MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2022 ME 53 Docket: Aro-22-24 Submitted On Briefs: June 22, 2022 Decided: November 1, 2022
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, and LAWRENCE, JJ.
MICHELLE A. GARDNER
v.
LESLIE GREENLAW et al.
LAWRENCE, J.
[¶1] Michelle A. Gardner, the maternal grandmother of the two minor
children at issue in this case, appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Presque Isle, Langner, J.) dismissing with prejudice her complaints for
determination of de facto parentage concerning those children. The court
determined that the issue preclusion branch of the res judicata doctrine
completely barred the grandmother’s claims because the issue of the children’s
best interests, raised by her complaints for de facto parentage, was already
decided in a prior consolidated proceeding on competing guardianship
petitions, where the guardianship court (Caribou, Soucy, J.) appointed
Michael A. Greenlaw and Lynn M. Greenlaw, the maternal grandfather and his
wife, as guardians of the children rather than appointing the grandmother. 2
[¶2] Because we agree with the grandmother’s contention that the best
interests determinations required in the guardianship actions and in the
actions for de facto parentage are distinct determinations, we vacate the court’s
judgment and remand the matter for the court to consider the grandmother’s
standing with respect to her complaints for de facto parentage and, if she
demonstrates such standing, to proceed in accordance with 19-A M.R.S. § 1891
(2022).
I. BACKGROUND
[¶3] The competing petitions to appoint guardians for the two children
were filed by the grandmother and by the grandfather and his wife in
2019-2020.1 After a consolidated three-day hearing, the guardianship court
granted the grandfather’s petitions and denied the grandmother’s petitions in
judgments signed on March 29 and April 8, 2021.
[¶4] Although the guardianship court found that the status quo favored
appointing the grandmother as guardian because the children had spent
significantly more time with her, it determined that the grandfather’s home was
1We take judicial notice of the docket entries in the guardianship actions and the docket entries in other prior proceedings involving the parties and these children. See Cabral v. L’Heureux, 2017 ME 50, ¶ 10, 157 A.3d 795 (“Courts may take judicial notice of pleadings, dockets, and other court records where the existence or content of such records is germane to an issue in the same or separate proceedings.”); M.R. Evid. 201(b)-(d). In this opinion, we refer to the petitions filed by the grandfather and his wife as the grandfather’s petitions. 3
ultimately the more stable and healthy option.2 The guardianship court found
that the appointment of the grandfather and his wife as guardians was in the
children’s best interests but also determined that it was in the children’s best
interests “to continue [their] relationship” with the grandmother. The
guardianship court accordingly established provisions, lasting six months, to
assist with the children’s transition to living with the grandfather and his wife,
including a requirement that the children have visits with the grandmother “not
less than weekly.” See 18-C M.R.S. § 5-211(1) (2022).3
[¶5] On April 12, 2021, before appealing the guardianship court’s
judgments,4 the grandmother filed complaints for determination of de facto
parentage concerning both children.5 The grandfather and his wife filed an
2 The mother of the children, Leslie Greenlaw, and the father of the older child, Mark W. Hanning II, consented to the grandmother’s petitions and did not consent to the grandfather’s petitions. The father of the younger child is deceased. Before granting the grandfather’s petitions, the guardianship court found that the parents were unwilling or unable to exercise their parental rights. See 18-C M.R.S. § 5-204(2)(C)(1)-(2) (2022). The mother of the children and the father of the older child are parties in the actions for de facto parentage. 3 The guardianship court further ordered that “if continuing regular contact . . . continues to be in
the [children’s] best interest[s], the guardians shall continue such contact.” 4 On December 7, 2021, we affirmed the guardianship court’s judgments, concluding that competent evidence supported its determination that granting the grandfather’s petitions was in the children’s best interests and that the guardianship court did not abuse its discretion. Guardianship by Michael G., Mem-21-125 (Dec. 7, 2021). 5 To be clear, we do not condone the grandmother’s procedural tactics, particularly given the resulting misuse of judicial resources, the perpetuation of the “tug-of-war” between the grandmother and the grandfather and his wife (which the guardianship court feared was emotionally harming the older child), and the children’s urgent “need [for] stability and permanence.” The guardianship actions began over three years ago, yet the grandmother delayed filing her complaints for de facto 4
answer to each complaint and moved to dismiss the complaints, invoking the
issue preclusion branch of the res judicata doctrine. Specifically, they argued
that a determination of the grandmother’s status as a de facto parent would
require the court to examine whether “[t]he continuing relationship between”
the grandmother and the children is in the children’s best interests, 19-A M.R.S.
§ 1891(3)(E), and that issue was already litigated and determined when the
guardianship court found that granting the grandfather’s petitions was in the
children’s best interests, see 18-C M.R.S. § 5-204(2) (2022).6
[¶6] The grandmother filed objections to the motions to dismiss, and,
after holding a conference on December 8, 2021, the court dismissed the
complaints with prejudice in a decision entered on January 12, 2022. The court
concluded that (1) the issue of the children’s best interests was central to both
actions, (2) the guardianship court had determined that the “continuing
relationship between” the children and the grandmother, compared to the
parentage until after she learned that the guardianship court denied her petitions. Moreover, the grandmother fully understood how to file a complaint for de facto parentage because she did so with respect to the older child in 2018, before the guardianship actions, and she also joined in filing petitions for three-party child protection proceedings regarding the children. Those cases were all dismissed, and the guardianship court found that the parties had agreed to resolve their differences regarding the children through the competing guardianship petitions. 6 Title 18-C M.R.S. § 5-204(2)(C) (2022) was amended in 2021, effective after the guardianship court’s judgments, to add a subsection not relevant in this case. See P.L. 2021, ch. 340, § 1 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified at 18-C M.R.S. § 5-204(2)(C) (2022)). 5
children’s relationship with the grandfather and his wife, “was not in the best
interest of the children,” and (3) the grandmother “had a fair opportunity and
incentive” to address the issue and was thus estopped from relitigating the
issue in a separate action. The court also determined that allowing the
grandmother to proceed on the complaints for de facto parentage would be
incompatible with the interests of justice and cause the parties to “be once
again embroiled in bitter litigation.”7 The grandmother timely appealed.
See 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1) (2022); 19-A M.R.S. § 104 (2022); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶7] The grandmother contends that the court erred because there were
separate and distinct factual issues involved in the two proceedings and that,
regardless, the issue of the children’s best interests was resolved in her favor
because the court determined that “it would be in each child’s best interest to
continue their relationship with” the grandmother. The grandfather and his
7 In its judgment, the court also considered and dismissed a separate complaint for determination of de facto parentage filed by the younger child’s paternal grandparents, Keith and Renee MacArthur, after concluding that they “failed to establish standing to maintain the action.” See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2) (2022).
Further, in yet another instance of the claim splitting ensnarling the children at the center of this appeal, the court noted that the mother and the father of the older child had submitted a stipulated amended order in their parental rights and responsibilities action. The court stated that the stipulated order was intended to allocate to the grandmother certain rights of contact with the older child. 6
wife argue that the grandmother “purposefully engaged in claim splitting” and
that the findings in the guardianship proceeding necessarily preclude the
contrary finding, required for the grandmother to maintain her actions for
de facto parentage, that the continuing relationship between the grandmother
and children is in the children’s best interests.
[¶8] Issue preclusion is a branch of the res judicata doctrine, which “is a
court-made collection of rules designed to ensure that the same matter will not
be litigated more than once.” In re Children of Bethmarie R., 2018 ME 96, ¶ 15,
189 A.3d 252 (quotation marks omitted). “[A]lso known as collateral estoppel,”
issue preclusion “prevents the relitigation of factual issues already decided if
the identical issue was determined by a prior final judgment” and the estopped
party “had a fair opportunity and incentive in an earlier proceeding to present
the same factual issue or issues it wishes to litigate again in a subsequent
proceeding.” Guardianship of Jewel M., 2010 ME 80, ¶ 39, 2 A.3d 301 (quotation
marks omitted).8 Issue preclusion applies “only if the identical issue
8 The other branch of res judicata, which is known as claim preclusion and is inapplicable here because the grandfather and his wife make no such assertion, “bars the relitigation of claims if[] (1) the same parties or their privies are involved in both actions; (2) a valid final judgment was entered in the prior action; and (3) the matters presented for decision in the second action were, or might have been, litigated in the first action.” Guardianship of Jewel M., 2010 ME 80, ¶¶ 39-40, 2 A.3d 301. 7
necessarily was determined by a prior final judgment.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted).
[¶9] We review de novo a court’s determination that issue preclusion
“bars a particular litigation.” Portland Water Dist. v. Town of Standish, 2008 ME
23, ¶ 7, 940 A.2d 1097. We have stated that “[p]rinciples of res judicata must
be applied with caution in domestic relations cases, as new developments often
inform decisions as to what may be in the best interest of a child in
circumstances where relationships must continue and will change over time
until a child reaches majority.” Bethmarie R., 2018 ME 96, ¶ 15, 189 A.3d 252
(quotation marks omitted).
[¶10] A court may appoint a guardian for a minor child pursuant to the
Maine Uniform Guardianship, Conservatorship and Protective Proceedings Act
if the court finds that the proposed guardian is “suitable,” the appointment “is
in the best interest of the minor,” and “the parents are unwilling or unable to
exercise their parental rights.” 18-C M.R.S. §§ 5-101, 5-204(2) (2022). The
term “[b]est interest of the minor” is defined to mean “the best interest of the
child according to the factors” in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2022). 18-C M.R.S.
§ 5-102(4) (2022). 8
[¶11] For a court to adjudicate a person as a child’s de facto parent
pursuant to the Maine Parentage Act, the court must first determine, in a
preliminary proceeding, that the person has established standing by presenting
prima facie evidence of the statutory elements found in 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3),
and then determine, after a plenary proceeding, that the person has proved
those same elements by clear and convincing evidence. See 19-A M.R.S.
§§ 1831, 1891(2)(C)-(D), (3) (2022); see Davis v. McGuire, 2018 ME 72, ¶ 15,
186 A.3d 837. One of these elements is that “[t]he continuing relationship
between the person and the child is in the best interest of the child.”9
19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(E); see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3).
[¶12] The court was thus correct that the guardianship court applied a
best interests standard in choosing between the competing guardianship
Ultimately, the court must determine that the person seeking status as a de facto parent “has 9
fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed and responsible parental role in the child’s life.” 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3) (2022). The other elements require the court to find that
A. The person has resided with the child for a significant period of time;
B. The person has engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
C. A bonded and dependent relationship has been established between the child and the person, the relationship was fostered or supported by another parent of the child and the person and the other parent have understood, acknowledged or accepted that or behaved as though the person is a parent of the child; [and]
D. The person has accepted full and permanent responsibilities as a parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation.
Id. 9
petitions and that a best interests determination also is pertinent to
consideration of the grandmother’s complaints for de facto parentage. The
court erred, however, in concluding that there was total issue preclusion
because the finding that the guardianship appointments, of the grandfather and
his wife over the grandmother, would serve the children’s best interests is not
the determination of an issue identical to a finding of whether “[t]he continuing
relationship between the [grandmother] and the child[ren]” is in the children’s
best interests. 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(E); see Marin v. Marin, 2002 ME 88, ¶¶ 2,
5, 7, 10, 797 A.2d 1265 (concluding that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar
the District Court from determining the father’s parental rights and
responsibilities in a divorce proceeding, despite the existence of a prior
guardianship proceeding in Probate Court awarding co-guardianship to the
child’s maternal grandparents).10
[¶13] Simply put, there are less expansive remedies regarding parental
duties and responsibilities available to a court when it appoints a person as a
guardian than when it adjudicates a person to be a de facto parent. Compare
18-C M.R.S. § 5-207(1)-(2) (2022), with 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653(2)(A)-(D),
10 The Marin court noted, however, that the determination of parental rights and responsibilities in the divorce proceeding would be subject to the prior guardianship order. Marin v. Marin, 2002 ME 88, ¶¶ 3, 10, 797 A.2d 1265. 10
1891(4)(B) (2022). The duties and responsibilities that the guardianship court
assigned to the grandfather and his wife in their roles as guardians tracked the
statutory language in 18-C M.R.S. § 5-207(1)-(2).11
[¶14] By comparison, when a court adjudicates a person to be a de facto
parent, it must “determine parental rights and responsibilities in accordance
with section 1653.” 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(4)(B); see also C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME
43, ¶¶ 10-11, 845 A.2d 1146. The court’s determination of a de facto parent’s
role depends on a child’s best interest, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3), and can be as
11 Title 18-C M.R.S. § 5-207(1) (2022) reads, “Except as otherwise limited by the court, a guardian
of a minor has the duties and responsibilities of a parent regarding the minor’s support, care, education, health and welfare. A guardian shall act at all times in the best interest of the minor and exercise reasonable care, diligence and prudence.” Pursuant to 18-C M.R.S. § 5-207(2) (2022), a guardian shall
A. Become or remain personally acquainted with the minor and maintain sufficient contact with the minor to know of the minor’s capacities, limitations, needs, opportunities and physical and mental health;
B. Take reasonable care of the minor’s personal effects and bring a protective proceeding if necessary to protect other property of the minor;
C. Expend money of the minor that has been received by the guardian for the minor’s current needs for support, care, education, health and welfare;
D. Conserve any excess money of the minor for the minor’s future needs, but if a conservator has been appointed for the estate of the minor, the guardian shall pay the money at least quarterly to the conservator to be conserved for the minor’s future needs;
E. Report the condition of the minor and account for money and other assets in the guardian’s possession or subject to the guardian’s control, as ordered by the court on application of any person interested in the minor’s welfare or as required by court rule; and
F. Inform the court of any change in the minor’s custodial dwelling or address. 11
narrow or as broad as the court’s parens patriae authority allows. See C.E.W.,
2004 ME 43, ¶¶ 10-11 & n.12, 845 A.2d 1146; Stitham v. Henderson, 2001 ME
52, ¶ 17, 768 A.2d 598 (explaining that given the party’s position as a de facto
parent, the court had the “jurisdiction to decide whether” it was in the child’s
best interest for that party “to have a continuing role in [the child’s] life and
what that role should be”). The remedies provided by the statutory provisions
governing a guardianship proceeding are not “conterminous with an award of
parental rights and responsibilities,” which is the remedy pursuant to the
statutory provisions regarding an action for de facto parentage. C.E.W., 2004
ME 43, ¶ 12, 845 A.2d 1146.
[¶15] Here, due to the grandmother’s claim splitting, the same parties
that litigated the competing petitions for guardianship are before the court in
the grandmother’s actions for de facto parentage. In the guardianship
proceeding, the grandmother and the grandfather and his wife clearly had a fair
opportunity and incentive to address the issues of the primary residence of the
children and the responsibility (i.e., decision-making authority) for the
children’s “support, care, education, health and welfare” (i.e., welfare and 12
well-being).12 18-C M.R.S. § 5-207(1). The guardianship court appointed the
grandfather and his wife as the children’s guardians and in doing so awarded
them both primary residence of the children and decision-making authority for
the children’s welfare and well-being. See id. Therefore, in the grandmother’s
actions for de facto parentage, issue preclusion appropriately would bar the
court’s reconsideration of the guardianship court’s award of primary residence
of the children and decision-making authority for their welfare and well-being
to the grandfather and his wife. See Marin, 2002 ME 88, ¶ 10, 797 A.2d 1265.
[¶16] Although the guardianship court preliminarily determined that it
was in the children’s best interests to continue their relationship with the
grandmother, through visits occurring not less than weekly, the guardianship
court left open the nature of that relationship beyond the six-month transition
period.13 Accordingly, if the court concludes that the grandmother has standing
to pursue her complaints for de facto parentage, the determination of her
parental rights and responsibilities would, at a minimum, allow the court to
define her continuing relationship with the children (e.g., regular visitation), if
The guardianship court determined that resolution of the grandmother’s and the grandfather’s 12
competing guardianship petitions was the agreed upon way in which the parties’ dispute regarding the children was to be resolved. See supra n.5. 13 See supra n.3. 13
it is in the children’s best interests, subject to the guardianship judgments.
See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(4)(B).
III. CONCLUSION
[¶17] In summary, because the best interests determinations required
in a guardianship proceeding are not identical to those in a proceeding for
de facto parentage, issue preclusion does not prevent the court from
considering the grandmother’s complaints for de facto parentage. For the
reasons noted above, however, if the grandmother has standing to pursue
de facto parentage, issue preclusion will constrain the parental rights and
responsibilities that she may be awarded. We therefore vacate the court’s
judgment and remand the matter for the court to consider the grandmother’s
standing to pursue her complaints for de facto parentage pursuant to 19-A
M.R.S. § 1891 and, if she demonstrates such standing, to proceed in accordance
with the statute.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 14
James M. Dunleavy, Esq., Currier, Trask & Dunleavy P.A., Presque Isle, for appellant Michelle A. Gardner
Christopher M. Leger, Esq., Kelley & Leger Law Offices, Caribou, for appellees Michael A. Greenlaw and Lynn M. Greenlaw
Presque Isle District Court docket numbers FM-2021-108 and FM-2021-109 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY