Miclon v. Zoning Board of Appeals
This text of 378 A.2d 531 (Miclon v. Zoning Board of Appeals) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The plaintiff, the building official and zoning enforcement officer for the town of Windsor Locks, appealed to the Court of Common Pleas from the decision of the defendant zoning board of appeals (hereinafter the board) granting a variance to the defendant Barnett B. Berliner to construct an eighty-six unit apartment complex upon a parcel of land zoned Business 1. From the judgment of that court finding the issues for the defendants and dismissing the appeal, the plaintiff has appealed to this court upon the granting of certification.
The parcel of land for which Berliner sought and the board granted the variance which is the subject of this appeal contains approximately six acres, comprising part of a larger tract of land of approximately fifteen acres, located at the junction of Route 20, the Bradley Field Connector, and Route 75, Turnpike Road, which was rezoned from Industrial 1 to Business 1 in 1968 at Berliner’s request. The Berliner parcel comprises the rear portion of the larger tract and is bounded, without access, by Route 20 to [422]*422the southwest and by land zoned Industrial 1 belonging to the town on the southeast. The parcel has access onto Turnpike Road to the northwest by use of a driveway across the larger tract. It is pie-shaped, with its narrow end toward Turnpike Road, widening to the rear, and drops off sharply toward the rear of the parcel to at least sixty feet below street level. The remainder of the larger tract is developed, containing a Ramada Inn and a small office building. In applying to the board for his variance, Berliner claimed to have spent a number of years and considerable effort attempting to develop his parcel for office space. He claimed that, because of the severe drop-off and limited access to Turnpike Road, the parcel could not reasonably be developed for office space but, because of these same factors, would be well suited for apartments. The board granted his application, stating for its record the criteria for granting a variance contained in § 12.3.3 of the zoning ordinance,1 and four members stating that the criteria were satisfied.
The issue raised by the plaintiff’s appeal is whether, on the record of the board’s proceedings, its action was arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of its discretion. Bogue v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 165 Conn. 749, 752, 345 A.2d 9; Belknap v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 380, 385, 232 A.2d 922; Wil[423]*423lard v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 152 Conn. 247, 248-49, 206 A.2d 110. The board is empowered, by § 8-6 of the General Statutes and § 12.3.3 of the zoning ordinance, to grant a variance from the strict application of the zoning ordinance only in cases of exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship. See, e.g., Dolan v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 156 Conn. 426, 430, 242 A.2d 713; Ward v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 153 Conn. 141, 143, 215 A.2d 104. The basis for Berliner’s claim for a variance was that for a number of years he had been unable to develop his parcel for office space. While the record reveals the difficulties of access and topography to which his parcel is subject in attempting to develop it for this purpose, Berliner, representing himself before the board, made no showing that this parcel could not reasonably be developed for some other use permitted in a Business 1 zone or that the effect of limiting the parcel to the permitted uses only would be confiscatory or arbitrary. See Culinary Institute of America, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 257, 262, 121 A.2d 637; Libby v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 46, 51, 118 A.2d 894.2
Even if exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship was shown to have existed, the board could not grant a variance for a use which was inconsistent with the “general purpose and intent of the zoning ordi[424]*424nance”; Krejpcio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 152 Conn. 657, 662, 211 A.2d 687; or which impaired the integrity of the comprehensive plan. Parsons v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 290, 295, 99 A.2d 149. The fact that the variance permitted a use which was “higher” than that of the surrounding property did not, alone, ensure that the permitted use was consistent with the comprehensive plan. Since no comprehensive plan was certified as part of the record, the court must look to the zoning ordinance itself for the comprehensive plan. See Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 154 Conn. 470, 473-74, 226 A.2d 509; Couch v. Zoning Commission, 141 Conn. 349, 355, 106 A.2d 173; Haar, “In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan,” 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154, 1166-70. Prom the Windsor Locks zoning map it appears that the Turnpike Road area of Windsor Locks is zoned Business 1, Industrial 1 and Industrial 3. The Business 2 district, in which apartments have been constructed, is located in the eastern part of town along Main Street and North Main Street. The record of the board’s proceedings indicates that both the economic and industrial development commission and the planning and zoning commission opposed allowing apartments in the Turnpike Road area.3 Berliner’s own testimony suggested that the proposed apartments were not in keeping with the comprehensive plan [425]*425established by the zoning ordinance.4 Apart from this substantial evidence that the development of apartments on the Berliner parcel was not consistent with the comprehensive plan, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the proposed apartments were in harmony with the comprehensive plan.5 The board therefore acted unlawfully in granting a variance to permit this use.
It is unnecessary to consider the plaintiff’s remaining claim that the board’s action cannot be sustained because the board, in granting Berliner’s requested variance, failed to state upon its records the reasons for its action, describing specifically the exceptional difficulty or unusual hardship on which its decision was based. See General Statutes § 8-7.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to sustain the appeal.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
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378 A.2d 531, 173 Conn. 420, 1977 Conn. LEXIS 867, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miclon-v-zoning-board-of-appeals-conn-1977.