Michael Vantol v. Home-Owners Insurance Company

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 22, 2019
Docket345639
StatusUnpublished

This text of Michael Vantol v. Home-Owners Insurance Company (Michael Vantol v. Home-Owners Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michael Vantol v. Home-Owners Insurance Company, (Mich. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL VANTOL, UNPUBLISHED October 22, 2019 Plaintiff,

v No. 345639 Iosco Circuit Court HOME-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 17-000501-NF

Defendant-Cross-Plaintiff- Appellant, and

PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Cross-Defendant- Appellee, and

PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and SERVITTO and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Home-Owners Insurance Company (Home-Owners) appeals as of right the trial court order granting summary disposition in favor of Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (Progressive) and denying Home-Owners motion for summary disposition. We affirm.

Plaintiff, Michael Vantol, filed a complaint against defendants in April 2017 asserting that he was injured in a July 12, 2016 automobile accident while driving a commercial semi-

-1- tractor with an attached trailer. Vantol alleged that, despite that the vehicle was covered by policies of insurance issued by both Home-Owners and Progressive, both refused to provide him all of the personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits owed to him under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.1 Home-Owners thereafter filed a cross-complaint against Progressive, asserting that Home-Owners has paid no fault-benefits to plaintiff and that, because both Home-Owners and Progressive were equal in order of priority for payment of the benefits, Home-Owners was entitled to partial recoupment from Progressive of the benefits it had paid.

Progressive moved for summary disposition on plaintiff’s complaint and Home-Owners cross-complaint pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Progressive argued that at the time of the accident, Vantol was self-employed by Hammer Transport, LLC (Hammer) and leased the 2001 International semi-tractor involved in the accident to Short Transit, LLC (Short) under a long- term lease agreement. According to Progressive, Short obtained an insurance policy on the vehicle with Home-Owners and plaintiff obtained a “bobtail” insurance policy2 on the vehicle with Progressive. Progressive averred that the July 2016 accident at issue occurred when Vantol was driving the semi-tractor under dispatch with Short and while carrying a load for them, and that Progressive’s policy contains an exclusion for PIP coverage while the vehicle was leased to anyone other than the named insured or while being used to transport goods for anyone other than the named insured. Progressive thus argued that its policy exclusion applied and it was not liable for the payment of PIP benefits to Vantol. Home-Owners argued that it, not Progressive, was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2). Home-Owners claimed that prevailing law provides that an insurer cannot avoid its mandatory statutory responsibility for PIP benefits by inserting a policy exclusion that is contrary to the no-fault act, which is what Progressive did. Home-Owners thus asserted that it and Progressive are equal in priority for the payment of Vantol’s PIP benefits and that it is entitled to partial recoupment from Progressive for the PIP benefits that Home-Owners had paid thus far. The trial court granted Progressive’s motion for summary disposition and denied Home-Owners’ counter-motion for summary disposition.3 Home-Owners now challenges the trial court’s summary disposition rulings on appeal.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Auto-Owners Ins Co v Campbell-Durocher Group Painting & Gen Contracting, LLC, 322 Mich App 218, 224; 911 NW2d 493 (2017). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual

1 Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company was dismissed as a party by a stipulated order entered July 27, 2017. 2 “Bobtailing” is trucking parlance for driving a tractor without an attached trailer. Hunt v Drielick, 496 Mich 366, 373; 852 NW2d 562 (2014). The purpose of a “bobtail” insurance policy generally is to provide insurance coverage when the tractor is being operated without a trailer or with an empty trailer, and is not being operated in the business of a carrier. Id. at 376. 3 Plaintiff settled its claim with Home-Owners and the parties stipulated to dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. The trial court entered the order of dismissal on September 6, 2017.

-2- support of a plaintiff’s claim, and is reviewed by considering the pleadings, admissions, and other admissible evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Latham v Barton Malow Co, 480 Mich 105, 111; 746 NW2d 868 (2008). “Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). A genuine issue of material fact exists when reasonable minds could differ on an issue after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Lakeview Commons v Empower Yourself, 290 Mich App 503, 506; 802 NW2d 712 (2010). Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo. Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 472 Mich 521, 525–526; 697 NW2d 895 (2005).

The rules of contract interpretation apply to the interpretation of insurance contracts. McGrath v Allstate Ins Co, 290 Mich App 434, 439; 802 NW2d 619 (2010). The language of insurance contracts is to be read as a whole, must be construed to give effect to every word, clause, and phrase and, when the policy language is clear, a court must enforce the specific language of the contract. Id. “Clear and specific exclusionary clauses must be given effect, but are strictly construed in favor of the insured.” McKusick v Travelers Indem Co, 246 Mich App 329, 333; 632 NW2d 525 (2001).

Home-Owners and Progressive agree that they are equal in priority for purposes of PIP benefit payments because each had a policy of insurance in place on the semi-tractor. There also appears to be no argument that the policy exclusion at issue is unclear, unspecific, or ambiguous. The issue for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in holding that the exclusion contained in Progressive’s insurance policy was valid and allowable under existing law. We find that the trial court correctly ruled.

The goal of the no-fault insurance system is to provide victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, and prompt reparation for certain economic losses. Gauntlett v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 242 Mich App 172, 179; 617 NW2d 735 (2000). Accordingly, the Legislature enacted MCL 500.3101(1), which provides in relevant part, that “[t]he owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance . . . . ” Our Supreme Court stated:

Although designated as “personal protection insurance” under the no-fault act, PIP benefits are in fact statutory benefits, arising regardless of whether an injured person has obtained a no-fault insurance policy. Indeed, a no-fault insurance carrier can be liable for no-fault benefits even if the motor vehicle it insures was not the actual motor vehicle involved in the accident. [Dye by Siporin & Assoc, Inc v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co, __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (2019)]

If one is involved in an accident while in a vehicle for which PIP is required under MCL 500.3101(1), an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury “arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle . . .” MCL 500.3105. “Owner” is defined in the no fault act as:

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Michael Vantol v. Home-Owners Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michael-vantol-v-home-owners-insurance-company-michctapp-2019.