Michaud v. HSBC Bank et al.

2013 DNH 175

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: December 19, 2013
• Docket: 13-CV-378-PB
• Status: Published

Opinion

Michaud v . HSBC Bank et a l . 13-CV-378-PB 12/19/13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Robert W . Michaud

v. Civil N o . 13-cv-378-PB Opinion N o . 2013 DNH 175 HSBC Bank USA, N.A. as Trustee for Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2005-3 Trust, Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-3

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case arises from a loan granted to Robert and Piedad

Michaud by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. that was secured by a mortgage

on the Michauds’ home in Nashua, New Hampshire. M r . Michaud

claims he has entered into a binding loan modification agreement

with the current holder of the promissory note and mortgage,

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. as Trustee for Wells Fargo Home Equity

Asset-Backed Securities 2005-3 Trust, Home Equity Asset-Backed

Certificates, Series 2005-3. He seeks to enforce this contract

and enjoin HSBC from foreclosing. HSBC moves to dismiss the

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

I grant the motion. I. BACKGROUND1

As consideration for a $219,600 home loan, Robert and

Piedad Michaud executed a promissory note payable to Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A on June 3 0 , 2005. The note was secured by a mortgage

on residential property that the Michauds purchased with the

loan proceeds; Wells Fargo was named mortgagee. The Michauds

suffered a financial hardship in 2012, leading M r . Michaud to

reach out to Wells Fargo in July of that year to inquire about

modification of his loan terms. The Michauds paid the

Litigation Law Group (“LLG”) $4,000 to assist him with the loan

modification negotiations. LLG worked with Wells Fargo until

April 2013, at which point LLG cut off its phone and email

service. After several unsuccessful attempts to contact LLG,

Mr. Michaud learned from Wells Fargo that LLG had been issued a

cease and desist order. M r . Michaud alleges that LLG defrauded

him by retaining the $4,000 payment despite taking no action on

1 The facts are drawn from the First Amended Petition to Enjoin Foreclosure (Doc. N o . 6 ) and from the other documents provided by the parties that are central to the complaint’s factual allegations. See Beddall v . State S t . Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 1 2 , 17 (1st Cir. 1998) (“When . . . a complaint’s factual allegations are expressly linked to — and admittedly dependent upon — a document (the authenticity of which is not challenged), that document effectively merges into the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”).

2 his behalf to pursue a loan modification.2 Following this

revelation, M r . Michaud continued to discuss loan modification

requirements with a loan preservation specialist at Wells Fargo.

On June 2 1 , 2013, Wells Fargo assigned the Michauds’ note

and mortgage to HSBC but continued to service the loan on HSBC’s

behalf. The Michauds presumably defaulted on their loan

obligations during this period – they do not claim otherwise -

and either HSBC or Wells Fargo scheduled a foreclosure auction

for July 2 4 , 2013. Two days before the sale was to occur, M r .

Michaud filed a pro se 3 petition with the New Hampshire Superior

Court to enjoin the sale, stating that “we need more time to

work with Wells Fargo – we need to stop [the] foreclosure . . .

.” Doc. N o . 3 . That same day, the court enjoined the sale

pending a hearing on the petition. Before this hearing could

occur, HSBC removed the case to this court on August 2 3 , 2013.

On September 1 3 , 2013, M r . Michaud amended his complaint to

allege that HSBC or its agent had recently offered to modify his

loan terms. M r . Michaud claims to have accepted this offer,

creating a binding loan modification agreement with HSBC.

LLG is not a party in this case.

The Michauds have since retained counsel. 3 On September 2 7 , 2013, HSBC moved to dismiss the amended

complaint for failure to state a claim. M r . Michaud filed an

objection to the motion on October 7 , 2013.

I I . STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff

must make factual allegations sufficient to “state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v . Iqbal,

556 U.S. 6 6 2 , 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v . Twombly,

550 U.S. 5 4 4 , 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when

it pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678

(citation omitted).

In deciding a motion to dismiss, I employ a two-step

approach. See Ocasio–Hernández v . Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1 ,

12 (1st Cir. 2011). First, I screen the complaint for

statements that “merely offer legal conclusions couched as fact

or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.”

Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). A claim

4 consisting of little more than “allegations that merely parrot

the elements of the cause of action” may be dismissed. Id.

Second, I credit as true all non-conclusory factual allegations

and the reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations, and

then determine if the claim is plausible. Id. The plausibility

requirement “simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of illegal

conduct. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The “make-or-break

standard” is that those allegations and inferences, taken as

true, “must state a plausible, not a merely conceivable, case

for relief.” Sepúlveda–Villarini v . Dep’t of Educ. of P.R., 628

F.3d 2 5 , 29 (1st Cir. 2010); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level . . . . ” ) .

III. ANALYSIS

Mr. Michaud bases his amended complaint on his contention

that HSBC or its agent sent him a loan modification offer on or

about July 2 6 , 2013. The alleged offer includes the following

terms: (1) a reduction of the principal balance from $253,931 to

$228,537.90; (2) a reduction of the interest rate from six

percent to two percent; and (3) a reduction of the required

5 monthly payment from $1523.59 to $845.59. Doc. N o . 6. The

Michauds claim that they have accepted this offer and seek to

enjoin the foreclosure and enforce the terms of this alleged

contract with HSBC.

I need not address the highly doubtful proposition that the

July 26 correspondence constitutes a valid offer, as M r . Michaud

has failed to craft a plausible argument that the letter in

question originated from HSBC or its agent. The letter states

that “[t]his public notice is courtesy of NMA Legal-Network

National Mortgage Aid. NMA . . . is not a creditor or a

lender.” Doc. N o . 7-4.4 It further states that the

“[i]nformation [in this letter] was obtained from public record

sources.” Id. The letter includes “RE: Wells Fargo Bk NA” 4 HSBC presented a copy of this letter as an exhibit accompanying its motion to dismiss. Doc. N o . 7-4. The amended complaint alleges that HSBC or its agent “sent a mortgage modification proposal to the Petitioners” without explicitly mentioning a letter. Doc. N o . 6. The date and terms of the alleged offer match those in the letter, and M r . Michaud does not challenge the letter’s authenticity, claim that it is not the offer in question, or otherwise object to its introduction. See Doc. N o . 8 . I therefore consider it in deciding the motion to dismiss without converting that motion to one for summary judgment. See Beddall, 137 F.3d at 17 (“[T]he court’s inquiry . . . should not be hamstrung simply because the plaintiff fails to append to the complaint the very document upon which by her own admission the allegations rest. . . . [Otherwise,] a plaintiff could thwart the consideration of a critical document merely by omitting it from the complaint.”).

6 above M r . Michaud’s address, but in the context of the above

quoted text, this reference to Wells Fargo merely identifies the

loan that is the subject of NMA’s letter. The letter contains

no other reference to Wells Fargo. It contains no reference to

HSBC whatsoever. On its face, it appears to be no more than a

common solicitation from a third party that has learned from

public records that a struggling homeowner involved in

foreclosure proceedings may be interested in its services.

Despite the letter’s obvious nature, M r . Michaud claims

that “[t]he relationship between the offeror and the Respondent

in this action is a question of fact not susceptible to

dismissal based on the pleading.” Doc. N o . 8 . That might be

true had M r . Michaud presented any evidence whatsoever to

establish that NMA had actual or apparent authority to act on

HSBC’s behalf. See Dent v . Exeter Hosp., Inc., 155 N.H. 7 8 7 ,

792 (2007) (defining actual authority and noting that apparent

authority “exists where the principal so conducts itself as to

cause a third party to reasonably believe that the agent is

authorized to act” (quoting Boynton v . Figueroa, 154 N.H. 5 9 2 ,

604 (2006))). As it stands, however, M r . Michaud’s unsupported

allegation is merely a “legal conclusion[] couched as fact,” not

7 a plausible claim sufficient to survive dismissal. See Ocasio–

Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (alterations omitted).

Mr. Michaud also argues in his objection to the motion to

dismiss that HSBC “overlooks . . . that the offer . . . is not

the only basis for enjoining the foreclosure,” noting that

“[t]he original Petition . . . clearly indicates that [Mr.

Michaud] was ‘working with Wells Fargo’ a [sic] the time of

receipt of the foreclosure notice but ‘need[s] more time.’”

Doc. N o . 8 (last alteration in original) (emphasis omitted). In

citing exclusively to the original complaint in support of this

claim, however, M r . Michaud’s counsel overlooks the fact that

“an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.” See

Pac. Bell Tel. C o . v . Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 4 3 8 , 456

n.4 (2009); accord Evergreen Partnering Grp., Inc. v . Pactiv

Corp., 720 F.3d 3 3 , 40 n.2 (1st Cir. 2013). Such an oversight

might be countenanced if M r . Michaud remained pro s e . Now that

he is represented by counsel, claims raised in the original

complaint but not the amended complaint are deemed waived. To

the extent that the amended complaint is intended to incorporate

a similar claim, see Doc. N o . 6 (“The Petitioner continues to

work with Wells Fargo . . . but needs additional time.”), it

fails to state a viable cause of action. See, e.g., Worrall v .

8 Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 2013 DNH 1 5 8 , 15 (citing Schaefer v .

IndyMac Mortg. Servs., N o . 12–cv–159–JD, 2012 WL 4929094, at *6

(D.N.H. Oct. 1 6 , 2012), aff’d, 731 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2013);

Moore v . Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 2d

107, 129-30 (D.N.H. 2012)).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons I grant HSBC’s motion to dismiss

(Doc. N o . 7 ) . The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and

close the case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

December 1 9 , 2013

cc: Bradley M . Lown, Esq. Michael R. Stanley, Esq.