Michael Winfield v. R. Strauss

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 2, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-02456
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 Michael WINFIELD, Case No.: 3:25-cv-2456-AGS-MMP

5 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 6 vs. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF 3) AND DISMISSING 7 COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO R. STRAUSS, 8 AMEND Defendant. 9 10 11 Plaintiff Michael Winfield, proceeding without an attorney, seeks to waive the filing 12 fee for his lawsuit. That motion is granted, but his complaint doesn’t pass mandatory 13 screening. 14 MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 15 Winfield moves to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without paying the usual $405 16 in court fees. See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999) (“An action may 17 proceed despite failure to pay the filing fees only if the party is granted IFP status.”); 18 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (“filing fee of $350”); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District 19 Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023) (“Administrative fee” of “$55”). 20 Winfield is currently “incarcerated,” not “employed,” and does not have a “checking 21 account” nor other “savings” or “assets” (ECF 3, at 1–3.) Based on these representations, 22 the Court finds that he is unable to pay the required fees. 23 SCREENING 24 Next, the Court must screen the complaint and dismiss it if—among other things— 25 it “fails to state a claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Although the requirement is not 26 onerous, Winfield’s complaint does not meet the standard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) 27 (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 28 relief”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (noting that Rule 8’s purpose 1 is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it 2 rest” (cleaned up)). 3 Winfield is suing “Nurse R. Strauss” for “defamation of character, slander, mental 4 anguish[,] and discrimination,” relying on federal civil-rights law—specifically, 42 U.S.C. 5 § 1983. (ECF 1, at 2.) The first three are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., 6 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (holding defamation is not actionable under § 1983 7 because “defamatory [statements], however seriously they may have harmed [plaintiff’s] 8 reputation, did not deprive him of any ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests protected by the Due 9 Process Clause”); Hernandez v. Johnson, 833 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding 10 that “libel and slander claims against [prison employee] are precluded by Paul”); Whatley 11 v. Gray, Case No. 17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS, 2018 WL 828200, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 12 2018) (finding a prisoner’s “claims of ‘defamation of character,’ [] libel, or slander do not 13 rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation”); Carrillo v. Mission Valley Nordstrom 14 Rack, No. 23-cv-1535-WQH-LR, 2023 WL 7169560, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2023) 15 (holding that plaintiff’s allegation that defendant “defamed his character” “fails to allege 16 the deprivation of a constitutional right”). 17 That leaves Winfield’s discrimination claim, which he does not sufficiently explain. 18 First, he does not specify what discrimination law his claim is based on. Discrimination 19 claims usually require that the plaintiff allege he belongs to a “protected class.” See, e.g., 20 JW Seals v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., No. Cv 18-10104-CBM-(JEMx), 2020 WL 21 5092455, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2020) (California Fair Employment and Housing Act 22 discrimination claim requires that plaintiff “belongs to a protected class”); Narayanan v. 23 Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ. ex rel. Univ. of Nev., Reno, No. 24 3:11–cv–00744–LRH–VPC, 2013 WL 2394934, at *5 (D. Nev. May 30, 2013) (Title VII 25 discrimination claim requires that plaintiff “belonged to a protected class”). Winfield never 26 does so. Second, he fails to allege any facts supporting discrimination—he just provides 27 statements he perceives as “defamation” or “slander.” (ECF 1, at 3; ECF 1-2, at 2 28 (“Complainant alleges ‘Nurse R. Strauss’ stated that she alone gave the complainant 1 || HIV.”). 2 Because Winfield’s bare-bone allegations are deficient—and mostly support 3 ||non-actionable claims—his complaint must be dismissed. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 4 678 (2009) (requiring a complaint contain enough facts to “state a claim to relief that 5 ||is plausible on its face”). Given Winfield’s unrepresented status, however, the Court grants 6 ||him leave to file an updated IFP petition and amend his complaint. After all, a “district 7 |{court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely 8 that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Rosati v. 9 || Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). 10 CONCLUSION 11 Thus, the Court orders as follows: 12 1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. 13 2. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 14 3. By January 16, 2026, plaintiff must file any amended complaint. The amended 15 ||complaint must be complete by itself without reference to any previous version of his 16 || pleading; defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the amended complaint 17 || will be considered waived. If Winfield fails to timely amend, the Court will enter a final 18 || Order dismissing this case. 19 Dated: December 2, 2025

1 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 □□