Michael White v. City of Philadelphia, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 22, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-04538
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL WHITE : CIVIL ACTION : v. : : CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al. : NO. 23-4538

MEMORANDUM Bartle, J. December 22, 2025 Plaintiff Michael White has sued the City of Philadelphia and the Estate of Lawrence Gerrard, a now deceased Philadelphia detective, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations related to his criminal prosecution and conviction that occurred over four decades ago. The essence of these alleged violations are the obtaining a coerced confession from White, the fabricating of testimony at his trial, and the withholding of material required to be produced under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).1 The claim against the City rests on Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

1 Five of the six counts in the complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remain. Those against the Estate of Gerrard are labeled: (1) Count I – “Deprivation of Liberty without due process of laws and Denial of a Fair Trial under the Fourteenth Amendment”; (2) Count II – “Violation of Plaintiff’s rights against self- incrimination in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”; (3) Count III – “Civil Rights Conspiracy”; and (4) Count IV – “Failure to Intervene.” Count VI against the City is labeled “Municipal Liability.” Count V contained a claim against defendant, Estate of Lt. William Shelton. This claim was previously dismissed. Before the court are the motions of the defendants for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). The court views the facts and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2004).

Summary judgment is granted where there is insufficient record evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find for the nonmovant. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party]’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for [that party].” Id. In addition, Rule 56(e)(2) provides “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). II

It is undisputed that Georgell Lewis was shot and killed during a robbery on January 19, 1977 at a variety store in North Philadelphia he either owned or managed and that White and Eughenia Jones were arrested that day for the crimes. The next day, January 20, 1977, White purportedly signed a written confession after being interrogated by Detective Gerrard. In that confession, White admitted that he was present at the variety store and told Lewis to lie down so that he could be searched for money. At that point, Lewis was shot when a gun went off “by accident.” The confession does not say who was the shooter. Jones took a ring and watch belonging to Lewis. After giving his confession, White was transferred to

a Philadelphia County prison where he received medical treatment. Thereafter, White moved to suppress his confession on the ground that it was coerced by the detectives including Gerrard who beat and threatened him. His counsel subpoenaed his medical records in support of the motion, but the medical records were missing and never found. In June 1977, after five days of hearings and eight witnesses (but not White), Judge Armond Della Porta of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denied the motion to suppress. The Judge stated on the record: ... the statement given was given as a result of an understanding of his rights and appreciation of the consequences of a waiver and that he knowingly and without force, threats or pressure voluntarily did waive his constitutional rights and gave a statement to the police. Therefore, the statement is admissible.

Judge Della Porta also found that the Commonwealth’s handling of inmates’ medical records was negligent but that there was no evidence that anyone acted willfully or intentionally to keep White’s medical records from being produced. White’s jury trial, presided over by Judge Della Porta, began on June 23, 1977. At that point, defense counsel asked the prosecution for information about whether Lewis had any drugs on his person or in the store. The prosecutor replied that he had checked Lewis’ record and that as far as he knew, Lewis had never been convicted of a crime. Defense counsel had hoped to use any information about Lewis’ involvement in the drug trade to argue that the shooting was over a drug deal between Lewis and Jones. There was also testimony from Carmella Sproul, a young woman who was working in the store at the time of the crimes but did not witness the shooting. She stated on the stand that there was no illegal drug activity on the premises. A number of years later she recanted this part of her testimony. White was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery,

and conspiracy and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. White, 415 A.2d 399, 402 (Pa. 1980). The focus of its decision was on an issue not relevant here. In footnote 1, the Court stated that all other issues raised by White were “without merit and not requiring in-depth analysis,” including the issue White raised that “the suppression court erred in finding [his] waiver of constitutional rights valid.” Id. at 400 n.1. In 1993, over twelve years after the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Judge Della Porta held a hearing on White’s petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act. Commonwealth ex rel. Michael White v. Vaughn, Jan. Term

1977, Nos. 2333-37, slip op. at 2 (Phila. Cty. Ct. Common Pleas Mar. 19, 1993). The Court ruled that the Commonwealth had committed a Brady violation by not revealing to defense counsel at White’s 1977 trial that Lewis had an arrest record. Id. at 10. It found that the prosecutor at the time had been aware of this information. White, the Court determined, had been denied due process and a fair trial. It vacated the judgment of sentence and barred further prosecution. Id. at 10-11. The Superior Court, however, reversed. Commonwealth v. White, No. 903 Philadelphia 1993, slip op. at 5-6 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 29, 1993). Having exhausted his state remedies, White filed a

petition for habeas corpus relief in this court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Commonwealth did not oppose the petition. On December 29, 2022, my colleague Judge John R. Padova vacated White’s conviction and sentence based on Judge Della Porta’s analysis, his own analysis, and the Commonwealth’s concession that there had been a Brady violation in not producing Lewis’ arrest record. White v. Vaughn, No. 94-6598, 2022 WL 17993129, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2022). The Court ordered the Commonwealth to retry or release White within 180 days. Id. After the Commonwealth opted to retry him, he pleaded guilty to third degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy, and was sentenced to time served. He was released from custody after serving over

forty-six years in prison. III The defendants argue that White’s § 1983 action is barred under the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Court held that in order to recover damages for an unconstitutional or unlawful conviction or imprisonment that would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a “§ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at

486-87. The Court ruled that a tort action, including one under § 1983, is not the proper vehicle to call into question outstanding criminal judgments. Id. at 485. In undertaking a Heck analysis, a court asks itself two questions. First, would a favorable judgment in a § 1983 action undermine the validity of plaintiff’s first and/or second criminal conviction. Second, if the answer is “yes” as to either, has that criminal conviction been invalidated? Dennis v. City of Philadelphia, 379 F. Supp. 3d 420, 428 (E.D. Pa. 2019). White’s § 1983 action asserts unconstitutional acts by the City and Detective Gerrard that occurred in 1977. He claims

he received an unfair trial in 1997 due to a coerced confession, fabricated evidence, and the withholding of Brady material. He does not argue and the success in this action does not depend on his innocence, for even the guilty have constitutional rights and are entitled to a fair trial.2 Id. at 430; Poventud v. City

2 White has always maintained that he himself did not kill Lewis, and his confession does not say that he did. At his guilty plea hearing in 2023, he did not admit he was the shooter. Even if he was not the shooter, he can still be convicted of second or third-degree murder. Commonwealth v. of New York, 750 F.3d 121, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 48-49 (2022). Success in this § 1983 action would clearly undermine the validity of his 1977

criminal conviction since success would necessarily mean that the conviction was tainted with constitutional violations and cannot stand. That conviction, however, was called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254. It was terminated in White’s favor when it was vacated by this court in 2022. Heck, 512 U.S. at 485. At that point, the first conviction no longer existed. Id. The court must also ask the same questions as to his second conviction. White pleaded guilty, knowingly and voluntarily, in 2023 to third-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy before a Common Pleas judge. He did so by admitting to certain material facts recited by an Assistant District

Attorney in open court. There was no mention of his confession or the testimony of Carmella Sproul, and his guilty plea was not predicated on either. His pending § 1983 action simply involves the 1977 alleged constitutional violations and has nothing to do with his 2023 conviction which was free of constitutional challenges. Success in this lawsuit would not in any way undermine or call into question his second conviction. The fact

Wilson, 426 A.2d 575, 576 (Pa. 1981); see Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482, 499-501 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020). that the second conviction remains in effect presents no obstacle under Heck. Defendants cite two decisions of our Court of Appeals

which they read as barring White’s action under Heck. Both are inapposite. In Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005), the plaintiff sued local police officials under § 1983 for violation of his First Amendment rights in connection with his arrest on a college campus for resisting arrest, disorderly conduct and failure of disorderly persons to disperse. Plaintiff resolved the charges by entering into Pennsylvania’s Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition Program. Id. at 203. The Court of Appeals explained that the program imposes a number of restrictions and that participation in the program is not a favorable termination of criminal charges. Id. at 208-12. As a result, plaintiff’s § 1983 action failed under Heck. Id. at

210. In contrast, the termination of White’s first conviction ended favorably to him. The second decision on which the defendants rely is Bronowicz v. Allegheny County, 804 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2015). There the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action in which he alleged constitutional violations involving numerous sentencings as well as proceedings involving revocation of probation. Id. at 340. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated his sentence in one case. Id. at 343. The Commonwealth conceded, among other problems, that Bronowicz’s probation had been revoked and he had been sentenced to prison in absentia with no indication that he had waived his presence. Id. Defendants cite language in this

Court of Appeals decision that the invalidation of a sentence must indicate the innocence of the accused to constitute a favorable outcome and to avoid the Heck bar. Id. at 346. This is dictum. Indeed, in that action, there was no indication by the Superior Court or the Court of Appeals that Bronowicz was innocent of any violation of his probation. Yet the court allowed his § 1983 action to proceed. The court explained that it “eschewed an overly mechanical approach.” Instead, we consider whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the prior proceedings reflect a favorable outcome for the plaintiff that would be consistent with the success of the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

Id. In addition, any actual innocence requirement for a § 1983 action to succeed, at least insofar as a claim for malicious prosecution is concerned, has been abrogated by the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 48-49 (2022). It is also significant that Heck never said a word about innocence as a factor in deciding whether to allow a § 1983 action to proceed. See generally Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In sum, a court must determine under Heck whether a favorable outcome in a § 1983 action would undermine a criminal judgment. If the criminal judgment has been invalidated, a plaintiff’s § 1983 action may proceed. Likewise, the action may proceed if an outstanding criminal judgment exists but would not

be undermined. In both circumstances, there is no clash between a § 1983 action and a criminal judgment. This action, if successful, would undermine White’s first conviction, but that conviction has been invalidated. This action, if successful, would not undermine his second conviction which remains in force. Accordingly, it is not barred by Heck. IV The defendants further argue that even if this action is not prohibited by Heck, White is collaterally estopped from challenging the constitutionality of his confession. They rely on Judge Della Porta’s 1977 ruling upholding the confession and

the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirming that ruling. Commonwealth v. White, 415 A.2d 399, 400 n.1 (1980). A federal court, pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, and to 28 U.S.C. § 1738, is bound to apply the same preclusive effect to a state court decision as the state court itself would apply. Migra v. Warren City School District, 465 U.S. 75, 81-83 (1984). Thus, this court must look to the law of Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Rue v. K-Mart Corporation, 713 A.2d 82, 84 (Pa. 1998), set forth the following requirements for collateral estoppel or issue preclusion:

(1) An issue decided in a prior action is identical to one presented in a later action; (2) The prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (3) The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior action, or is in privity with a party to the prior action; and (4) The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.

There is no dispute that factors (1) and (3) have been satisfied. The critical questions are whether there has been a final judgment on the merits in the state court on the issue of coerced confession and whether White had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. In April 1977, before White’s trial, Judge Della Porta of the Court of Common Pleas held a lengthy evidentiary hearing over five days on White’s motion to suppress his confession. The Court heard from eight witnesses. On April 18, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled, as noted earlier: the statement given was given as a result of an understanding of his rights and appreciation of the consequences of a waiver, and that he willingly, understandingly, knowingly and without any force or threats or pressure voluntarily did waive his constitutional rights and give a statement to the police. Therefore, the statement is admissible in evidence.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thereafter affirmed Judge Della Porta’s ruling. Commonwealth v. White, 415 A.2d 399, 402 (1980). It concluded that any argument about the invalidity of the confession was “without merit” and “not requiring in-depth analysis.” Commonwealth v. White, 415 A.2d 399, 400 n.1 (1980). In addition, White has not pointed to anything in the record that the Commonwealth improperly withheld from him any evidence relevant to his motion to suppress. The hearing on the motion was held two months before the trial began in late June 1977. Nor has White otherwise cited to any relevant new evidence that was unavailable at the time of his suppression motion.3 White has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of his confession in the Pennsylvania courts. The court turns to question whether there is a final judgement on the merits of White’s confession. For purposes of issue preclusion, a final judgment “includes any prior adjudication of another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982); In re Brown, 951

F.2d 564, 569-70 (3d Cir. 1991).

3 The medical records of White, missing since 1977, were not located during discovery in this action. After the affirmance of White’s conviction by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Judge Padova, in the § 2254 proceeding, ordered White to be retried or released in 180 days.

White v. Vaughn, No. 94-6598, 2022 WL 17993129, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2022). Our Court of Appeals in Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1998), explained that a district court in a § 2254 proceeding is not reviewing or revising a state court decision generally as if the district court were deciding the matter on direct appeal. Id. Rather, the district court is simply focusing on personal liberty and determining whether there was improper detention. Id. If there was improper detention, the district court may order immediate release conditional upon the state court’s correcting the constitutional errors found by the district court to have occurred in the state proceedings. In the § 2254 proceeding here, Judge Padova

granted relief solely on the basis of a Brady violation. White v. Vaughn, No. 94-6598, 2022 WL 17993129, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2022). He did not disturb the ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirming the validity of White’s confession. White’s first judgment of conviction, it is true, has been overturned for purposes of Heck. Nonetheless, it was overturned in the limited sense of requiring a new trial or release because of a Brady violation. The focus was on White’s illegal detention. Judge Padova’s decision did not undermine or affect the validity of White’s confession. If White had been retried in 2023, there was no existing state or federal court ruling to prevent the introduction into evidence of his 1977

confession. Only the Brady violation would have had to have been rectified. The decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upholding White’s confession on the merits after a full and fair hearing before Judge Della Porta is sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect. See In re Brown, 951 F.2d at 569- 70. Accordingly, White is barred in this § 1983 action by collateral estoppel or issue preclusion from relitigating the constitutionality or legality of his confession. V Finally, defendants move for summary judgment to the extent that White’s claims are predicated on fabricated

testimony of Carmella Sproul at the 1977 trial and on the failure to provide him with the impeachment material of Lewis’ arrest record in violation of Brady. It must be emphasized that all decisions made with respect to what information would be or would not be produced to a defendant before trial and what evidence is sought to be admitted at trial are decisions made by the assistant district attorney. Under Pennsylvania law, the Office of the Philadelphia District Attorney is a separate entity from and not under the control of the City of Philadelphia. Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, 103 F. Supp. 3d 694, 710 (E.D. Pa. 2015). Detective Gerrard was an employee of the City and not of the

District Attorney’s Office. There is nothing in the record to support any knowledge or involvement of the City or Gerrard with respect to any fabricated testimony of Sproul or the Brady violation. Consequently, the City and the Gerrard’s Estate cannot be deemed to have caused or to be responsible for any harm to White as a result of these constitutional infractions. The fault, if any, rests with the prosecutor and the District Attorney’s Office. VI For the above reasons, the court will grant the motions of the defendants the City of Philadelphia and the Estate of Lawrence Gerrard for summary judgment.