crash.” (R. at 25, at 5.) The

trial court then concluded that Holbrook’s failure to see Middleton was

“immaterial” because “a driver that has the right of way [does not] have a duty to

look for other drivers violating her right of way.” (Id. at 5-6, citing Timmins v.

Russomano, 14 Ohio St.2d 124, 127, 236 N.E.2d 665 (1968), and Lumaye v.

Johnson, 80 Ohio App.3d 141, 145, 608 N.E.2d 1108 (10th Dist.1992)). Based on

these observations, the trial court found, “as a matter of law,” that:

- Holbrook had the right-of-way;

- Middleton failed to yield to Holbrook’s right-of-way;

- Middleton’s failure to yield constituted negligence per se;

-4- Case No. 9-15-47

- Middleton’s negligence “cannot be outweighed by any failure of

[Holbrook] to observe [Middleton].” (Id. at 6.)

{¶6} Middleton appeals the trial court’s judgment raising three assignments

of error as quoted below.

Assignments of Error

Assignment of Error Number One The trial court erred in granting Defendants-Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment when it determined that Defendant Holbrook had the right of way and was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Assignment of Error Number Two The trial court erred in granting Defendants-Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment when it failed to apply Ohio Revised Code §§ 4511.38(A) and 4511.39(A), as well as Marion City Code §§ 331.13(A) and 331.14(A).

Assignment of Error Number Three The trial court erred when it found that failure to yield the right-of- way constituted negligence per se.

Standard of Review

{¶7} All three assignment of error concern the summary judgment ruling.

Under Civ.R. 56,

Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being -5- Case No. 9-15-47

entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.

Civ.R. 56(C); Parrish v. Jones, 138 Ohio St.3d 23, 2013-Ohio-5224, ¶ 13, quoting

Civ.R.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI