Michael Wayne Pilling v. Salt Lake City Police Officers et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Utah
• Decided: June 15, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00413
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH

MICHAEL WAYNE PILLING,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER TO CURE DEFICIENT COMPLAINT v.

Case No. 2:26-CV-413-TS SALT LAKE CITY POLICE OFFICERS et al., District Judge Ted Stewart

Defendants.

Pro se plaintiff Michael Wayne Pilling, being held at Utah State Hospital, brought this civil-rights action, see 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2026).1 Having now screened the Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, under its statutory review function, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915A (2026),2 the Court orders

1The federal statute creating a "civil action for deprivation of rights" reads, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2026).

2The screening statute reads: (a) Screening.--The court shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. (b) Grounds for dismissal.--On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-- (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Plaintiff to file an amended complaint curing deficiencies if he would like to further pursue claims. A. COMPLAINT'S DEFICIENCIES The Complaint: 1. does not properly affirmatively link an individually named defendant to each element of each alleged civil-rights violation. (See below.)

2. does not concisely link each element of the claim of improper medical treatment to each individually named defendant. (See below.)

3. is not clear as to whether Plaintiff understands the difference between suing defendants in their individual or official capacities. (See below.)

4. must be amended with an understanding of how sovereign immunity applies to states, state entities, and state employees. (See below.)

5. does not appear to provide adequate details (e.g., physical descriptions, dates and times of interactions, etc.) about unknown defendants, to help the Court try to seek waiver of service from them.

6. possibly improperly names a judge as a defendant, apparently without considering judicial immunity. (See below.)

7. does not concisely link each element of a claim of excessive force to separate individually named defendant(s). (See below.)

8. possibly asserts claims attacking the validity of Plaintiff's incarceration, which should-- if at all--be timely exhausted in the state-court system before being brought in a federal habeas corpus petition, not a civil-rights complaint.

9. possibly asserts claims invalidated by the rule in Heck. (See below.)

10. does not adequately link each element of a false-arrest claim to specific, named defendant(s). See Kaufman v. Higgs, 697 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2012) ("In the context of a false-arrest claim, an arrestee's constitutional rights were violated if the arresting officer acted in the absence of probable cause that the person had committed a crime.").

28 U.S.C.S. § 1915A (2026). 11. has claims apparently based on current confinement; however, the complaint appears not to have been submitted using legal help Plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to by his institution. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996) (requiring prisoners be given "'adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law' . . . to ensure that inmates . . . have a reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement") (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (emphasis added)).

B. GUIDANCE FOR PLAINTIFF Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain "(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought." Rule 8's requirements mean to guarantee "that defendants enjoy fair notice of what the claims against them are and the grounds upon which they rest." TV Commc'ns Network, Inc. v ESPN, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991). Pro se litigants are not excused from meeting these minimal pleading demands. "This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Moreover, it is improper for the Court "to assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant." Id. Thus, the Court cannot "supply additional facts, [or] construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded." Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff should consider these points before filing an amended complaint: 1. The revised complaint must stand entirely on its own and shall not refer to, or incorporate by reference, any part of the original complaint(s). See Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 612 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating amended complaint supersedes original). Also, an amended complaint may not be added to after filing without moving for amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. 2. Each defendant must be named in the complaint's caption, listed in the section of the complaint setting forth names of each defendant, and affirmatively linked to applicable claims within the "cause of action" section of the complaint. 3. The complaint must clearly state what each individual defendant--typically, a named government employee--did to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating personal participation of each named defendant is essential allegation in civil-rights action). "To state a claim, a complaint must 'make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.'" Stone v. Albert, 338 F. App'x 757, 759 (10th Cir.

2009) (unpublished) (cleaned up). Plaintiff should also include, as much as possible, specific dates or at least estimates of when alleged constitutional violations occurred. 4. Each cause of action, together with the facts and citations that directly support it, should be stated separately. Plaintiff should be as brief as possible while still using enough words to fully explain the "who," "what," "where," "when," and "why" of each claim. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) ("The [Bell Atlantic Corp. v.] Twombly Court was particularly critical of complaints that 'mentioned no specific, time, place, or person involved in the alleged [claim].' [550 U.S. 544, 565] n.10 (2007). Given such a complaint, 'a defendant seeking to respond to plaintiff's conclusory allegations . . . would have little idea

where to begin.' Id."). 5. Plaintiff may not name an individual as a § 1983 defendant based solely on supervisory position. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.2d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996). 6. Grievance denial alone, unconnected to "violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983." Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009). 7. "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C.S. § 1997e(a) (2026). However, Plaintiff need not include grievance details in the complaint. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised by defendants. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). 8. Affirmative link. [A] plaintiff who brings a constitutional claim under § 1983 can't obtain relief without first satisfying the personal-participation requirement. That is, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant "personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation" at issue. Vasquez v. Davis, 882 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2018). Indeed, because § 1983 is a "vehicle[] for imposing personal liability on government officials, we have stressed the need for careful attention to particulars, especially in lawsuits involving multiple defendants." Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250 (explaining that when plaintiff brings § 1983 claims against multiple defendants, "it is particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom"); Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 532-33 (10th Cir. 1998)) (holding that district court's analysis of plaintiff's § 1983 claims was "infirm" where district court "lump[ed]" together plaintiff's claims against multiple defendants--"despite the fact that each of the defendants had different powers and duties and took different actions with respect to [plaintiff]"--and "wholly failed to identify specific actions taken by particular defendants that could form the basis of [a constitutional] claim").

Estate of Roemer v. Johnson, 764 F. App'x 784, 790-91 (10th Cir. 2019). "A plaintiff's failure to satisfy this requirement will trigger swift and certain dismissal." Id. at 790 n.5. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has "gone so far as to suggest that failure to satisfy the personal-participation requirement will not only justify dismissal for failure to state a claim; it will render the plaintiff's claim frivolous." Id. 9. Inadequate medical treatment. The Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment requires prison officials to "provide humane conditions of confinement" including "adequate . . . medical care." Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998)) (quoting Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998)). To state a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment for failure to provide proper medical care, "a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs."

Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Any Eighth Amendment claim must be evaluated under objective and subjective prongs: a. "Was the deprivation sufficiently serious?" And, if so, b. "Did the officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind?" Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Under the objective prong, a medical need is "sufficiently serious . . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Sealock, 218 F.3d at 1209 (citations & quotation marks omitted).

The subjective component requires the plaintiff to show that prison officials were consciously aware that the prisoner faced a substantial risk of harm and wantonly disregarded the risk "by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). "[T]he 'inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care' tantamount to negligence does not satisfy the deliberate indifference standard." Sparks v. Singh, 690 F. App'x 598, 604 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976)). Furthermore, "a prisoner who merely disagrees with a diagnosis or a prescribed course of treatment does not state a constitutional violation." Perkins v. Kan. Dep't of Corrs., 165 F.3d 803, 811 10th Cir. 1999); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010) ("Disagreement with a doctor's particular method of treatment, without more, does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation."). 10. Official capacity versus individual capacity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explains:

The Supreme Court has instructed that "official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (cleaned up). By contrast, individual-capacity suits "seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law." Id.

Coates v. Reigenborn, Nos. 22-1339 & 22-1434, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 27456, at *9-10 (10th Cir. Oct. 16, 2023) (unpublished); see also Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 932 (10th Cir. 2015) ("A suit against a government agent in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the government."). One difference between suing a defendant in an official versus individual capacity has to do with averring causation. To adequately assert causation against a defendant in an individual capacity, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant "set in motion a series of events that he knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive [the plaintiff] of her constitutional rights." Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up); see also Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1254 (10th Cir. 2015) ("When confronting individual-capacity § 1983 claims, our focus must always be on the defendant--on the injury he inflicted or caused to be inflicted, and on his motives." (cleaned up)). Conversely, to adequately assert causation against a defendant in an official capacity, the plaintiff must first identify an official policy or custom, and then establish that the challenged policy or custom was the "'moving force' behind the injury alleged." Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. 11. Eleventh Amendment immunity. Under the Eleventh Amendment, sovereign immunity blocks actions for money damages against states, state agencies, and state officers in their official capacities. See Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Sevenoaks, 545 F.3d 906, 911 (10th Cir. 2008); Couser v. Gay, 959 F.3d 1018, 1022 (10th Cir. 2020); see also Buck v. Utah Labor

Comm'n, 73 F. App'x 345, 347 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding Eleventh Amendment shields the State of Utah and its employees in official capacity from claims alleging violations of § 1983). However, an exception provides "that 'a plaintiff may bring suit against individual state officers acting in their official capacities if the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and the plaintiff seeks prospective relief.'" Norton v. Parsons, No. 23-4055, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 2109, at *5 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 2024) (emphasis added) (unpublished) (quoting Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012)). 12. Judicial Immunity. It is well settled that judges "are absolutely immune from suit unless they act in 'clear absence of all jurisdiction,' meaning that even erroneous or malicious

acts are not proper bases for § 1983 claims." Segler v. Felfam Ltd. P'ship, 324 F. App'x 742, 743 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)). The judge here very well may have been acting in a judicial capacity in presiding over Plaintiff’s case(s); if so, such actions are entitled to absolute immunity. See Doran v. Sanchez, 289 F. App'x 332, 332 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). 13. Excessive Force. This is general information on an excessive-force cause of action: "An excessive force claim involves two prongs: (1) an objective prong that asks if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation, and (2) a subjective prong under which the plaintiff must show that the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 936 (10th Cir. 2018) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). An official's state of mind is sufficiently culpable "if he uses force maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We have long recognized "that a prison guard, to maintain control of inmates, must often make instantaneous, on-the-spot decisions concerning the need to apply force without having to second-guess himself." Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1983). So "when prison officials must act to preserve internal order and discipline, we afford them wide-ranging deference." Redmond, 882 F.3d at 938 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although this deference does not protect "actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose," it does prevent us from substituting our "judgment for that of officials who have made a considered choice." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Lehman v McKinnon, No. 20-1312, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 27250, at *5-6 (10th Cir. Sept. 10, 2021) (unpublished). 14. Heck. Plaintiff's claims possibly include some allegations that if true may invalidate Plaintiff's incarceration. "In Heck, the Supreme Court explained that a § 1983 action that would impugn the validity of a plaintiff's [incarceration] cannot be maintained unless the [basis for incarceration] has been reversed on direct appeal or impaired by collateral proceedings." Nichols v. Baer, 315 F. App'x 738, 739 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)). Heck keeps litigants "from using a § 1983 action, with its more lenient pleading rules, to challenge their [incarceration] without complying with the more stringent exhaustion requirements for habeas actions." Butler v. Compton, 482 F.3d 1277, 1279 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Plaintiff argues that his constitutional rights were, in part, breached in a way that may attack Petitioner's very imprisonment. Heck requires that, if a plaintiff requests § 1983 damages, this Court must decide whether judgment for the plaintiff would unavoidably imply the invalidity of Plaintiff's incarceration. Id. at 487. Here, it appears it may. If this Court were to conclude that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated in a prejudicial manner, it would be stating that Plaintiff's incarceration was invalid. Thus, the involved claims "must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that [a] conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id.

C. ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 1. Plaintiff must within 120 days cure the Complaint's deficiencies noted above by filing a document entitled, "Amended Complaint," that does not refer to or include any other document. Dkt. No. 1. 2. The Clerk's Office shall mail Plaintiff the Pro Se Litigant Guide with a blank-form civil-rights complaint which Plaintiff must use to pursue an amended complaint. 3. If Plaintiff fails to timely cure the above deficiencies according to this Order's instructions, this action will be dismissed without further notice.

4. The amended complaint shall not include any claims outside the dates and allegations of transactions and events contained in the Complaint. Id. The Court will not address any such new claims or outside allegations, which will be dismissed. If Plaintiff wishes to raise other claims and allegations, Plaintiff may do so only in a new complaint in a new case. If an amended complaint is filed, the Court will screen each claim and defendant for dismissal or an order effecting service upon valid defendants who are affirmatively linked to valid claims. 5. Plaintiff must tell the Court of any address change and timely comply with Court orders. See D. Utah Civ. R. 83-1.6(b) ("An unrepresented party must immediately notify the Clerk's Office in writing of any name, mailing address, or email address changes."). Failure to do so may result in this action's dismissal for failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) ("If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule--except one for lack of

jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19--operates as an adjudication on the merits."). 6. Extensions of time are disfavored, though reasonable extensions may be granted. Any motion for time extension must be filed no later than fourteen days before the deadline to be extended. 7. No direct communication is to take place with any judge. All relevant information, letters, documents, and papers, labeled with case number, are to be directed to the court clerk. 8. Plaintiff must observe this District of Utah local rule: "A party proceeding without an attorney (unrepresented party or pro se party) is obligated to comply with: (1) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) these Local Rules of Practice; (3) the Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility; and (4) other laws and rules relevant to the action." DUCivR 83-1.6(a). DATED this 15th day of June, 2026. BY THE COURT:

TUDE Af STEWART UnitedStates District Court