Michael Showalter v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: December 18, 2025
• Docket: 4:25-cv-00098
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Michael Showalter, No. CV-25-00098-TUC-JCH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff Michael Showalter brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking 16 judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security 17 (“Commissioner”) denying his claim for disability benefits. Doc. 1. The Court referred this 18 matter to Magistrate Judge Michael A. Ambri for a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) 19 (Doc. 8). Judge Ambri recommends the Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision. 20 Plaintiff objects to the R&R (Doc. 21). For the following reasons, the Court will overrule 21 Plaintiff’s Objection, adopt the R&R in full, and affirm the Commissioner’s decision. 22 I. Relevant Background 23 A. Procedural History 24 On November 29, 2018, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for supplemental 25 security income alleging disability beginning on August 30, 2017.1 Plaintiff’s claim was 26 denied initially on May 20, 2019, and upon reconsideration on August 22, 2019. AR at 15; 27 136–44, 146–50. Plaintiff filed a written request for hearing, and Administrative Law Judge

28 1 Administrative Record alleging disability beginning on August 30, 2017 (“AR”) at 15, 383–91, 443–54. 1 (“ALJ”) Mark Triplett held a telephonic hearing on November 28, 2022, and a 2 supplemental telephonic hearing on January 22, 2024. AR at 15. The ALJ determined 3 Plaintiff was not under disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act and denied 4 his application. See AR at 15–31. Plaintiff’s request for review with the Appeals Council 5 was denied on January 7, 2025, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final 6 decision. AR at 1–6. 7 B. Claim Evaluation 8 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must be unable “to engage in any 9 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 10 impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected 11 to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). An 12 individual is considered disabled only if his “physical or mental impairment or impairments 13 are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, 14 considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 15 substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. 16 § 1382c(a)(3)(B). 17 A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for disability benefits. See 18 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. First, the claimant must show he is not engaged in substantial gainful 19 activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful 20 activity, he will not be considered disabled, and his claim will be denied. Id. If he is not 21 engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claimant must show at step two that he has a 22 severe physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. 23 § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant can show severe impairment, step three determines 24 whether his impairment(s) meet one of several listed impairments that automatically render 25 him disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). 26 At step three, the Commissioner looks at whether “the medical severity of [a 27 claimant’s] impairment(s). . . . meets or equals one of our listings in appendix 1 to subpart 28 P of part 404.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). This appendix lists the criteria for groups of 1 disorders—pertinent here, mental disorders—and breaks them down into subcategories 2 with specific requirements. See generally 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Mental 3 disorders are included under category 12.00. Id. Listing 12.04—Depressive, bipolar, and 4 related disorders—and listing 12.06—anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders—are 5 evaluated under three paragraphs: paragraphs A, B, and C. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, 6 App. 1, 12.04, 12.06. Listing 12.08,—personality and impulse control disorders—is 7 evaluated only under paragraphs A and B. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1., 12.08. 8 For listings 12.04 and 12.06, “[a claimant’s] mental disorder must satisfy the requirements 9 of both paragraphs A and B, or the requirements of both paragraphs A and C.” 20 C.F.R. 10 § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00A2. Relevant here, to satisfy paragraph C, a claimant’s 11 “mental disorder must be ‘serious and persistent’; that is, there must be a medically 12 documented history of the existence of the disorder over a period of at least 2 years, and 13 evidence that satisfies the criteria in both C1 and C2.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 14 1, 12.00A2c. A claimant meets the C1 criteria when “the evidence shows that [he] relie[s], 15 on an ongoing basis, upon medical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial 16 support(s), or a highly structured setting(s), to diminish the symptoms and signs of [his] 17 mental disorder.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00G2b. A claimant meets the 18 C2 criteria when “the evidence shows that, despite [his] diminished symptoms and signs, 19 [he] [has] achieved only marginal adjustment.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 20 12.00G2c. 21 A claimant has achieved only “marginal adjustment” when his “adaptation to the 22 requirements of daily life is fragile” and he has “minimal capacity to adapt to changes in 23 [his] environment or to demands that are not already part of [his] daily life.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 24 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00G2c. In considering whether a claimant has achieved only a 25 “marginal adjustment” in his symptoms, the Commissioner looks at whether “the evidence 26 shows that changes or increased demands have led to exacerbation of [his] symptoms and 27 signs and to deterioration in [his] functioning.” Id. For example, “[s]uch deterioration may 28 have necessitated a significant change in medication or other treatment [or] evidence may 1 document episodes of deterioration that have required [a claimant] to be hospitalized or 2 absent from work, making it difficult for [him] to sustain work activity over time.” Id. 3 If the claimant’s impairments are severe but do not meet one of the listed 4 impairments in step three, the fourth step determines if his residual functional capacity 5 (“RFC”) precludes him from doing his past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. 6 § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant has the RFC to do his past relevant work, he is not 7 disabled. Id. If the claimant cannot do his past relevant work, the fifth and final step 8 requires the Commissioner to determine if the claimant can make the adjustment to other 9 work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can make such 10 an adjustment, he is not disabled. Id.; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 11 (1987) (describing shifting burden at step five). 12 C. The ALJ’s Findings 13 Plaintiff’s initial application alleged disability due to rheumatoid arthritis in his 14 shoulders, back, and hands, and hepatitis C. AR at 444. At the hearing before the ALJ, 15 Plaintiff’s counsel argued that while the denial of Plaintiff’s initial application may not 16 have been erroneous, “there is a lot of medical evidence since that time” concerning 17 Plaintiff’s mental health. AR at 82. Specifically, counsel discussed Plaintiff’s 18 hospitalization for major depressive disorder recurrent with psychotic features. AR 19 at 82–83. 20 The ALJ completed the required five-step analysis for Plaintiff’s impairments and 21 determined Plaintiff was not disabled. See AR at 12–38. At step one, the ALJ found 22 Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of his 23 disability, November 29, 2018. AR at 17–18.2 At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had 24 severe impairments including depressive disorder with psychosis, anxiety disorder, 25 personality disorder, alcohol use disorder, opioid use disorder, and stimulant use disorder. 26 AR at 18. The ALJ also found Plaintiff had non-severe impairments including 27 hyperlipidemia, hepatitis C, testicular tension, and bilateral hydroceles, among others. AR

28 2 At Plaintiff’s first hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff amended his alleged onset date to November 29, 2018. AR at 82. 1 at 18–20. The ALJ explained that “[t]hese nonsevere conditions, considered singly or in 2 combination, have caused only transient and mild symptoms, if any. . . . [and] do not more 3 than minimally limit the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.” AR at 18. 4 At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 5 impairments that automatically rendered him disabled. AR at 20. Specifically, the ALJ 6 found “[t]he severity of the claimant’s mental impairments, considered singly and in 7 combination, do not meet or medically equal the criteria of listing 12.04, 12.06, and 12.08” 8 of appendix 1. AR at 20. The ALJ stated that, in making his finding, he considered whether 9 the “paragraph B” and “paragraph C” criteria were satisfied. AR at 20–21. In evaluating 10 the “paragraph C” criteria, the ALJ stated the following: 11 In this case, the evidence fails to establish the presence of the “paragraph C” criteria. The conditions are not “serious and persistent” which is defined as a 12 documented history of the disorder over a period of at least two years with both: (1) Medical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support(s), 13 or a highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of the mental disorder; and (2) Marginal adjustment, 14 that is, the claimant has minimal capacity to adapt to changes in the environment or to demands that are not already part of daily life. 15 16 At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC “to perform a full range of work 17 at all exertional levels,” but he could “tolerate no exposure to workplace hazards such as 18 unprotected heights and exposed, moving machinery,” could “perform simple, routine 19 tasks, and can tolerate occasional contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the general 20 public,” required “regular work breaks at 2 hour intervals,” and could “tolerate occasional 21 changes to work routines and work processes.” AR at 21. At the same step, the ALJ found 22 Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. AR at 29. At step five, the ALJ 23 found that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, he could 24 perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. AR at 30. 25 Accordingly, the ALJ deemed Plaintiff not to be disabled, and rejected his claim. AR at 31. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 II. Standards of Review 2 A. R&R Standard of Review 3 In reviewing a magistrate judge’s R&R, “[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo 4 determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. 5 § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 6 (9th Cir. 1989). A court is obligated to review only the specific portions of the report, 7 proposed findings, or recommendations objected to. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If, 8 following review, “the district court is satisfied with the magistrate judge’s findings and 9 recommendations it may in its discretion treat those findings and recommendations as its 10 own.” Morris v. Shin, No. CV 20-322, 2023 WL 6248830, at *7 n. 5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 11 2023) (quoting Goffman v. Gross, 59 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1995)). 12 B. ALJ Decision Standard of Review 13 An ALJ’s decision may be reversed only when it is unsupported by substantial 14 evidence or constitutes harmful legal error. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 15 (9th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 16 preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 17 to support a conclusion.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) 18 (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court 19 looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] 20 evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 21 97, 102 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 22 229 (1938)). While the Court is required to examine the record as a whole, it may neither 23 reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Thomas v. 24 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). When the evidence is susceptible to more 25 than one rational interpretation, the Court must uphold the Commissioner’s conclusion. Id. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 III. Analysis 2 Plaintiff objects to the R&R for two reasons. First, the R&R found “[t]he medical 3 record cited by the ALJ indicates that Showalter has achieved more than marginal 4 adjustment to his psychological impairments and does not satisfy the requirements of 5 ‘paragraph C2.’” Doc. 20 at 7. Petitioner objects to this finding because “improvement with 6 psychosocial supports is necessary in a ‘Paragraph C’ analysis.”3 Doc. 21 at 1. Second, the 7 R&R found that even “if the ALJ committed legal error by failing to explicitly explain his 8 reasoning in the step 3 section of his decision, the ALJ’s analysis of the record explains 9 why Showalter did not satisfy the ‘paragraph C2’ criteria.” Doc. 20 at 12. Petitioner objects 10 that the “mere mention of ‘doing well’ while receiving substantial psychosocial supports 11 in the form of familial intervention and frequent outpatient treatment is not dispositive of 12 the issue of ‘marginal adjustment.” Doc. 21 at 1–2. 13 Plaintiff is correct that while the ALJ explained the paragraph C requirements at 14 step three, he did not explicitly state why Plaintiff “fail[ed] to establish the presence of 15 ‘paragraph C’ criteria.” Still, this does not mean that this finding was supported only by 16 the “mere mention of ‘doing well’ while receiving substantial psychosocial supports in the 17 form of familial intervention and frequent outpatient treatment.” Doc. 21 at 1–2. The ALJ’s 18 opinion is full of citations to the record explaining why the ALJ did not find Plaintiff 19 disabled. The Court considers this reasoning when evaluating the ALJ’s findings at step 20 three because when reviewing an ALJ’s findings, the Court considers “all the pages of the

21 3 As an initial matter, its unclear exactly what this argument is objecting to. The R&R acknowledged that, in order to satisfy the paragraph C criteria, a claimant can show he has 22 “achieved only marginal adjustment when the evidence shows that changes or increased demands have led to exacerbation of [his] symptoms and signs and to deterioration in [his] 23 functioning,” and one example of this is a claimant that has “become unable to function outside of [his] home or a more restrictive setting, without substantial psychosocial 24 supports.” Doc. 20 at 7 (citing 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00G2c). The R&R reasoned Plaintiff was able to adapt to changes in his living arrangements and demonstrated 25 he was able to function outside of his home without substantial psychosocial supports. Id. at 9. Without more detail, it appears to the Court that this objection is just a restatement 26 of Plaintiff’s arguments in his opening brief. Objections that merely repeat or rehash arguments already addressed in the R&R are insufficient to trigger de novo review, see 27 Curtis v. Shinn, No. CV-19-04374-PHX-DGC-JZB, 2021 WL 4596465, at *5 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2021). Still, the Court’s reasoning below addresses the ALJ’s findings related to 28 psychosocial supports. 1 ALJ’s decision.” Kaufmann v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 843, 851 (9th Cir. 2022) (emphasis in 2 original) (finding a district court “clearly erred by overlooking the ALJ’s full explanation” 3 in finding an ALJ failed to adequately explain his conclusion on one issue). 4 The ALJ’s analysis at step four consists of eight pages of explanation of why the 5 record showed that Plaintiff’s mental health conditions were severe, but not disabling. See 6 AR at 21–29. The ALJ reviewed a timeline of Plaintiff’s psychiatric history and discussed 7 that, since his psychiatric hospitalization on December 30, 2021, Plaintiff’s medical record 8 showed he consistently improved with treatment and Plaintiff himself consistently reported 9 he was “doing great.” See AR at 23–24. The ALJ discussed many of Plaintiff’s psychiatric 10 evaluations and their results individually, which seemed to show consistent progress 11 despite the continued persistence of some symptoms. AR at 23–26. Plaintiff further 12 progressed from hospitalization to a group home, and eventually returned to living with his 13 mother and brother. AR at 23–24. In 2023, Plaintiff “denied any significant problems 14 completing daily activities.” AR at 26. The ALJ emphasized that “[d]espite his severe 15 mental health conditions, [Plaintiff] engaged in activities such as going for walks and 16 participating in support groups, utilized his coping skills, he wanted a relationship, was 17 working doing landscaping, and staying busy doing different types of work.” AR at 27 18 (citations omitted). Plaintiff was receiving ongoing psychosocial supports, but he was 19 improving to the point where he was able to perform some work. Considering this 20 evidence, it would have been illogical for the ALJ to conclude at step three that Plaintiff’s 21 impairments preclude him “from performing any gainful activity.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 22 U.S. 521, 532 (1990) (emphasis in original) (explaining Plaintiff’s heavy burden at step 23 three), superseded by statute on other grounds. 24 This extensive analysis makes clear the ALJ did not believe the record showed that 25 “changes or increased demands have led to exacerbation of [Plaintiff’s] symptoms and 26 signs and to deterioration in [his] functioning.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 27 12.00G2c. The ALJ explicitly found that, rather than deteriorating, “[t]he claimant reports, 28 and his records document, improved symptoms and functioning with treatment.” AR at 27. Though the ALJ was not explicit in his reasoning at step three, his reasoning at step four 2|| directly applies to the paragraph C2 criteria. The Court can discern the ALJ’s reasoning, 3 || his findings are supported by substantial evidence, and the decision must be upheld. 4) IV. Order 5 Accordingly, 6 IT IS ORDERED overruling Plaintiff's Objections to the Report and 7 || Recommendation (Doc. 21). 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED adopting in full the Report and Recommendation 9|| (Doc. 20) and affirming the decision of the Commissioner. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment 11 || accordingly and close this case. 12 Dated this 17th day of December, 2025. 13 14 f fy

16 / / John C. Hinderaker _/United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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