Michelle M. Walker v. Terry E. Walker

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 6, 2020
Docket2020CA0172
StatusUnknown

This text of Michelle M. Walker v. Terry E. Walker (Michelle M. Walker v. Terry E. Walker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michelle M. Walker v. Terry E. Walker, (La. Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

c t NOT FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA

W L- 7y! 6 y COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2020 CA 0172

MICHELLE M. WALKER

VERSUS

TERRY E. WALKER

Judgment Rendered: NOV 0 6 7120

On Appeal from the Twenty -Second Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St. Tammany State of Louisiana Docket No. 2017- 12327

Honorable Dawn Amacker, Judge Presiding

Mark Alan Jolissaint Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellant Slidell, Louisiana Michelle M. Walker

Angel Cox Williams Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee Jesmin Basanti Finley Terry E. Walker Slidell, Louisiana

Court Appointed Special Master Ernest Anderson Slidell, Louisiana

BEFORE: GUIDRY, MCCLENDON, AND LANIER, JJ. McCLENDON, I

Plaintiff seeks to appeal a consent judgment partitioning former community

property and a trial court judgment ruling that the consent judgment is valid and

enforceable. Defendant answered the appeal. Finding the consent judgment at issue to

be nonappealable and the trial court judgment lacking in finality, we dismiss the appeal

and the answer to the appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Michelle Walker filed a petition for divorce from Terry Walker on May 18, 2017.

Terry answered the petition for divorce and asserted a reconventional demand seeking,

inter alia, partition of the parties' community property pursuant to LSA- R.S. 9: 2801. A

judgment of separation of property dated July 12, 2017 terminated the community

property regime retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition for divorce.

On September 22, 2017, the parties and their counsel mutually agreed to

mediation to resolve the partition of the former community property. Following

successful mediation, the mediator prepared a pleading entitled ""Consent Judgment of

Final Partition of Community Property and Settlement of All Claims" ( consent

judgment). The consent judgment addressed the voluntary partition of the parties'

community property, as well as final and interim spousal support. The parties and their

respective counsel executed the consent judgment. The language of the consent

judgment reflected the parties' intent that the consent judgment be submitted to the

trial court for signature and thereby rendered a final judgment of the trial court.

On September 25, 2017, the consent judgment was filed into the suit record for

execution by the trial court. On October 26, 2017, the trial court held a hearing for M. confirmation of consent of the parties" to the consent judgment.' During the hearing,

Michelle advised that she no longer agreed to the consent judgment.2 Thus, rather

than executing the consent judgment as a judgment of the court, the trial court set a

scheduling conference for January 5, 2018.

Terry's appellate brief indicates that the trial court ordered the October 26, 2017 hearing for the purpose of homologating the consent judgment.

2 Michelle obtained different counsel after the mediation and before the October 26, 2017 hearing. Her motion to substitute counsel was granted during the hearing.

PQ On December 19, 2017, Terry filed a " Rule to Enforce Compromise" ( rule to

enforce consent judgment) requesting that the trial court find that the consent

judgment was valid and enforceable, and accordingly, that the trial court execute the

consent judgment as a judgment of the court.' Terry also sought an award of attorney' s

fees and costs incurred in connection with the rule to enforce the consent judgment.

On January 11, 2018, Michelle filed a " Petition to Annul Purported Settlement

Agreement." Michelle argued that the consent judgment was null on the basis of error

because it incorrectly classified community property as separate property, and vice

versa. Michelle also averred that as a result of the misclassification, the consent

judgment was lesionary because the value of the property she received pursuant to the

consent judgment was less by more than one-fourth of the fair market value of the

portion she should have received.

The parties' divorce became final by judgment dated February 8, 2018. On the

same day, the parties executed a " Consent Judgment to Appoint a Special Master" to

address the pending issues regarding the consent judgment. A trial was held before the

special master on December 13, 2018. Michelle sought to prove that the parties

mutually erred in the classification of two items of property addressed in the consent

judgment. The first item at issue was the classification of a piece of commercial

property valued at $ 241, 000. 00 ( commercial property). Michelle contended that the

commercial property, which had been treated as community property and allocated to

Michelle pursuant to the terms of the consent judgment, was actually Michelle' s

separate property. The second item at issue was the classification of funds Terry

received from the Poarch Band of Creek Indians ( tribal distributions) during the parties'

marriage. Michelle claimed that the tribal distributions were community property, but

had been incorrectly classified as Terry's separate property, for which Michelle owed

Terry reimbursement, under the terms of the consent judgment. Terry maintained that

the consent judgment properly classified the commercial property as community

3 Although extensive litigation followed Michelle' s expression of opposition to the execution of the consent agreement as a judgment of the court, this appeal is limited to the trial court's execution of the consent agreement as a judgment of the court and the trial court' s judgment adopting the special master's recommendations regarding Terry' s rule to enforce consent agreement and Michelle' s petition to annul consent agreement. property and the tribal distributions as his separate property, and that the consent

judgment should be enforced.

Following the trial, the special master filed his recommendations with the trial

court on February 12, 2019. The special master found that the commercial property

was Michelle' s separate property, and therefore, the parties mutually erred regarding

the classification of the commercial property as community property in the consent

judgment. The special master also found that there was no error regarding the

classification of the tribal distributions as Terry's separate property and that a

reimbursement claim was owed. Accordingly, the special master reformed the consent

judgment by deleting the commercial property from the inventory of community

property assets. However, the reformation did not result in Michelle receiving less than

three- quarters of her one- half interest in the community property. Thus, the special

master declined to rescind the consent judgment on the basis of lesion.

Both parties filed objections challenging the special master's recommendations.

Trial was scheduled for July 12, 2019. The parties stipulated to the submission of a

certified copy of the transcript of the trial conducted before the special master,

including all exhibits, testimony, and the entire record of the divorce proceedings, and

agreed to submit trial briefs limited to the issues raised in their objections to the special

master's recommendations. No other evidence was filed and no other witnesses were

called.

Following the trial court's consideration of the evidence, the trial court adopted

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Michelle M. Walker v. Terry E. Walker, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michelle-m-walker-v-terry-e-walker-lactapp-2020.