Michelle Shelly Scanlin v. Savannah Lacey Manhold, Sarah Cruse and Lauren Price Laroche and Chance Brown Real Estate, LLC

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided May 30, 2024·No. 01-24-00309-CV·Published

Opinion

Opinion issued May 30, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

interlocutory order granting summary judgment.1 In their motion, appellants state

that the trial court issued an order on April 29, 2024 denying appellants’ motion for

permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. More than ten days have elapsed since

the filing of appellants’ motion to dismiss, and no party has objected to dismissal.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.3(a). Accordingly, we grant the motion and dismiss the

appeal. We dismiss any other pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Landau, Countiss, and Guerra.

1 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d) (authorizing trial court to permit interlocutory appeal from otherwise unappealable interlocutory order under certain circumstances), (f) (authorizing appeals court to accept interlocutory appeal permitted by trial court and requiring appealing party to petition appellate court for permission); TEX. R. CIV. P. 168 (governing procedure for trial court’s granting permission to appeal); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3 (governing procedure for filing petition for permissive appeal with appellate court when trial court has permitted appeal from interlocutory order).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Michelle Shelly Scanlin v. Savannah Lacey Manhold, Sarah Cruse and Lauren Price Laroche and Chance Brown Real Estate, LLC, (Tex. Ct. App. 2024).

Michelle Shelly Scanlin v. Savannah Lacey Manhold, Sarah Cruse and Lauren Price Laroche and Chance Brown Real Estate, LLC (Michelle Shelly Scanlin v. Savannah Lacey Manhold, Sarah Cruse and Lauren Price Laroche and Chance Brown Real Estate, LLC) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

§ 51.014
Texas CP § 51.014(d)