Michaud v. St. Mary's Hospital, No. 099015 (Aug. 19, 1992)

Connecticut Superior Court

Michaud v. St. Mary's Hospital, No. 099015 (Aug. 19, 1992)

1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 7842

CourtConnecticut Superior Court

DecidedAugust 19, 1992

DocketNo. 099015

StatusUnpublished

This text of 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 7842 (Michaud v. St. Mary's Hospital, No. 099015 (Aug. 19, 1992)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Michaud v. St. Mary's Hospital, No. 099015 (Aug. 19, 1992), 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 7842 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).

Pincite

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] ORDER (#163) After hearing held on plaintiff's motion to strike special defenses (first and second) of defendant-Surredi, it is hereby ORDERED: granted; for the following reasons:

". . . Practice Book Section 164 distinguishes between those cases where a special defense is required in contradistinction to those where a simple denial, whether general or specific, is sufficient." Second Exeter Corporation v. Epstein, 5 Conn. App. 427,428 (1985). "Facts which are consistent with [the plaintiff's allegations] but show, notwithstanding that he has no cause of action, must be specially alleged." P.B., Section 164. In essence, a special defense admits evidence consistent with a plaintiff's claim, "but nevertheless would tend to destroy the cause of action." Bernier v. National Fence Co., 176 Conn. 622,629 (1979).

The defendant's first and second special defenses do nothing to destroy the plaintiff's cause of action which is predicated on a claim of professional negligence by an attending physician. How the plaintiff Paul Michaud got himself into the physical condition as to which the defendant-Surredi was to provide care and treatment, is irrelevant. Joinder of the principal issues presented (i.e., whether the defendant breached the standard of care required of him once the plaintiff came into his care and the damages, if any, stemming therefrom) can be attained by simple denials.

GAFFNEY, J. CT Page 7843

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] ORDER (#163) After hearing held on plaintiff's motion to strike special defenses (first and second) of defendant-Surredi, it is hereby ORDERED: granted; for the following reasons:

". . . Practice Book Section 164 distinguishes between those cases where a special defense is required in contradistinction to those where a simple denial, whether general or specific, is sufficient." Second Exeter Corporation v. Epstein, 5 Conn. App. 427,428 (1985). "Facts which are consistent with [the plaintiff's allegations] but show, notwithstanding that he has no cause of action, must be specially alleged." P.B., Section 164. In essence, a special defense admits evidence consistent with a plaintiff's claim, "but nevertheless would tend to destroy the cause of action." Bernier v. National Fence Co., 176 Conn. 622,629 (1979).

The defendant's first and second special defenses do nothing to destroy the plaintiff's cause of action which is predicated on a claim of professional negligence by an attending physician. How the plaintiff Paul Michaud got himself into the physical condition as to which the defendant-Surredi was to provide care and treatment, is irrelevant. Joinder of the principal issues presented (i.e., whether the defendant breached the standard of care required of him once the plaintiff came into his care and the damages, if any, stemming therefrom) can be attained by simple denials.

GAFFNEY, J. CT Page 7843

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 7842, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michaud-v-st-marys-hospital-no-099015-aug-19-1992-connsuperct-1992.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack