Michael S. Eisenhauer v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided April 15, 2015·No. 04-15-00196-CR·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 04-15-00196-CR FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 4/15/2015 4:22:15 PM KEITH HOTTLE CLERK

No. 04-15-00196-CR

IN THE FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXASSAN ANTONIO, TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 4/15/2015 4:22:15 PM KEITH E. HOTTLE MICHAEL S. EISENHAUER, Clerk Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

RESPONSE TO THE ORDER PROPOSING TO DISMISS THIS APPEAL PURSUANT RULE 25.2(d) OF THE TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

Comes now MICHAEL S. EISENHAUER, Appellant, by and through

undersigned counsel, in reply to the ORDER of this Honorable Court dated April

7, 2015, and shows the Court the following:

I. Procedural history:

Appellant was charged by indictment in cause number 2013-CR-6130 with

family violence assault, enhanced with the allegation that Appellant was previously

convicted of family violence assault causing bodily injury. The primary offense

was alleged to have been committed in Bexar County, Texas, on or about June 19,

2013. (CR at 5). On July 16, 2013, the trial court granted attorney Brad Kvitna’s motion to appear as Appellant’s attorney. (CR at 6-8). Mr. Kvinta also filed a

written appearance as retained counsel on November 15, 2013. (CR at 34).

On February 18, 2014, pursuant to a written plea agreement with the State,

Appellant pleaded no contest to the charged offense. (CR at 45, 47). The parties

agreed that the punishment assessed would be capped at six years of imprisonment,

with a $1,500 fine. (CR at 45). As part of the plea agreement, Appellant agreed in

writing to waive the right of appeal. (CR at 45). The trial court approved

Appellant’s waiver and voluntary relinquishment of his known rights in this case,

including the right of appeal. (CR at 49).

On April 4, 2014, the trial court, the Honorable Maria Teresa Herr presiding,

followed the terms of the plea agreement and sentenced Appellant to six years of

imprisonment in the Institutional Division, with a $1,500.00 fine. (CR at 64). The

trial court imposed court costs of $394.00 and entered a family violence finding.

(CR at 64-65). The trial court certified that this is a plea-bargain case, that

Appellant has “NO right of appeal,” and that he also waived the right of appeal.

(CR at 66). By his signature, Appellant acknowledged that he was informed that he

has no right of appeal in this case. (CR at 66).

Almost a year after he was sentenced, on March 24, 2015, Appellant filed a

pro se notice of appeal with the District Clerk. (CR at 72-76). Appellant’s pro se

2 notice of appeal was not timely filed, and nothing in the trial record shows that he

filed a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal. (CR at 2-4).

On April 1, 2015, the trial court appointed the Bexar County Public

Defender’s Office to represent Appellant in this attempted appeal. (CR at 101).

The clerk’s record was filed on April 6, 2015. On April 7, 2015, this Court

ORDERED that this appeal will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 25.2(d) of the

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure unless Appellant files a response establishing

that the notice of appeal was timely filed and causes an amended trial court

certification (showing that Appellant has the right of appeal) to be filed by April

17, 2015. This is court-appointed counsel’s response to the Court’s ORDER.

II. No right of appeal:

In a plea-bargain case where the sentence does not exceed the agreed-upon

punishment, the defendant may appeal only matters that were raised by written

motion and ruled upon before trial, or by getting the trial court’s written

certification that he has permission to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Rule

25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, “The appeal must be

dismissed if a certification that shows the defendant has a right of appeal has not

been made part of the record under these rules.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d).

This was a plea-bargain case. As noted above, the clerk’s record shows that

Appellant pleaded “nolo contendere” to the primary offense pursuant to the terms

3 of a written plea agreement with the State. (CR at 47, 64). The trial court followed

that plea agreement by sentencing Appellant to six years of imprisonment. (CR at

47, 64). The trial court accurately certified that this is a plea-bargain case,

Appellant has “NO right of appeal,” and also waived the right of appeal. (CR at

66). Appellant signed that notice. (CR at 66). Additionally, no written pretrial

motions were filed and ruled upon before the plea-entry hearing.1 (CR at 2-5). For

these reasons, the trial court’s certification of the defendant’s right of appeal

accurately reflects that this is a plea-bargain case, the terms of the plea bargain

were followed, and Appellant has no right of appeal.

III. Waiver:

A defendant may waive the right of appeal, as long as the waiver is made

“voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.14

(“The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may waive any rights

secured him by law.”); Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Tex. Crim. App.

2009). The record shows that Appellant waived the right of appeal in writing as

part of the plea agreement, and the trial court approved that waiver. (CR at 45, 49).

Undersigned counsel can identify nothing in the clerk’s record to show that the

trial court failed to follow the terms of the plea bargain, and nothing shows that

Appellant’s written waiver of the right of appeal was involuntary. Since Appellant

1 Appellant’s motion to suppress was neither granted nor denied per the clerk’s record. (CR at 26). 4 has validly waived the right of appeal, this Court has not acquired jurisdiction over

this case. Marsh v. State, 444 S.W.3d 654, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)(“…because

Appellant had validly waived his right to appeal, the court of appeals never

acquired jurisdiction.”). If Appellant now wishes to argue that his plea was

involuntary, for example, he will have to raise that argument in a post-conviction

writ. He cannot make that argument in this attempted appeal. See TEX.R.APP.P.

25.2(a)(2).

IV. No jurisdiction:

Appellant’s notice of appeal was due to be filed within thirty days after the

sentence was imposed in open court. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1). So it was due to be

filed by May 5, 2014. Appellant could have filed a motion for extension of time to

file the notice of appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3. His notice of appeal would have then

been due on May 19, 2014. But he did not file a motion for extension of time to

file his pro se notice of appeal, and did not file his pro se notice of appeal until

March 24, 2015. (CR at 156). It was not timely filed. For that reason alone, this

jurisdiction of this Court was not invoked. See Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522

(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that a timely filed notice of appeal is necessary to

invoke the jurisdiction of a court of appeals).

V. No amended trial court certification will be sought by counsel:

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Related

Ex Parte Broadway
301 S.W.3d 694 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2009)
Chavez v. State
183 S.W.3d 675 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Olivo v. State
918 S.W.2d 519 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1996)
Marsh, Robert Lane
444 S.W.3d 654 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2014)