Mid-American Supply Corporation v. Truist Bank

Opinion

United States District Court EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION

MID-AMERICAN SUPPLY § CORPORATION, § § Plaintiff, § Civil Action No. 4:21-CV-00841 § Judge Mazzant v. § § TRUIST BANK d/b/a BB&T, § § Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Mid-American Supply Corporation’s Motion for New Trial (Dkt. #71). Having considered the motion, the response, and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial (Dkt. #71) should be DENIED. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are fully set out in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order deciding the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment (the “Opinion”), which the Court issued on March 8, 2023 (Dkt. #64). In the Opinion, the Court granted Defendant Truist Bank d/b/a BB&T’s (“Truist”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #20) and denied Plaintiff Mid-American Supply Corporation’s (“Mid-American”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. #23). The Court specifically found that Mid-American’s claim for violations of Texas Business and Commercial Code § 4.401 failed as a matter of law because the transactions at issue were “properly payable” within the meaning of the statute (Dkt. #64 at p. 9). Likewise, the Court found that Mid- American’s claim for a declaratory judgment necessarily failed because the underlying cause of action—Mid-American’s § 4.401 claim—failed as a matter of law (Dkt. #64 at p. 10). The Court entered a Final Judgment in favor of Truist on the same day that it entered the Opinion (Dkt. #65). Mid-American filed its Motion for New Trial on March 30, 2023 (Dkt. #71) and Truist responded on April 13, 2023 (Dkt. #75). LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a general motion for reconsideration. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 123 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1997). A motion asking the Court to reconsider a prior ruling is therefore evaluated either as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or as a motion for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Tex. A&M Rsch. Found. v. Magna Transp., Inc., 338 F.3d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 2003). The applicable rule depends on when the motion was filed—if the motion was filed within twenty-eight days after the entry of judgment, it is analyzed under Rule 59, and, if it was filed outside of that time, it is analyzed under Rule 60. Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Mid-American filed its Motion for New Trial, through which it seeks reconsideration

of the Court’s summary judgment ruling, on March 30, 2023, within twenty-eight days of the Court’s entry of final judgment (Dkt. #71). Accordingly, Rule 59(e) applies here. Rule 59(e) serves the “narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 2004). Thus, Rule 59(e) does not provide a vehicle “to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)). Instead, to prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion, the movant must show: (1) a manifest error of law or fact; (2) an intervening change in controlling law; (3) the availability of new evidence not previously available; or (4) that the motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. See, e.g., Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp., Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003). In this context, a “manifest error of law” is an error “that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard for controlling law.” Guy v.

Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004). A district court has “considerable discretion” in deciding whether to grant a Rule 59(e) motion. Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993). That said, relief under Rule 59(e) is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. Templet, 367 F.3d at 479 (“Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.”). ANALYSIS As an initial matter, the Court will construe Mid-American’s “Motion for New Trial” as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment. When, as here, summary judgment has been granted, the disposed claims do not proceed to a formal trial, making a “new trial” a logical fallacy.

St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 123 F.3d at 339; see also Burbridge v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 4:19- CV-00647, 2021 WL 2343256, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2021) (“Because no trial was held in this case, Rule 59(a) does not apply.”). And so, because Mid-American’s motion seeks reconsideration of the Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Truist, it is properly construed as a motion under Rule 59(e). Burbridge, 2021 WL 2343256, at *1. Mid-American contends that the Court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Truist, but Mid-American fails to offer any evidence that was previously unavailable to the Court or to demonstrate an intervening change in controlling law. Cf. Schiller, 342 F.3d at 567. Rather, Mid-American merely rehashes arguments that the Court already considered and rejected in ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Specifically, Mid-American contends that the Court erred in entering summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding: (1) Wei Shao Heironimus’s authority to access Mid-American’s Truist bank account as of 2020 (Dkt. #71 ¶¶ 13–14); (2) the applicability of Texas Business and Commercial

Code § 4.406’s limitations defense (Dkt. #71 ¶¶ 15–16); and (3) Truist’s alleged breach of the Commercial Bank Services Agreement (Dkt. #71 ¶¶ 17–18). Each of these arguments was fully briefed in Mid-American’s motion for partial summary judgment and in its response to Truist’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #23 at pp. 12–16; Dkt. #26 at pp. 12–16). After considering those arguments, the Court concluded that summary judgment in favor of Truist was proper (Dkt. #64). Thus, Mid-American has not established that the “extraordinary remedy” of reconsideration is warranted here as it has not presented any arguments that the Court has not already considered and rejected. See Templet, 367 F.3d at 479. 1 In the end, Mid-American’s motion contains nothing more than a “rehashing [of] evidence, legal theories, or arguments” that the Court has already considered and rejected. Id. at 478–79. It

is for this reason that the Court concludes that Mid-American’s motion should be denied. CONCLUSION It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial (Dkt. #71) is hereby DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.

1 Indeed, the exhibits that Mid-American attaches to its Motion for New Trial (Dkt. #71, Exhibits 1–5) are the exact same exhibits that it previously attached to its response in opposition to Truist’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #26, Exhibits 1–5). SIGNED this 6th day of June, 2023.

AMOS L. MAZZANT 2 0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE