Michalek v. Port Townsend Police Department

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJanuary 24, 2020
Docket3:19-cv-06170
StatusUnknown

This text of Michalek v. Port Townsend Police Department (Michalek v. Port Townsend Police Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michalek v. Port Townsend Police Department, (W.D. Wash. 2020).

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 BRIAN JUDAH MICHALEK, CASE NO. 3:19-CV-6170-RJB-DWC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE OR 12 v. AMEND 13 PORT TOWNSEND POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., 14 Defendants. 15

Plaintiff Brian Judah Michalek, proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights complaint under 16 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Having reviewed and screened Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 17 1915A, the Court declines to serve Plaintiff’s Complaint but provides Plaintiff leave to file an 18 amended pleading by February 24, 2020, to cure the deficiencies identified herein. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiff, who is housed in the Jefferson County Jail, alleges police officers Daniel Rios 21 and Patrick Fudally used excessive force against him during an arrest. Plaintiff alleges he was 22 removed from a patrol car, beaten and his head pressed against the ground, resulting in bruising 23 and scraping of his lower back, head, neck, face, collar bone, left quadricep, wrists and ankles, as 24 1 well as being rendered semi-conscious. Dkt. 6 at 5, 7. In addition to his claim for excessive 2 force (Count I), Plaintiff also asserts claims for false statements (Count II) and for false 3 imprisonment and kidnapping (Claim III). Dkt. 6 at 6, 7. Plaintiff names as defendants the two 4 individual police officers (Defendants Rios and Fudally), the Port Townsend Police Department,

5 and the “Jefferson County Courthouse,” and/or its “probation department,” “judge department,” 6 and “prosecutor department” (collectively, the “County Defendants”). Dkt. 6 at 1, 3.1 7 II. DISCUSSION 8 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Court is required to screen 9 complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or 10 employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the 11 complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 12 state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant 13 who is immune from such relief.” Id. at (b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Barren v. Harrington, 14 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998).

15 Except for Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant Rios, Plaintiff’s Complaint 16 suffers from deficiencies requiring dismissal if not corrected in an amended complaint. 17 A. Personal Participation 18 To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) he suffered a 19 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the 20

21 1 The Court notes the Complaint appears to be missing some pages. Its narrative seems to be cut off in 22 places (see, e.g. Dkt. 1-1 at 5, 7) and it reaches only to Page 7 of a reported 9 pages, before including a superfluous blank health services request form (Dkt. 1-1 at 8, 9). The Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to 23 contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief,” and “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(e). If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he 24 should check to ensure all pages are included, and the statement of each claim is complete. 1 violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. 2 Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The first step in a § 1983 claim is therefore to 3 identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 4 271 (1994).

5 To satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how individually 6 named defendants caused, or personally participated in causing, the harm alleged in the 7 complaint. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 8 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). A person subjects another to a deprivation of a constitutional right 9 when committing an affirmative act, participating in another’s affirmative act, or omitting to 10 perform an act which is legally required. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 11 Sweeping conclusory allegations against an official are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Leer, 12 844 F.2d at 633. Further, a § 1983 suit cannot be based on vicarious liability alone, but must allege 13 the defendant’s own conduct violated the plaintiff’s civil rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 14 378, 385-90 (1989).

15 The Complaint alleges “Officer Daniel Rios busted and bruised my face, neck” and other 16 parts of Plaintiff’s body. Dkt. 6 at 7. This is the only place the Complaint identifies a particular 17 Defendant as an actor engaging in conduct alleged to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The 18 Complaint contains no allegations of any actions by Defendant Fudally, the Port Townsend 19 Police Department, or the County Defendants. 20 Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to allege personal participation against 21 Defendant Fudally, the Port Townsend Police Department, or the County Defendants. To 22 proceed with any claims against those named Defendants, Plaintiff must set forth specific factual 23

24 1 allegations underlying his claims and specifically identify how each person violated his 2 constitutional rights. 3 B. Improper Defendants 4 In addition, Defendants Port Townsend Police Department, “Jefferson County

5 Courthouse,” the “Probation Department,” “Judge Department,” and “Prosecutor Department” 6 are not legal entities capable of being sued under § 1983. Rather, two municipalities—the City 7 of Port Townsend and Jefferson County—would be the proper defendants. See Monell v. New 8 York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); 9 Wright v. Clark County Sheriff’s Office, 2016 WL 1643988, *2 (W.D. Wash. April 26, 2016). 10 To set forth a claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show the defendant’s employees or 11 agents acted through an official custom, pattern, or policy permitting deliberate indifference to, 12 or violating, the plaintiff’s civil rights, or that the entity ratified the unlawful conduct. Monell, 13 436 U.S. at 690-91.

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Related

Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Albright v. Oliver
510 U.S. 266 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Watchorn v. Roxana Petroleum Corporation
5 F.2d 636 (Eighth Circuit, 1925)
Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.
114 F.3d 1467 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)
Johnson v. Duffy
588 F.2d 740 (Ninth Circuit, 1978)

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Michalek v. Port Townsend Police Department, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michalek-v-port-townsend-police-department-wawd-2020.