Michigan Insurance v. Kibbee

6 Mich. 410
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJune 3, 1859
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 6 Mich. 410 (Michigan Insurance v. Kibbee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michigan Insurance v. Kibbee, 6 Mich. 410 (Mich. 1859).

Opinion

Martin Oh. J.:

The Michigan Insurance Company was the holder of two mortgages executed by the Kibbees, at the time the contract between them and Thompson was executed, and at the same time one David N. Tuttle, of Buffalo, was the holder of two other mortgages upon a portion of the same premises, of jirior date to those of the Insurance Company; the second of which had been foreclosed, and the property advertised for sale by a master under the decree of fore” closure. Tuttle had offered to discharge the first mortgage, and the decree of foreclosure, for the sum of six thousand dollars, one- half to be paid down, and the residue in three years, by semi-annual installments of five hundred dollars each, with interest; and the Insurance Company had also offered to take one thousand five hundred dollars in satisfaction and discharge of its mortgages; and these offers of the Company and of Tuttle were known to Thompson, and were the basis of the contract between the Kibbees and him. With such knowledge, and in the hope of securing the benefit of these offers, the contract of January 5th, 1852, was entered into. By it, the Kibbees agreed to sell, and Thompson to purchase, the property covered by the several mortgages, for seven thousand five hundred dollars, which was to be paid in the following manner: Thompson Was to pay six thousand dollars to Tuttle, to satisfy his claims against the Kibbees, and one thousand five hundred to the [424]*424Insurance Company for a like purpose, and each payment was independent of the other, as we will endeavor presently to show. The six thousand dollars was to be paid to Tuttle, if it should be found necessary to pay so much, to procure the release of his mortgage and decree; but Thompson was at liberty to' make any better, or any other, bargain he could with Tuttle; but the sum of six thousand dollars only was to be allowed to him for obtaining the discharge of these debts, whatever might be the price at which he should procure it, and that sum was bo be allowed to him in any event. The instant Tuttle was satisfied his debts,, the sum of six thousand dollars was paid upon this purchase from the Kibbees, irrespective of the cost to Thompson; the speculation was his, the profit or loss equally accruing to him, as circumstances or his choice might determine. But because Tuttle might not adhere to his offer to discharge the mortgage and decree for six thousand dollars, or Thompson be unable from any other reason to procure such discharge, a provision was inserted to * meet such a contingency, and Thompson agreed that in such event, if the property should go to sale under the decree, he would bid at such sale the six thousand dollars, less the amount due on the first mortgage, if necessary to prevent a purchase by any other party; and as this would not be sufficient to satisfy the decree, interest, and costs, the Kibbees were to provide for and pay the balance of the decree and the first mortgage, so that the amount to be paid by Thompson should not exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars, to be payable at the same time, and upon the same terms and conditions, as if the mortgage and decree had been discharged by Tuttle without sale. In other words, the parties contracted that if the property should be sold by the master, Thompson should bid a sum equal to the remainder after deducting the amount of the first mortgage from the sum of six thousand dollars, and as such bid would not satisfy the decree, the Kibbees were to provide for the balance, and were also to' take up [425]*425the first- mortgage, which would remara still outstanding; and Thompson was to pay to them the balance over and above his bid, so as to make the amount of six thousand dollars, in semi-annual installments of five hundred dollars and interest, as it was contemplated and provided he would pay Tuttle if the negotiation was consummated with him, and the sale of the property prevented.

The residue of the seven thousand five hundred dollars —viz. one thousand five hundred dollars — was entirely separated from this transaction respecting the Tuttle mortgage and decree, and dedicated to another use. This sum, Thompson agreed he would pay to the Insurance Company for the satisfaction of its mortgages, six months after he should have acquired a title to the premises; and this he was entitled to have immediately upon his procuring a release of the mortgage and decree from Tuttle, by negotiation, or after the sale under the decree, if a sale should be made, and he bid thereat as provided in the contract. The time, and nothing but the time, for this payment was contingent upon the success of Thompson’s negotiation with Tuttle, as, if that was consummated, the title would be presently conveyed to him, while if the property should be sold, and the Kibbees be compelled to pay off^the first mortgage, a longer or a shorter time might elapse before they could convey, according to circumstances. This conclusively shows that this payment was in no way contingent upon the amount of the residuum left after paying Tuttle’s mortgage and decree.

The Kibbees, on their part, agreed to convey the property to Thompson upon his performance of his covenants; he first executing such mortgage or other security as might be necessary for securing the payment of whatever balance of the purchase money might remain unpaid, which might be more or less ■ according to the result of his negotiation with Tuttle, but would at least cover the ob[426]*426ligation to pay the debt of the Kibbees to the Insurance Company. Thompson was put into immediate possession of the premises, and they are yet held by him or the Harts, under that surrendry, and, as we shall see, under the contract. The contract was deposited with one Wesson by the parties, and Thompson, at the same time, deposited with him three hundred dollars to be paid to the Kibbees as and for rent, if the sale to him was not perfected in the way contemplated in the contract, or to be applied towards the payment of the purchase price; that is, be refunded, or appropriated towards the satisfaction of the decree and mortgage, as the case might be, if the sale should be consummated.

From this synopsis of the contract it appears that Thompson was restricted to two methods of extinguishing Tuttle’s claims; first, by negotiation, in which case, whatever he paid, more or less, he was to be allowed six thousand dollars therefor; and, second, by bidding at the sale, in which case the Kibbees were to provide for and pay the balance of the decree, as also the first mortgage; so that in either or any event, in whatever ’mode Tuttle was satisfied of his claims, and for whatever consideration he released them, such discharge and release should cost the Kibbees no more than six thousand dollars, unless the property should be sold under the decree, -and they be compelled to pay to Tuttle, for the discharge of the mortgage, a sum Avhich would increase that amount; in Avhich event, Thompson Avould only be required to. pay them sufficient over his bid to make the six thousand dollars.

He could, in no event, compel them to pay more than six thousand dollars, to discharge the Tuttle claims. They might be compelled, it is true, to do -so, but that necessity was left contingent only upon the necessity for a negotiation by them Avith Tuttle for the discharge of the mortgage, which could only arise after a sale under the [427]*427decree; and the right to make this negotiation the Kibbees ■reserved to themselves.

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Related

Kirkpatrick v. Bessalo
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7 D.C. 165 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1871)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
6 Mich. 410, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michigan-insurance-v-kibbee-mich-1859.