FILED Dec 19 2019, 9:38 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Valerie K. Boots Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Christopher Taylor-Price Attorney General of Indiana Marion County Public Defender Agency Ian McLean – Appellate Division Supervising Deputy Attorney Indianapolis, Indiana General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael Scanland, December 19, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-790 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable John M. Christ, Appellee-Plaintiff. Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49G14-1801-F6-1620
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Following a jury trial in Marion Superior Court, Michael Scanland
(“Scanland”) was convicted of Class C misdemeanor possession of
paraphernalia and sentenced to forty days in jail. Scanland appeals and presents
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 1 of 16 two issues, which we restate as: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion
by determining that Scanland was not subject to custodial interrogation and
that the statements he made to a parole agent were therefore admissible even
though Scanland was not advised of his Miranda rights; and (2) whether the trial
court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of drug paraphernalia found
in Scanland’s home following a search based on the statements Scanland made
to the parole agent. Concluding that Scanland was not subject to custodial
interrogation, we affirm.
Statement of Facts1 [2] Scanland was convicted of murder in 1995. He was released on parole on
December 22, 2016. The terms of his parole release agreement included the
following:
5. ABUSE OF ALCOHOL OR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE – I understand that the following is a violation of my parole:
a) Being intoxicated, or
1 We held oral argument in this case on December 10, 2019, at Winamac Community High School in Winamac in Pulaski County, Indiana. We thank the faculty, staff, and students of Winamac Community High School for their gracious hospitality, and we thank all students present for their attention during the argument and their thoughtful questions following the argument. We also commend counsel for both parties for the quality of their written and oral advocacy. Lastly, we note that, with this oral argument in Pulaski County, our court has now held an oral argument in all ninety-two Indiana counties through our Appeals on Wheels program.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 2 of 16 b) Using, possessing, or trafficking illegally in a controlled substance. Abuse of alcohol or drugs is not a defense for violation of the parole release agreement.
***
7. CRIMINAL CONDUCT – I will not engage in conduct prohibited by federal or state law or local ordinance.
9. HOME VISITATION AND SEARCH –
a) I will allow my supervising officer or other authorized officials of the Department of Correction to visit my residence and place of employment at any reasonable time.
b) I understand that I am legally in the custody of the Department of Correction and that my person and residence or property under my control may be subject to reasonable search by my supervising officer or authorized official of the Department of Correction if the officer or official has reasonable cause to believe that the parolee is violating or is in imminent danger of violating a condition to remaining on parole.
Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 1 (emphases added).
[3] In January 2018, Scanland was living with his girlfriend Sandra Burrow
(“Sandra”) in Marion County, Indiana. Scanland and Sandra had issues with
their neighbor, and the police were called to Scanland’s home several times as a
result. During one altercation, the neighbor, according to Scanland, threatened
his life. Sandra called the police to report this, and the police investigated.
Scanland later called the police himself to obtain the incident report number.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 3 of 16 The supervising officer on duty, Sgt. Stargel, told Scanland to go to
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) Northwest District
Headquarters the following day and speak with Sgt. Grimes for assistance with
mediating the dispute with his neighbor. Sgt. Stargel also advised Scanland to
talk to his parole officer. Sgt. Stargel then emailed Sgt. Grimes about Scanland,
an email that was later forwarded to another parole agent, Eric Vanatti (“Agent
Vanatti”), who worked at the Northwest District Headquarters.
[4] The day after the incident with the neighbor, Scanland and Sandra went to the
Northwest District Headquarters to speak with Sgt. Grimes. Believing that they
were not getting proper assistance, Scanland and Sandra became upset. From
his office, Agent Vanatti heard a man shouting and a woman crying. He got up
to investigate and saw Scanland and Sandra causing the disturbance. Agent
Vanatti was wearing a polo shirt and his badge. He asked Scanland to sit at a
table in the lobby, but Scanland remained standing.
[5] Agent Vanatti asked Scanland to come to his office. There, Agent Vanatti asked
Scanland to take a drug test, as Vanatti believed Scanland to be under the
influence of a controlled substance. Scanland, who was still agitated,
responded, “I’m not going to. I’m dirty,” meaning that he had been using illicit
drugs. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 25. When Agent Vanatti asked what drug Scanland had
been using, he told Vanatti that he had been using methamphetamine. Id. at
174. Agent Vanatti told Scanland that he still needed to do a urine screen and
took him to the restroom. Scanland, however, refused to submit to the test.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 4 of 16 Agent Vanatti therefore took Scanland back to his office, where Scanland
confirmed yet again that he refused to submit to the drug screen. Agent Vanatti
then placed Scanland in handcuffs and began to complete a Department of
Correction (“DOC”) form titled “TRANSMITTAL – PAROLE BOARD
ACTION,” detailing Scanland’s refusal to submit to the drug screen, his
conflict with his neighbor, and requesting a warrant for Scanland’s arrest. Ex.
Vol., Defendant’s Ex. D.
[6] As Agent Vanatti typed up his report, Scanland stated, without prompting, that
he had been using methamphetamine from 2:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. that
morning. He then asked Agent Vanatti to go to Scanland’s home and retrieve
the pipe he used to smoke methamphetamine. Scanland stated that the pipe was
hidden inside a sock in a dresser drawer of his bedroom. Scanland wanted
Agent Vanatti to get the pipe because he was afraid that Sandra might find it
and was concerned for her health.2
[7] Agent Vanatti, two other parole agents, and an IMPD officer accompanied
Scanland to his home. The officers searched for and found two pipes hidden in
dresser drawers in Scanland’s bedroom. One pipe was found inside a sock and
the other inside a glove. The officers then obtained a warrant to search the
2 Scanland also told Agent Vanatti that he “didn’t want to do what he did to the person as to why he was on parole,” i.e., murder, and was concerned that his conflict with his neighbor might escalate to that point. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 15.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 5 of 16 home for drugs. Subsequent testing revealed the presence of methamphetamine
residue on the pipes.
Procedural History [8] On January 16, 2018, the State charged Scanland with Level 6 felony
possession of methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor possession of
paraphernalia.3 Scanland filed a motion to suppress on July 2, 2018, claiming
that the statements he made to Agent Vanatti were inadmissible because he had
not been advised of his Miranda rights and that the evidence found during the
subsequent search of his home was inadmissible as it was conducted due to his
inadmissible statements. The trial court held a hearing on Scanland’s motion on
August 23, 2018, and entered an order denying the motion on November 1,
2018. Scanland filed a motion to correct error4 on November 27, 2018, which
the trial court denied on January 18, 2019.
[9] A jury trial was held on March 11, 2019. At trial, Scanland objected to the
introduction of his statements to Agent Vanatti and the admission of the drug
pipes. The trial court overruled Scanland’s objections, and the jury found
3 The State also charged Scanland with Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, but the State dismissed this charge prior to trial. 4 Because Scanland’s motion asked the trial court to reconsider its ruling on his pre-trial motion to suppress, which is not a final appealable order, the motion was actually a motion to reconsider, not a motion to correct error. See Citizens Indus. Grp. v. Heartland Gas Pipeline, LLC, 856 N.E.2d 734, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that a party may file a motion to reconsider while the case is in fieri and that a motion to correct error is proper only after the entry of final judgment), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 6 of 16 Scanland guilty of possession of paraphernalia but not guilty of possession of
methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced Scanland to forty days in jail, with
credit for twenty days already served.5 Scanland now appeals.
Standard of Review [10] Because Scanland appeals following his conviction, and not from an
interlocutory order denying his motion to suppress, the issue before the court is
one of the admission of evidence. See Hicks v. State, 5 N.E.3d 424, 427 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014), trans. denied. A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the
admissibility of evidence, and we will reverse the trial court’s ruling only when
the trial court abuses that discretion. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion when
its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before it, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. Whether the challenge is
made through a pretrial motion to suppress or by an objection at trial, our
review of rulings on the admissibility of evidence is essentially the same, i.e. we
do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence in a light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, but we may also consider any
undisputed evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Id. Additionally, we
may consider foundational evidence introduced at trial in conjunction with any
evidence from a suppression hearing that is not in direct conflict with the trial
5 We note that, as a result of this incident, Scanland’s parole was revoked, and the Indiana Department of Correction’s online “Offender Search” now lists Scanland’s “earliest possible release date” as 2035. See https://www.in.gov/apps/indcorrection/ofs/ofs?lname=scanland&fname=michael&search1.x=0&search1. y=0.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 7 of 16 evidence. Id. At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of
demonstrating the constitutionality of measures it used to secure evidence.
McIntosh v. State, 829 N.E.2d 531, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
I. Scanland’s Statements to the Parole Agent
[11] Scanland claims that he was in custody and subject to the functional equivalent
of interrogation and that he should therefore have been advised of his Miranda
rights. Because he was not so advised, Scanland argues that his statements to
the police should have been excluded.
[12] The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants to individuals
the right to be free from self-incrimination. Hartman v. State, 988 N.E.2d 785,
788 (Ind. 2013) (citing U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . .”)). This
constitutional protection applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964)).6 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that, to protect this
right against self-incrimination, a person questioned by law enforcement
officers after being taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way must first be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
6 The Indiana Constitution contains a similarly worded protection against compelled self-incrimination. See Ind. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 14 (“No person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself.”). Scanland makes no argument under the Indiana Constitution.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 8 of 16 and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. See State v. Brown, 70 N.E.3d 331, 335 (Ind. 2017) (summarizing
Miranda holding).
[13] Statements obtained from the custodial interrogation of a suspect who has not
been advised of his or her Miranda rights are generally inadmissible. Bailey v.
State, 763 N.E.2d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2002) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). An
officer is only required to give Miranda warnings when a defendant is both (1) in
custody and (2) subject to interrogation. Furnish v. State, 779 N.E.2d 576, 578–
79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
A. Custody
[14] The question of whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda is a
mixed question of fact and law. State v. Ruiz, 123 N.E.3d 675, 679 (Ind. 2019).
The test for whether a defendant is in custody is not whether a defendant feels
free to go, but rather whether there was a “‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom
of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Brown, 70 N.E.3d
at 336 (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994)). We look to the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether a person was in custody.
Brown, 70 N.E.3d at 335.
[15] Scanland argues that, once he was placed in handcuffs in Agent Vanatti’s office,
he was in custody. Indeed, we have held before that the use of handcuffs
restrains an individual’s freedom of movement to the degree associated with a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 9 of 16 formal arrest. Wright v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1223, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
(citing Loving v. State, 647 N.E.2d 1123, 1125 (Ind. 1995)); see also Hudson v.
State, 129 N.E.3d 220, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that suspect who was
placed in handcuffs was in custody). The State does not deny that, once
Scanland was placed in handcuffs, he was in custody.
[16] It is therefore undisputed that Scanland was in custody for Miranda purposes
after he was placed in handcuffs in Agent Vanatti’s office, which was when he
made the incriminating statements regarding the drug pipes in his home.
Because it is undisputed that Scanland was in custody at the time he made his
incriminating statements, we must determine whether he was subject to
interrogation while in custody. See Furnish, 779 N.E.2d at 578–79.
B. Interrogation
[17] Scanland argues that the statements he made to Agent Vanatti regarding the
drug pipes in his home were made during the functional equivalent of
interrogation, thus necessitating a Miranda advisement. Scanland is correct that,
under Miranda, “‘interrogation’ refers to ‘either express questioning or its
functional equivalent.’” Hartman, 988 N.E.2d at 788 (quoting Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). The functional equivalent of interrogation
“refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the
part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect.” B.A. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 225, 233
(Ind. 2018), “Police custody alone does not trigger Miranda; there must be Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 10 of 16 police interrogation as well.”) Id. (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301). The focus is the
suspect’s perceptions, not police intent. Id. The focus on the suspect’s
perception “reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a
suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police
practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the
police.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
[18] However, “since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the
unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation
can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they
should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id. at
301–02 (emphasis added). In contrast, “[a] wholly volunteered and unsolicited
statement by the accused is not the product of a custodial interrogation such
that any advisement of rights need be given.” Tacy v. State, 452 N.E.2d 977, 982
(Ind. 1983).
[19] Scanland contends that the totality of circumstances surrounding his statements
constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation.7 Specifically, he notes
that, at the time of his statement, he was handcuffed and seated in Agent
Vanatti’s office as Vanatti typed up a report that included a request for a
7 Scanland appears to argue that Agent Vanatti should have known that his action of taking Scanland into custody was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response given Scanland’s status as a parolee. But this conflates the question of custody with the question of interrogation. “[An] interrogation must involve a measure of compulsion beyond that inherent in custody itself[.]” Hudson, 129 N.E.3d at 225.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 11 of 16 warrant based on Scanland having violated his parole by using
methamphetamine. Scanland also notes that Agent Vanatti knew that he was
on parole, agitated, and likely still under the influence of methamphetamine.
But this falls short of conduct Agent Vanatti should have known was
reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response.8
[20] Agent Vanatti repeatedly testified that he did not ask any questions of Scanland
prior to Scanland’s statements regarding the pipes. Although Scanland claims
that Agent Vanatti was talking to him, Agent Vanatti testified that Scanland
made his incriminating statements while Vanatti was busy completing the
Transmittal form, and the trial court was within its discretion to credit Agent
Vanatti’s testimony over Scanland’s. See note 8, supra. Nothing Agent Vanatti
said or did was the functional equivalent of interrogation. Indeed, there is no
indication that Agent Vanatti spoke with Scanland in any manner in an attempt
to get incriminating statements from him. Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
392–93 (1977) (holding that officer’s statements to defendant that he should
8 Scanland also claims that Agent Vanatti told Sandra that Scanland was going back to prison for violating parole. He also claims that Vanatti told someone on the telephone that there were “bricks of dope” in Scanland’s home. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 73. These allegations, however, are supported only by Scanland’s testimony, which the trial court was not obligated to credit. At oral argument, Scanland contended that his statements were uncontradicted and noted that we may consider undisputed evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Hicks, 5 N.E.3d at 427. Although not specifically contradicted by Agent Vanatti, his testimony did not include any account of such statements to Scanland. Thus, we do not consider these facts to be truly undisputed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 12 of 16 disclose the location of the child victim’s body so that there could be a
“Christian burial” was the functional equivalent of an interrogation). 9
[21] In short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that, even
though Scanland was in custody when he made the statements regarding the
drug pipes in his home, he was not subject to interrogation or the functional
equivalent thereof. His statements were instead voluntary and therefore
admissible even though Scanland was not advised of his Miranda rights.
II. The Search of Scanland’s Home
[22] Scanland also argues that the search of his home was unreasonable because it
was based on his statements that he claims were obtained in violation of his
Miranda rights. Scanland notes that the terms of his parole release agreement
state that he was subject to “reasonable search” by his parole officer or an
official of the DOC “if the officer or official has reasonable cause to believe that
the parolee is violating or is in imminent danger of violating a condition to
remain on parole.” Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 1. Scanland argues that the search
9 Scanland notes that Vanatti asked him to fill out an “admission of guilt” form wherein he admitted that he had used methamphetamine. But Vanatti asked Scanland to fill out this form only after Scanland admitted that he had drug pipes in his home. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 13–14. Thus, this request could not be considered interrogation that led to the incriminating statements. We acknowledge that, after Scanland stated that he would test positive for illicit drug use, Vanatti asked Scanland what drugs he had been using, to which Scanland replied that he had been using methamphetamine. To be sure, this was an express question. But this occurred when Scanland first refused to submit to the drug screen, which was before he was placed in handcuffs. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 13, 25, 174, 198. Thus, Scanland was not in custody when asked this question. Moreover, by stating that he would fail the drug test, Scanland had already admitted to using illicit drugs.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 13 of 16 cannot be deemed reasonable or justified by reasonable cause because the
search of his home was based on statements that, he claims, were obtained in
violation of Miranda.10
[23] We have already concluded, however, that Scanland’s statements to the parole
agent regarding the drug pipes in his home were not the product of a custodial
interrogation. His statements alone were sufficient to establish reasonable cause
to believe that Scanland was in violation of the terms of his probation by using
illicit drugs and possessing drug paraphernalia.
[24] It is also important to remember that Scanland’s behavior and statements to
Agent Vanatti in Vanatti’s office fall clearly under the terms of his parole
agreement. In Paragraph 9(b) of the Parole Release Agreement, Scanland
agreed that his “person and residence” were subject to reasonable search by
DOC officials if the officials had “reasonable cause to believe” that Scanland
had violated the terms of his parole. Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 1. At the police
station, Scanland acted in a manner suggesting that he was under the influence
of a controlled substance. The use of a controlled substance was in violation of
the terms of both Paragraph 5(b) (prohibiting the use of controlled substances)
and Paragraph 7 (forbidding illegal conduct) of the Parole Release Agreement.
10 Scanland also argues that, during the search, he was asked by officers where his bedroom was. He claims that his answer directing the officers to his bedroom was the result of custodial interrogation and that the State relied upon his answer in establishing constructive possession of the drug pipes. We are not persuaded. Scanland had already volunteered that the drug pipes were in his home and where they were located inside his home. This alone was sufficient to establish his constructive possession of the pipes.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 14 of 16 Scanland was thus required to submit to the urine screen, as it was a reasonable
search of his person based on Agent Vanatti’s reasonable belief that Scanland
was under the influence of a controlled substance. When Scanland refused to
submit to the drug screen, he also admitted that he would test positive for illicit
drugs. Scanland’s behavior, his refusal to submit to the urine screen, and his
admission were sufficient to establish reasonable cause to search his home
under the terms of the Parole Release Agreement. We therefore conclude that
the search of Scanland’s home for the drug pipes was proper under the terms of
the Parole Relase Agreement, as well as under the rubric of non-custodial
interrogation.11 The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the pipes into evidence.
Conclusion [25] Scanland’s statements to the parole agent that there were drug pipes in his
home were made while Scanland was in custody, but he was not subject to
custodial interrogation or the functional equivalent of interrogation. The failure
to advise Scanland of his Miranda rights therefore did not render his statements
inadmissible. Additionally, Scanland’s statements to the parole agent that he
had been using methamphetamine and that there were drug pipes in his home
established reasonable cause to search his home under the terms of his parole
release agreement. The trial court therefore did not err by admitting the pipes
11 Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in the admission of the pipes or Scanland’s statements, we need not address his argument that the admission of his statements and the pipes was not harmless error.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 15 of 16 into to evidence. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the
admission of this evidence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[26] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-790 | December 19, 2019 Page 16 of 16