OPINION
Per Curiam:
We are required in this appeal to interpret the 1979 version of NRS 687B.145 which directs insurance carriers to provide uninsured and underinsured motorist protection to their policy holders. Because we conclude that the district court’s interpretation is supported by the plain language of the statute, we affirm.
Respondent and cross-appellant Jan Ellen Miller Daniel (Daniel) sustained injuries when her vehicle was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by Lee Hua Mulnix (Mulnix). An arbitrator later determined Daniel’s damages, which included all medical expenses, economic losses, and pain and suffering, to be $25,628.15.
Both Daniel and Mulnix were covered by the same insurance carrier, appellant and cross-respondent Mid-Century Insurance Company (Mid-Century). The limits on Daniel’s and Mulnix’s third party liability insurance were identical: $15,000.00 per person, $30,000.00 per occurrence. In addition to her liability coverage, Daniel’s policy included no-fault and uninsured/ underinsured motorist protection. Daniel settled her claim against Mulnix for $15,000.00, the maximum amount recoverable under Mulnix’s policy with Mid-Century.
After settling her claim against Mulnix’s policy, Daniel brought an action against Mid-Century for declaratory relief seeking additional compensation under the terms of her own policy. The district court granted Daniel partial summary judgment, finding Mid-Century liable under Daniel’s underinsured motorist protection for any damages not recoverable under Mulnix’s policy. Daniel requested entry of judgment for $10,628.15. Because Daniel had received $10,000.00 in reparation benefits under her own no-fault policy, the district court denied the motion and entered judgment for $628.15. From this order both parties appeal.
The primary issue presented for our consideration is whether NRS 687B.145(2), as it read in 1979,
encompasses excess-type or reduction-type underinsured motorist protection. Mid-Century argues that the statute incorporates the latter; Daniel argues for the former.
The excess approach allows the insured to recover when his damages exceed the limits of the tortfeasor’s insurance coverage. For example, if the tortfeasor had $15,000.00 in liability coverage but the insured suffered damages of $20,000.00, the insured could collect the excess $5,000.00 in damages on his underin
sured motorist policy. NRS 687B. 145(2) requires carriers to offer underinsured motorist coverage up to the limits of the insured’s liability coverage. Therefore Daniel, with the minimum $15,000.00 per person coverage on her liability policy, had $15,000.00 coverage on her underinsured motorist policy. Under the excess analysis, Daniel would then be able to recover any damages in excess of the $15,000.00 recoverable under Mulnix’s policy from her underinsured motorist policy up to her own $15,000.00 limit.
Conversely, under the reduction approach, Daniel would not be able to recover any excess damages because her $15,000.00 in underinsured motorist coverage equalled the $15,000.00 in liability coverage of the tortfeasor. In this analysis the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage is reduced by the amount recoverable under the tortfeasor’s policy. Therefore Daniel’s $15,000.00 coverage in underinsured motorist protection would be reduced to zero by Mulnix’s $15,000.00 in liability coverage.
Mid-Century concedes that NRS 687B. 145(2), as amended in 1983,
provides for excess-type underinsured motorist coverage. Mid-Century contends, however, that the legislature amended, not clarified, the statute in 1983. From July 1, 1979, when the underinsurance provision was first enacted, to July 1, 1983, when it was amended, Mid-Century asserts that the statute incorporated the reduction approach.
We agree with Daniel, however, that legislative intent to embrace the excess method is evident from the plain language of the original enactment. We will not, therefore, resort to extrinsic authorities in an effort to deduce legislative intent.
See
Cirac v. Lander County, 95 Nev. 723, 729, 602 P.2d 1012 (1979). The disputed language is repeated here for ease of reference:
Uninsured motorist coverage must include a provision which enables the insured to recover
any amount of damages
for bodily injury from his insurer to which he is legally entitled but
which exceeds the
limits of the bodily injury
coverage carried by
the owner or operator of
the other vehicle.
(Emphasis added).
We interpret this language to mean that the insured’s
damages
must exceed the limits of the coverage carried by the owner or operator of the other vehicle. The phrase “any amount of damages” logically modifies the clause “which exceeds the limits of the . . . coverage carried by the owner ... of the other vehicle.” Hence, underinsured motorist coverage becomes effective when the insured’s damages exceed the tortfeasor’s bodily injury coverage limits.
Because the language of the statute is plain, we need not consider the parties’ contentions regarding the intent behind the subsequent amendment and the merits of one approach versus the other. When the plain language of an original enactment is consistent with the language of an “amendment,” we need not infer amendatory intent. We therefore conclude that the 1983 alteration of the statutory language must have been a clarification of the legislature’s original intent to incorporate the excess approach.
In her cross-appeal Daniel argues that NRS 687B.145(1)
prohibits Mid-Century from using her reparation benefits to set off her underinsured motorist benefits. Mid-Century correctly points out, however, that the district court did not allow a set-off but merely precluded Daniel from receiving a double recovery. NRS 687B. 145(1) invalidates “anti-stacking” provisions in insurance policies where the insured has paid a separate premium for the coverage. Even before the passage of NRS 687B. 145(1), we consistently struck down as void anti-stacking provisions where the insured had purchased multiple coverage for the same risk.
See
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Lopez, 93 Nev.
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OPINION
Per Curiam:
We are required in this appeal to interpret the 1979 version of NRS 687B.145 which directs insurance carriers to provide uninsured and underinsured motorist protection to their policy holders. Because we conclude that the district court’s interpretation is supported by the plain language of the statute, we affirm.
Respondent and cross-appellant Jan Ellen Miller Daniel (Daniel) sustained injuries when her vehicle was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by Lee Hua Mulnix (Mulnix). An arbitrator later determined Daniel’s damages, which included all medical expenses, economic losses, and pain and suffering, to be $25,628.15.
Both Daniel and Mulnix were covered by the same insurance carrier, appellant and cross-respondent Mid-Century Insurance Company (Mid-Century). The limits on Daniel’s and Mulnix’s third party liability insurance were identical: $15,000.00 per person, $30,000.00 per occurrence. In addition to her liability coverage, Daniel’s policy included no-fault and uninsured/ underinsured motorist protection. Daniel settled her claim against Mulnix for $15,000.00, the maximum amount recoverable under Mulnix’s policy with Mid-Century.
After settling her claim against Mulnix’s policy, Daniel brought an action against Mid-Century for declaratory relief seeking additional compensation under the terms of her own policy. The district court granted Daniel partial summary judgment, finding Mid-Century liable under Daniel’s underinsured motorist protection for any damages not recoverable under Mulnix’s policy. Daniel requested entry of judgment for $10,628.15. Because Daniel had received $10,000.00 in reparation benefits under her own no-fault policy, the district court denied the motion and entered judgment for $628.15. From this order both parties appeal.
The primary issue presented for our consideration is whether NRS 687B.145(2), as it read in 1979,
encompasses excess-type or reduction-type underinsured motorist protection. Mid-Century argues that the statute incorporates the latter; Daniel argues for the former.
The excess approach allows the insured to recover when his damages exceed the limits of the tortfeasor’s insurance coverage. For example, if the tortfeasor had $15,000.00 in liability coverage but the insured suffered damages of $20,000.00, the insured could collect the excess $5,000.00 in damages on his underin
sured motorist policy. NRS 687B. 145(2) requires carriers to offer underinsured motorist coverage up to the limits of the insured’s liability coverage. Therefore Daniel, with the minimum $15,000.00 per person coverage on her liability policy, had $15,000.00 coverage on her underinsured motorist policy. Under the excess analysis, Daniel would then be able to recover any damages in excess of the $15,000.00 recoverable under Mulnix’s policy from her underinsured motorist policy up to her own $15,000.00 limit.
Conversely, under the reduction approach, Daniel would not be able to recover any excess damages because her $15,000.00 in underinsured motorist coverage equalled the $15,000.00 in liability coverage of the tortfeasor. In this analysis the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage is reduced by the amount recoverable under the tortfeasor’s policy. Therefore Daniel’s $15,000.00 coverage in underinsured motorist protection would be reduced to zero by Mulnix’s $15,000.00 in liability coverage.
Mid-Century concedes that NRS 687B. 145(2), as amended in 1983,
provides for excess-type underinsured motorist coverage. Mid-Century contends, however, that the legislature amended, not clarified, the statute in 1983. From July 1, 1979, when the underinsurance provision was first enacted, to July 1, 1983, when it was amended, Mid-Century asserts that the statute incorporated the reduction approach.
We agree with Daniel, however, that legislative intent to embrace the excess method is evident from the plain language of the original enactment. We will not, therefore, resort to extrinsic authorities in an effort to deduce legislative intent.
See
Cirac v. Lander County, 95 Nev. 723, 729, 602 P.2d 1012 (1979). The disputed language is repeated here for ease of reference:
Uninsured motorist coverage must include a provision which enables the insured to recover
any amount of damages
for bodily injury from his insurer to which he is legally entitled but
which exceeds the
limits of the bodily injury
coverage carried by
the owner or operator of
the other vehicle.
(Emphasis added).
We interpret this language to mean that the insured’s
damages
must exceed the limits of the coverage carried by the owner or operator of the other vehicle. The phrase “any amount of damages” logically modifies the clause “which exceeds the limits of the . . . coverage carried by the owner ... of the other vehicle.” Hence, underinsured motorist coverage becomes effective when the insured’s damages exceed the tortfeasor’s bodily injury coverage limits.
Because the language of the statute is plain, we need not consider the parties’ contentions regarding the intent behind the subsequent amendment and the merits of one approach versus the other. When the plain language of an original enactment is consistent with the language of an “amendment,” we need not infer amendatory intent. We therefore conclude that the 1983 alteration of the statutory language must have been a clarification of the legislature’s original intent to incorporate the excess approach.
In her cross-appeal Daniel argues that NRS 687B.145(1)
prohibits Mid-Century from using her reparation benefits to set off her underinsured motorist benefits. Mid-Century correctly points out, however, that the district court did not allow a set-off but merely precluded Daniel from receiving a double recovery. NRS 687B. 145(1) invalidates “anti-stacking” provisions in insurance policies where the insured has paid a separate premium for the coverage. Even before the passage of NRS 687B. 145(1), we consistently struck down as void anti-stacking provisions where the insured had purchased multiple coverage for the same risk.
See
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Lopez, 93 Nev. 463, 567 P.2d 471 (1977); Staten v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 94 Nev. 283, 579 P.2d 766 (1978).
See also
Neumann v. Standard Fire Insurance Co., 101 Nev. 206, 699 P.2d 101 (1985). We have never permitted the stacking of multiple policies, however, to allow an insured a double recovery for the same loss. Because Daniel has received
or been awarded compensation to the full extent of her injuries,
we conclude that Daniel is not entitled to an additional $10,000.00 in underinsured motorist benefits. To hold otherwise would allow Daniel a double recovery for the same item of damages.
Before its repeal, NRS 690B.020(7) provided: “To the extent that a person is entitled to basic reparation benefits under chapter 698 of NRS [no-fault], he may not recover payments under uninsured motor vehicle coverage.”
In a previous examination of NRS 690B.020(7) we concluded that the “Legislature intended NRS 690B.020(7) to preclude only a double recovery of benefits under both the no-fault and uninsured motorist provisions of a policy.” Staten v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 94 Nev. 283, 285, 579 P.2d 766 (1978).
See also
Bryan v. Allen, 96 Nev. 572, 573, 613 P.2d 412 (1980) (appellants’ jury award properly reduced by amount of previously paid reparation benefits because “injured party . . . not entitled to multiple recovery for the same loss”). Thus NRS 690B.020(7) authorized the stacking of no-fault and uninsured motorist benefits, but only when the insured’s damages exceeded the reparation coverage limits. Daniel is not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits to the extent that her damages were compensated by her reparation benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment that Daniel is entitled to recover $628.15, not $10,628.15, from her underinsured motorist policy.