Michael Stephen Lehman v. State of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: August 30, 2023
• Docket: 22-0407
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0407 Filed August 30, 2023

MICHAEL STEPHEN LEHMAN, Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Patrick R. Grady,

Judge.

Michael Lehman appeals the denial of his application for postconviction

relief. AFFIRMED.

Gregory F. Greiner, West Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ. 2

AHLERS, Judge.

In 2015, the State charged Michael Lehman with first-degree murder and

first-degree burglary after he stabbed a man to death in a motel room. The parties

reached a plea agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, Lehman pleaded guilty to

an amended charge of second-degree murder and was sentenced to a prison term

not to exceed fifty years.

Lehman filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR). Following a

trial, the district court denied his application. Lehman appeals. He raises one

issue. He asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have his

competency evaluated.

Defendants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel in the plea-

bargaining process. Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 868 (Iowa 2015). A PCR

applicant’s assertion of ineffective assistance of defense counsel raises a

constitutional claim, so our review is de novo rather than for errors at law. Sothman

v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021). With de novo review, we give weight

to the district court’s findings, but we are not bound by them. Id.

An applicant seeking PCR must prove both of the following by a

preponderance of the evidence: (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and

(2) the failure resulted in prejudice. Dempsey, 860 N.W.2d at 868. As both prongs

need to be established, if an applicant fails to prove one prong, we need not

address the other. Id.

As to the first prong of the two-pronged test, consistent with it being the

applicant’s burden to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, we presume an 3

attorney performed competently. Id. The standard for measuring counsel’s

performance is one of “a reasonably competent practitioner.” Id. (citation omitted).

As to the second prong, the applicant must prove that counsel’s subpar

performance resulted in prejudice. Id. Prejudice is established when an applicant

proves that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the probability of a different

result rises to the level that it undermines our confidence in the outcome. Id. at

868–69.

As noted, Lehman claims his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to have

his competency evaluated. Based on our de novo review, we determine Lehman

has failed to prove both prongs of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

When evaluating competency, “[t]here is a presumption that a defendant is

competent, and the defendant has the burden to prove incompetence.” State v.

Newman, 970 N.W.2d 866, 871 (Iowa 2022). At the PCR trial, Lehman failed to

present persuasive evidence that he was incompetent at the time leading up to

and during his guilty plea. On appeal, he points, generally, to two classes of

evidence in support of his claim that plea counsel should have sought evaluation

of his competence—his behavior the night of the stabbing and his long history of

mental-health issues. But neither of these classes of evidence meets Lehman’s

burden.

While his behavior on the night of the stabbing may raise issues of various

legal defenses, it does not govern the reasonableness of plea counsel’s failure to

seek a competency evaluation months later because “[t]he question is one of

present competency, not past malady.” See State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773,

783 n.3 (Iowa 2018). This is also why “a past history of mental illness, without 4

more, is insufficient to trigger a competency hearing.” Id. So, even if Lehman’s

mental illness was present during the time leading up to and including the plea

hearing, that fact “is not necessarily sufficient to trigger the requirement of a

competency hearing under Iowa Code section 812.3 [(2016)] and due process.”

See id. What would trigger defense counsel’s obligation to seek a competency

hearing would be present mental illness “sufficient to give rise to a serious question

as to whether the defendant meaningfully underst[ood] the charges and [was]

capable of meaningfully assisting in the defense.” Id.

The evidence presented at the PCR trial convinces us that Lehman

meaningfully understood the charges and was capable of meaningfully assisting

in his defense. Lehman testified that, while his case proceeded, he felt that he

understood the process. Plea counsel testified that it was very clear to him that

Lehman had recollection of events. Counsel also testified that (1) he did not recall

having any concerns about Lehman’s competency; (2) Lehman appeared to

understand what was going on with his case; (3) Lehman appeared to understand

the issues and what his options were; (4) Lehman appeared to understand court

procedure, such as who the participants were and how the trial would work; and

(5) he did not have any concerns about Lehman’s ability to assist in his own

defense. Plea counsel’s testimony was largely unrebutted. Under these

circumstances, we find that plea counsel had no reason to question Lehman’s

competency, so plea counsel did not breach any duty owed to Lehman in failing to

request a competency hearing. See Newman, 970 N.W.2d at 871 (finding there

was nothing indicating the need for a competency hearing when “the defendant

was lucid, oriented to time and place, demonstrated an understanding of the 5

proceedings and the role of the persons present, demonstrated an ability to

communicate with his lawyer, and demonstrated an appreciation of the charge

against him and the consequences of pleading guilty”).

Although the finding that Lehman’s plea counsel did not breach any

essential duty owed to Lehman ends the inquiry, we briefly address the prejudice

prong. Even assuming for the sake of discussion that Lehman’s counsel should

have requested a competency hearing and breached an essential duty by failing

to do so, Lehman failed to prove prejudice. In the context of a claim that counsel

was ineffective for failing to have a defendant’s competency evaluated, “prejudice

can be established by proving a reasonabl[e] probability the defendant would have

been found unfit had a competency hearing been held.” Karns v. State, No. 21-

0758, 2022 WL 2348144, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 29, 2022) (alteration in original)

(quoting McGee v. State, No. 19-1335, 2020 WL 5650470, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App.

Sep. 23, 2020)). Here, no evidence was presented at the PCR trial that could

support a conclusion that, had a competency evaluation been requested, it would

have revealed that Lehman was incompetent. Without such evidence, Lehman

has failed to meet his burden to prove prejudice. See id. at *4 (“To [meet Karns’s

burden to establish prejudice], Karns has to prove it is reasonably likely he would

have been found incompetent at the time he entered the guilty pleas. But the only

evidence we have to support a claim Karns was incompetent is a list of diagnoses

and the fact that he was not taking his medication as prescribed. To conclude that

list is sufficient evidence to establish Karns’s likely incompetence would require us

to assume that certain untreated diagnoses always render a person incompetent.

We can’t make that leap.” (footnote omitted)). 6

Having concluded Lehman failed to meet both prongs of his ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to seek a competency

evaluation, we affirm the denial of Lehman’s PCR application.

AFFIRMED.