1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 MICHELLE CHRISTINA GUTTIG, Case No. 23-cv-02917-TSH
7 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 8 v. ATTORNEY'S FEES
9 SSA COMMISSIONER, Re: Dkt. No. 20 10 Defendant.
11 12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 After Plaintiff Michelle Christina Guttig brought this action for review of the 14 Commissioner of Social Security’s decision to deny benefits, the Court remanded the case, and the 15 Commissioner subsequently issued a decision in her favor. Plaintiff’s attorney, Francesco 16 Benavides, now seeks $39,000 in attorney’s fees under section 206(b) of the Social Security Act, 17 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 20. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion. 18 II. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff brought this action for judicial review under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 20 405(g). On October 26, 2023, the Court granted the parties’ stipulation to remand for further 21 proceedings. ECF No. 16. The Court subsequently granted the parties’ stipulation for attorney’s 22 fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, in the amount of 23 $8,720.19. ECF No. 19. 24 On remand, the Commissioner granted Plaintiff’s application and awarded retroactive 25 benefits. Mot., Ex. 1 (Notice of Award), ECF No. 20-1. The notice did not specify the total 26 amount of Plaintiff’s back-due award of disability benefits. Id. However, the notice advised 27 Plaintiff that 25% of her past-due benefits, and her family’s past due benefits, were being withheld 1 attorney fees, equating to 25% of the back-due award, was $57,114.25. Id. 2 Under a contingent-fee agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay counsel up to 25% of any past- 3 due benefits award. Mot., Ex. 3 (Fee Agreement), ECF No. 20-3. Benavides requests a fee of 4 $39,000.00. Mot. at 3. Neither the government nor Plaintiff has filed an objection to the motion 5 for fees, and the deadline for doing so has passed. 6 III. LEGAL STANDARD 7 Attorneys handling social security proceedings may seek fees for their work under both the 8 EAJA and the Social Security Act. While the government pays an award pursuant to the EAJA, 9 an award pursuant to § 406 of the Social Security Act is paid out of a successful claimant’s past- 10 due benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 11 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Sorensen v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). 12 Section 406(b)(1) provides that a federal court that “renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . 13 who was represented before the court by an attorney” may grant the attorney “a reasonable fee for 14 such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the 15 claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” In passing § 406, Congress sought to protect 16 attorneys from the nonpayment of fees, while also shielding clients from unfairly large fees. 17 Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 805. 18 The Supreme Court in Gisbrecht explained that § 406(b) is meant “to control, not to 19 displace, [contingency] fee agreements between Social Security benefits claimants and their 20 counsel.” 535 U.S. at 793. Even if a fee request under § 406(b) is within the 25 percent statutory 21 limit, the attorney bears the burden of showing that the fee sought is reasonable, and the court is 22 responsible for serving as an “independent check” to ensure the reasonableness of the fee. Id. at 23 807. Following Gisbrecht, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that a § 406(b) fee request should be 24 assessed by “looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.” 25 Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 26 808). The court should consider “the character of the representation and the results the 27 representative achieved,” and determine “whether the amount [of fees specified in the contingency 1 that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Id. at 1151. The reasonableness 2 determination is not governed by the lodestar method, because “[t]he lodestar method under- 3 compensates attorneys for the risk they assume in representing [social security] claimants and 4 ordinarily produces remarkably smaller fees than would be produced by starting with the 5 contingent-fee agreement.” Id. at 1150. However, “the court may require counsel to submit a 6 record of hours spent and a statement of normal hourly billing charges[,] . . . but only as an aid in 7 assessing the reasonableness of the fee.” Id. (emphasis in original). 8 Additionally, a § 406(b) fee award is offset by any award of EAJA fees. Thus, if the court 9 awards fees under both the EAJA and § 406(b), “the claimant’s attorney must refun[d] to the 10 claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (citation omitted). 11 IV. DISCUSSION 12 The Court finds counsel has met his burden to demonstrate the requested fees are 13 reasonable. First, counsel has presented a valid contingent fee agreement. Mot., Ex. 3. Benavides 14 states he has been practicing Social Security law for approximately 15.5 years and, outside of 15 contingency fee related representation, his hourly rate ranges from $350 to $550 per hour. 16 Benavides Decl. ¶¶ 9-10, ECF No. 20. Second, he has supplied timesheets documenting hours 17 worked. Mot., Ex. 4, ECF No. 20-4. Benavides states he spent 39.6 hours working on this case, 18 leading to an effective hourly rate of $984.85 per hour. Id.; Benavides Decl. ¶ 12. Third, there is 19 no evidence that counsel’s work was substandard or that the fee award is disproportionate to the 20 amount of work on the case, and the effective hourly rate is within the range of what courts have 21 approved under Section 406(b). See, e.g., Fernandez v. King, 2025 WL 277398, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 22 Jan. 23, 2025) (awarding fee request that provides an hourly rate of $1,145.67); Ainsworth v. 23 Berryhill, 2020 WL 6149710, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2020) (awarding fee request that provides 24 an hourly rate of $1,325.34); Villa v. Astrue, 2010 WL 118454, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2010) 25 (approving § 406(b) fees exceeding $1,000 per hour and noting: “Reducing § 406(b) fees after 26 Crawford is a dicey business”). Moreover, counsel obtained an excellent result for his client and 27 took on the risk of contingent representation. The Court is mindful of the Ninth Circuit’s 1 hope of inflating their fees” because “[t]he payoff is too uncertain.” Moreno v. City of 2 Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). “As a result, courts should generally defer to 3 the ‘winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the 4 case.’” Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 5 Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112); see also Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal.
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1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 MICHELLE CHRISTINA GUTTIG, Case No. 23-cv-02917-TSH
7 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 8 v. ATTORNEY'S FEES
9 SSA COMMISSIONER, Re: Dkt. No. 20 10 Defendant.
11 12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 After Plaintiff Michelle Christina Guttig brought this action for review of the 14 Commissioner of Social Security’s decision to deny benefits, the Court remanded the case, and the 15 Commissioner subsequently issued a decision in her favor. Plaintiff’s attorney, Francesco 16 Benavides, now seeks $39,000 in attorney’s fees under section 206(b) of the Social Security Act, 17 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 20. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion. 18 II. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff brought this action for judicial review under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 20 405(g). On October 26, 2023, the Court granted the parties’ stipulation to remand for further 21 proceedings. ECF No. 16. The Court subsequently granted the parties’ stipulation for attorney’s 22 fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, in the amount of 23 $8,720.19. ECF No. 19. 24 On remand, the Commissioner granted Plaintiff’s application and awarded retroactive 25 benefits. Mot., Ex. 1 (Notice of Award), ECF No. 20-1. The notice did not specify the total 26 amount of Plaintiff’s back-due award of disability benefits. Id. However, the notice advised 27 Plaintiff that 25% of her past-due benefits, and her family’s past due benefits, were being withheld 1 attorney fees, equating to 25% of the back-due award, was $57,114.25. Id. 2 Under a contingent-fee agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay counsel up to 25% of any past- 3 due benefits award. Mot., Ex. 3 (Fee Agreement), ECF No. 20-3. Benavides requests a fee of 4 $39,000.00. Mot. at 3. Neither the government nor Plaintiff has filed an objection to the motion 5 for fees, and the deadline for doing so has passed. 6 III. LEGAL STANDARD 7 Attorneys handling social security proceedings may seek fees for their work under both the 8 EAJA and the Social Security Act. While the government pays an award pursuant to the EAJA, 9 an award pursuant to § 406 of the Social Security Act is paid out of a successful claimant’s past- 10 due benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 11 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Sorensen v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). 12 Section 406(b)(1) provides that a federal court that “renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . 13 who was represented before the court by an attorney” may grant the attorney “a reasonable fee for 14 such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the 15 claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” In passing § 406, Congress sought to protect 16 attorneys from the nonpayment of fees, while also shielding clients from unfairly large fees. 17 Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 805. 18 The Supreme Court in Gisbrecht explained that § 406(b) is meant “to control, not to 19 displace, [contingency] fee agreements between Social Security benefits claimants and their 20 counsel.” 535 U.S. at 793. Even if a fee request under § 406(b) is within the 25 percent statutory 21 limit, the attorney bears the burden of showing that the fee sought is reasonable, and the court is 22 responsible for serving as an “independent check” to ensure the reasonableness of the fee. Id. at 23 807. Following Gisbrecht, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that a § 406(b) fee request should be 24 assessed by “looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.” 25 Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 26 808). The court should consider “the character of the representation and the results the 27 representative achieved,” and determine “whether the amount [of fees specified in the contingency 1 that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Id. at 1151. The reasonableness 2 determination is not governed by the lodestar method, because “[t]he lodestar method under- 3 compensates attorneys for the risk they assume in representing [social security] claimants and 4 ordinarily produces remarkably smaller fees than would be produced by starting with the 5 contingent-fee agreement.” Id. at 1150. However, “the court may require counsel to submit a 6 record of hours spent and a statement of normal hourly billing charges[,] . . . but only as an aid in 7 assessing the reasonableness of the fee.” Id. (emphasis in original). 8 Additionally, a § 406(b) fee award is offset by any award of EAJA fees. Thus, if the court 9 awards fees under both the EAJA and § 406(b), “the claimant’s attorney must refun[d] to the 10 claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (citation omitted). 11 IV. DISCUSSION 12 The Court finds counsel has met his burden to demonstrate the requested fees are 13 reasonable. First, counsel has presented a valid contingent fee agreement. Mot., Ex. 3. Benavides 14 states he has been practicing Social Security law for approximately 15.5 years and, outside of 15 contingency fee related representation, his hourly rate ranges from $350 to $550 per hour. 16 Benavides Decl. ¶¶ 9-10, ECF No. 20. Second, he has supplied timesheets documenting hours 17 worked. Mot., Ex. 4, ECF No. 20-4. Benavides states he spent 39.6 hours working on this case, 18 leading to an effective hourly rate of $984.85 per hour. Id.; Benavides Decl. ¶ 12. Third, there is 19 no evidence that counsel’s work was substandard or that the fee award is disproportionate to the 20 amount of work on the case, and the effective hourly rate is within the range of what courts have 21 approved under Section 406(b). See, e.g., Fernandez v. King, 2025 WL 277398, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 22 Jan. 23, 2025) (awarding fee request that provides an hourly rate of $1,145.67); Ainsworth v. 23 Berryhill, 2020 WL 6149710, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2020) (awarding fee request that provides 24 an hourly rate of $1,325.34); Villa v. Astrue, 2010 WL 118454, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2010) 25 (approving § 406(b) fees exceeding $1,000 per hour and noting: “Reducing § 406(b) fees after 26 Crawford is a dicey business”). Moreover, counsel obtained an excellent result for his client and 27 took on the risk of contingent representation. The Court is mindful of the Ninth Circuit’s 1 hope of inflating their fees” because “[t]he payoff is too uncertain.” Moreno v. City of 2 Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). “As a result, courts should generally defer to 3 the ‘winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the 4 case.’” Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 5 Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112); see also Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 6 || 2003) (“The courts recognize that basing a reasonableness determination on a simple hourly rate 7 basis is inappropriate when an attorney is working pursuant to a reasonable contingency contract 8 for which there runs a substantial risk of loss.”). As such, the requested fee is also reasonable 9 || because of the substantial risk of loss inherently involved in representing Social Security disability 10 || claimants. 11 Once the Court determines the fee sought under § 406(b) is reasonable, it must account for 12 || the attorney’s fees paid by the Commissioner under the EAJA. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. 13 “Congress harmonized fees payable by the Government under EAJA with fees payable under § 14 || 406(b) out of the claimant’s past-due Social Security benefits” by requiring the claimant’s attorney 15 || to refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee up to the point where the claimant receives a 16 100% of the past-due benefits. 7d. Here, the Court finds counsel’s § 406(b) request reasonable, 3 17 and therefore counsel shall refund to Plaintiff the $8,720.19 in EAJA fees previously awarded. 18 See Crooks v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 1469519, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2022) (directing counsel to 19 || refund to client fees previously awarded under the EAJA). 20 Vv. CONCLUSION 21 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees. 22 The Commissioner is directed to certify fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $39,000, 23 payable to Francesco Benavides. Counsel is ORDERED to refund the $8,720.19 EAJA fee award 24 || to Plaintiff. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: December 10, 2025
THOMAS S. HIXSON 28 United States Magistrate Judge