Michael Williams v. Debbie Philips

536 F. App'x 704
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedAugust 2, 2013
Docket12-15956
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 536 F. App'x 704 (Michael Williams v. Debbie Philips) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michael Williams v. Debbie Philips, 536 F. App'x 704 (9th Cir. 2013).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Michael B. Williams, a civil detainee confined at Coalinga State Hospital pursuant to California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that a withdrawal of funds from his patient trust account violated his federal constitutional rights and the no-contest clause of his father’s will. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim, Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir.2005), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Williams’s equal protection claim because Williams failed to allege facts demonstrating that defendants intentionally and without rational basis treated him differently from others similarly situated and inten *705 tionally discriminated against him. See N. Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir.2008) (elements of equal protection claim).

The district court properly dismissed Williams’s due process claim because the Notice of Intended Withdrawal and denial of Williams’s appeal, included as exhibits to the First Amended Complaint, showed that Williams received all of the process that he was due. See Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1554 (9th Cir.1988) (due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard).

The district court properly dismissed Williams’s takings claim because Williams failed to allege facts demonstrating that his funds were taken for public use. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 7281 (sums exceeding $500 in a patient’s personal deposit fund “may be applied to the payment of the care, support, maintenance, and medical attention of the patient”); Ward v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 807, 810 (9th Cir.2010) (elements of a takings claim).

The district court properly dismissed Williams’s state law claim alleging that defendants violated the “no-contest” provision of his father’s will because the defendants were not beneficiaries of the will. See Burch v. George, 7 Cal.4th 246, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 866 P.2d 92, 103 (1994) (no contest clause “essentially acts as a disinheritance device, i.e., if a beneficiary contests or seeks to impair or invalidate the trust instrument or its provisions, the beneficiary will be disinherited and thus may not take the gift or devise provided under the instrument”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir.2010) (setting forth standard of review).

We do not consider Williams’s contentions concerning'an alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the California Constitution raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

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Related

Williams v. Phillips
134 S. Ct. 1295 (Supreme Court, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
536 F. App'x 704, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michael-williams-v-debbie-philips-ca9-2013.