Michael Thomas Dalton v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: February 6, 2024
• Docket: 1228221
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges O’Brien, AtLee and Malveaux UNPUBLISHED

Argued by videoconference

MICHAEL THOMAS DALTON MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 1228-22-1 JUDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN FEBRUARY 6, 2024 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH Tanya Bullock, Judge

S. Mario Lorello (Zoby & Broccoletti, P.C., on brief), for appellant.

Lucille M. Wall, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

The trial court convicted Michael Thomas Dalton of strangulation, two counts of abduction,

and four counts of assault and battery of a family member. On appeal, Dalton challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions for strangulation, abduction, and one assault.

Finding no error, we affirm Dalton’s convictions.

BACKGROUND

On appeal, we state the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the

prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). “In doing so, we discard any of

appellant’s conflicting evidence and regard as true all credible evidence favorable to the

Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence.”

McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 516 (2020).

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). I. January 3, 2020 Offense

On January 3, 2020, Dalton and his fiancée, N.T.,1 argued as they drove to a friend’s

birthday dinner. When Dalton stopped at a red light, he yelled at N.T., “If you want to leave, then

get the fuck out of the car.” N.T. turned to open the passenger door, but Dalton grabbed the back of

her neck and pulled her towards him, preventing her from exiting.

At trial, the Commonwealth introduced photographs N.T. took shortly after the incident.

The photographs depicted bruising on the back of her neck from Dalton’s assault.

Dalton denied that he and N.T. had argued on the way to the dinner and testified that he

never grabbed N.T. When asked how N.T. obtained the bruising on her neck, Dalton stated that the

“only thing [he could] think of” was that he pulled her back into the car to protect her from

oncoming traffic.

II. May 21, 2020 Offenses

On May 21, 2020, Dalton began another argument with N.T. which became “physical.”

N.T. ran from their house into the driveway, but Dalton chased her. Surveillance video recorded

Dalton place N.T. in a choke hold, lift her from the ground, and carry her by her neck into the

backyard. While Dalton had her in the choke hold, he told N.T. that she “couldn’t leave.” Once in

the backyard, Dalton pushed N.T. onto the deck. When N.T. stood up, Dalton pushed her again,

grabbed her arm, and forced her back inside the house. N.T. suffered from neck pain for the next

two days.

III. August 22, 2020 Offenses

On August 22, 2020, N.T. decided to end her relationship with Dalton. An argument

ensued, and N.T. began to pack a suitcase so she could leave. Dalton initially agreed to “let [N.T.]

go,” but then “changed his mind.” He “ripped the suitcase out of [N.T.’s] hand,” pushed her onto

1 We use the victim’s initials to protect her privacy. -2- the bedroom floor, sat on her, placed both his hands around her neck, and squeezed for 10 to 12

seconds. N.T. could not breathe.

After Dalton released her, N.T. tried to leave the house, but for approximately two hours,

Dalton blocked the door. Each time N.T. tried to push past Dalton, he would either push her back or

grab her arm. Dalton told her multiple times, “You’re not fucking leaving.” N.T. tried to exit

through the back door, but Dalton ran ahead of her and blocked that door, too. During one of N.T.’s

escape attempts, Dalton pushed her against the back of a couch, grabbed the front of her throat, and

squeezed for several seconds. N.T. could not breathe, and she thought Dalton was going to kill her.

Eventually, Dalton calmed and “was very apologetic.” After he left the house to get dinner,

N.T. walked to a nearby motel and photographed her injuries, which included bruises on the inside

of her left arm and red scratch marks on the front of her neck. The Commonwealth introduced

those photographs at trial.

III. Trial

At the conclusion of the case, the court convicted Dalton of three counts of assault and

battery for the incidents on January 3, May 21, and August 22, 2020; two counts of abduction, one

occurring on May 21 and one on August 22, 2020; and of strangulation for the incident on August

22, 2020.2

ANALYSIS

On review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “[t]he judgment of

the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without

evidence to support it.” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v.

Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). We examine the evidence “in the light most

2 The court also convicted Dalton of a fourth count of assault and battery occurring on May 10, 2020. Dalton does not challenge that conviction on appeal. -3- favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below, and determine whether ‘any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Shahan v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 246, 258 (2022) (quoting Farmer v.

Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 402, 416 (2013)).

I. The evidence was sufficient to convict Dalton of the August 22, 2020 strangulation.

Dalton argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that the red scratch marks on the

front of N.T.’s neck were caused by Dalton’s strangulations because N.T. did not explicitly

testify that she received the marks during the strangulations. Instead, he speculates that they may

have come from his “additional assaultive behavior” on August 22, 2020.

“Any person who, without consent, impedes the blood circulation or respiration of

another person by knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully applying pressure to the neck of such

person resulting in the wounding or bodily injury of such person is guilty of strangulation.”

Code § 18.2-51.6(A). “‘[B]odily injury’ within the scope of [the strangulation statute] is any

bodily injury whatsoever and includes an act of damage or harm or hurt that relates to the body;

is an impairment of a function or bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or is an act of

impairment of a physical condition.” Ricks v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 470, 479 (2015) (quoting

Code § 18.2-51.6(A)).

The red scratch marks on the front of N.T.’s neck are sufficient to establish a bodily

injury under the strangulation statute. See id. at 478-79 (affirming a strangulation conviction

when the defendant “held the victim down with his hand on her neck” so “that she was unable

to . . . breathe” and “she had a red mark on her neck”). Dalton’s speculation that the marks may

have come from his other assaults on N.T. is without support in the record. The other “assaultive

behavior” N.T. described was Dalton pushing her, ripping a suitcase out of her hand, repeatedly

blocking the doors, and grabbing her arm to keep her from leaving the house; she never testified

-4- that Dalton touched her neck at any other point except while strangling her. “[T]he

Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the

evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant.” Taylor v.

Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 13, 30 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Hamilton v.

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755 (1993)). Thus, the evidence supports the court’s

conclusion that the scratch marks on N.T.’s neck occurred when Dalton strangled her on August

22, 2020.

II. The evidence was sufficient to convict Dalton of abducting N.T. on May 21, 2020 and August 22, 2020.

Dalton argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for abducting

N.T. because both detentions were incidental to his assaults.

Abduction is the unjustified “tak[ing], transport[ing], detain[ing] or secret[ing]” of

another person by means of “force, intimidation or deception” with the intent “to deprive such

other person of [her] personal liberty.” Code § 18.2-47(A). “[T]he statutory offense is complete

upon ‘the physical detention of a person, with the intent to deprive [her] of [her] personal liberty,

by force, intimidation, or deception.’” Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 224 (2013)

(quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 526 (1984)).

Under the incidental detention doctrine, if a defendant is “accused of abduction by

detention and another crime involving restraint of the victim, both growing out of a continuing

course of conduct,” he may be convicted of “separate offenses only when the detention

committed in the act of abduction is separate and apart from, and not merely incidental to, the

restraint employed in the commission of the other crime.” Swezey v. Commonwealth, 77

Va. App. 809, 815 (2023) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 310, 314 (1985)).

“The only issue when abduction is charged alongside an offense for which detention is an

intrinsic element is whether any detention exceeded the minimum necessary to complete the -5- required elements of the other offense.” Lawlor, 285 Va. at 225. Thus, our task is to determine

“whether sufficient evidence exists to support the fact[]finder’s determination that a defendant

used greater restraint than that necessary to commit the simultaneously charged offense.” Epps

v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 393, 403 (2016).3

“[W]hether the detention established by the evidence is ‘the kind of restraint which is an

intrinsic element of crimes such as rape, robbery, and assault,’ is a question of law to be

determined by the court,” Swezey, 77 Va. App. at 815 (alteration in original) (quoting Lawlor,

285 Va. at 229), but we “defer to the trial court’s findings of historical fact,” Vay v.

Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 236, 253 (2017) (quoting Hoyt v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App.

489, 496 n.4 (2004)).

A. The May 21, 2020 Abduction

Dalton contends that the May offense was a “single event” and that any detention was

“subsumed by the assault and battery” offense.

During the May incident, Dalton placed N.T. in a choke hold, lifted her from the ground,

and then carried her by her neck from their driveway to their backyard. He later forced N.T. into

the house. The evidence was sufficient to establish that Dalton completed the assault and battery

when he placed N.T. in a choke hold. Dalton’s subsequent acts of lifting N.T., carrying her into the

backyard, and then forcing her into the house were separate from, not incidental to, the initial

assault. In taking these actions, Dalton “used greater restraint than that necessary to commit” the

initial assault. Epps, 66 Va. App. at 403.

3 While the factors set out in Hoyt v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 489, 494 (2004), may be considered “when helpful,” Swezey, 77 Va. App. at 817, consideration of those factors does not aid the resolution of this case. Instead, we find that the “mandatory” test in Lawlor, 285 Va. at 225, conclusively addresses and controls the issues presented. See Swezey, 77 Va. App. at 817 (“[T]he Lawlor test is mandatory and consideration of the Hoyt factors is permissive. . . . [T]he Hoyt factors may be considered when helpful.”). -6- Dalton’s forcible asportation of N.T. further supports a finding that Dalton’s abduction of

N.T. was independent of the assault. Although “some degree of detention [is sometimes] inherent

in . . . assault,” asportation of the victim is not. Vay, 67 Va. App. at 251 (quoting Lawlor, 285 Va.

at 225 n.13); see also Scott, 228 Va. at 526 (holding that statutory abduction requires no proof of

asportation); Wiggins v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 173, 189 (2005) (holding that a robbery did

not subsume an abduction under the incidental detention doctrine when “the victim was forced to

walk approximately ‘twenty-three feet’ to the front cash register and then approximately ‘eight

feet’ to the drive-through cash register”).

Accordingly, Dalton’s May abduction of N.T. was “separate and apart from” the assault.

Swezey, 77 Va. App. at 819.

B. The August 22, 2020 Abduction

Dalton further contends that “each of the overt acts that would potentially give rise to an

abduction [during the August incident was] accompanied by an assaultive act.”

Like the May abduction, the August abduction was not incidental to Dalton’s assault and

battery of N.T. The evidence established that Dalton “ripped” away a suitcase N.T. was holding

and pushed her to the floor. The assault and battery was thus complete. Dalton then prevented

N.T. from leaving the house by blocking the exits for approximately two hours. When N.T. tried to

walk around him, he pushed her back or grabbed her arm and said, “You’re not fucking leaving.”

These actions “exceeded the minimum necessary to complete the” assault and battery, “thus

establishing the separate crime of abduction.” Swezey, 77 Va. App. at 818-19 (quoting Lawlor, 285

Va. at 225).

III. The evidence was sufficient to convict Dalton of assault and battery of a family member for the incident on January 3, 2020.

Finally, Dalton argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for

assaulting N.T. on January 3 because the Commonwealth failed to prove his intent. He contends -7- that no evidence “explain[ed] the ongoing circumstances at the intersection” and the evidence failed

to disprove his alternative theory that he grabbed N.T. to keep her in the vehicle for her safety.

The crime of assault and the crime of battery are independent, common law crimes,

“although they are linked in Code § 18.2-57.” Parish v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 324, 329

(2010); Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 625 (2019). “Placing an individual in

reasonable apprehension of bodily harm constitutes an assault.” Kelley, 69 Va. App. at 625. A

battery is “the actual infliction of corporal hurt on another that is done willfully or in anger.”

Montague v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 532, 541 (2009). “‘One cannot be convicted of assault and

battery “without an intention to do bodily harm—either an actual intention or an intention

imputed by law.”’” Parish, 56 Va. App. at 330 (quoting Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App.

463, 468 (2000)).

“Proving intent by direct evidence often is impossible.” Adams, 33 Va. App. at 470.

“‘Intent is the purpose formed in a person’s mind and may, like any other fact, be shown by

circumstances,’ including the ‘words or conduct’ of the alleged offender.” Secret v.

Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228-29 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Herring, 288 Va. 59, 75

(2014)); see also Parish, 56 Va. App. at 331 (“A perpetrator’s intent may be inferred from the

nature of the overt act and the surrounding circumstances.” (quoting Clark v. Commonwealth,

279 Va. 636, 642 (2010))). Moreover, the intent necessary to sustain an assault and battery

conviction “may be imputed if the touching is ‘done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.’”

Parish, 56 Va. App. at 331 (quoting Adams, 33 Va. App. at 469). A fact finder’s “decision on the

question of intent is accorded great deference on appeal and will not be reversed unless clearly

erroneous.” Towler v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 297 (2011).

Dalton’s words and the nature of his actions support the court’s conclusion that he intended

to harm N.T. During the argument, Dalton yelled at N.T., “If you want to leave, then get the fuck

-8- out of the car.” When she tried to do so, Dalton grabbed N.T. by the neck and pulled with enough

force to injure her. From these circumstances, a reasonable fact finder could conclude, as the court

did, that Dalton intended to harm N.T.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm Dalton’s convictions.

Affirmed.

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