Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2023-0696 ____________
MICHAEL W. JONES, Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
July 10, 2025
GROSSHANS, J.
Michael Wayne Jones appeals his convictions of first-degree
murder and sentences of death. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we affirm in
all respects.
I
A
Michael and Casei Jones married in 2017. They settled in
Summerfield, Florida, along with four children—Cameron and
Preston Bowers were Casei’s sons from a previous marriage; while Mercalli and Aiyana Jones were Jones and Casei’s daughters in
common.
One mid-July evening in 2019, Jones and Casei got into an
argument which escalated into a screaming match. According to
Jones, Casei picked up a baseball bat. Jones grabbed the bat away
from Casei and proceeded to beat her to death with it. Jones then
wrapped Casei’s body in a shower curtain, stuffed her body in a
plastic storage box, and hid the box in the back bedroom. The
children were not aware of their mother’s death or the location of
her body.
Shortly after Casei’s murder, Jones reached out to his ex-wife
Sarah in an attempt to rekindle a relationship with her and develop
a bond with the children they had together. While communicating
with Sarah, Jones claimed that he separated from Casei and that
she had moved to live near her mother.
As he continued his efforts to foster a relationship with Sarah,
Jones began to field questions from Casei’s children about their
mother’s whereabouts. In response to one such question, Jones
said that he and Casei were taking a break. Jones also lied to
-2- Casei’s extended family, often impersonating her in texts and on
social media.
In late July, all four children left for extended visits with family
members, resulting in less questions about Casei. In August, just
days before school began, Jones picked up the children and
returned with them to the house in Summerfield. Jones realized
the problem posed by the boys going to school and worried they
might reveal they had not seen their mother for weeks. As he would
later confess to police, “One day I just realized school is starting.
The boys are school age and I started to just choke them out.”
First, Jones killed nine-year-old Cameron by climbing on top
of the sleeping boy and strangling him to death with his bare
hands. Once Cameron was dead, Jones put his body inside a
suitcase and left the suitcase in the boys’ bedroom.
The next day, Preston (age four) asked Jones about his
brother. That night, after Preston fell asleep, Jones filled up the
bathtub and placed a large zip tie around Preston’s throat. Jones
carried Preston to the bathroom where he held the child facedown
in the bathtub until he drowned. Jones then put Preston’s body in
-3- a trash bag and left it in the bathroom overnight. He would later
place the body into a storage box.
With the death count now at three, traces of the murders
became evident inside the home. To reduce such signs, Jones
scattered cat litter over the floor that was stained with the bodily
fluids of the victims. He also wrapped the body-containing boxes in
plastic to suppress the smell of decomposition.
Having taken these measures, Jones continued to live in the
home with his two daughters, notwithstanding the presence of the
three decaying bodies. But near the end of August, Jones received
an eviction notice. The day before the scheduled eviction, Jones
carried Mercalli (age two) to the bathroom where he drowned her
facedown in the bathtub. Jones then returned to the living room
for one-year-old Aiyana. He drowned her just as he had her sister.
He put the girls’ bodies in separate trash bags, before placing
them into one box. Jones then placed the five bodies—all now
contained in plastic storage boxes—in Casei’s minivan. He drove
the van to Jacksonville to stay with Sarah, telling her that he and
Casei had separated and that the children were with Casei.
-4- Jones kept up this ruse for almost two more weeks, continuing
to impersonate Casei in text messages. Ultimately, Casei’s family
grew suspicious of the irregular communication. In mid-
September, Casei’s mother contacted the Marion County Sheriff’s
Office and asked officers to conduct a wellness check on Casei.
When the responding detective entered the Summerfield home, he
noticed a strong odor, which he believed to be from decomposition
and bleach. Subsequently, after obtaining a warrant, law
enforcement secured physical evidence from the home. Meanwhile,
having learned that Casei’s vehicle was missing, law enforcement
published a “be on the lookout” for Casei, her four children, and the
minivan.
As the investigation continued, law enforcement learned of
Sarah and reached out to her. On a call—with Jones directing
her—Sarah said that she had last seen Jones, Casei, and the kids
at a McDonald’s in Palatka, Florida, just a few days earlier. These
statements were false. Sarah, for her part, later admitted lying to
police. Eventually, Sarah told Jones that “clearly something [was]
going on” and that “he needed to talk to [the police].”
-5- In response, Jones fled Florida, driving north. After crossing
into Georgia, he left the boxes containing the bodies of the four
children in a heavily wooded area. Jones then continued north,
eventually running off the road and crashing into a culvert. The
responding officer, Deputy Wade Bennett, arrived at the crash scene
and smelled the odor of decomposition coming from the wrecked
van. When asked what he was doing in Georgia, Jones volunteered
that the smell was from his dead wife whom he had killed. Deputy
Bennett then asked if Jones had any children, and he stated he did,
but that they were with their grandmother.
Deputy Bennett took Jones to a Georgia jail for questioning.
There, Jones confessed to the five killings and provided a detailed
account of the surrounding events and circumstances. At the
request of the officer, Jones led law enforcement to the children’s
remains. 1
After these developments, Jones was transferred to a nearby
sheriff’s office. There, a detective from Marion County (who had
learned of the recent developments in Georgia) interviewed Jones.
1. The bodies were confirmed by a Georgia medical examiner to be those of Preston, Cameron, Aiyana, and Mercalli.
-6- As part of this interview, Jones described in detail the murders of
the four children. When the detective asked Jones why he
committed the murders, Jones said that “everything” was on him
and that all the pressure got to him.
Jones was later transported back to Florida and interviewed a
third time. During that interview, the detective again questioned
Jones about his motive:
DETECTIVE BARTLETT: Okay. I’m trying to think of everything to make sure we covered everything. Obviously the one question is, everybody’s asked me why. I know -- I understand why Casei. Why the boys, why your daughters? THE DEFENDANT: I don’t know. It’s just everything mounted up. Just seemed like no way out.
B
A grand jury indicted Jones on four counts of first-degree
murder (for the death of the children) and one count of second-
degree murder (for Casei’s death). That same day, the State filed a
notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Ultimately, Jones pled
guilty to all five murders as charged in the indictment. Following a
colloquy with Jones and the prosecutor’s presentation of the factual
basis for the crimes, the court accepted Jones’s guilty pleas.
-7- C
At the penalty phase, the State sought to prove six aggravating
factors for each first-degree murder count: (1) the defendant was
previously convicted of a violent felony; (2) the murder was
committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest; (3) the murder
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); (4) the murder
was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP); (5) the victim was a
person less than twelve years of age; and (6) the murder was
committed by a person in a position of familial authority. Of those
six, Jones chose only to dispute the “avoid arrest” aggravator. 2
Specifically, the defense argued that Jones killed the children
due to a psychotic episode. To support that theory, Jones
presented several expert witnesses. Dr. Harold Bursztajn, a
neuropsychiatrist who met with Jones fifty-two times, testified that
2. In addition to challenging this aggravator, the defense sought to prove fifty-four mitigating circumstances, including three statutory mitigators. Those statutory mitigators were: (1) the defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity; (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and (3) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.
-8- Jones’s “delusions and hallucinations are most consistent with an
illness . . . called the schizoaffective spectrum.” Dr. Stephen
Nelson, a pediatric neurologist and epileptologist, diagnosed Jones
with a neurodevelopmental disorder and testified that this disorder
“would make him prone to psychosis.” The final expert, Dr. John
Fabian, a forensic psychologist and neuropsychologist, diagnosed
Jones with “major depressive disorder with psychotic features” and
opined Jones underwent a psychotic break after killing Casei.
Relying in part on this expert evidence, the defense requested
a special jury instruction that included additional nonstatutory
considerations. The court declined to give the requested
instruction, and instead read the standard instruction to the jury.
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended
sentences of death for the four first-degree murder counts.
Consistent with the jury’s recommendation, the court imposed four
death sentences.3 In its sentencing order, the court found that the
State had proven all six aggravating factors—to which it assigned
great weight. As to mitigation, the court found one statutory
3. Jones waived his right to a Spencer hearing. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
-9- mitigator—that Jones had no significant history of prior criminal
activity—and assigned it little weight. The court also determined
that the defense had proven forty nonstatutory mitigating factors,
with assigned weights ranging from slight to none. In its
conclusion, the court found that the aggravators “substantially
outweigh[ed]” the mitigating circumstances, warranting imposition
of the death sentences.
This appeal followed.
II
Jones raises three issues for our review. First, Jones argues
that the trial court’s refusal to supplement the standard jury
instruction on the avoid-arrest aggravator was improper. Next, he
contends that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme
unconstitutionally permits the arbitrary imposition of death
sentences. For his final argument, Jones claims that the death
penalty violates the Eighth Amendment in light of evolving
standards of decency. And though not raised by Jones, we also
- 10 - review whether his guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered. 4
Jones contends the trial court erred by denying his request for
a special jury instruction. 5 To prevail on this claim, Jones has the
burden to demonstrate “(1) the special instruction was supported by
the evidence; (2) the standard instruction did not adequately cover
the theory of the defense; and (3) the special instruction was a
correct statement of the law and not misleading or confusing.”
Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 112 (Fla. 2008) (citing Stephens v.
State, 787 So. 2d 747, 756 (Fla. 2001)). The State concedes prongs
one and three, thus we focus our discussion solely on the disputed
prong.
In analyzing the second prong, we look to the instructions as a
whole to see if they “adequately address the applicable legal
standards.” See Stephens, 787 So. 2d at 755. And we have found
standard instructions adequate even when those instructions do
4. See Altersberger v. State, 103 So. 3d 122, 128 (Fla. 2012).
5. We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. Stephens v. State, 787 So. 2d 747, 755 (Fla. 2001).
- 11 - not contain judicially crafted interpretations of the aggravators. See
Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182, 1193 (Fla. 1997); Stephens, 787
So. 2d at 755; see also Loyd v. State, 379 So. 3d 1080, 1095 (Fla.
2023), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 188 (2024).
Here, the jury was instructed to determine if “[t]he First Degree
Murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.” That standard
instruction tracks the statutory text. See § 921.141(6)(e), Fla. Stat.
(2022) (listing as an aggravating factor that “[t]he capital felony was
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest
or effecting an escape from custody”). The statute and standard
instruction both focus on the purpose for which the murder was
committed—i.e., to avoid arrest.
Jones contends that the standard jury instruction, as given,
was insufficient. We disagree and find the instruction adequately
encompassed Jones’s theory of defense. See Davis, 698 So. 2d at
1192-93 (rejecting argument that an avoid-arrest instruction that
tracked the statute was legally inadequate because it did not
include a comparable special instruction).
- 12 - As a defense to the aggravator, counsel argued that Jones did
not kill the children for the purpose of avoiding arrest because his
actions were instead the product of a psychotic episode. Jones’s
defense also emphasized that the children had not witnessed the
crimes, so killing them would not have aided him in avoiding arrest.
It is true that the instruction Jones requested had additional
language not contained in the standard instruction. Indeed, the
requested instruction would have added the victim’s status as a
consideration: “Where the victim of the homicide is not a law
enforcement officer, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the sole or dominant motive for the murder was to avoid
a lawful arrest.” 6
However, the absence of this instructional language did not
prevent defense counsel from emphasizing the status of the
children as non-eyewitnesses and non-law enforcement. Nor, as
seen above, did its absence foreclose an argument that Jones’s
6. Neither the standard instruction, nor the statute, addresses the status of the victim. The additional language proposed by Jones derives from this Court’s holding in Mullens v. State, 197 So. 3d 16, 27-28 (Fla. 2016) (holding that the State bears a heightened burden of proof when the avoid-arrest aggravator is applied to non-law enforcement victims).
- 13 - psychotic break was the real reason for the children’s murders. The
fact that the jury categorically rejected Jones’s defense in this
regard does not render the instruction itself inadequate.
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in declining to give the instruction Jones requested.
However, even if Jones succeeded in showing an abuse of
discretion, any instructional flaw would be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
We begin with the observation that the jury found five other
aggravators—including the CCP, HAC, and prior-violent-felony
aggravators. The trial court, for its part, gave great weight to all the
aggravators, noting that either the CCP or HAC aggravators
standing alone would have justified the death penalty. See
Santiago-Gonzalez v. State, 301 So. 3d 157, 176 (Fla. 2020)
(characterizing CCP and HAC as the weightiest aggravators).
Apart from aggravation, we also consider the mitigating
circumstances presented at the penalty phase. Here, those
mitigators pale in comparison to the magnitude of the unchallenged
aggravators. Consequently, “[t]here is no reasonable possibility that
- 14 - [the] potential error affected the sentence.” Lowe v. State, 259 So.
3d 23, 60-61 (Fla. 2018).
Jones next asks us to find that Florida’s capital sentencing
scheme is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
According to Jones, the elimination of proportionality review 7 and
the number and breadth of aggravating factors in section
921.141(6) results in arbitrary and unconstitutional sentences.
We have repeatedly rejected this argument and others like it.
See Cox v. State, 390 So. 3d 1189, 1200 (Fla. 2024) (rejecting
comparable argument and characterizing it as “well-worn”), cert.
denied, 145 S. Ct. 1084 (2025); Wells v. State, 364 So. 3d 1005,
1015-16 (Fla. 2023) (rejecting as meritless the argument that
Florida’s death-penalty statute fails to sufficiently narrow the class
of murderers eligible for the death penalty in violation of the Eighth
Amendment). Jones has given us no reason to revisit this
precedent, nor has he established any constitutional defect in
7. Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020).
- 15 - Florida’s death-penalty statute. Accordingly, he is not entitled to
relief.
C
As his final claim, Jones argues that the death penalty violates
the Eighth Amendment based on “evolving standards of decency.”
We have consistently held that Florida’s death-penalty scheme
satisfies both the state and federal constitutions. See Cox, 390 So.
3d at 1199-1200. The mere fact that other states may have shifted
in their penological objectives does not render Florida’s death
penalty unconstitutional. See, e.g., Long v. State, 271 So. 3d 938,
945 (Fla. 2019) (holding that Florida’s death-penalty methods do
not violate the Constitution simply because of the policy choices of
other states). Jones is not entitled to relief as to this claim.
III
In death-penalty cases, we “independently review the
sufficiency of the evidence underlying [a first-degree murder]
conviction, and the ‘customary review’ evaluates whether the
conviction is supported by competent, substantial evidence.”
Davidson v. State, 323 So. 3d 1241, 1250 (Fla. 2021) (alteration in
original) (quoting Santiago-Gonzalez, 301 So. 3d at 180). When a
- 16 - defendant’s guilty plea results in a death-eligible conviction, we
examine the record to determine whether the defendant made that
plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Doty v. State, 170 So.
3d 731, 738 (Fla. 2015). In carrying out this review, we “scrutinize
the plea to ensure that the defendant [1] was made aware of the
consequences of his plea, [2] was apprised of the constitutional
rights he was waiving, and [3] pled guilty voluntarily.” Fletcher v.
State, 343 So. 3d 55, 60 (Fla. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting
Ocha v. State, 826 So. 2d 956, 965 (Fla. 2002)).
Here, the trial court informed Jones of the nature of the
charges, the consequences of his pleas, and the rights he would
give up as a result of the pleas. Jones acknowledged all these
things, but nevertheless remained firm in his decision to accept
guilt. In addition, the court determined that Jones was in
satisfactory physical and mental health and was making the
decision to plead based on his own free will. Moreover, the evidence
of Jones’s guilt was overwhelming. He made incriminating
statements on the day he was arrested and confessed in two
recorded interviews. Physical evidence and witness testimony also
decidedly pointed to Jones’s guilt. The prosecutor noted this
- 17 - evidence in its factual basis, which Jones acknowledged as
adequate.
Thus, having independently reviewed the record, we conclude
that Jones’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
entered.
IV
For the reasons given above, we affirm Jones’s four
first-degree murder convictions and death sentences.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LABARGA, J., concurring in result.
I fully concur in the decision to affirm the first-degree murder
convictions in this case. Moreover, I recognize that the majority has
rejected this Court’s decades-long practice of conducting
comparative proportionality review in cases involving the direct
appeal of a sentence of death, and it has since repeatedly rejected
such challenges.
- 18 - However, I concur in result because I continue to adhere to
the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. State,
308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020).
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Marion County, Anthony M. Tatti, Judge Case No. 422019CF003487CFAXXX
Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Robert J. Pearce III, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellant
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Naomi Nichols, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee
- 19 -