Mickel v. York

51 N.E. 848, 175 Ill. 62
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 24, 1898
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 51 N.E. 848 (Mickel v. York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mickel v. York, 51 N.E. 848, 175 Ill. 62 (Ill. 1898).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

It is insisted by appellant that the wall, at the time it fell, was owned by York, while York insists, as was the view taken by the court below, that the wall was, from the time of its completion, the property of all the parties to the contract; that York owned so much of the wall as rested upon his lot, with an easement in the remaining portion, and that Mickel and his sister owned all of the wall which rested upon their lot, with an easement in that portion of the wall which was upon the lot of York.

The contract provides that Mickel and his sister, and their heirs, before proceeding to join any building to the wall, and before making any use thereof or breaking into the same, shall pay or secure to be paid unto York, his heirs and assigns, the full moiety or one-half part of the value of the wall, or so much thereof as shall be joined to or used, which value shall be the cost price at the time when such wall is to be used by Mickel and his sister. The contract further provides: “And said parties further agree and covenant that if, it shall hereafter become necessary to repair or rebuild the whole or any portion of the said party wall or walls, the expense of such repairing or rebuilding shall be borne equally by them, their respective heirs and assigns, as to so much of said walls as the said parties, their heirs and assigns, shall or may use jointly.”

Where a party wall of adjoining buildings rests partly upon the soil of each owner, and was constructed as a party wall, the owners are neither joint owners nor tenants in common of such wall. Each is possessed in severalty of his own soil up to the dividing line, and of that portion of the wall which rests upon it; but the soil of each, with the wall belonging to him, is burdened with an easement or servitude in favor of the other, to the end that it may afford a support to the wall and building of such other. But where a party wall is constructed on the line between adjacent lots, resting partly on each, by one of the lot owners, under a parol or written agreement, by which agreement the other owner agrees to pay one-half the value of the wall when he elects to use it, the builder of the wall owns it absolutely, with a permanent right in him and his grantees to have one-half the wall stand on the land of the other while the other re-0 tains title, and also after it has passed to an assignee with notice of the rights of the owner of the wall. If, however, by agreement the owner of the lot who did not build the wall has a rig'ht to elect to pay one-half its value and use the same, and he does so, he thereby becomes the owner of not only the one-half standing upon his own land, but has an easement in the other half standing on the lot of the one who built the wall.

In Glover v. Mersman, 4 Mo. App. 90, (a case similar to this,) it was said: “The plaintiff was not necessarily the absolute owner of one-half the wall because that stood upon his lot. It had been so placed by his license in the agreement of May, 1871. By that agreement the ownership naturally resulting from his title to the soil was modified, if not wholly surrendered, for the time being. A stipulation to the effect that, upon building a house against the wall, and paying to the defendant one-half of what it would then cost to build such wall, he should have the right to use it as a party wall, was equivalent to an agreement that until such conditions were fulfilled he should not have the right so to use it.' The wall, therefore, was the sole property of the defendant, and for any negligence or mismanagement in its keeping he was liable, as in every case when such negligence or mismanagement by an owner causes injury to another.”

In Brown v. McKee, 57 N. Y. Ct. of App. 684, it was said: “Where, under a parol agreement between adjoining proprietors, one builds a party wall one-half upon the premises of each, the other agreeing to pay one-half the value when he shall use the wall, upon the erection of the wall the agreement becomes valid in equity. The builder owns the wall absolutely until the other elects to use the same, with a permanent right in him and bis'grantees to have one-half the wall stand on the land of the other, not only while the other retains title, but after it passed to an assignee with notice of the rights of the owner of the wall. If the owner of the land burdened with this easement elect to use the wall and pay half its value, he thereby becomes owner not only of the one-half standing upon his own land, but has an easement in the other half.”

In Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232, by indenture between the plaintiffs and defendants, either party was authorized to build a wall of brick, with stone foundation, half on the land of each, and half the cost of which was to be paid by the other if he used it. The defendants made a contract with a firm of masons, by which the latter were to furnish all the materials and labor in building the stone and brick work, including the lathing and plastering, according to certain specifications. After the wall had been completed by the masons and accepted by the defendants, it fell and crushed the building and property upon the adjoining land of the plaintiffs. The court says (p. 240): “The whole wall, when completed and accepted, was, by virtue of the indenture between the defendants and the plaintiffs, owned by the defendants until they should be reimbursed half the cost of it by the plaintiffs. (Richardson v. Tobey, 121 Mass. 457.) For the injury caused to property on the adjoining land by the falling of this wall by reason of its defective and unsafe condition, whether owing to other than negligence or that of the masons who had built it, the defendants are responsible.”

In Maine v. Cumston, 98 Mass. 317, the city of Boston, owning certain lots, executed a written agreement to convey to one Blanchard a certain lot with this condition: So long as said lot remains unoccupied by a building, the said Blanchard shall permit the proprietor of each adjoining lot who may build, to erect one-half the thickness of the division wall on said lot, and shall pay to the proprietor so erecting-said wall a proportionate part of the cost thereof for such part as he or his assigns may use; and if Blanchard erects a building on said lot he shall build one half of the thickness of the division wall on each unoccupied adjoining lot. By mesne conveyances Blanchard’s lot was conveyed to one Ames, who built a house, erecting one-half of a party wall- on an adjoining lot dwned by the city. By mesne conveyances Ames’ title came to plaintiff, and the city sold the adjoining lot, on which one-half the thickness of the party wall rested, to the defendant, who built and used that party wall. On a suit by plaintiff against the defendant to recover the value of one-half of the wall the court said: “We have no doubt of the liability of the defendant for the cost of the partition wall which he made use of in constructing the house on the lot of land adjoining that of the plaintiff. The property in the whole wall passed to the plaintiff by the deed under which he claims title. * * * The plaintiff, under his deed, which contains an express reference to the terms of the original purchase from the city, had a right to maintain the whole wall as a part of his house, until the city, or some one claiming title under the city, built on the adjacent land and made use of the partition wall, or some part of it.

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Bluebook (online)
51 N.E. 848, 175 Ill. 62, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mickel-v-york-ill-1898.