UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA MICHAEL TORELL, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05504-DGE Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING v. COMPLAINT STATE OF WASHINGTON et al., Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), has submitted an amended complaint suing Defendants for deliberate indifference stemming from his medical needs. (Dkt. No. 24 at 1.) This Court previously entered an order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (Dkt. No. 7.) The Court ordered Plaintiff to file his amended complaint no later than November 7, 2025, or his case would be dismissed without prejudice. (Dkt. No. 23.) On November 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 24.) Because this complaint is untimely, and because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court DISMISSES the case. In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that from August 2, 2022 through June
1, 2024, while he was incarcerated at Clallam County Jail and the Washington State Department of Corrections, Defendants acted “with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” (Dkt. No. 24 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that on August 2, 2022, prior to being booked into jail, a CT scan revealed that Plaintiff had a cyst in his throat, and Plaintiff was instructed to follow up with an ear, nose, and throat specialist within two weeks. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that “[j]ail and DOC staff were aware of this diagnosis and medical instruction,” yet failed to provide any follow up care or specialist evaluation. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges, “Instead of treatment, Plaintiff was given throat lozenges, juice, and told he might have COVID, while staff ignored the documented medical directive requiring immediate attention.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he informed “numerous
correctional officers, sergeants, and counselors,” that he was either choking or having trouble breathing, and these individuals “either ignored him, made him wait hours, or mocked his condition.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that “Officer Mr. Brown” observed Plaintiff’s distress but stated that his sergeant instructed him not to sign or assist, and “Defendant Dr. Light,” “ARNP M. Godwin,” and “other named DOC medical providers” had direct knowledge of Plaintiff’s throat condition. (Id. at 2.) “At least one nurse” visually examined Plaintiff’s throat and failed to order diagnostic testing or physician review, and “[s]taff who examined Plaintiff” documented his symptoms but only issued mild discomfort medications and delayed referral for months. (Id.) Plaintiff does
not include any numbered counts in his complaint, but contends these facts constitute deliberate indifference under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id.) Any complaint filed by a person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is
subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court to the extent it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc ). “The standard for determining whether [a] Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915 “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). The amended complaint was filed on November 12, 2025. (Dkt. No. 24.) This was five days after the date Plaintiff was required to file the amended complaint. The amended complaint should be dismissed because it was untimely filed. Moreover, the amended complaint is vague as to the involvement of each purported Defendant such that is unclear whether the Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment applies. Plaintiff identifies he was “incarcerated at Clallam County Jail and subsequently within the Washington State Department Corrections.” (Dkt. No. 24 at 1.) Plaintiff does not identify whether his time at the Clallam County Jail included pretrial detention versus post-conviction
detention. Nor does he identify when he was transferred from the Clallam County Jail to the State Department of Corrections. Plaintiff also does not identify which correctional staff at which correctional facility knew of his alleged medical condition or when and how they obtained such information.
The distinction between pretrial detention and post-conviction confinement is important because protections under the Eighth Amendment do not attach until after conviction. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) (“Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the States has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.”); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979). Whereas “[c]laims by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, rather than the Eight Amendment.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998). And although the same standards may be applied to prisoner rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment, id., failing to identify “a short and plain statement of the claim” against each defendant does not comport with the requirements of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 8.1
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA MICHAEL TORELL, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05504-DGE Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING v. COMPLAINT STATE OF WASHINGTON et al., Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), has submitted an amended complaint suing Defendants for deliberate indifference stemming from his medical needs. (Dkt. No. 24 at 1.) This Court previously entered an order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (Dkt. No. 7.) The Court ordered Plaintiff to file his amended complaint no later than November 7, 2025, or his case would be dismissed without prejudice. (Dkt. No. 23.) On November 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 24.) Because this complaint is untimely, and because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court DISMISSES the case. In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that from August 2, 2022 through June
1, 2024, while he was incarcerated at Clallam County Jail and the Washington State Department of Corrections, Defendants acted “with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” (Dkt. No. 24 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that on August 2, 2022, prior to being booked into jail, a CT scan revealed that Plaintiff had a cyst in his throat, and Plaintiff was instructed to follow up with an ear, nose, and throat specialist within two weeks. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that “[j]ail and DOC staff were aware of this diagnosis and medical instruction,” yet failed to provide any follow up care or specialist evaluation. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges, “Instead of treatment, Plaintiff was given throat lozenges, juice, and told he might have COVID, while staff ignored the documented medical directive requiring immediate attention.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he informed “numerous
correctional officers, sergeants, and counselors,” that he was either choking or having trouble breathing, and these individuals “either ignored him, made him wait hours, or mocked his condition.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that “Officer Mr. Brown” observed Plaintiff’s distress but stated that his sergeant instructed him not to sign or assist, and “Defendant Dr. Light,” “ARNP M. Godwin,” and “other named DOC medical providers” had direct knowledge of Plaintiff’s throat condition. (Id. at 2.) “At least one nurse” visually examined Plaintiff’s throat and failed to order diagnostic testing or physician review, and “[s]taff who examined Plaintiff” documented his symptoms but only issued mild discomfort medications and delayed referral for months. (Id.) Plaintiff does
not include any numbered counts in his complaint, but contends these facts constitute deliberate indifference under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id.) Any complaint filed by a person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is
subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court to the extent it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc ). “The standard for determining whether [a] Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915 “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). The amended complaint was filed on November 12, 2025. (Dkt. No. 24.) This was five days after the date Plaintiff was required to file the amended complaint. The amended complaint should be dismissed because it was untimely filed. Moreover, the amended complaint is vague as to the involvement of each purported Defendant such that is unclear whether the Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment applies. Plaintiff identifies he was “incarcerated at Clallam County Jail and subsequently within the Washington State Department Corrections.” (Dkt. No. 24 at 1.) Plaintiff does not identify whether his time at the Clallam County Jail included pretrial detention versus post-conviction
detention. Nor does he identify when he was transferred from the Clallam County Jail to the State Department of Corrections. Plaintiff also does not identify which correctional staff at which correctional facility knew of his alleged medical condition or when and how they obtained such information.
The distinction between pretrial detention and post-conviction confinement is important because protections under the Eighth Amendment do not attach until after conviction. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) (“Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the States has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.”); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979). Whereas “[c]laims by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, rather than the Eight Amendment.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998). And although the same standards may be applied to prisoner rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment, id., failing to identify “a short and plain statement of the claim” against each defendant does not comport with the requirements of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 8.1
As to the merits of the alleged constitutional violations, “[d]eliberate indifference [in violation of the Eighth Amendment] ‘may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment[.]’” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988)). “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, Plaintiff must
1 Also, Plaintiff fails to identify whether his constitutional claims are being brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which normally is the vehicle for asserting constitutional claims against defendants acting under color of state law. make a subjective showing that the prison official he seeks to hold liable acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” that is, “one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302–03). Under the objective requirement, the prison official’s acts or omissions must deprive an inmate of the “minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). This objective component is satisfied so long as the institution “furnishes sentenced prisoners with adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1258 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. Under the subjective standard, deliberate indifference requires a showing that the prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official is deliberately indifferent only if they know that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards it by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not provide the required showing that his treatment meets either the objective or subjective requirements to demonstrate a constitutional violation. His claim regarding medical care does not suggest that his basic needs were not met, only that Defendants did not refer him to a specialist for months. Furthermore, Plaintiff names only three Defendants in his proposed amended complaint: Scott Light, PA-C; Michael Godwin, ARNP; and “Officer Mr. Brown.”2 Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that any of these
2 There are two Defendants with the last name “Brown:” Alyssa Brown, CMA and J. Brown, CMA. The Court is unclear which Defendant Plaintiff is referring to. named Defendants had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”3 Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) without prejudice. Plaintiff will be given one last opportunity to correct the deficiencies identified in this Order. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint no later than December 12, 2025. If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint by such date that addresses the deficiencies identified herein, the matter will be closed. The Clerk is directed to calendar this event. Dated this 14th day of November, 2025. A David G. Estudillo United States District Judge
3 Plaintiff fails assert any cause of action against the other 41 Defendants.