Michael Sparks v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJune 25, 2024
DocketDA-1221-21-0206-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Michael Sparks v. Department of the Army (Michael Sparks v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michael Sparks v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MICHAEL L. SPARKS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-1221-21-0206-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: June 25, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Elchonon Reizes , Esquire, Houston, Texas, for the appellant.

Linda K. Webster , Esquire, Fort Hood, Texas, for the agency.

Nora E. Hinojosa , Esquire, Fort Cavazos, Texas, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied his request for corrective action in this individual right of action appeal. He argues that the administrative judge exhibited bias and that some of this 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

occurred during a small portion of the hearing recording that is lost. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-5. The appellant also challenges the administrative judge’s findings on the merits. Id. at 6-19. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 Although the appellant alleged that the administrative judge exhibited bias, he has not shown that the administrative judge’s conduct during the proceedings below requires remand. See Oliver v. Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980); Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). We acknowledge that a roughly 2-hour portion of the 2-day hearing is irretrievably lost, but we do not find that this requires a different result under the circumstances. See, e.g., Harp v. Department of the Army, 791 F.2d 161, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 100 M.S.P.R. 500, ¶ 6 (2005). ¶3 Regarding the merits of his reprisal claims, the appellant disagrees with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the agency proved that it would have taken the same personnel actions involving telework and a 5-day suspension in the 3

absence of the appellant’s protected whistleblowing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-19. But we discern no basis for disturbing the administrative judge’s well-reasoned findings, which are based in part upon credibility determinations that are entitled to deference. 2 See Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997). Lastly, the appellant asserts that the agency denied him due process when it took the 5-day suspension, but that claimed impropriety is beyond the scope of this IRA appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19; see Hugenberg v. Department of Commerce, 120 M.S.P.R. 381, ¶ 24 (2013).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

2 The appellant has suggested that an agency cannot be found to have rebutted a prima facie case of reprisal when, as occurred here, the administrative judge found some motive to retaliate and no evidence of similarly situated nonwhistleblowers. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. However, he has not cited any support for this idea, and Board precedent reflects otherwise. See, e.g., Scoggins v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 31 (2016) (finding that an agency rebutted a prima facie case of reprisal even though there was some motive to retaliate and no comparator evidence because the evidence in support of the agency’s personnel action was very strong and outweighed the motive to retaliate). 3 Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter. 4

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum. Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A). If you submit a petition for review to the U.S.

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Related

Liteky v. United States
510 U.S. 540 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Anthony R. Harp v. Department of the Army
791 F.2d 161 (Federal Circuit, 1986)
Robert A. Bieber v. Department of the Army
287 F.3d 1358 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Todd R. Haebe v. Department of Justice
288 F.3d 1288 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs
838 F.3d 1367 (Federal Circuit, 2016)

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Michael Sparks v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michael-sparks-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2024.