IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Michael Turi, Jun 11 2026, 9:50 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
J.R., a Minor b/n/f Stacy Rheinlander, Appellee-Plaintiff
June 11, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-2858 Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court The Honorable Jillian Kratochvil, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 82D06-2407-CT-4101
Opinion by Judge May Judges Mathias and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 1 of 15 May, Judge.
[1] Michael Turi appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for relief from
judgment and argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion. J.R., a male minor, by next friend Stacy Rheinlander (“J.R. by
Rheinlander”) asserts on cross-appeal that J.R. by Rheinlander is entitled to
damages pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E). We affirm the trial court’s
denial of Turi’s motion for relief from judgment and decline to award J.R. by
Rheinlander damages pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E).
Facts and Procedural History [2] On July 16, 2024, J.R. by Rheinlander filed a complaint against Turi. The
complaint alleged J.R. “suffered substantial and significant injuries” because he
was exposed to “unsafe and unhealthy levels of lead” while living at a rental
property owned by Turi. (App. Vol. II at 7.) The complaint alleged Turi’s
negligence in operating, inspecting, and maintaining the rental property
proximately caused J.R.’s injuries. In addition, the complaint alleged Turi was
negligent in failing to warn J.R. about the dangerous lead levels at the rental
property. J.R. by Rheinlander sent the complaint and summons to Turi by
certified mail to 1025 West Heerdink Avenue in Evansville, Indiana. The post
office later sent an electronic return receipt notifying J.R. by Rheinlander that
the complaint and summons were successfully delivered. The return receipt
indicated that the certified mail was delivered when it was picked up at the post
office and included a copy of the recipient’s electronic signature:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 2 of 15 (Id. at 13.) It also included tracking information for the mail:
(Id. at 14.)
[3] Turi failed to answer the complaint, and the trial court entered a default
judgment against him. The trial court then held a damages hearing on
February 26, 2025, and Turi failed to appear at the damages hearing. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 3 of 15 Following the hearing, the trial court entered a judgment against Turi for
$500,000.
[4] On September 18, 2025, Turi filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant
to Trial Rule 60(B)(1). Turi asserted he did not receive actual notice of the
lawsuit, and he asked the trial court to set aside the default judgment because of
excusable neglect. Turi alleged as a meritorious defense that “[t]here was no
exposed lead paint in the housing unit” and J.R. “was already showing signs of
lead paint poisoning” when he moved into the housing unit. (Id. at 22-23.)
J.R. by Rheinlander responded that he successfully served Turi via certified
mail and “[t]hat to obtain said certified mail, a valid photo ID had to be
produced, and a signature was required[.]” (Id. at 25.)
[5] At the hearing on his motion for relief from judgment, Turi testified that he
resided at “1025 Heerdink, Evansville, Indiana.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10.) Turi also
testified regarding the return of service:
Q. Here is the return of service on the complaint. Is that your signature?
A. Looks like mine, but it – I – I don’t ever write my name like that. I don’t know what this is.
Q. So, it’s not yours.
A. No.
Q. Or is it yours?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 4 of 15 A. I can’t – I never sign my name like that.
*****
Q. Okay. Are you claiming this is not your signature on July 30, 2024, at 1:14 p.m.?
A. I don’t know. Was I in jail?
Q. I don’t know sir.
A. Well, I think that’s where it came.
Q. Well, actually this was picked up at the post office.
A. If it was picked up at the post office then somebody else could have picked it up because it sure doesn’t look like my handwriting. I couldn’t write that small from my Parkinson’s disease.
Q. Well, it’s usually – the handwriting is usually on an electronic pad. Signatures don’t exactly match, but you see above it says individual recipient name. Do you see that?
A. Yeah, it says Michael W. Turi.
(Id. at 12 & 16-17.) J.R. by Rheinlander argued that Turi’s motion for relief
from judgment should be denied because Turi testified that his address matched
the service address and because Turi’s assertion that someone else could simply
pick up Turi’s certified mail from the post office was not credible.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 5 of 15 [6] On October 13, 2025, the trial court issued an order denying Turi’s motion for
relief from judgment. The trial court found:
1. Plaintiff mailed the Summons and Complaint to Turi on July 18, 2024 by certified mail.
2. As evidenced on Exhibit A, on July 30, 2024, Turi signed for the Summons and Complaint in person at the United States Post Office.
3. Turi failed to demonstrate any mistake, surprise or excusable neglect.
(App. Vol. II at 34.)
Discussion and Decision 1. Motion for Relief from Judgment [7] Turi challenges denial of his motion for relief from judgment. Trial Rule 60(B)
requires the trial court to “balance the need for an efficient judicial system with
the judicial preference for deciding disputes on the merits.” Munster Cmty. Hosp.
v. Bernacke, 874 N.E.2d 611, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We review a trial court’s
ruling on a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B) for an
abuse of discretion. Wilkerson v. Egan, 253 N.E.3d 1149, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App.
2025). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or is contrary to
law.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 6 of 15 [8] The trial court’s entry of findings of fact also impacts our review. Fields v.
Safway Grp. Holdings, LLC, 118 N.E.3d 804, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans.
denied. We apply a two-tiered standard when reviewing a trial court’s findings
and judgment. Id. We first “determine whether the evidence supports the trial
court’s findings, and [then] whether the findings support the judgment.” Id.
We review the trial court’s findings and judgment for clear error. Id. “Findings
of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any reasonable inference
from the evidence to support them. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a
review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “We do not reweigh the evidence but
consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgment.” Miller v.
Lucas, 264 N.E.3d 651, 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Because the trial court
entered its findings of fact sua sponte, “[t]he trial court’s findings control only
as to the issues they cover and a general judgment will control as to the issues
upon which there are no findings.” Id.
[9] Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(1) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect[.]
“There are no fixed rules for determining what facts and circumstances
constitute excusable neglect; rather, that determination is left to the discretion
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 7 of 15 of the trial court.” First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Crawfordsville v. Coling, 419
N.E.2d 1326, 1330 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). “The trial court’s discretion is
necessarily broad in this area because any determination of excusable neglect,
surprise, or mistake must turn upon the unique factual background of each
case.” Biodynamic Extraction, LLC v. Kickapoo Creek Botanicals, LLC, 187 N.E.3d
295, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). “‘Excusable neglect . . . is just that: excusable
neglect, not just neglect. It is something that can be explained by unusual, rare,
or unforeseen circumstance[.]’” Huntington Nat. Bank v. Car-X Assocs. Corp., 39
N.E.3d 652, 656 (Ind. 2015) (quoting, with approval, Huntington Nat. Bank v.
Car-X Assocs. Corp., 22 N.E.3d 687, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (Barnes, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 29 N.E.3d 123 (2015)) (emphasis in Barnes, J., dissenting).
[10] Turi contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
relief from judgment. He emphasizes his testimony that he did not receive
notice of the lawsuit until after the judgment was entered, and he also asserts
that his failure to respond to the complaint should be attributed to “excusable
neglect” because of “his lack of sophistication, his age, his Parkinson’s disease,
his failing memory, and his recent head traumas.” (Appellant’s Br. at 14.)
However, these arguments are simply requests for us to reweigh the evidence
and judge the credibility of the witnesses, which we cannot do. See Gabriel v.
Windsor, Inc., 843 N.E.2d 29, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“Many of Gabriel’s
challenges to the findings of fact are simply requests that we reweigh the
evidence, which we cannot do.”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 8 of 15 [11] Turi’s testimony largely focused on his alleged lack of notice, but Turi testified
that he lived at “1025 Heerdink, Evansville, Indiana.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10.) That
is the address to which the certified copy of the complaint and summons were
sent. The return receipt from the post office listed Michael Turi as the recipient
of the certified mail containing the complaint and summons. The receipt
included a copy of a signature and indicated the mail was delivered on July 30,
2024, at 1:14 p.m., when the recipient picked it up at the post office. 1025
Heerdink Avenue is also the address where J.R. by Rheinlander served Turi
with his motion for default judgment, and it is the distribution address listed for
Turi on the trial court’s orders. Nonetheless, Turi did not appear until nearly
seven months after the default judgment was entered. Moreover, while Turi
made passing references to his age and health problems during his testimony,
he did not explain how those problems prevented him from responding to the
complaint. Therefore, the trial court’s conclusion that Turi received adequate
service of the complaint and his failure to respond was not the result of
excusable neglect was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it denied Turi’s motion for relief from judgment.1
See, e.g., Biodynamic Extraction, LLC, 187 N.E.3d at 300-01 (holding trial court
1 Turi also faults the trial court for failing to conduct an analysis under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) which provides that a trial court may grant relief from judgment for “any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).” However, Turi did not assert that he was entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) in his motion for relief from judgment. Therefore, the trial court did not err by not addressing that subsection in its order, and Turi may not make an argument based on that subsection for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Showalter v. Town of Thorntown, 902 N.E.2d 338, 342-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding property owner’s claim on appeal was waived when the owner did not assert it before the trial court), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 9 of 15 did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for relief from judgment because
company’s evidentiary designations were insufficient to demonstrate it was not
at fault for an alleged breakdown in communication between it and its
registered agent).
2. Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) [12] On cross-appeal, J.R. by Rheinlander asks us to award damages pursuant to
Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) and remand the case to the trial court for a
calculation of such damages. Appellate Rule 66(E) states: “The Court may
assess damages if an appeal, petition, or motion, or response, is frivolous or in
bad faith. Damages shall be in the Court’s discretion and may include
attorneys’ fees. The Court shall remand the case for execution.” “Our
discretion to award attorney fees under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) is limited,
however, to instances when an appeal is permeated with meritlessness, bad
faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay.” Thacker v.
Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We exercise “extreme
restraint” in awarding damages pursuant to Appellate Rule 66(E) “because of
[its] potential chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to appeal.” Id. “A
strong showing is required to justify an award of appellate damages, and the
sanction is not imposed to punish mere lack of merit, but something more
egregious.” In re Est. of Carnes, 866 N.E.2d 260, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 10 of 15 [13] “Claims for appellate attorney fees may be based on substantive and/or
procedural bad faith.” Matter of Guardianship of A.E.R., 184 N.E.3d 629, 641
(Ind. Ct. App. 2022).
To prevail on a substantive bad faith claim, a party must show that the appellant’s contentions and arguments are utterly devoid of all plausibility. Procedural bad faith occurs when a party flagrantly disregards the form and content requirements of the rules of appellate procedure, omits and misstates relevant facts appearing in the record, and files briefs written in a manner calculated to require the maximum expenditure of time both by the opposing party and the reviewing court.
Staff Source, LLC v. Wallace, 143 N.E.3d 996, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal
citations omitted).
[14] J.R. by Rheinlander accuses Turi of both substantive and procedural bad faith.
J.R. by Rheinlander asserts Turi engaged in substantive bad faith because his
“entire argument is based on the incorrect premise that the trial court was
required to accept his testimony as true.” (Appellee’s Br. at 24.) However,
while J.R. by Rheinlander accurately points out the lack of merit in Turi’s
argument, we do not think it rises to the level of egregiousness meriting an
award of appellate attorney fees for substantive bad faith pursuant to Appellate
Rule 66(E). See, e.g., Giger v. Hogue, 272 N.E.3d 194, 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025)
(holding servient estate owner was not entitled to attorney fees as a result of
substantive bad faith because “we are not convinced that the [dominant estate
owners] intentionally misrepresented law or fact and find it more likely that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 11 of 15 they presented arguments to us that are based on a good faith, albeit incorrect,
reading of the law”), trans. denied.
[15] The procedural bad faith claim is a much closer call. J.R. by Rheinlander notes
Turi’s counsel has significant appellate experience, but Turi’s counsel failed to
comply with the Appellate Rules in several respects. This includes repeating
violations after being chastised regarding those same violations in previous
decisions by this Court. For example, Appellate Rule 50(C) states that “[t]he
table of contents shall specifically identify each item contained in the Appendix,
including the item’s date.” However, the table of contents in Turi’s Appendix
Volume 1 does not include the filing dates for the items in the Appendix. This
same rule violation was noted in a prior decision where Turi’s counsel was the
attorney representing the appellant. See Barnett v. State, No. 82A01-0812-CR-
558, 2009 WL 2014115 at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. July 13, 2009) (mem.) (“There are
also several problems with the appendix filed by Barnett’s counsel. First, the
table of contents does not include the date for each item included in the
appendix, as required by Appellate Rule 50(C).”), trans. denied. 2
[16] Likewise, Appellate Rule 46(C) provides that an appellant brief’s statement of
facts “shall describe the facts relevant to the issues presented for review” and
“shall be in narrative form and shall not be a witness by witness summary of the
2 While this case was unpublished, nonprecedential, and cannot be cited for its persuasive value pursuant to Rule 65(D)(2) because it was issued prior to January 1, 2023, we do not cite the case and other unpublished decisions to establish precedent but to demonstrate the failure of Turi’s counsel to heed prior directives from this Court.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 12 of 15 testimony.” Here, Turi’s counsel did not present the statement of facts in
narrative form. Rather, the statement of facts section of his brief simply
consisted of a block quote of Turi’s testimony from the transcript. We have
previously explained to Turi’s counsel that block-quoted testimony does not
meet the requirements of our appellate rules. See In re Paternity of D.J., No. 24A-
JP-1116, 2025 WL 762552 at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. March 11, 2025) (mem.)
(explaining twenty-five-page statement of facts submitted by Turi’s counsel that
included “the three-page guardian ad litem report as well as more than fifteen
pages of block-quoted witness testimony from two different hearings” failed to
comply with Rule 46(C)).
[17] In addition, Rule 46(A)(7) provides that the summary of the argument portion
of a party’s brief “should contain a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of the
arguments made in the body of the brief.” The summary of the argument
section of Turi’s brief simply restates the issue. It does not succinctly
summarize his argument. This same flaw was pointed out to Turi’s counsel in
a prior decision. See Runau v. State, No. 19A-CR-1845, 2020 WL 356499 at *1
n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2020) (mem.) (“Runau’s brief does not contain a
Summary of Argument required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(7) - it instead largely
repeats the Statement of Issues. . . . We remind counsel that the appellant’s brief
must contain the sections set forth in Rule 46(A), in the order set forth in that
rule.”) (internal citation omitted).
[18] A litigant’s failure to follow the Appellate Rules constitutes a disservice upon all
other litigants before us because it results in the unnecessary expenditure of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 13 of 15 limited judicial resources to decide that litigant’s case and hinders judicial
efficiency. See Thacker, 797 N.E.2d at 34 (“The purpose of our appellate rules . .
. is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of
searching the record and briefing the case.”). Moreover, Turi’s counsel’s failure
to heed previous warnings to abide by the Appellate Rules demonstrates
obstinance and lack of respect for our authority. Thus, we strongly caution Turi’s
counsel not to repeat these same violations of the Appellate Rules and to take
extra care in future appeals to not violate the Appellate Rules.
[19] Nonetheless, Turi’s brief and appendices generally follow the Rules’ form and
content requirements, and his brief is largely comprehensible despite the
violations. Therefore, we hold the violations do not merit an award of appellate
attorney fees. Cf. Wenner v. Hensley, 224 N.E.3d 339, 344-45 (Ind. Ct. App.
2023) (holding award of appellate attorney fees was warranted when appellant
“wholly disregarded the form and content requirements of our appellate rules,”
relied on facts that lacked support in the record or were irrelevant, and “his
briefs required an inordinate amount of time to decipher”).
Conclusion [20] The trial court’s finding that Turi was adequately served was supported by the
facts and circumstances in the record, and therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied Turi’s motion for relief from judgment. In
addition, despite Turi’s counsel’s failure to heed our prior warnings regarding
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 14 of 15 violations of the Appellate Rules, we decline to award J.R. by Rheinlander
appellate attorney fees. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
[21] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
John Andrew Goodridge Evansville, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David W. Stone IV STONE Law Office & Legal Research Anderson, Indiana Troy K. Rivera NUNN Law Office Bloomington, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2858 | June 11, 2026 Page 15 of 15