MICHEL v. FAMILY DIVISION OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEASE OF PHILADELPHIA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 10, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-02813
StatusUnknown

This text of MICHEL v. FAMILY DIVISION OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEASE OF PHILADELPHIA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (MICHEL v. FAMILY DIVISION OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEASE OF PHILADELPHIA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MICHEL v. FAMILY DIVISION OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEASE OF PHILADELPHIA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, (E.D. Pa. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA RICARDY MICHEL, : Plaintiff, : Vv. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-2813 FAMILY DIVISION OF THE COURT: OF COMMON PLEASE OF : PHILADELPHIA FIRST JUDICIAL : DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, ef al, : Defendants. : MEMORANDUM

WEILHEIMER, J. JUNE, 2025 Ricardy Michei has filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C, § 1983 against the Family Division of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, and two of its employees, Shawn T. Hagerty, Manager, and Darlene Smith, Bench Warrant Officer.' Michel also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted and the Complaint will be dismissed. 1 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS? Michel’s allegations are brief and not entirely clear, Michel alleges that on May 14, 2025 Defendant Hagerty issued a civil bench warrant against him without probable cause. He claims he was never served to appear in court and his due process rights were thereby violated. (Compl.

| Smith’s first name is not spelled consistently in the Complaint, The Court uses the spelling contained in the caption. * The factual allegations are taken from Michel’s Complaint (ECF No. 2), which consists of the form available for unrepresented litigants to file a complaint and a two-page typed attachment, The Court deems the entire submission to constitute the Complaint and adapts to sequential pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system. Where the Court quotes from the Complaint, punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors will be cleaned up as needed.

at 4.) He references a “new memorandum” signed by President Trump on April 9, 2025 that “called ‘regulations that are unconstitutional.’” (/d.) He claims that Defendant Hagerty did not respond to his email in regard to a motion to vacate the bench warrant and that Defendant Smith and others were “involved in this crime against me.” (/d.) He also claims that unnamed non- defendant court clerks sent back motions he filed in regard to his case after stamping them received. (/d.) In the typed portion of his submission, Michel states that the actions were taken against him by the Child Support Enforcement Unit of the Court of Common Pleas in connection with a child support enforcement matter, Ud, at 7.) He received the warrant on May 19, 2025 without any notice, hearing, due process, or a finding of willful noncompliance. Ud.) He filed a motion to vacate the bench warrant and copied Defendant Smith but received no response, allegedly reflecting deliberate indifference to his rights. Ud.) He claims President Trump has reaffirmed his rights by issuing a Presidential Memorandum directing agencies to review all enforcement actions in light of United States Supreme Court rulings. (éd. at 8.) For relief on his claims, Michel seeks “legal compensation” (7d. at 5) and that the bench warrant be vacated (id. at 8). I. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court grants Michel leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)Gi) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B){it) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir, 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S, 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir, 2021). At this early stage of the litigation, the Court will □ accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, and ask only whether the complaint contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F 4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, Because Michel is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F Ath 182, 185 Gd Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Jd. However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Jd. (quoting Mala, 704 F, 3d at 245). An unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” id.; see also Doe v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024 WL 379959, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (“While a court must liberally construe the allegations and ‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant mentioned it be name,’ Higgins y, Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir, 2002), this does not require the court to act as an advocate to identify any possible claim that the facts alleged could potentially support.”). Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91 (3d Cir, 2019). To conform to Rule 8, a pleading must contain a short and plain statement showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Travaline vy. US. Supreme Court, 424 F. App’x 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2011). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that, in determining whether a pleading meets

Rule 8’s “plain” statement requirement, the Court should “ask whether, liberally construed, a pleading ‘identifies discrete defendants and the actions taken by these defendants’ in regard to the plaintiffs claims.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93 (citation omitted). A pleading may still satisfy the “plain” statement requirement “even if it is vague, repetitious, or contains extraneous information” and “even if it does not include every name, date, and location of the incidents at issue.” Id. at 93-94. The important consideration for the Court is whether, “a pro se complaint’s language ... presents cognizable legal claims to which a defendant can respond on the merits,” id. at 94. However, “a pleading that is so ‘vague or ambiguous’ that a defendant cannot reasonably be expected to respond to it will not satisfy Rule 8.” Jd. at 93; see also Fabian v. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., No. 16-4741, 2017 WL 3494219, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2017) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that pleadings provide enough information to put a defendant on sufficient notice to prepare their defense and also ensure that the Court is sufficiently informed to determine the issue.”) (quotations omitted).

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MICHEL v. FAMILY DIVISION OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEASE OF PHILADELPHIA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michel-v-family-division-of-the-court-of-common-please-of-philadelphia-paed-2025.