Michelle Faye Gonzales Hughes v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 30, 2018
• Docket: 18A-CR-112
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 30 2018, 8:52 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE R. Brian Woodward Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Crown Point, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Ellen H. Meilaender Supervising Deputy Attorney General

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michelle Faye Gonzales Hughes, August 30, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-112 v. Appeal from the Lake Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Diane Ross Appellee-Plaintiff. Boswell, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 45G03-1509-MR-6

Pyle, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-112 | August 30, 2018 Page 1 of 11 Statement of the Case [1] Michelle Hughes (“Hughes”) appeals the thirty-year aggregate sentence

imposed after she pleaded guilty to two counts of Level 3 felony kidnapping.1

She specifically argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her

and that her thirty-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the

offense and her character. Because we conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in sentencing Hughes and that Hughes’ sentence is not

inappropriate, we affirm Hughes’ sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Issues 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Hughes.

2. Whether Hughes’ sentence is inappropriate.

Facts [3] When seventeen-year-old Aarion Greenwood (“Greenwood’) was released

from the Porter County Juvenile Detention Center in June 2015, he was met by

his girlfriend, twenty-six-year-old Hughes; his father (“Father”); his stepmother

(“Stepmother”); his brother (“Brother”); and his brother’s friend (“Brother’s

Friend”). Greenwood, his family, and his friends immediately drove to a

nearby motel to retrieve a firearm that Greenwood had given to a friend,

1 IND. CODE § 35-42-3-2.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-112 | August 30, 2018 Page 2 of 11 eighteen-year-old Aareon Lackey (“Lackey”). Hughes drove a car in which

Greenwood, Brother, and Brother’s Friend were passengers. Other family

members followed behind in a van. The two vehicles arrived at the motel, and

the group confronted Lackey about the gun. When Lackey told the group that

he did not know where the gun was, the group forced Lackey and his sixteen-

year-old brother, Antonio, (“Lackey’s Brother”) to leave the motel without their

shoes or cell phones. As Lackey’s Brother got into Hughes’ car, Lackey

attempted to get into the same vehicle. Father, however, forcefully directed

Lackey to get into the van.

[4] Hughes drove Greenwood, Brother, and Lackey’s Brother to a trailer park to

look for the gun. On the way, Greenwood struck Lackey’s Brother in the

mouth, drawing blood. Other family members and Lackey followed in the van.

When the group arrived at the trailer, Brother got out of the car and approached

the van, where Stepmother handed him a gun and told him that she did not

trust anyone in the trailer. Brother’s Friend got out of the van holding a gun.

When no one answered the trailer’s front door, Brother gave the gun back to

Stepmother and got back into the car with Hughes, Greenwood, and Lackey’s

Brother, and the two vehicles drove away.

[5] Hughes subsequently followed the van down a narrow access road and into a

field. Lackey and his brother were forced out of the vehicles and led into the

woods where Stepmother shot and killed them both. Their decomposing

remains, including bones and teeth, were discovered in July 2015, and they

were identified through dental records.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-112 | August 30, 2018 Page 3 of 11 [6] In September 2015, the State charged Hughes and her co-defendants with two

counts of murder, two counts of felony murder, and two counts of Level 5

felony kidnapping. Two years later, Hughes pled guilty to two counts of Level

3 felony kidnapping in exchange for the dismissal of the other counts. At the

guilty plea hearing, Hughes admitted to the facts contained in the stipulated

factual basis.

[7] At the sentencing hearing, the State pointed out that the Lackey brothers had

been “left in those woods rotting, torn apart by animals, and denying the ability

of their parents to kiss them goodbye one last time and bury them” (Tr. 25-26).

The State further pointed out that all that was left of the Lackey brothers was

“bones, teeth, pieces of hair[,] and clothing.” (Tr. 26). In addition, the State

argued that at “any point in time, [Hughes] could have peeled off, but she

didn’t. She drove Antonio Lackey to his death in that death mobile, to that

farm.” (Tr. 29). The State also argued that “after everything was done, she

drove away. She knew those boys didn’t come out of the woods. They didn’t

get into the van. They certainly didn’t get into the car. She drove away.” (Tr.

29).

[8] Evidence presented at the sentencing hearing further revealed that Hughes’ four

young children had been living with Hughes’ mother since 2014, and that

Hughes had “signed over parental rights [to her mother]” in 2015. (App. Vol. 2

at 215). In addition, Hughes’ prior criminal history included convictions for

misdemeanor theft in 2011 and Level 5 felony burglary in 2015. Hughes was

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-112 | August 30, 2018 Page 4 of 11 sentenced for the burglary conviction days after committing the offenses in this

case.

[9] Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court found as mitigating factors that

Hughes had a limited criminal history and that she had accepted responsibility

for her actions and pled guilty. The trial court found as aggravating factors that

the “crime was a heinous cold-blooded execution of two teenage boys” and that

Hughes “had ample opportunity to extricate herself from the situation” and

failed to do so. (App. Vol. 2 at 235). Specifically, the trial court explained as

follows regarding the second aggravator:

I’m sure it didn’t escalate or spiral out of control after [Greenwood’s stepmother] walked those children into the woods. You saw that building up long before it happened. Long before it happened, you knew that this was not going to end well, but you did not extricate yourself at all.

(Tr. 47). Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Hughes to fifteen years for each

conviction and ordered the sentences to run consecutively to each other for an

aggregate sentence of thirty (30) years. Hughes now appeals her sentence.

Decision 1. Abuse of Discretion

[10] Hughes first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her.

Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is

in the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-112 | August 30, 2018 Page 5 of 11 An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and

effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable,

probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. at 491. A trial

court may abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to

enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that

includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record;

(3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported

by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that

are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.

[11] Here, Hughes contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it “relied

upon aggravating circumstances not supported by the record.” (Hughes’ Br. 7).

Hughes specifically argues that the trial court did “nothing more than us[e] an

element of the offense as an improper aggravator.” (Hughes’ Br. 8). Although

it is true that a material element of the crime may not be used as an aggravating

factor to support an enhanced sentence, the trial court may properly consider

the particularized circumstances of the crime as aggravating factors. McElroy v.

State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589-90 (Ind. 2007). Generally, this aggravator is thought

to be associated with particularly heinous facts or situations. Id. at 590.

[12] Here, the trial court found as aggravating factors the “crime was a heinous cold-

blooded execution of two teenage boys” and that Hughes “had ample

opportunity to extricate herself from the situation” and failed to do so. (App.

Vol. 2 at 235). These particularized circumstances of the crime were proper

aggravating factors, which are well-supported by the evidence. Specifically,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-112 | August 30, 2018 Page 6 of 11 Hughes participated in removing the teenaged brothers from their motel room

and driving them down a narrow access road, where they were then led into the

woods, shot, and killed. Their bodies were left to decay in the woods, and by

the time they were found, the only things left were teeth, bones, hair and pieces

of their clothing. This evidence supports the trial court’s first aggravating factor

that the “crime was a heinous cold-blooded execution of two teenage boys.”

(App. Vol. 2 at 235).

[13] In addition, Hughes was the driver of the car in which Lackey’s brother was

placed. She drove the young man from the motel to a trailer park. When the

group left the trailer park, Hughes followed the van down a remote access road

into a field and watched the boys being led into the woods. We agree with the

State that Hughes, “who was driving herself in her mother’s car, had multiple

opportunities to break off from the rest.” (State’s Br. at 11). This evidence

supports the trial court’s second aggravating factor. The trial court did not

abuse its discretion in its determination of aggravating factors.

[14] Hughes also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her

two sentences to run consecutively to each other. Specifically, she argues that

the trial court failed to balance the aggravating factors against the mitigating

factors. However, Anglemyer makes clear that, when imposing a sentence, a

trial court “no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating

factors against each other” and thus “a trial court can not now be said to have

abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Anglemyer, 868

N.E.2d at 491. Hughes’ argument therefore fails. The trial court did not abuse

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-112 | August 30, 2018 Page 7 of 11 its discretion in failing to balance the aggravating factors against the mitigating

factors.

[15] Hughes also appears to argue that the aggravating factors did not support

consecutive sentences. A single aggravating factor may be used to both

enhance a sentence and to impose consecutive sentences. See Haggard v. State,

771 N.E.2d 668, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Here, the trial court

found two valid aggravating factors. We further note that consecutive

sentences reflect the significance of multiple victims. See McCann v. State, 749

N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. 2001). “[W]hen the perpetrator commits the same

offense against two victims, enhanced and consecutive sentences seem

necessary to vindicate the fact that there were separate harms and separate acts

against more than one person.” Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2003).

2. Inappropriate Sentence

[16] Lastly, Hughes argues that her sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate

Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after

due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the

offender. The defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that her

sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).

Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate turns on the “culpability of the

defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-112 | August 30, 2018 Page 8 of 11 other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d

1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[17] The Indiana Supreme Court has further explained that “[s]entencing is

principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should

receive considerable deference.” Id. at 1222. “Such deference should prevail

unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the

nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of

brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or

persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122

(Ind. 2015).

[18] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is

the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the

crime committed. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. Here, Hughes was convicted

of two Level 3 felonies. The sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is between

three and sixteen years with an advisory sentence of nine years. See I.C. § 35-

50-2-5. The trial court sentenced Hughes to fifteen years for each conviction

and ordered the two sentences to run consecutively to each other for an

aggregate sentence of thirty years. This is less than the maximum sentence and

more than the advisory sentence.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-112 | August 30, 2018 Page 9 of 11 [19] With regard to the nature of the offense, we agree with the trial court that the

offense was a “heinous cold-blooded execution.”2 (App. Vol. 2 at 235).

Hughes was part of a group that forcibly removed the Lackey brothers from

their motel room and drove them in separate cars to a field, where they were led

into the woods, shot, and killed. Their bodies were then left in the woods to

decompose.

[20] Next we turn to the nature of Hughes’ character. To the extent that Hughes

argues that she was a young mother of four children at the time of sentencing,

Hughes’ children had been living with Hughes’ mother since 2014, and Hughes

had “signed over parental rights [to her mother]” in 2015. (App. Vol. 2 at 215).

In addition, this was not Hughes’ first contact with the criminal justice system.

She was convicted of misdemeanor theft in 2011 and Level 5 felony burglary in

2015. In fact, as the State points out, the “burglary case was still pending

against her at the time she decided to commit these heinous crimes; she was

sentenced on the burglary only days after the events of this case.” (State’s Br.

18). In addition, we agree with the State that it “speaks very poorly of

[Hughes’] character that the realization of facing the consequences of a felony

burglary conviction was not enough to dissuade her from deciding her to

participate in these even more serious crimes.” (State’s Br. 18-19). Hughes has

2 Although the murder charges were dismissed when Hughes pled guilty to the kidnapping charges, the trial court was nevertheless allowed to consider the facts of the dismissed charges for sentencing purposes. See Bethea v. State, 983 N.E. 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013) (trial court does not err when considering facts presented relating to crimes under a plea agreement, including those crimes to be dismissed).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-112 | August 30, 2018 Page 10 of 11 failed to meet her burden to persuade this Court that her thirty-year sentence for

her two Level 3 felony kidnapping convictions is inappropriate.

[21] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, Sr.J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-112 | August 30, 2018 Page 11 of 11