IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL SHAVER, : Civil No. 1:25-CV-77 : Plaintiff, : : v. : : (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom) FRANK BISIGNANO, : Commissioner of Social Security,1 : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction Michael Shaver filed an application under Title II of the Social Security Act for disability and disability insurance benefits on April 23, 2021.2 Following a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), the ALJ found that Shaver was not disabled from his alleged onset date of September 23, 2019, through June 6, 2022, the date of the ALJ’s decision.3 The Appeals Council denied review, and Shaver appealed the
1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Bisignano is substituted as the defendant in this suit. 2 Tr. 181-83. 3 Tr. 20-36. decision to the District Court.4 The Court remanded the matter back to an ALJ for reconsideration.5 Shaver had another hearing before an ALJ,
and following that hearing, the ALJ published his decision finding that Shaver was not disabled from his alleged onset date of disability of September 23, 2019, through October 28, 2024, the date of that decision.6
Shaver now appeals this decision, arguing that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. After a review of the record,
and mindful of the fact that substantial evidence “means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’”7 we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s findings in this case. Therefore, we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner denying this claim. II. Statement of Facts and of the Case
Michael Shaver filed for disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging disability due to partial blindness in the right eye, strokes, high
4 Tr. 1-4. 5 Tr. 1867-68. 6 Tr. 1789-1806. 7 , 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). 2 blood pressure and cholesterol, depression, a pelvic crush injury, injury to his lower extremities, three cracked vertebrae in the lower back, right
side numbness, and chronic pain.8 Shaver was 43 years old at the time of his alleged onset of disability, had at least a high school education, and had no past relevant work.9
The medical record regarding Shaver’s impairments10 revealed that in October of 2018, Shaver suffered a stroke causing mild residual right
sided numbness.11 On July 15, 2019, Shaver presented to the emergency department unresponsive with agonal breathing, ashen skin, central cyanosis, and perpetual vomiting after working outside in the heat.12
Shaver obtained an emergency head and neck CT, MRI, and EEG, which revealed no new abnormalities.13 The next day, Shaver reported negative
8 Tr. 224. 9 Tr. 1804. 10 Because Shaver’s appeal focuses on the ALJ’s treatment of evidence related to his physical impairments, we will forego discussion and analysis of Shaver’s mental health records and evaluations. 11 Tr. 495, 688, 690. 12 Tr. 845-49. 13 Tr. 848-49. 3 symptoms altogether.14 Treatment notes indicated the episode was likely caused by dehydration.15
On September 23, 2019, Shaver incurred a work-related injury where he was pinned between the bucket and tire of a backhoe.16 He presented to the emergency department where pelvic X-rays and chest
and spine CTs revealed a bilateral superior and inferior pubic rami fracture, a vertical fracture through the central sacrum and widening at
the left sacroiliac joint, and L4-L5 transverse process fractures.17 An MRI of the lumbar spine did not show cord compression or any new injuries.18 Shaver underwent a percutaneous placement of a transsacral
transiliac screw and a left anterior column screw.19 He was prescribed physical therapy sessions, which he attended from October of 2019 to May of 2020.20 Shaver’s progress was noted as fair and his tolerance to
14 Tr. 850. 15 Tr. 857. 16 Tr. 687-90. 17 18 Tr. 1716. 19 Tr. 700-01. 20 Tr. 750, 1741-81, 2629-2968. 4 treatment was noted as good.21 He was discharged due to a plateau in progress.22
At a January 2020 follow-up visit with Dr. J. Spence Reid, Shaver reported significant pain throughout his pelvis but denied taking any medications for relief.23 He claimed an inability to stand or walk for any
period of time.24 Physical examination showed obvious discomfort when standing, a slow and bilaterally antalgic gait, tenderness to palpation
diffusely around the pelvic ring, and pain with the squeeze of the iliac wings.25 X-rays of the pelvis showed intact hardware without signs of loosening or displacement and continued healing at the fracture site.26
Dr. Reid noted Shaver could be more aggressive in his rehabilitation and directed him to transition to a work hardening program in physical therapy.27 He further recommended taking Tylenol as needed.28
21 Tr. 2661, 2685, 2722, 2727, 2741, 2745, 2750, 2760, 2773, 2777. 22 Tr. 2637. 23 Tr. 633. 24 25 26 27 Tr. 634 28 5 In March of 2020, Shaver received a steroid and anesthetic injection of the symphysis pubis joint after complaints of ongoing pain.29 He
continued to report pelvic pain and difficulty with functional mobility over the next few months.30 Shaver underwent an independent medical evaluation with Dr. Paul Horenstein in May of 2020.31 Dr. Horenstein
reviewed Shaver’s imaging which showed no loosening of hardware, no evidence of hip joint space abnormalities, no hip arthritis or hip
subluxation bilaterally, healing fractures of both the superior and inferior rami as well as hardware fixation, and no evidence of nonunion.32 Physical examination revealed a Trendelenburg type gait favoring both
sides, good range of motion of both hips with flexion to 90 degrees with pain complaints but no restrictions, 4/5 hip flexion strength bilaterally, 5/5 quad and hamstring strength, and 5/5 ankle dorsi and plantar flexion
29 Tr. 619. 30 Tr. 621, 635, 1543-56. 31 Tr. 1552-57. 32 Tr. 1554. 6 strength.33 It was further noted that Shaver’s percutaneous incisions over the left pelvis were healed.34
In August of 2020, Shaver reported multiple falls given his significant pain and lack of mobility.35 Dr. Reid noted Shaver appeared in no acute distress, had difficulty when transitioning from sitting to
standing, had 5/5 strength with hip abduction and adduction, and had no pain over the pubic symphysis.36 A pelvis X-ray revealed unchanged
alignment and hardware without complication.37 Dr. Reid approved Shaver to return to work at a sedentary capacity.38 Two months later, Shaver reported pain throughout his left hip,
pelvis, and low back with any amount of weightbearing, ambulation, standing, and sitting.39 Physical examination revealed no acute distress,
33 Tr. 1555. 34 35 Tr. 604. 36 37 Tr. 610. 38 Tr. 605. 39 Tr. 611. 7 an antalgic gait, intact range of motion, and somewhat limited range of motion of the left hip due to pain.40
In November of 2021, Shaver was transported to the emergency department after he was found unconscious on the floor of a public bathroom from a suspected seizure.41 Shaver reported noncompliance
with his medications given his financial circumstances.42 A brain CT revealed normal white matter attenuation and no evidence of acute
ischemia.43 Shaver was prescribed 500 mg of Keppra and directed to follow-up with neurology.44 In March of 2022, Shaver appeared at WellSpan Lebanon
Neurology with Dr. Robert Fuino for an evaluation of a tremor.45 Shaver reported concerns of Parkinson’s disease due to shaking in his upper extremities when craftworking, cutting wood, and wood burning, causing
him to drop objects.46 He further reported constant numbness in his
40 41 Tr. 819-20, 823. 42 Tr. 829. 43 Tr. 836. 44 Tr. 834. 45 Tr. 1682. 46 Tr. 1682-83. 8 hands making it difficult to write and carry objects.47 Dr. Fuino ruled out Parkinson’s disease and indicated he did not see a tremor.48 A few
months later, Shaver was diagnosed with mild essential tremor.49 In May of 2022, an EMG of the upper extremities revealed chronic bilateral median neuropathies at the wrists consistent with carpal tunnel
syndrome and chronic bilateral ulnar neuropathies at the elbows.50 Shaver appeared for a neurology follow-up the next month where an
examination revealed no rest tremor, a minimal postural tremor and a mild action tremor without dysmetria, no impairment of rapid alternating movements, and normal muscle tone in upper extremities.51
Shaver noted he experiences staring episodes when he does not take his Keppra medication.52 In December of 2022, Shaver reported his symptoms as stable and
deferred additional medication management for his tremors.53
47 48 49 Tr. 2480. 50 Tr. 2323. 51 Tr. 2321. 52 Tr. 2320. 53 Tr. 2314-16. 9 Treatment notes documented a normal gait and movement of all extremities spontaneously without issue.54 An updated brain MRI and
EEG were ordered, which displayed no evidence of epileptiform activity or electrographic seizure, snoring with associated bradycardia, no acute intracranial findings, and mild white matter disease of chronic
microvascular ischemia.55 In February of 2023, Shaver presented to WellSpan Cardiology for
a follow-up visit with complaints of shortness of breath, chest pain, and fatigue.56 Treatment notes indicated an elevated BMI and an intolerance to CPAP.57 A sleep study was performed, which documented a total sleep
time of 342.6 minutes with a normal sleep efficiency.58 Shaver was diagnosed with obstructive sleep apnea and a trial of BiPAP therapy was recommended.59
54 Tr. 2317. 55 Tr. 2313, 2305. 56 Tr. 3111. 57 Tr. 3113. 58 Tr. 2069. 59 Tr. 2068. 10 In March of 2023, Shaver received a Boston scientific loop recorder to address his recurrent strokes.60 Treatment notes indicated no
significant findings of A-fib in the months following the procedure and that Shaver remained asymptomatic.61 As to his seizures, Shaver remained asymptomatic without any residual seizure activity after
focusing on medication compliance.62 He further denied headaches, chest pain/palpitations, dizziness/lightheadedness, numbness/tingling, gait
instability/balance issues, and any other additional complaints.63 It is against the backdrop of this record that an ALJ held a hearing on Shaver’s disability application on October 15, 2024.64 Shaver and a
Vocational Expert both appeared and testified at this hearing.65 Following this hearing, on October 28, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision denying Shaver’s application for disability benefits.66 The ALJ first
concluded that Shaver had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
60 Tr. 2170. 61 Tr. 2258, 2263. 62 Tr. 2258-59, 2263-64. 63 Tr. 2260, 2264. 64 Tr. 1814-32. 65 66 Tr. 1789-1806. 11 since his alleged onset date of September 23, 2019.67 At Step 2 of the sequential analysis that governs disability claims, the ALJ found that
Shaver suffered from severe impairments of degenerative disc disease, obesity, residual effects of cerebral vascular incident, fracture of pelvis, and seizure disorder.68 At Step 3, the ALJ concluded that none of these
impairments met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment under the Commissioner’s regulations.69
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ then concluded that Shaver: [H]a[d] the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except can stand and/or walk four hours in an eight-hour workday; can occasionally perform postural movement except never use ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, loud noise, vibrations, fumes, odors, dust, gases, and poor ventilation; and avoid even moderate exposure to dangerous machinery and unprotected heights.70
In reaching his RFC determination, the ALJ considered the objective medical record detailed above, the medical opinion evidence, and Shaver’s reported symptoms. With respect to the medical opinion
67 Tr. 1791. 68 Tr. 1792-94. 69 Tr. 1794-95. 70 Tr. 1795. 12 evidence, the ALJ considered the opinions on record. The ALJ was persuaded by the opinions of Drs. Horenstein and Lelwellyn Raymundo
to the extent they suggest Shaver can perform light work with the limitations stated above.71 The ALJ reasoned that these opinions were supported by “citation to recovery from stroke and pelvis crush injury,
medication control of seizures, and examination finding of walking with and without a cane, five out of five strength in the upper extremities, and
decrease in lower extremity strength.”72 The ALJ further found the opinions were consistent with the longitudinal objective clinical findings.73
The ALJ was partially persuaded by the opinion of Daniel Chege, NP.74 The ALJ found Mr. Chege’s opinion that the use of a cane was medically necessary unpersuasive given Mr. Chege’s own examination
findings and the objective medical record showing Shaver’s ability to
71 Tr. 80-85, 1552-57, 1801-02. 72 Tr. 1801. 73 74 Tr. 1802. 13 walk and stand without a cane, along with the fact that no treatment provider prescribed a cane.75
The ALJ was not persuaded by the opinions of Dr. Vinicius Ladeira Craveiro, Katrina Karnas, PT, Dr. Joanna Deleo, Dr. Kent L. Wagner, Dr. Anthony Galdieri, and Dr. Hong Park.76 Dr. Craveiro and Ms. Karnas
opined that Shaver could return to a full range of sedentary work.77 Similarly, Dr. Deleo opined that Shaver was limited to sedentary work
with lifting and/or carrying ten pounds occasionally and frequently and standing and/or walking two hours and needing to use a cane.78 Dr. Wagner opined that Shaver could sit, stand, and walk two hours in an
eight hour day, needed a cane to stand and walk, needed to miss more than four days per month, and could rarely lift less than ten pounds.79 The ALJ concluded these opinions were not supported by their own
examination findings, and were inconsistent with the treatment records which showed “walking and standing without assistance, normal
75 76 Tr. 1802-03. 77 Tr. 1550, 1785, 1802. 78 Tr. 70-72. 79 Tr. 779-83. 14 strength in the upper extremities, normal use of upper extremities, . . . improved functioning after recovery from injury[,]” and “an ability to lift
twenty-two pounds from floor to knuckle, and to standing and walking fifty-five minutes at one time without difficulty.”80 The ALJ was not persuaded by the opinions of Drs. Galdieri and Park because their
opinions that the evidence was insufficient to determine severity and functional limitations did not constitute medical opinions.81
With respect to Shaver’s symptoms, the ALJ found that Shaver’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his impairments were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence.82
Shaver testified he experiences recurrent seizures and strokes, is encroached on the left side, cannot walk without a cane or walker, is partially blind in the right eye, can only sit or stand for ten minutes at a
time, and has numbness and shaking.83 He claimed his daily lower back and side pain prevents him from sleeping and that he typically sits on
80 Tr. 1802-03. 81 Tr. 1803, 1862-63. 82 Tr. 1796-98. 83 Tr. 1818-20. 15 the couch for roughly five hours per day.84 Shaver further claimed he has difficulty dressing himself, shaving, and showering.85 As to completing
household chores, Shaver testified that he cooks simple meals, cleans, does laundry, and mows the grass with a riding lawn mower.86 The ALJ ultimately found Shaver’s testimony to be inconsistent
with the objective clinical findings.87 The ALJ recounted the objective evidence during the alleged disability period, including unremarkable
MRI imaging of the spine, radiographic studies of the hip, and EEG findings.88 The ALJ also noted examination findings of good range of motion and sensation in all extremities, normal reflexes and pulse rates
in the lower extremities, controllable pain with over the counter medication, full strength with hip abduction and adduction, stability with right-sided symptoms, normal cardiac and pulmonary functioning.89
Moreover, the ALJ recognized that Shaver was not consistently observed
84 Tr. 1818-19, 1822. 85 Tr. 1823, 1825. 86 Tr. 1825-27. 87 Tr. 1796. 88 Tr. 1797-98. 89 Tr. 1797-1800. 16 with a cane and that he was not medically prescribed one.90 Ultimately, the ALJ concluded Shaver was not as limited as he alleged.
Having made these findings, the ALJ found at Step 4 that Shaver had no relevant past work but found at Step 5 that he could perform the occupations of a telephone information clerk, polisher, and table
worker.91 Accordingly, the ALJ found that Shaver had not met the stringent standard prescribed for disability benefits and denied his
claim.92 This appeal followed. On appeal, Shaver argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. This case is fully
briefed and is therefore ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner. III. Discussion
A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-
90 Tr. 1798, 1800. 91 Tr. 1804-05. 92 Tr. 1805. 17 maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record.93 Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but
rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”94 Substantial evidence means less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.95
A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ “ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing
evidence.”96 However, where there has been an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.”97 The court must “scrutinize
93 42 U.S.C. §405(g); , 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); , 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012). 94 , 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). 95 , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). 96 , 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting , 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)) (internal quotations omitted). 97 , 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). 18 the record as a whole” to determine if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.98
The Supreme Court has explained the limited scope of our review, noting that “[substantial evidence] means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.’”99 Under this standard, we must look to the existing administrative record to determine if there is “‘sufficient
evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.”100 Thus, the question before us is not whether the claimant is disabled, but rather whether the Commissioner’s finding that he or she is not disabled is
supported by substantial evidence and was based upon a correct application of the law.101
98 , 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 99 , 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (quoting , 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 100 101 , No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence”) (alterations omitted); , 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts”); , 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is 19 When conducting this review, we must remain mindful that “we must not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.”102
Thus, we cannot re-weigh the evidence. Instead, we must determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings. In doing so, we must also determine whether the ALJ’s decision meets the
burden of articulation necessary to enable judicial review; that is, the ALJ must articulate the reasons for his decision.103 This does not require
the ALJ to use “magic” words, but rather the ALJ must discuss the evidence and explain the reasoning behind his or her decision with more than just conclusory statements.104 Ultimately, the ALJ’s decision must
be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.”105
plenary); , 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review of all legal issues . . . .”). 102 , 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing , 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)). 103 , 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). 104 , 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 105 , 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). 20 B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ
To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”106 This requires a claimant to show a severe physical
or mental impairment that precludes him or her from engaging in previous work or “any other substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.”107 To receive benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she is under retirement age, contributed to the insurance program, and became disabled prior to the date on which he or she was last insured.108
106 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1505(a), 416.905(a). 107 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1505(a), 416.905(a). 108 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a). 21 In making this determination, the ALJ follows a five-step evaluation.109 The ALJ must sequentially determine whether the
claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has a severe impairment that meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) is able
to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”).110
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her
impairment(s).”111 In making this assessment, the ALJ must consider all the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non- severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her
analysis.112 Our review of the ALJ’s determination of the plaintiff’s RFC
109 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a), 416.920(a). 11020 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). 111 , 220 F.3d at 121 (citations omitted); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). 112 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2). 22 is deferential, and that determination will not be set aside if it is supported by substantial evidence.113
The claimant bears the burden at Steps 1 through 4 to show a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her from engaging in any past relevant work.114 If met, the burden then shifts to
the Commissioner to show at Step 5 that there are jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform
consistent with the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience.115 With respect to the RFC determination, courts have followed
different paths when considering the impact of medical opinion evidence on this determination. While some courts emphasize the necessity of medical opinion evidence to craft a claimant’s RFC, other courts have
taken the approach that “[t]here is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of
113 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002). 114 , 994 F.2d at 1064. 115 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512(f), 416.912(f); , 994 F.2d at 1064. 23 determining an RFC.”116 Additionally, in cases that involve no credible medical opinion evidence, courts have held that “the proposition that an
ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a physician is misguided.”117 Given these differing approaches, we must evaluate the factual
context underlying an ALJ’s decision. Cases that emphasize the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically
arise in the factual setting where well-supported medical sources have found limitations to support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected the medical opinion based upon an assessment of other evidence.118
These cases simply restate the notion that medical opinions are entitled to careful consideration when making a disability determination. On the other hand, when no medical opinion supports a disability finding or
when an ALJ relies upon other evidence to fashion an RFC, courts have routinely sustained the ALJ’s exercise of independent judgment based
116 , 174 F. App’x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006); 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778–79 (W.D. Pa. 2013). 117 , 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015). 118 , 962 F. Supp. 2d at 778–79. 24 upon all the facts and evidence.119 Ultimately, it is our task to determine, considering the entire record, whether the RFC
determination is supported by substantial evidence.120 C. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ’s Assessment of a Claimant’s Alleged Symptoms
When evaluating lay testimony regarding a claimant’s reported degree of pain and disability, the ALJ must make credibility determinations.121 Our review of those determinations is deferential.122 However, it is incumbent upon the ALJ to “specifically identify and
explain what evidence he found not credible and why he found it not credible.”123 An ALJ should give great weight to a claimant’s testimony “only when it is supported by competent medical evidence.”124 As the
Third Circuit has noted, while “statements of the individual concerning
119 , 174 F. App’x 6; 129 F. Supp. 3d at 214– 15. 120 312 F.3d 113. 121 577 F.3d at 506. 122 123 , 777 F.3d 607, 612 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). 124 , 150 F. Supp. 3d 406, 415–16 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (citations omitted). 25 his or her symptoms must be carefully considered, the ALJ is not required to credit them.”125
The Social Security Rulings and Regulations provide a framework for evaluating the severity of a claimant’s reported symptoms.126 Thus, the ALJ must follow a two-step process: first, the ALJ must determine
whether a medically determinable impairment could cause the symptoms alleged; and second, the ALJ must evaluate the alleged symptoms
considering the entire administrative record.127 Symptoms such as pain or fatigue will be considered to affect a claimant’s ability to perform work activities only if medical signs or
laboratory findings establish the presence of a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms.128 During the second step of this assessment, the ALJ must
determine whether the claimant’s statements regarding the intensity,
125 667 F.3d 356, 363 (3d. Cir. 2011) (referencing 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(a) (“statements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled”). 126 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; SSR 16–3p. 127 SSR 16-3p. 128 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b); SSR 16–3p. 26 persistence, or limiting effects of his or her symptoms are substantiated considering the entire case record.129 This includes, but is not limited to,
medical signs and laboratory findings; diagnoses; medical opinions provided by treating or examining sources and other medical sources; and information regarding the claimant’s symptoms and how they affect his
or her ability to work.130 The Social Security Administration recognizes that individuals
may be limited by their symptoms to a greater or lesser extent than other individuals with the same medical impairments, signs, and laboratory findings.131 Thus, to assist in the evaluation of a claimant’s subjective
symptoms, the Social Security Regulations set forth seven factors that may be relevant to the assessment of the claimant’s alleged symptoms.132 These factors include: the claimant’s daily activities; the “location,
duration, frequency, and intensity” of the claimant’s pain or symptoms; the type, dosage, and effectiveness of medications; treatment other than
129 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16–3p. 130 131 SSR 16-3p. 132 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). 27 medications; and other factors regarding the claimant’s functional limitations.133
D. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence.
Our review of the ALJ’s decision denying an application for benefits is significantly deferential. Our task is simply to determine whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record; that is “only— ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’”134 Judged against this deferential standard of review, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision in this case.
Shaver first argues that the ALJ failed to identify a significant number of jobs that he can perform.135 The ALJ found that Shaver could perform three occupations: telephone information clerk (DOT 237.367-
046), polisher (DOT 713.684-018), and table worker (DOT 739.687- 182).136 Shaver claims the job of a telephone information clerk is
133 134 , 139 S. Ct. at 1154. 135 Doc. 16 at 7-9. 136 Tr. 1804-05. 28 outdated, the job of a table worker is not included in the Occupational Information Network (“O*NET”), and the job of a polisher has only 6,000
existing jobs.137 Specifically, Shaver relies on 138 in arguing that a telephone information clerk is outdated due to
technological advances.139 While the nonbinding caselaw recognized the “quaint” nature of the job, it further noted that the job still remains, and
that remand is not appropriate where only “one of three job categories is questionable.”140 Accordingly, we find this argument without merit. Shaver also relies on O*NET in alleging that the job of a table
worker is not sufficient. He claims the job is not included in O*NET nor is there an O*NET equivalent job.141 However, courts in our circuit “have been hesitant to reject the testimony of Vocational Experts relying upon
the DOT in favor of the descriptions on O*NET, given the fact that ‘Social Security Ruling 00-4P sets forth that the relevant inquiry is whether VE
137 Doc. 16 at 7-9. 138 No. 1404970, 2015 WL 3505512, at *10 (D.N.J. June 3, 2015). 139 Doc. 16 at 7-8. 140 , 2015 WL 3505512, at *10-11. 141 Doc. 16 at 8. 29 testimony is consistent with the DOT.’”142 “[T]he regulations simply do not require a [Vocational Expert’s] testimony to be consistent with
O*Net.”143 We agree with this body of caselaw and conclude that the ALJ fulfilled his requirement under the controlling regulations. As to the job of a polisher, “there is no precise estimate for what
constitutes ‘significant numbers’ of jobs under the Social Security Act.”144 Moreover, such determination is not made by viewing the number of
available positions for an individual job.145 Here, the ALJ identified three jobs that collectively provide 21,000 jobs nationally.146 We find this satisfies the Commissioner’s requirement to identify jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy.147 Shaver also challenges the ALJ’s RFC findings, arguing the ALJ failed to address his need to lie down during the day. In support of this
142 , No. 1:22-cv-1856, 2024 WL 4803530, at *19 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2024) (collecting cases). 143 at *20. 144 , 519 F. App’x 769, 772 (3d Cir. 2013). 145 146 Tr. 1805. 147 , 519 F. App’x at 772 (finding that 20,000 available jobs sufficient to establish work exists in significant numbers). 30 argument, Shaver points to record evidence that he contends supports abnormal physical findings. However, the ALJ explicitly considered
Shaver’s testimony, including that he has difficulty sleeping and naps once or twice daily, but found that Shaver was not as limited as he alleged.148 In doing so, the ALJ recounted the medical evidence, which
did not support a finding of significant fatigue during the day resulting in a need to nap.149 While Shaver seemingly challenges the ALJ’s
credibility determination, we are not permitted at this stage to reweigh the evidence, and instead must simply determine whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by “substantial evidence.”150 Here, we conclude
that the ALJ’s RFC findings is supported by substantial evidence. Shaver further challenges the ALJ’s assessment of his obesity in accordance with SSR 19-2p.151 The Third Circuit has explained that the
ALJ need not “use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis” of a claimant’s obesity.152 Rather, so long as
148 Tr. 1796. 149 Tr. 1800. 150 , 667 F.3d at 359; , 139 S. Ct. at 1154. 151 Doc. 16 at 11-15. 152 577 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). 31 the ALJ “meaningfully consider[s] the effect of a claimant’s obesity, individually and in combination with her impairments, on her workplace
function at step three and at every subsequent step[,]” a remand is not required.153 Here, the ALJ acknowledged obesity as a severe impairment and discussed this impairment at Step 3, explicitly noting that he
considered SSR 19-2p regarding the claimant’s obesity and any impact it has on his co-existing impairments in determining whether it met or
medically equaled a listing.154 In determining Shaver’s RFC, the ALJ recounted the medical records that documented Shaver’s obesity, referring to Shaver’s BMI during the relevant period.155 This evidence
was discussed in conjunction with the claimant’s physical examination findings, both normal and abnormal.156 Shaver fails to point to evidence showing that his obesity had more than a minimal effect on his abilities,
and instead generally refers to his physical impairments and his
153 at 504; , 661 F. App’x 762, 765 (3d Cir. 2016); , 563 F. App’x 904, 911 (3d Cir. 2014). 154 Tr. 1792, 1795. 155 Tr. 1797-98 156 Tr. 1796-1801. 32 complaints that his pain was worse with prolonged sitting, standing, and walking. But as we have noted, the ALJ explained why he found Shaver’s
testimony not entirely consistent with the medical evidence. Ultimately, we conclude that the ALJ’s assessment of Shaver’s obesity is supported by substantial evidence.
Shaver also contends that the ALJ erred in assessing his subjective testimony, in that the ALJ ignored his “qualifications” as to how he
carried out daily activities.157 However, the ALJ recounted the medical evidence, which included both abnormal and objectively unremarkable physical findings during the relevant period. He discussed these
objective findings, coupled with Shaver’s activities of daily living, his testimony, and the fact that he improved with treatment. The ALJ ultimately determined that Shaver’s “admitted abilities provided
support, in part, for the residual functional capacity set forth above and are quite inconsistent with the claimant’s allegations of totally debilitating impairments.”158
157 Doc. 16 at 16-19. 158 Tr. 1800-01. 33 Lastly, Shaver argues the ALJ erred in failing to consider his consistent work history because it constituted favorable evidence that
required consideration.159 While the ALJ did not discuss the claimant’s work history, Shaver fails to identify how prejudice inured from such alleged error. Social Security appeals are subject to harmless error
analysis.160 Under the harmless error analysis, a remand is warranted only if the error “prejudices a party’s ‘substantial rights’”; that is, if the
error “likely affects the outcome of the proceeding, . . .”161 Shaver’s argument fails to demonstrate prejudice occurred, and so, even assuming that it was an error, we hold now it was harmless.
Given that the ALJ considered all the evidence and adequately explained the decision for including or discounting certain limitations as established by the evidence, we find no error with the decision.
Therefore, under the deferential standard of review that applies to appeals of Social Security disability determinations, we conclude that
159 Doc. 16 at 19-20. 160 , 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016). 161 , 72 F. Supp. 3d 479, 494 (D. Del. 2014). 34 substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s evaluation of this case, and this decision will be affirmed.
IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner in this case will be affirmed, and the plaintiff’s appeal denied.
An appropriate order follows. Submitted this 3rd day of March 2026.
Daryl F. Bloom Chief United States Magistrate Judge