Michael S. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, E.D. Washington·Decided April 29, 2026·No. 4:25-cv-05137·Unknown

Opinion

1 Apr 29, 2026

SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 2

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6

7 MICHAEL S.,1 No. 4:25-cv-5137-EFS

8 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING THE 9 v. ALJ’S DENIAL OF BENEFITS, AND REMANDING FOR 10 FRANK BISIGNANO, MORE PROCEEDINGS Commissioner of Social Security, 11 Defendant. 12

13 Plaintiff Michael S. asks the Court to reverse the Administrative 14 Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of Title 16 benefits. Plaintiff claims he is 15 unable to work due to several conditions, cannot perform any of the 16 17

18 1 For privacy reasons, Plaintiff is referred to by first name and last 19 initial or as “Plaintiff.” See LCivR 5.2(c). 20 1 medium-exertional-level jobs the ALJ found he could perform due to

2 the need to elevate his legs throughout the day, and is entitled to 3 benefits as of his 55th birthday in 2019 pursuant to Medical-Vocational 4 Rule 202.04. Because the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s

5 symptom claims, the ALJ erred. This error affected the ALJ’s step-five 6 findings. This matter is remanded for further proceedings, rather than 7 for an award of benefits, as further development of the record is

8 necessary to consider the swelling of Plaintiff’s legs. 9 I. Background 10 Plaintiff’s case comes before the Court for a second time. Plaintiff

11 filed his Title 16 application for benefits in October 2017, alleging 12 disability beginning October 4, 2017, due to post traumatic stress 13 disorder, anxiety, depression, joint pain, headaches, back pain, and

14 neuropathy in extremities.2 15 Following a hearing, ALJ Marie Palachuk issued a decision in 16 October 2019 finding Plaintiff not disabled.3 In her decision, the ALJ

18 2 Administrative Record (AR) 38, 65, 160–70. 19 3 AR 12–31, 35–59. 20 1 discussed the medical opinions of: 1) Desmond Tuason, MD, who

2 reviewed the medical records at the reconsideration stage and opined 3 Plaintiff could perform light work; 2) James Opara, MD, who conducted 4 a physical consultative examination and opined Plaintiff could stand

5 and walk two hours in an eight-hour work day and occasionally lift and 6 carry 50 pounds; and 3) Patrick Metoyer, PhD, who conducted a 7 psychological consultative examination and opined Plaintiff had

8 impairments in mental functioning areas.4 The ALJ rejected Dr. 9 Tuason’s exertional limitations as inconsistent with the medical 10 records, rejected Dr. Opara’s opinion as internally inconsistent, and

11 found Dr. Metoyer’s opinion partially persuasive.5 12 This Court reversed and remanded.6 The Court found that the 13 ALJ failed to accurately characterize the medical records when finding

14 Dr. Tuason’s opinion inconsistent, substantial evidence did not support 15 the consistency analysis, and the ALJ failed to assess the 16

17 4 AR 23–24. 18 5 AR 24–25. 19 6 AR 614–40; E.D. Wash. Case No. 4:20-cv-5196-MKD. 20 1 supportability of Dr. Tuason’s opinion.7 The Court found that

2 substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. 3 Opara’s opinion because the ALJ focused on a few normal findings 4 while ignoring relevant abnormal findings.8 As remand was warranted,

5 the Court did not review challenges regarding other opinions.9 The 6 Court instructed the ALJ, on remand, to reconsider the supportability 7 and consistency of the medical opinions, incorporate the medical

8 opinions’ limitations into the RFC or give reasons supported by 9 substantial evidence to support them, resolve any internal 10 inconsistencies in Dr. Opara’s opinion, determine and make a finding

11 whether Sarah Hodge, LPN—who recommended that Plaintiff elevate 12 his legs due to foot and leg swelling—provided a medical opinion, and 13 reevaluate Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms.10

14 15

16 7 AR 624–28. 17 8 AR 629–32. 18 9 AR 632–33. 19 10 AR 628, 632–33, 637. 20 1 On remand, the record was updated and, in August 2024, the ALJ

2 held a new hearing at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert 3 testified.11 4 The ALJ issued a new decision on September 23, 2024, again

5 finding Plaintiff not disabled.12 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s alleged 6 symptoms were inconsistent with the medical evidence and other 7 evidence.13 The ALJ considered the lay statements from Plaintiff’s

8 niece inconsistent for the same reasons.14 As to the medical opinions, 9 the ALJ found: 10 • the reviewing opinions of Dennis Koukol, MD, and Eugene

11 Kester, MD, unpersuasive. 12 • the reviewing opinion of Dr. Tuason generally persuasive. 13 • the reviewing opinion of Mary Koehler, MD, very persuasive.

15 11 AR 557–84. 16 12 AR 527–50. Per 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)–(g), a five-step evaluation 17 determines whether a claimant is disabled. 18 13 AR 537–44. 19 14 AR 538–39. 20 1 • the consulting physical-examination opinion of Dr. Opara not

2 persuasive. 3 • the consulting psychological-examination opinion of Dr. 4 Metoyer somewhat persuasive.

5 • the testifying opinion of Stephen Rubin, PhD, not persuasive. 6 • the recommendation of Nurse Hodge to not be a functional 7 opinion, but to the extent it is considered an opinion, not

8 persuasive.15 9 As to the sequential disability analysis, the ALJ found: 10 • Step one: Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

11 activity since October 4, 2017, the application date. 12 • Step two: Plaintiff had the following medically determinable 13 severe impairments: degenerative disc disease; migraines;

14 congestive heart failure; anxiety disorder; and polysubstance 15 use/abuse. 16

17 18

19 15 AR 545–48. 20 1 • Step three: Plaintiff did not have an impairment or

2 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the 3 severity of one of the listed impairments. 4 • RFC: Plaintiff had the RFC to perform medium work as

5 defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c) with postural activities 6 performed occasionally, except he can never climb ladders, 7 ropes, or scaffolds; must avoid concentrated exposure to

8 extreme temperatures and hazards; is able to understand, 9 remember, and carry out simple, routine tasks; can maintain 10 concentration, persistence, and pace for two-hour intervals

11 between regularly scheduled breaks; can adapt to normal 12 changes; cannot work at assembly-line or similar fast pace; 13 and can have superficial interaction with the public and

14 coworkers. 15 • Step four: Plaintiff had no past relevant work. 16 • Step five: considering Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work

17 history, Plaintiff could perform work that existed in significant 18 19

20 1 numbers in the national economy, such as church janitor, auto

2 detailer, and scrap sorter/recycling laborer.16 3 Plaintiff timely filed written exceptions to the ALJ’s decision to 4 the Appeals Council, which denied review.17 Plaintiff now appeals to

5 district court.18 6 II. Standard of Review 7 The ALJ’s decision is reversed “only if it is not supported by

8 substantial evidence or is based on legal error”19 and such error 9 impacted the nondisability determination.20 Substantial evidence is 10

11 16 AR 532–49. 12 17 AR 520–23. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 422.201. 13 18 ECF No. 1. 14 19 Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). See 42 U.S.C. 15 § 405(g). 16 20 Molina v.

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Michael S. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, (E.D. Wash. 2026).

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