Michel Hughes v. Benjamin Bright

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Decided: April 16, 2026
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 69 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-23-749

Opinion Delivered: April 16, 2026 MICHEL HUGHES APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 26DR-19-979] V. HONORABLE LYNN WILLIAMS, JUDGE BENJAMIN BRIGHT APPELLEE DISSENTING OPINION.

SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice

Without explanation, the court has dismissed this appeal as improvidently granted.

This case presents important issues concerning joint custody that we should address, but

because of today’s decision, thousands of families across the state have less certainty as to the

validity of their joint-custody agreements, many of which may have been working perfectly

for years. Also, by granting review, we have forced the parties to spend additional time,

money, and energy on this case. Now, that is all for naught.

In asking us to review the court of appeals’ decision, Michel Hughes raised two

issues. First, the court of appeals erred in green-lighting the circuit court’s conclusion that

parents living within fifteen minutes of each other constituted a material change in

circumstances that warranted a change to their custody agreement. Second, the court of

appeals misapplied the doctrine of inconsistent positions by holding that, because Hughes

argued there was a material change in circumstances, she could not appeal the circuit court’s finding of a material change in circumstances, even though the finding was based on factual

allegations that she disputed.

On the first issue, a fifteen-minute move cannot qualify as a material change in

circumstances.1 Such a claim not only undermines the preference for joint custody, but it

is also completely unworkable. How should a circuit court decide if parties live fifteen

minutes away from each other? Should it consider traffic, weather, or the driving habits of

a particular individual? What if there is construction for a year that closes the shortest route

and forces the parents to take a different, longer route? Or should the time between the

parents’ homes be determined by how the crow flies? If so, how fast does the crow fly?

And do we account for headwind or tailwind? We should have kept this case to clarify that

a fifteen-minute move is not enough to qualify as a material change in circumstances.

The same goes for the court of appeals’ inconsistent-positions analysis. The court of

appeals held that because Hughes argued there was a material change in circumstances

below, she could not appeal the circuit court’s finding of a material change in circumstances

in favor of Benjamin Bright. The court of appeals came to this conclusion even though the

circuit court’s order was based on factual allegations that Hughes disputed. In other words,

the court of appeals applied the doctrine of inconsistent positions to bar Hughes from

arguing that the facts the circuit court relied on were insufficient to find that there had been

1 See Schnick v. Russell, 2022 Ark. App. 212, at 10, 645 S.W.3d 345, 351 (holding that there was a material change in circumstances when one parent moved nine-and-a-half hours away to Omaha, Nebraska); see also Case v. Van Pelt, 2019 Ark. App. 382, at 7, 587 S.W.3d 567, 571 (affirming the circuit court’s decision to dismiss a petition to modify custody when one of the reasons cited was a twenty-five- to thirty-minute move).

2 a material change in circumstance. The court of appeals has a fundamental misunderstanding

of the difference between factual allegations and legal conclusions.

Hughes is bound to her allegations but not the legal conclusion drawn by the circuit

court. On appeal, she should be able to challenge the circuit court’s legal conclusion—and

she can do so by challenging the circuit court’s factual basis for that conclusion.

Misunderstanding the difference between allegations and legal conclusions can have a broad

impact on our legal system—think a motion to dismiss, treating allegations, not legal

conclusions, as true—and should be addressed by this court. We owe litigants clarity on

this issue that, in light of today’s decision, they currently do not have.

Finally, this all ties into a broader problem that has plagued circuit courts and the

court of appeals for years: an unwillingness to effectuate the statutory preference for joint

custody. The General Assembly has made clear that “an award of joint custody is favored

in Arkansas[,]” and there is a rebuttable “presumption that joint custody is in the best interest

of the child[.]”2 Despite this, the court of appeals has maintained a “low threshold for

modification” that “disregards the express legislative policy favoring joint custody, the

appellate standard of review for custody decisions, and the ‘child’s best interest’ analysis.”3

Holding that a fifteen-minute move qualifies as a material change in circumstances to

warrant a change in joint custody drags the court of appeals’ low threshold even lower and

effectively neuters the statutory preference for joint custody. After all, if something as small

2 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(1)(A)(iv)(b). 3 Pace v. Pace, 2020 Ark. 108, at 11, 595 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Womack, J., concurring).

3 as this can qualify as a material change in circumstances, it is hard to imagine what, if

anything, would not.

Moreover, the fact that parents are uncooperative cannot, alone, warrant a finding

of material change in circumstances. Instead, the parent seeking a change in custody must

establish that the other parent is “willfully creating conflict in an attempt to disrupt a current

or pending joint-custody arrangement[,]” and the circuit court must find that it is “unable

to enter an order that will reduce areas of conflict caused by the disruptive parent[.]”4 Here,

the circuit court made no such findings, and Bright failed to show that Hughes had willfully

created conflict to disrupt their joint-custody agreement.5 In most of these cases, circuit

courts will need to deal with uncooperative parties. After all, “[p]eople typically do not

divorce or engage in custody battles because they are skilled at cooperation and

communication.”6 Circuit courts and the court of appeals must recognize, however, that

lack of cooperation cannot be “the sole and dispositive factor in reversing joint custody.”7

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision to dismiss this appeal

as improvidently granted.

WEBB and BRONNI, JJ., join.

4 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(b)(1)(A)(iii). 5 Id. 6 Pace, 2020 Ark. 108, at 12–13, 595 S.W.3d at 354 (Womack, J., concurring). 7 Id. at 13, 595 S.W.3d at 354 (Womack, J., concurring).