I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶5
In November 2021, Hupke was arrested and booked into county
jail. At the time, Hupke was on parole for unrelated charges,
so he was placed on a parole hold pending review by his
parole officer. Hupke had moved his residence without
informing his parole officer, which was a violation of a
condition of his parole. Hupke called his mother from jail,
explained the situation, and emphasized the importance of
getting the parole hold lifted so he could be released from
jail. Hupke instructed his mother not to tell his parole
officer that he had already moved, but instead to say that he
was in the process of moving. Hupke's mother ultimately
conveyed the false information to the parole officer as
instructed.
¶6
Hupke's phone calls were recorded and reviewed, and he
was charged with one count of attempt to influence a public
servant under section 18-8-306. The phone calls were admitted
as evidence at trial, and Hupke was convicted.
¶7
On appeal, Hupke challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction. People v. Hupke, 2024 COA
73, ¶ 1, 557 P.3d 816, 817. Specifically, he argued that
the phrase "by means of deceit" in section 18-8-306
requires a defendant to personally deceive a public servant.
Id. Here, Hupke contended, the prosecution presented
no evidence that he personally deceived his parole
officer—rather, any deception was carried out by his
mother. Id. A division of the court of appeals
rejected his contentions and affirmed his conviction.
Id. at ¶ 16, 557 P.3d at 819.
¶8
The division reasoned that the plain language of the statute
encompassed Hupke's actions because the phrase "by
means of deceit" in section 18-8-306 describes an
"offender's attempt to influence a public servant
through any fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation designed to deceive and trick the public
servant." Id. at ¶ 11, 557 P.3d at 819.
The division then concluded that sufficient evidence
supported Hupke's conviction because he acted by means of
deceit when he used his mother to convey false information to
his parole officer in an effort to get his parole hold
lifted. Id. at ¶ 14, 557 P.3d at 819.
¶9
We granted Hupke's petition for a writ of certiorari, and
we now affirm.
II.
Analysis
¶10
Hupke argues that section 18-8-306 criminalizes a
defendant's own acts of deceit, not a
defendant's truthful instructions to a third party to
engage in
deceptive acts on the defendant's behalf. He contends
that his conduct did not amount to "deceit" because
he told his mother the truth and merely instructed her to
lie; his mother's actions deceived the parole
officer.
¶11
We begin by setting forth the standard of review and
applicable legal principles. We then consider the meaning of
the phrase "by means of deceit" in section 18-8-306
and hold that, contrary to Hupke's contention,
"deceit" encompasses a defendant's use of a
third party to engage in deceptive acts on the
defendant's behalf.
¶12
Next, we turn to the facts of this case and apply them to the
elements of section 18-8-306. We conclude that a reasonable
juror could have found that Hupke's conduct, viewed in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, constituted an
attempt to influence a public servant by means of deceit.
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
support Hupke's conviction.
A.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶13
We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo.
McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d
379, 389. When we construe a statute, our primary purpose is
to identify and give effect to the legislature's intent.
Id. We look first to the language of the statute and
give its words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings.
Id. We discern their ordinary meanings by construing
undefined words and phrases according to their common usage.
People v. Johnson, 2024 CO 32, ¶ 17, 549 P.3d
957, 961.
¶14
We likewise review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo.
Manjarrez v. People, 2020 CO 53, ¶ 20, 465 P.3d
547, 551. In so doing, we must "determine whether the
relevant evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to support the
conclusion by a reasonable juror that the defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Butler v.
People, 2019 CO 87, ¶ 20, 450 P.3d 714, 718.
B.
The Meaning of the Phrase "By Means of Deceit" in
Section 18-8-306
¶15
Section 18-8-306 provides that it is a class 4 felony to
"attempt[] to influence any public servant by means of
deceit . . . with the intent thereby to alter or affect the
public servant's decision . . . or action concerning any
matter which is to be considered or performed by the public
servant." The purpose of this provision "is to
protect public servants from undue influence or intimidation
by means of deceit." People v. Janousek, 871
P.2d 1189, 1194 (Colo. 1994).
¶16
Because the statute does not define "deceit," we
look to its plain and ordinary meaning. Over thirty-two years
ago, we explained that "deceit" means "[a]
fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation . . . used by one
or more persons to deceive and trick another, who is ignorant
of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party
imposed upon." Id. at 1196 (alteration and
omission in
original) (quoting Deceit, Black's Law
Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)). It includes "any trick,
collusion, contrivance, false representation, or underhand
practice used to defraud another." Id. (quoting
Deceit, Webster's Third New International
Dictionary (1986)). Although those dictionary definitions
have evolved somewhat over time, their essence remains
unchanged. See Deceit, Black's Law Dictionary
(12th ed. 2024) ("The act of intentionally leading
someone to believe something that is not true; an act
designed to deceive or trick ...."); Deceit,
Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deceit [https://
perma.cc/7V5T-E94Z] ("[T]he act of causing someone to
accept as true or valid what is false or invalid ....").
¶17
While Hupke acknowledges that the term "deceit" is
broader than "lie," he argues that
"deceit" is not so broad as to include using a
third party to convey a lie on a defendant's behalf. We
disagree. As reflected by the broad definitions above, the
ordinary meaning of "deceit" encompasses a wide
range of conduct. True, it is possible to engage in deceit by
personally misleading or tricking another individual into
believing something that is not true. But it is equally
possible to mislead or trick another person by using
someone else to convey false or misleading information.
Indeed, in some cases, it may be even more deceptive to use a
messenger to convey untrue information—especially a
messenger whom the recipient is likely to find more
believable or trustworthy. Either method amounts
to conduct designed to lead another person to believe
something that is not true, which is the heart of
"deceit."[2]
¶18
Importantly, the use of deceit is simply a means to an end.
Section 18-8-306 does not criminalize deceit in and of
itself; it prohibits attempts to influence public servants
"by means of" deceit. Thus, imagine a person asks a
third party to convey false information to a public servant
to influence some action by the public servant, but the third
party never follows through. While such a scenario may amount
to solicitation or conspiracy (depending on the
circumstances), it does not amount to an attempt to influence
the public servant under section 18-8-306 because a public
servant cannot possibly be influenced by information that
never reaches them.[3]
¶19
Hupke also contends that the legislature could not have
intended for the statute to cover his conduct because other
class 4 felonies, such as second degree
assault, § 18-3-203(2)(b), C.R.S. (2025), and second
degree motor vehicle theft, § 18-4-409(6)(b), C.R.S.
(2025), are more serious than using another person to convey
a lie. In other words, Hupke argues that the legislature
could not have intended to punish his actions as harshly as
the legislature punishes crimes like second degree assault.
We disagree.
¶20
First, we find no such limitation in the language chosen by
the legislature. The legislature chose the phrase "by
means of deceit," which includes many forms of trickery.
We must presume that its choice was deliberate and made with
full knowledge of the effects. See In re People v.
Beverly, 2025 CO 18, ¶ 21, 568 P.3d 398, 404.
Second, given that the purpose of the statute is to
"protect public servants from undue influence or
intimidation by means of deceit," Janousek, 871
P.2d at 1194, the legislature reasonably chose language
intended to cover a broad range of conduct. Public servants
must routinely make consequential decisions where the
accuracy of information is paramount. So, criminalizing
attempts to influence the actions of public servants is
critical to ensuring the accuracy and integrity of their
decisions.
¶21
In sum, we hold that the meaning of the phrase "by means
of deceit" in section 18-8-306 encompasses a
defendant's use of a third party to engage in deceptive
acts on the defendant's behalf.
C.
Application
¶22
Turning to the facts of this case, we conclude that a
reasonable juror could have found that Hupke's conduct,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
amounted to an attempt to influence a public servant by means
of deceit. First, the parties do not contest that a parole
officer is a public servant. Second, undisputed evidence
showed that Hupke had changed residences without his parole
officer's permission. Third, there is no dispute that
Hupke sought to be released; the recorded phone conversations
revealed that Hupke wanted his parole officer to lift the
parole hold. Fourth, those conversations also revealed that
Hupke asked his mother to lie to his parole officer by saying
that he was in the process of moving when in fact he had
already moved. Fifth, the evidence showed that Hupke's
mother actually conveyed the lie to the parole officer. In
sum, Hupke effectively used his mother to lie to his parole
officer in an effort to influence the parole officer's
actions. A reasonable juror therefore could have found that
Hupke attempted to influence a public servant by means of
deceit, in violation of section 18-8-306.