REL: January 20, 2023
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 _________________________
2210320 _________________________
Michelle Rodriguez Lopez
v.
Marco Rodriguez
Appeal from Coffee Circuit Court (DR-20-900126)
EDWARDS, Judge.
Michelle Rodriguez Lopez ("the wife") appeals from a judgment
entered by the Coffee Circuit Court ("the trial court") in her divorce action
against Marco Rodriguez ("the husband"). 2210320
The parties married in April 2008; they had one child ("the child"),
a son who was born in November 2008. The wife also has a child by a
previous marriage; that child resided with the parties during the
marriage. The parties resided in a house that the husband owned in
Enterprise until July 2009, when they moved to Texas after the husband
left military service in May 2009. The parties remained in Texas until
they moved to Puerto Rico early in 2019. The respective moves were
related to the husband's career with the United States Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS"). The wife was a stay-at-home mother during
the marriage.
In September 2019, the parties separated. Upon the separation,
the wife and the children moved from Puerto Rico to Enterprise, where
they resided with the wife's mother; the Enterprise house was being
rented to a third party ("the Enterprise rental house"). The husband
remained in Puerto Rico, where he had committed to remain, presumably
to continue working for DHS, through 2023.
The wife removed $45,000 from the parties' joint bank account
when she moved to Enterprise in 2019; according to her, she left
2 2210320
approximately $90,000 in that account. The husband testified that those
remaining funds were subsequently used to pay most of the parties'
$47,112 federal and territorial income-tax liability for the 2019 tax year,
to pay living expenses of the wife and the children after the separation,
and to pay the wife $12,500 for a 2011 Toyota Venza automobile that was
awarded to her in a pendente lite order, which is discussed infra.
In August 2020, the wife filed a complaint in the trial court seeking
a divorce from the husband. She subsequently amended her complaint.
The husband filed an answer denying the pertinent allegations made by
the wife; he also filed a counterclaim for a divorce. The wife filed an
answer denying the pertinent allegations in the husband's counterclaim.
The wife filed a motion for pendente lite support, and the trial court
held ore tenus proceedings on that motion. In December 2020, the trial
court entered a pendente lite order requiring the husband to pay the wife
$750 per month for her support and $1,156 per month as child support.
The pendente lite order also required the husband to pay $1,000 toward
the shipping costs for the delivery to the wife of the 2011 Toyota Venza
that was in Puerto Rico, to maintain the existing medical insurance on
3 2210320
the wife and the child, to pay the child's private-school tuition, to pay
automobile insurance on the parties' respective automobiles, to pay all
expenses associated with the marital residence in Puerto Rico, and to pay
all expenses for the Enterprise rental house. We note that the wife was
also receiving $700 per month as child support from the father of the
wife's child from a previous marriage, who was 17 years old at the time
of the pendente lite hearing and was scheduled to graduate high school
in May 2021.
In April 2021, the trial court conducted ore tenus proceedings
regarding the divorce petition and the counterclaim. On August 18, 2021,
the trial court entered a judgment ("the August 18, 2021, judgment")
divorcing the parties based on the ground of incompatibility of
temperament, awarding the parties joint legal custody of the child,
awarding the wife sole physical custody of the child, and awarding the
husband visitation with the child. The August 18, 2021, judgment
required the husband to pay the wife $1,156 per month as child support,
excluding the months of June and July of each year, plus up to $500 per
month for the child's private-school tuition and education fees. The child-
4 2210320
support exclusion for June and July each year was "to offset the travel
expenses incurred [by the husband] in exercising his parenting time"
with the child; the husband's visitation included, among other times,
summer visitation for approximately six weeks and extended holiday
visitation. The husband also was required to maintain medical and
dental insurance on the child, and the parties were required to maintain
respective $100,000 life-insurance policies designating the child as the
primary beneficiary.
Regarding alimony and the division of the marital property, the
August 18, 2021, judgment awarded the wife $750 per month "as periodic
alimony" for 36 months; the personal property that was in her possession;
a 2015 Honda CRV automobile; the balances in any bank accounts that
were in only her name, which, according to her testimony, included
$10,000 left from the $45,000 she had originally taken upon the parties'
separation; and any retirement benefits that she had accumulated.
Except as indicated, no evidence or testimony was presented as to the
value at the time of trial (or the pendente lite hearing) of any of the
aforementioned marital property awarded to the wife.
5 2210320
The August 18, 2021, judgment made a similar marital-property
award to the husband, but the award included a Toyota 4-Runner
automobile and the 2011 Toyota Venza, the latter of which the husband
had purchased from the wife for $12,500 after the entry of the pendente
lite order. The husband also received a 2017 Polaris ATV, which he had
purchased for the child in December 2016 for $22,999, and a 2018
enclosed utility trailer for the ATV, which the husband had purchased in
May 2018 for $8,295. The husband testified that the ATV had been
purchased for the child to use with him and that the trailer had been
purchased to avoid having to pay for a storage facility for the ATV; the
husband wanted to keep those items for the son to enjoy. Except as
indicated, no evidence or testimony was presented as to the value at the
time of trial (or the pendente lite hearing) of any of the aforementioned
marital property awarded to the husband.
For the "Division of Real Property," the August 18, 2021, judgment
awarded the husband the Enterprise rental house, noting that he had
purchased that property before the parties had married, that it was titled
solely in his name, that it was subject to a mortgage, and that it had been
6 2210320
"primarily used as rental property during the parties' marriage." The
husband was required to pay the mortgage note and all other expenses
associated with the Enterprise rental house. No evidence or testimony
was presented at the pendente lite hearing or at trial as to the value of
the Enterprise rental house or the amount of the outstanding debt on the
mortgage note on that property. The "Division of Real Property" also
stated that the parties were "each … entitled to keep any and all other
real property owned in their individual name, wherever situated," but
there was no evidence or testimony presented indicating that any such
property existed. In addition to paying the mortgage note on the
Enterprise rental house, the husband further was obligated to pay the
outstanding debt on the Toyota 4-Runner, the Toyota Venza, and the
ATV, although no evidence or testimony as to the amounts owed on those
vehicles was presented at the pendente lite hearing or at trial, and to pay
all income-tax liability that had accrued during the marriage. We note
that the husband also testified that he had paid, in addition to the
parties' federal and territorial income-tax liabilities for the 2019 tax year,
$49,343 in federal and territorial-income taxes for the 2020 tax year; no
7 2210320
evidence or testimony was presented regarding the parties' 2021 income-
tax liabilities.
The wife timely filed a postjudgment motion. She argued that the
trial court had erred by preventing her from "entering evidence or
testimony through cross-examination of [the husband] regarding" his
retirement plan, which was a thrift savings plan ("the husband's TSP
account"), and that that error had resulted in an inequitable division of
the marital property. She also argued that the periodic-alimony award
was inadequate in amount and duration and that the trial court had
erred by awarding the husband the Enterprise rental house, by requiring
her to maintain a $100,000 life-insurance policy for the benefit of the
child, and by granting the husband the two-month exception to his
monthly child-support payments. After conducting a virtual hearing on
the wife's postjudgment motion, the trial court entered an order on
December 11, 2021, granting that motion, in part, by ordering a new trial
as to the issues regarding the division of the husband's TSP account.
On January 6, 2022, the trial court conducted ore tenus proceedings
as to the division of the husband's TSP account. During that new trial,
8 2210320
the husband introduced into evidence, without objection, an exhibit that
included values for some of the marital property and debt obligations that
had been awarded to the parties; that evidence was offered for purposes
of evaluating the equity of any award from the husband's TSP account to
the wife. 1 On January 13, 2022, the wife filed a notice of appeal, and this
court thereafter entered an order informing the parties that the wife's
appeal would be held in abeyance pending the entry of a final judgment
addressing the remaining issue of the husband TSP account.
On March 9, 2022, the trial court entered a new judgment awarding
the wife $65,000 from the husband's TSP account, which had a value of
$173,454.23 in September 2019, and confirming that all other terms of
the August 18, 2021, judgment remained unchanged. The wife timely
filed a postjudgment motion, which the trial court denied. The wife then
1At the beginning of the January 6, 2022, proceeding, the wife's counsel made arguments referencing the value of the Enterprise rental house. No evidence or testimony in the record supports those arguments. See Ex parte Russell, 911 So. 2d 719, 725 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) ("The unsworn statements, factual assertions, and arguments of counsel are not evidence.").
9 2210320
filed a motion to reinstate her appeal, and this court granted that motion
and directed the parties regarding briefing. 2
We will first dispose of a preliminary matter. The wife complains
at several points in her brief about the husband's not providing adequate
responses to discovery, particularly as to his income, credit-card
expenditures, and telephone-call history; the wife sought the latter two
items for purposes of proving the husband's alleged adultery. However,
at the initial trial, the husband noted that he had filed objections to some
of those discovery requests because of purported issues relating to his
security clearance with DHS. The trial court addressed the discovery
issues at the beginning of the initial trial and asked whether the parties
"want[ed] to go ahead and try this case today understanding that we may
2On July 20, 2022, the wife filed a motion in this court alleging that she had discovered new evidence and requesting leave to file in the trial court a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and a stay of the appeal pending a decision on her Rule 60(b) motion. This court granted the wife's request for leave to file a Rule 60(b) motion in the trial court and denied her request for a stay of her appeal. In her appellate brief, the wife alleges that, on July 27, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying her Rule 60(b) motion, and she has attached a purported copy of that order as an exhibit to her appellate brief. That purported order is not part of the record on appeal and has not been considered by this court. See Etherton v. City of Homewood, 700 So. 2d 1374, 1378 (Ala. 1997). 10 2210320
or may not have all these records because -- or do you want some
additional time to try to look at these records [with redactions]." The
husband's counsel stated that he wanted to proceed with the trial and the
wife's counsel stated: "We will go forward and just --." The trial court
interrupted that statement by stating "[a]ll right" and indicating that
they would proceed with the trial and address any evidentiary issues as
they arose and one of the parties objected. The trial court also stated that
it would reserve any issue regarding sanctions for the end of the trial.
The wife's counsel made no statement in response to the trial court's
proposed plan of action and registered no objection that the trial court
had erred by proceeding with the trial. In her appellate brief, the wife
makes no legal argument, with citation to authority, that the trial court
erred as to any discovery ruling or as to its decision to proceed with the
trial in April 2021. See Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.; Dykes v. Lane
Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994); see also White Sands Grp.,
L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So. 2d 1042, 1058 (Ala. 2008). Under the
circumstances, we will not consider whether the March 9, 2022, judgment
should be reversed based on the husband's alleged lack of responsiveness
11 2210320
to the wife's discovery requests or based on the trial court's decision to
proceed with the trial in April 2021.3
The wife argues that the husband failed to offer substantial
evidence of the value of the husband's TSP account after the parties'
separated in September 2019. According to her, she was entitled to a
share of the value of the husband's TSP account as of the date of the April
2021 initial trial or the January 2022 trial as to the division of the
husband's TSP account, and, thus, she says, the property division is
unsupported by the evidence. 4 The husband responds by arguing that
3 The wife asserts several times in her appellate brief that the husband was an adulterer. The trial court made no such finding, however, and the husband denied at trial that he had had committed adultery. In her appellate brief, the wife makes no legal argument, with citation to authority, that the trial court erred by not making a finding of adultery. We therefore have ignored the wife's assertions as to adultery by the husband. See Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.; Dykes, supra; see also Samayamanthula v. Patchipulusu, 338 So. 3d 787, 793 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) (discussing the presumptions that attend the ore tenus rule).
4The husband testified that he had contributed approximately $13,200 to the husband's TSP account during the 11 years before the parties married, and the wife conceded during her testimony in the January 2022 trial that the trial court could subtract "$13,000" from the value of the husband's TSP account. To the extent that the wife argues that the trial court may have erred by excluding the husband's premarriage contributions from the value of the husband's TSP account 12 2210320
the trial court properly limited consideration of the value of the
husband's TSP account to the value that existed as of the date of the
parties' separation. He relies on the Alabama Comment to § 30-2-51, Ala.
Code 1975, the Code section governing the division of retirement assets,
specifically its discussion of § 30-2-51(b), Ala. Code 1975. Section 30-2-
51(b) states, in pertinent part:
"The marital estate is subject to equitable division and distribution. Unless the parties agree otherwise, and except as otherwise provided by federal or state law, the marital estate includes any interest, whether vested or unvested, either spouse has acquired, received, accumulated, or earned during the marriage in any and all individual, joint, or group retirement benefits …."
In its discussion of § 30-2-51(b), the Alabama Comment to § 30-2-51
states: "The statute intentionally fails to define the term 'during the
marriage,' leaving it to the court to decide based on the evidence and
equitable considerations the appropriate starting and ending date of the
marriage for all purposes under the statute." Cf. Ex parte Bland, 796 So.
2d 340, 344 (Ala. 2000) (stating that even when a spouse's separate
for purposes of the marital-property division, she waived that argument during the January 2022 trial. 13 2210320
property "had been used for the common benefit of the parties during
their marriage," "it was nonetheless within the trial court's discretion to
determine the most equitable distribution of the parties' property").
In her reply brief, the wife does not respond to the husband's
argument regarding the import of the Alabama Comment to § 30-2-51 or
the trial court's discretion in equity.5 Accordingly, any argument that
the trial court erred by using the value of the husband's TSP account as
of September 2019, rather than as of the date of the April 2021 initial
trial or the January 2022 trial as to the division of the husband's TSP
account, has been waived. See Rule 28(a)(10) and Dykes, supra. We
therefore do not conclude that the trial court erred by dividing the
5We acknowledge that parts of the Alabama Comment to § 30-2-51 could be read as being in tension with the plain language of § 30-2-51(b), particularly considering the introductory clause to § 30-2-51(b)(1) that speaks in terms of the parties' agreement or the law. See IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 348 (Ala. 1992) (noting that an official comment to a statute may be useful in construction but such comment does "not necessarily represent legislative intent"). However, we need not address whether such an argument might have merit to resolve the issues raised in this appeal.
14 2210320
husband's TSP account based on its value when the parties separated in
September 2019.
The wife next argues that the marital-property division and the
periodic-alimony award were inequitable. As to the periodic-alimony
award, in Merrick v. Merrick, [Ms. 2200188, Oct. 29, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___
(Ala. Civ. App. 2021), this court discussed the application of Ala. Code
1975, § 30-2-57, stating: "The legislature has clearly required that an
alimony award be either rehabilitative alimony or periodic alimony and
that, to award either type of alimony, the trial court must make certain
express findings …." ___ So. 3d at ___. Those requirements include
findings as to those matters discussed in § 30-2-57(a), Ala. Code 1975,
and, if a periodic-alimony award is to be made, a finding "that
rehabilitative alimony is not feasible," § 30-2-57(b)(1), Ala. Code 1975,
based upon the trial court's consideration of the various factors described
in § 30-2-57(d) & (f), Ala. Code 1975.
The wife testified that she wanted alimony until she could "get on
[her] feet," which she stated would take three or four years. The husband
agreed that the wife should receive some alimony and that it should be
15 2210320
paid for three or four years. The trial court couched its alimony award in
terms of it being "periodic alimony"; however, in light of the wife's
testimony and the duration of the alimony award, it may have been
rehabilitative alimony, which this court has described as a type of
periodic alimony that is intended to allow the recipient spouse to
establish a self-supporting status. See Merrick, ___ So. 3d at ___.
Nevertheless, the legislature has clearly directed that a trial court must
make express findings as to the establishment of the basis for an alimony
award and as to the specific type of alimony that is awarded. As in
Merrick, "[w]e cannot properly review the award in this case without
having before us the express findings required by § 30-2-57." ___ So. 3d
at ___. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand
the case to the trial court with instructions that it enter a new judgment
in compliance with § 30-2-57, based on the evidence presented at the
April 2021 initial trial and at the January 2022 trial as to the division of
the husband's TSP account. In light of our reversal on the alimony issue,
we pretermit any discussion regarding the equity of the marital property
award because "[t]he issues of property division and alimony are
16 2210320
interrelated, and they must be considered together on appeal." Turnbo
v. Turnbo, 938 So. 2d 425, 430 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006). Instead, the trial
court is to reconsider the marital-property division in conjunction with
any alimony determination.
The wife next argues that the trial court erred regarding the
amount of child support that it ordered the husband to pay. As to this
issue, the husband testified at the pendente lite hearing that his gross
salary from DHS is $127,000 per year and that he receives $2,100 per
month ($25,200 per year) for disability through the Department of
Veteran's Affairs ("the VA"). His DHS W-2 form for 2018 indicates that
DHS paid him $131,588.85 that year; according to him, that amount
included his salary, additional pay for overtime and working on holidays,
and some extra pay relating to the parties' move to Puerto Rico. The CS-
42 "Child-Support Guidelines" form prepared for the pendente lite
hearing indicates that the husband earned $13,066 in monthly gross
income, which is consistent with his income stated on the DHS W-2 form
for 2018 and his VA income. That form also includes $1,257 as monthly
gross income for the wife. The trial court awarded the wife $1,156 per
17 2210320
month as pendente lite child support, and that amount likewise is
consistent with the calculations reflected on the CS-42 form that was
used in the pendente lite proceeding.
The husband testified at the April 2021 initial trial that his salary
was "[a]bout 120," and he again stated that he received $2,100 per month
from the VA. The mother's counsel confronted the husband with his DHS
W-2 form for 2019, which was not admitted into evidence and is not
included in the record. According to the colloquy as to the 2019 W-2 form,
the form reflected that DHS had paid the husband $195,677 that year.
During the husband's testimony, however, he stated that the 2019 W-2
form indicated that his salary was $132,900, which included some
premium pay, and the remaining difference between his salary and the
$195,677 was for moving expenses that DHS had paid to move the family
and their personal property from Texas to Puerto Rico. Also, the father
admitted that he had received a raise in pay in 2020 of approximately
one percent of his salary. Assuming that was accurate, his DHS salary
had increased to approximately $134,229 ($132,900 + $1,329 = $134,229)
in 2020, depending on how much premium pay he may have received.
18 2210320
Based on the foregoing, the husband's income had increased after
the pendente lite child-support award, even assuming the trial court
accepted his explanation regarding the parties' moving expenses. It is
possible that the trial court also imputed additional income to the wife
based on the evidence and testimony presented at the April 2021 initial
trial, particularly since the $1,257 imputed to her on the CS-42 form for
the pendente lite proceeding, when considered along with the $750 per
month periodic-alimony award, appears to be less than her living
expenses, even discounting for some exaggeration of those living
expenses. However, we are unable to determine the exact basis for the
child-support award because no CS-42 form appears in the record in
compliance with Rule 32(E), Ala. R. Jud. Admin., and the testimony
presented does not permit us to determine how the trial court calculated
$1,156 as the proper award based on the application of the child-support
guidelines. Accordingly, we reverse the March 9, 2022, judgment insofar
as it awarded the wife child support of $1,156 per month, and we remand
the case for the trial court to fully comply with Rule 32(E), including the
taking of additional evidence for purposes of calculating the husband's
19 2210320
child-support obligation if the trial court deems that necessary. See
Corbitt v. Corbitt, [Ms. 2200786, July 22, 2022] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. Civ.
App. 2022).
In light of our reversal of the child-support award, we pretermit
consideration of the wife's argument that the trial court erred by granting
the husband's request to make an adjustment to his child-support
obligation based on the travel expenses that he would incur for visitation
with the child. Likewise, we pretermit consideration of her arguments
that the trial court erred regarding the medical-insurance adjustment
that it used for purposes of child support and by requiring her to maintain
a $100,000 life-insurance policy naming the child as the beneficiary,
which appears to relate to the issue of securing support for the child
should she predecease the husband.
Based on the foregoing, the March 9, 2022, judgment is affirmed as
to the date chosen for the valuation of the husband's TSP account. That
judgment is reversed, however, as to the award of periodic alimony and
the amount of child support to be awarded to the wife, and the case is
remanded for the trial court to comply with § 30-2-57 as to its alimony
20 2210320
award, to reconsider the marital-property division in conjunction with
any alimony determination, and to comply with Rule 32(E) in
determining the amount of the child-support award.
The husband's and the wife's requests for attorney's fees on appeal
are denied.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.