Michel v. Larson (In Re Webster)

120 B.R. 111, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 2224, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1841, 1990 WL 157354
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 5, 1990
Docket19-21557
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 120 B.R. 111 (Michel v. Larson (In Re Webster)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michel v. Larson (In Re Webster), 120 B.R. 111, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 2224, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1841, 1990 WL 157354 (Wis. 1990).

Opinion

DECISION

JAMES E. SHAPIRO, Bankruptcy Judge.

This adversary case requires a determination of whether the activities of Rodney A. Larson (“Larson”) in the bankruptcy case of John M. Webster (“Webster”), a pro se debtor, constituted the unauthorized practice of law. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and § 157(b)(2)(0).

An evidentiary hearing was held on August 9, 1990. Larson failed to submit a responsive pleading. However, he appeared and testified at this hearing. Webster also testified.

Larson is a sole proprietor doing business as Bay Business & Individual Services. He has been operating in and near Green Bay, Wisconsin, since October of 1989. Larson acknowledges that he is not licensed to practice law, but denies that he has done so. The United States Trustee asserts that Larson is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Webster testified that he first heard of Larson through an advertisement in the Green Bay Press-Gazette, a local newspaper announcing that Larson provided “Bankruptcy Services.” Larson testified *113 that his ad originally read “Bankruptcy, Legal Services,” but was later revised by omission of the word “Legal.” (Tr. p. 44) Larson received $91.10 from Webster. Of this amount, $61.10 was for his basic services in connection with Webster’s bankruptcy petition, statement of affairs and schedules. The balance of $30.00 was for his additional services in connection with two lien avoidance motions. Larson stated that he has since increased his fee for his basic services to $90 and is contemplating a further increase to $120.

After Webster initially contacted Larson by telephone, Larson scheduled an appointment to meet with Webster at Webster’s home. Upon meeting Webster, Larson obtained from him the information necessary to complete the bankruptcy forms. Larson then left, typed up the papers and later returned to Webster’s home with the completed forms. Larson’s method of handling this transaction was consistent with his treatment of other pro se debtors.

Larson claims that he only sells bankruptcy forms and provides typing services. He testified that he types the forms “as it protruded from my client’s mouth exactly” (Tr. pp. 27-28). Webster’s testimony contradicts Larson and is more credible. It reveals that Larson is doing much more than selling bankruptcy forms and providing typing services. According to Webster’s testimony, Larson advised and counseled him with respect to the completion of the bankruptcy petition, statement of affairs and schedules, including which exemptions Webster should claim. It was Larson who explained to Webster the differences between the federal and state exemptions and why the federal exemptions should be claimed by Webster. It was also Larson who selected the specific federal exemptions which appear on Webster’s Schedule B-4. Webster also asserted that Larson informed him that his bankruptcy filing fee could be paid in installments. Webster added that it was Larson who advised him about lien avoidance motions, that Larson filled out the motions and that Webster had never heard of a lien avoidance motion before being so informed by Larson. The two lien avoidance motions filed in this case were groundless and were ultimately denied.

Larson’s efforts to justify his conduct are unavailing. His explanation that he believed he was providing “a good service ... with the intention to allow my clients with an economical way of filing bankruptcy because of the fact that attorneys are relatively more expensive” (Tr. p. 36) is no justification. Larson submitted into evidence certain agreements which he had prepared and which were signed, at Larson’s request, by many pro se debtors with whom he was transacting business. 1 The agreements assert that he was “merely providing a typing service” and that he “did not give any legal advice.” These are self-serving declarations and not controlling upon the court. What Larson stated he was doing in these agreements and what the record clearly demonstrates he was doing are two entirely different things.

The circumstances in this case match those in In re Bachmann, 113 B.R. 769 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1990). In Bachmann, the court found that an individual was doing more than selling and typing bankruptcy forms, as was claimed by him, but was in fact engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. This is precisely the situation here. The conduct of Larson, a lay person, in Webster’s bankruptcy case constituted the unauthorized practice of law. The court in Bachmann aptly declared:

According to generally understood definition of the practice of law in this country, it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings and the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before Judges and Courts and, in addition, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds .and, in general, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law (citing Howton v. *114 Morrow, 269 Ky. 1, 106 S.W.2d 81 [Ct. App.1937]).

Bachmann at 772.

This court has had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. It is satisfied that Webster lacked the necessary sophistication to complete the bankruptcy forms and that the completed forms are entirely the work product of Larson. When Webster was questioned by the court as to why he selected the federal exemptions over the state exemptions and why he chose specific exemptions, he replied that it was Larson who made these decisions, declaring:

I actually don’t even ... to be truthful, I don’t know what you’re really talking about. I honestly don’t.

(Tr. p. 47) Larson called all of the shots in this case. By doing so, he exercised legal judgment and was clearly engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.

In addition, Larson violated 11 U.S.C. § 329 of the Bankruptcy Code. 2 § 329(a) of the Bankruptcy Code requires a debtor’s attorney to file with the court a statement of compensation which has been paid to him or agreed to be paid for his services. § 329(b) permits the bankruptcy court to determine the reasonableness of this compensation. The fact that Larson is not an attorney does not excuse him from complying with § 329. A lay person is subject to § 329 if he renders “legal services” to the debtor. In re Telford, 36 B.R. 92 (9th Cir. BAP 1984); In re Glad, 98 B.R. 976 (9th Cir. BAP 1989); In re Grimes, 115 B.R. 639, 649 (Bankr.D.S.D.1990). Larson also violated Bankruptcy Rule 1006(b)(3) 3 which requires that a filing fee must be paid in full before a debtor may pay an attorney

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
120 B.R. 111, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 2224, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1841, 1990 WL 157354, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michel-v-larson-in-re-webster-wieb-1990.