December 10, 2020
Supreme Court
No. 2019-132-Appeal. (PC 18-6082)
Mickeda Barnes et al. :
v. :
Rhode Island Public Transit : Authority.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This appeal came before the Supreme
Court in conference on October 8, 2020, in accordance with an order directing that
the case be decided on the basis of the filings by the parties.1 The plaintiff,
Mickeda Barnes (plaintiff), appeals pro se from the dismissal of her complaint in
the Superior Court pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6) of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure. After careful review of the parties’ memoranda,
we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that this appeal may be
1 This matter was scheduled for oral argument on the show cause calendar before this Court on October 7, 2020. The plaintiff moved for a continuance on September 25, 2020, which this Court granted, in part. On October 1, 2020, the Court ordered the case to be decided on the papers. -1- summarily decided. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the order of
the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
This case concerns the sufficiency of a 245-page pleading2 that plaintiff filed
in Superior Court against the defendant, Rhode Island Public Transit Authority
(defendant or RIPTA), in 2018.3 The plaintiff was employed by RIPTA as a bus
driver from 2002 to 2016; she has an extensive history of work-related injury
claims against RIPTA and lengthy absences from work. During the pendency of
this appeal, there were at least three workers’ compensation petitions pending in
the Workers’ Compensation Court and four petitions pending in the Appellate
Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court. The plaintiff has filed at least
twenty-five work-related claims against RIPTA since 2008.
In November 2017, plaintiff filed an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island, alleging that defendant discriminated
against her, in violation of state and federal law. Five months later, she filed an
action in Superior Court, alleging that defendant had violated her constitutional
and civil rights, failed to compensate her for workplace injuries, and failed to
2 While the complaint itself was thirteen pages, it included over 200 pages of exhibits. 3 We glean the facts largely from plaintiff’s complaint, documents attached thereto, proceedings referenced therein, and court records. -2- reclassify her position. Thereafter, on April 25, 2018, plaintiff and defendant
executed a settlement agreement and general release of all claims (settlement
agreement) in both actions and “each and every claim or demand of every kind
arising up to the date [plaintiff] sign[ed] [the settlement] agreement[.]” In
exchange for this settlement and release, plaintiff was paid $150,000. The plaintiff
was not satisfied.
Four months later, despite the settlement agreement, plaintiff filed yet
another complaint—the instant action—in Superior Court.4 The plaintiff now
seeks $2.5 million for RIPTA’s purported failure to compensate her for past
workplace injuries.5 According to plaintiff, RIPTA should have offered her more
money in the settlement agreement; she seeks “a full and complete settlement of all
claims and injuries that are work related to be paid up front * * *.” The complaint
also contains several other vague assertions against defendant, such as alleged
misrepresentations by defendant in order to reduce its medical payments under the
Workers’ Compensation Act. Although the complaint refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
plaintiff failed to assert any specific violations under that statute. The complaint
4 The other named plaintiffs in the Superior Court action, Sidney Robertson and Doreen Robertson, are the dependent daughters of plaintiff. They have not joined in plaintiff’s appeal to this Court, nor have they filed separate notices of appeal. 5 The plaintiff also sought a lien on RIPTA’s property, which request is not at issue in this appeal. -3- also references the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), but does not expressly
assert a claim under the ADA.
The defendant promptly moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint in
accordance with Rules 12(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure. RIPTA argued in support of its motion that the Superior Court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims set forth in plaintiff’s complaint
because they are essentially workers’ compensation claims. The defendant also
argued that the April 2018 settlement agreement precluded plaintiff from bringing
the remaining claims. In response, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment,
and defendant filed an objection, incorporating by reference its memorandum in
support of its motion to dismiss.6
A hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss was held on January 9, 2019.
The trial justice, having read plaintiff’s 245-page filing, indicated that she was
having difficulty understanding the nature of the claims. The trial justice asked
plaintiff to articulate, in her own words, the background of the case and what she
was claiming. The trial justice devoted most of the hearing to a discussion with
plaintiff for purposes of discerning exactly what she alleged against RIPTA,
6 The plaintiff also filed an objection to defendant’s motion to dismiss. On October 30, 2018, the trial justice entered an order denying, without prejudice, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. -4- whether those allegations were properly pled in the complaint, and whether the
matter belonged in the Superior Court.
After a lengthy and patient colloquy, the trial justice determined that
plaintiff intended to file a claim for breach of contract under the settlement
agreement, a discrimination claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
workers’ compensation claims for a traumatic brain injury and a knee injury, and a
“reclassification” claim. The plaintiff stated that she believed she could pursue the
claims in the Superior Court based on advice she received from someone in the
Department of Labor and Training.
The trial justice granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, stating that
plaintiff’s complaint did not articulate the claims that plaintiff was asserting and
that the complaint failed to adequately inform defendant of the nature of her
claims. The trial justice found that the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction
over the traumatic brain injury and knee injury claims because they were
committed to the Workers’ Compensation Court. She also found that the
complaint did not properly articulate a breach-of-contract claim and that plaintiff
failed to show that Title VI entitled her to a private right of action. Turning to
plaintiff’s purported reclassification claim, the trial justice was uncertain of the
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December 10, 2020
Supreme Court
No. 2019-132-Appeal. (PC 18-6082)
Mickeda Barnes et al. :
v. :
Rhode Island Public Transit : Authority.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This appeal came before the Supreme
Court in conference on October 8, 2020, in accordance with an order directing that
the case be decided on the basis of the filings by the parties.1 The plaintiff,
Mickeda Barnes (plaintiff), appeals pro se from the dismissal of her complaint in
the Superior Court pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6) of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure. After careful review of the parties’ memoranda,
we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that this appeal may be
1 This matter was scheduled for oral argument on the show cause calendar before this Court on October 7, 2020. The plaintiff moved for a continuance on September 25, 2020, which this Court granted, in part. On October 1, 2020, the Court ordered the case to be decided on the papers. -1- summarily decided. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the order of
the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
This case concerns the sufficiency of a 245-page pleading2 that plaintiff filed
in Superior Court against the defendant, Rhode Island Public Transit Authority
(defendant or RIPTA), in 2018.3 The plaintiff was employed by RIPTA as a bus
driver from 2002 to 2016; she has an extensive history of work-related injury
claims against RIPTA and lengthy absences from work. During the pendency of
this appeal, there were at least three workers’ compensation petitions pending in
the Workers’ Compensation Court and four petitions pending in the Appellate
Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court. The plaintiff has filed at least
twenty-five work-related claims against RIPTA since 2008.
In November 2017, plaintiff filed an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island, alleging that defendant discriminated
against her, in violation of state and federal law. Five months later, she filed an
action in Superior Court, alleging that defendant had violated her constitutional
and civil rights, failed to compensate her for workplace injuries, and failed to
2 While the complaint itself was thirteen pages, it included over 200 pages of exhibits. 3 We glean the facts largely from plaintiff’s complaint, documents attached thereto, proceedings referenced therein, and court records. -2- reclassify her position. Thereafter, on April 25, 2018, plaintiff and defendant
executed a settlement agreement and general release of all claims (settlement
agreement) in both actions and “each and every claim or demand of every kind
arising up to the date [plaintiff] sign[ed] [the settlement] agreement[.]” In
exchange for this settlement and release, plaintiff was paid $150,000. The plaintiff
was not satisfied.
Four months later, despite the settlement agreement, plaintiff filed yet
another complaint—the instant action—in Superior Court.4 The plaintiff now
seeks $2.5 million for RIPTA’s purported failure to compensate her for past
workplace injuries.5 According to plaintiff, RIPTA should have offered her more
money in the settlement agreement; she seeks “a full and complete settlement of all
claims and injuries that are work related to be paid up front * * *.” The complaint
also contains several other vague assertions against defendant, such as alleged
misrepresentations by defendant in order to reduce its medical payments under the
Workers’ Compensation Act. Although the complaint refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
plaintiff failed to assert any specific violations under that statute. The complaint
4 The other named plaintiffs in the Superior Court action, Sidney Robertson and Doreen Robertson, are the dependent daughters of plaintiff. They have not joined in plaintiff’s appeal to this Court, nor have they filed separate notices of appeal. 5 The plaintiff also sought a lien on RIPTA’s property, which request is not at issue in this appeal. -3- also references the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), but does not expressly
assert a claim under the ADA.
The defendant promptly moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint in
accordance with Rules 12(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure. RIPTA argued in support of its motion that the Superior Court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims set forth in plaintiff’s complaint
because they are essentially workers’ compensation claims. The defendant also
argued that the April 2018 settlement agreement precluded plaintiff from bringing
the remaining claims. In response, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment,
and defendant filed an objection, incorporating by reference its memorandum in
support of its motion to dismiss.6
A hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss was held on January 9, 2019.
The trial justice, having read plaintiff’s 245-page filing, indicated that she was
having difficulty understanding the nature of the claims. The trial justice asked
plaintiff to articulate, in her own words, the background of the case and what she
was claiming. The trial justice devoted most of the hearing to a discussion with
plaintiff for purposes of discerning exactly what she alleged against RIPTA,
6 The plaintiff also filed an objection to defendant’s motion to dismiss. On October 30, 2018, the trial justice entered an order denying, without prejudice, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. -4- whether those allegations were properly pled in the complaint, and whether the
matter belonged in the Superior Court.
After a lengthy and patient colloquy, the trial justice determined that
plaintiff intended to file a claim for breach of contract under the settlement
agreement, a discrimination claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
workers’ compensation claims for a traumatic brain injury and a knee injury, and a
“reclassification” claim. The plaintiff stated that she believed she could pursue the
claims in the Superior Court based on advice she received from someone in the
Department of Labor and Training.
The trial justice granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, stating that
plaintiff’s complaint did not articulate the claims that plaintiff was asserting and
that the complaint failed to adequately inform defendant of the nature of her
claims. The trial justice found that the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction
over the traumatic brain injury and knee injury claims because they were
committed to the Workers’ Compensation Court. She also found that the
complaint did not properly articulate a breach-of-contract claim and that plaintiff
failed to show that Title VI entitled her to a private right of action. Turning to
plaintiff’s purported reclassification claim, the trial justice was uncertain of the
nature of the alleged injury or whether it was cognizable as part of plaintiff’s
discrimination claim.
-5- The trial justice graciously granted plaintiff leave to file an amended
complaint within fourteen days of the hearing to more clearly set forth the breach
of contract, Title VI, and reclassification claims. She informed plaintiff that her
right to amend did not include the right to restate any workers’ compensation
claims. The trial justice warned plaintiff that, if she failed to file an amended
complaint within fourteen days of the hearing, the entire case would be dismissed.
The plaintiff failed to do so.
On January 18, 2019, the trial justice entered an order memorializing her
decision from the hearing. The order granted plaintiff until January 23, 2019, to
file an amended complaint; otherwise “all her claims are dismissed, with
prejudice.” The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.
Standard of Review
“The sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the
complaint.” Narragansett Electric Company v. Minardi, 21 A.3d 274, 277 (R.I.
2011) (brackets omitted) (quoting Laurence v. Sollitto, 788 A.2d 455, 456 (R.I.
2002)). “In passing on a Rule 12(b) dismissal, this Court applies the same standard
as the trial justice.” Id. at 278. “We thus are confined to the four corners of the
complaint and must assume all allegations are true, resolving any doubts in
plaintiff’s favor.” Id. “A motion to dismiss may be granted only ‘if it appears
beyond a reasonable doubt that a plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any
-6- conceivable set of facts.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Estate of Sherman v.
Almeida, 747 A.2d 470, 473 (R.I. 2000)).
Furthermore, “[a] motion under Rule 12(b)(1) questions a court’s authority
to adjudicate a particular controversy before it.” Boyer v. Bedrosian, 57 A.3d 259,
270 (R.I. 2012). “This Court reviews de novo whether a court has subject-matter
jurisdiction over a particular controversy.” Long v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1074, 1078
(R.I. 2009). “In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a court is not limited to the face
of the pleadings. A court may consider any evidence it deems necessary to settle
the jurisdictional question.” Boyer, 57 A.3d at 270 (brackets omitted) (quoting
Morey v. State of Rhode Island, 359 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (D.R.I. 2005)).
Analysis
On appeal, plaintiff argues that she is entitled to recovery under G.L. 1956
§§ 9-32-1 and 9-32-4 of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The
plaintiff also argues that defendant failed to accommodate her disability under the
ADA. She asserts that defendant owes her workers’ compensation benefits for the
dates that she was unable to work due to injury. The plaintiff also contends that
the settlement agreement did not pertain to work-related injuries or unemployment
issues. She also asserts that the settlement agreement should have been reviewed
by the Attorney General. These claims are without merit.
We begin by noting that plaintiff has not provided this Court with any
-7- meaningful discussion of the issues raised on appeal. This Court has consistently
held that “[s]imply stating an issue for appellate review, without a meaningful
discussion thereof or legal briefing of the issues, does not assist the Court in
focusing on the legal questions raised, and therefore constitutes a waiver of that
issue.” Fisher v. Applebaum, 947 A.2d 248, 252 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Wilkinson v.
State Crime Laboratory Commission, 788 A.2d 1129, 1131 n.1 (R.I. 2002)). Here,
plaintiff’s arguments on appeal merely mirror the assertions that she made before
the trial justice at the January 9, 2019 hearing. The plaintiff has failed to address
the basis upon which she takes issue with the trial justice’s dismissal of her
complaint, and she has failed to provide any authority in support of her
contentions. Because “a mere passing reference to an argument is insufficient to
merit appellate review[,]” plaintiff’s purported arguments on appeal are waived
under this Court’s raise-or-waive rule. Tondreault v. Tondreault, 966 A.2d 654,
664 (R.I. 2009) (quoting DeAngelis v. DeAngelis, 923 A.2d 1274, 1282 n.11 (R.I.
2007)); see Broccoli v. Manning, 208 A.3d 1146, 1149 (R.I. 2019) (finding the
plaintiff’s arguments waived under the “raise-or-waive rule for failure to
meaningfully develop or discuss what error was committed on the part of the
hearing justice”).
Notwithstanding these extraordinary deficiencies, our careful review of the
record in this case demonstrates that the trial justice did not err in granting
-8- defendant’s motion to dismiss. Rule 8(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure states, in relevant part, that “[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief * * * shall contain * * * [a] short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief * * *.” In most instances, a plaintiff who files a
complaint in a civil action “is not required to draft the pleading with a high degree
of factual specificity.” Hyatt v. Village House Convalescent Home, Inc., 880 A.2d
821, 824 (R.I. 2005). However, “the drafter of a complaint has * * *
responsibilities with respect to providing some degree of clarity as to what is
alleged; due process considerations are implicated, and we require that ‘the
complaint give the opposing party fair and adequate notice of the type of claim
being asserted.’” Id. (quoting Butera v. Boucher, 798 A.2d 340, 353 (R.I. 2002)).
Our review of plaintiff’s 245-page pleading convinces us that plaintiff’s
claims were not properly set forth and failed to provide defendant with adequate
notice of the basis of her assertions. The complaint does not articulate with any
clarity a claim under Title VI, or breach of contract, or for “reclassification,” which
plaintiff alluded to at the January 9, 2019 hearing. Furthermore, to the extent that
these claims are unrelated to workers’ compensation, the settlement agreement
flatly precludes plaintiff from bringing them. Consequently, the trial justice
properly dismissed the complaint.
Lastly, the complaint outlines a multitude of work-related injuries and
-9- alleges that the defendant is responsible for paying the plaintiff’s medical expenses
and compensating her for missed work. However, the plaintiff is barred from
asserting all work-related injury claims in Superior Court. Subject-matter
jurisdiction is vested in the Workers’ Compensation Court, in accordance with
G.L. 1956 § 28-35-11.7 Indeed, that provision applies “to any and all employees
* * * who are injured or hired in the state of Rhode Island.” Section 28-29-1.3.
Accordingly, those claims were properly dismissed.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Superior Court. The
record may be remanded to the Superior Court.
7 General Laws 1956 § 28-35-11 provides that “[a]ll questions arising under chapters 29 – 38” of title 28 of the general laws “shall * * * be determined by the workers’ compensation court * * *.” - 10 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Mickeda Barnes, et al. v. Rhode Island Public Transit Title of Case Authority. No. 2019-132-Appeal. Case Number (PC 18-6082)
Date Opinion Filed December 10, 2020
Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Melissa A. Long
For Plaintiff:
Mickeda Barnes, Pro Se Attorney(s) on Appeal For Defendant:
Jillian Folger-Hartwell, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)