Michael Rodgers v. State of Indiana

Opinion

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Michael Rodgers, Jul 20 2026, 9:21 am

Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

v.

State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

July 20, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-CR-88 Appeal from the Huntington Circuit Court The Honorable Davin G. Smith, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 35C01-2411-F4-352

Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas Judges Bradford and Felix concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-88 | July 20, 2026 Page 1 of 11 Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Case Summary [1] Michael Rodgers was convicted of two counts of burglary, Level 4 felonies; two

counts of theft, Level 6 felonies; and eight counts of theft, Class A

misdemeanors. Rodgers argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to

support his convictions for burglary and that the trial court abused its discretion

in entering its restitution order. We disagree, and accordingly, affirm.

Issues [2] Rodgers raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Rodgers’ burglary convictions.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining its restitution order.

Facts

[3] In 2021, Nathaniel Minnich bought a three-acre property in Warren at an

auction. The property had four structures on it: a house, a detached garage, a

barn, and a shed. Minnich originally tried to move into the house, but the pipes

froze that winter, around February 2022, and Minnich set up “an apartment” in

the garage. Tr. Vol. II pp. 74, 105. Minnich ultimately moved in with his

grandparents in Hoagland because it was too difficult to live in the garage

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-88 | July 20, 2026 Page 2 of 11 without running water. Minnich had consistently lived with his grandparents

since February or March of 2022.

[4] Minnich visited his property about every two weeks to get the mail. Minnich

always kept the garage locked, but he never locked the house. Although the

exterior of the house was complete, the inside of the house did not have drywall

or flooring and was missing subflooring and insulation. The house contained

PEX tubing for a waterline; a disconnected water heater; an oven, which was

disconnected from the gas line; and other torn-out furnishings, including a

shower, a toilet, and cabinetry. There was no running water on the property.

Minnich stored his tools on the property. He had some in the house, but most

of the tools were in the garage.

[5] In the garage, Minnich had a bed; a refrigerator and freezer; a kitchen area,

including a crockpot, seasonings, and silverware; a filing cabinet and desk

containing bills, receipts, bank statements, paystubs, old Christmas cards, and a

notebook where Minnich wrote down his login information; an air conditioner;

some hunting gear; and a four-wheeler.

[6] On November 14, 2024, Minnich entered the house to get a transit level 1 and

observed that he had fewer tools and building materials than he remembered.

1 A transit level is an optical instrument mounted on a tripod. It is mainly used for surveying and building, and it can be used to determine precise angles and measurements.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-88 | July 20, 2026 Page 3 of 11 Minnich also found that the door to his detached garage had been kicked in.

The next day, Minnich noticed fraudulent charges on his credit card and

contacted the Huntington County Sheriff’s Office. The responding officer took

many photos of the property, including a bulldozer in the barn, and encouraged

Minnich to look for his items online.

[7] Minnich found many of his items being sold on Facebook Marketplace. The

account selling Minnich’s items had also listed Minnich’s bulldozer. The

photograph of the bulldozer was taken while it was in Minnich’s barn, and,

when the posting was discovered, it was already marked as sold. Although the

bulldozer was in the barn when Minnich and the responding officer took photos

of the property, Minnich returned a week later, and the bulldozer was gone.

[8] The Huntington County Sheriff’s Office connected this Facebook account to

Rodgers. The State charged Rodgers with: Count I, burglary of a dwelling, a

Level 4 felony; Count II, theft, a Level 6 felony; Count III, burglary, a Level 4

felony; Count IV, theft of property valued between $750 and $50,000, a Level 6

felony; and Counts V through XII, separate charges of theft, as Class A

misdemeanors. 2 On February 3, 2025, the State amended the charges to allege

that Rodgers was an habitual offender.

2 The charges were filed on November 27, 2024, and later amended on March 21, 2025.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-88 | July 20, 2026 Page 4 of 11 [9] A jury trial was held in November 2025. At the time of trial, the house was

Minnich’s mailing address, he was paying the mortgage, and electrical service

was active at the property. Minnich did not remember the last time he did

substantial work on the property but testified that he intended to move into the

property once it was properly renovated. 3

[10] On November 20, 2025, a jury found Rodgers guilty of all twelve counts. On

December 15, 2025, the trial court sentenced Rodgers to an aggregate sentence

of thirty years composed of an eleven-year sentence on Counts I through XII,

and an additional nineteen-year habitual offender enhancement. The trial court

also ordered Rodgers to pay Minnich $12,508 in restitution. Although Minnich

did not testify at sentencing, he submitted an itemized list of his damages with

prices and item descriptions to the Huntington County Probation Department.

Rodgers now appeals.

Discussion and Decision I. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Rodgers’ burglary convictions.

[11] Rodgers argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his

burglary convictions. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential

standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness

3 Minnich was working seven days a week at the time of trial. Minnich is a heavy equipment operator.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-88 | July 20, 2026 Page 5 of 11 credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-

Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported

by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value

supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could

have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting

this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury’s

determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the

conviction “‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the

evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is

sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the

verdict.’” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[12] Rodgers was convicted of burglary pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-43-2-1,

which provides: “A person who breaks and enters the building or structure of

another person, with intent to commit a felony or theft in it, commits burglary,

a Level 5 felony. However, the offense is: (1) a Level 4 felony if the building or

structure is a dwelling . . . .” (emphasis added). Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-

2-107 defines a dwelling as “a building, structure, or other enclosed space,

permanent or temporary, movable or fixed, that is a person’s home or place of

lodging.” “[O]ur courts have said that burglary of a dwelling is not so much an

offense against property as it is an offense against the sanctity and security of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-88 | July 20, 2026 Page 6 of 11 habitation.” Howell v. State, 53 N.E.3d 546, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing

Watt v. State, 446 N.E.2d 644, 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)), trans. denied.

[13] “[T]he legislature has provided an increased penalty for burglarizing a dwelling

‘because of the potential danger to the probable occupants.’” Id. at 549 (quoting

Byers v. State, 521 N.E.2d 318, 319 (Ind. 1988)). We also observe the unique

threat to an intruder who enters a structure that is serving as a dwelling; Indiana

Code Section 35-41-3-2(d) permits the use of deadly force to prevent an

unlawful entry or attack on a dwelling.

[14] Rodgers argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his

convictions on Count I: burglary (of the house), a Level 4 felony, and Count

III: burglary (of the garage), a Level 4 felony. Tr. Vol. II pp. 48-50. Rodgers

argues that neither structure qualified as a “dwelling.” We disagree and find

that both structures meet the statutory definition of a dwelling.

[15] Rodgers argues that Minnich’s house was not a dwelling because Minnich had

not lived in the house for about two and a half years; Minnich had not worked

on the house in over a year and a half before discovering the burglary; and the

house lacked subflooring, bathrooms, and running water. “It is well established

that if a house is left empty temporarily by its occupant, the house does not lose

its status as a dwelling if the occupant intends to return.” Howell, 53 N.E.3d at

549. Minnich visited the property every few weeks; he kept his tools inside; and

he intended to live in the house in the future. Rodgers is merely requesting that

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-88 | July 20, 2026 Page 7 of 11 we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. We find sufficient evidence was

submitted for the jury to infer that the house was a dwelling.

[16] Rodgers also argues that Minnich’s garage was not a dwelling because Minnich

primarily lived with his grandparents and there was no running water in the

garage. Indiana law, however, has long held that buildings with the

accoutrements of comfortable living are considered dwellings. See Burwell v.

State, 517 N.E.2d 812, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). In Ferrell v. State, our Supreme

Court found that a house was a dwelling; the occupant was living elsewhere,

but kept his furniture inside, and visited nearly every day to pick up the mail.

565 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind. 1991). Here, Minnich’s garage contained his bed,

a desk, a kitchen area, and a filing cabinet containing Minnich’s personal

financial documents. These accoutrements of comfortable living and Minnich’s

consistent, although infrequent, visits to the property indicate that the garage

was a dwelling. Accordingly, we find that the State provided sufficient

evidence to prove both of Rodgers’ burglary convictions. 4

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining its restitution order.

[17] Rodgers argues that the trial court’s restitution order was an abuse of discretion.

We review a restitution order for an abuse of discretion. Archer v. State, 81

4 Rodgers makes no substantive double jeopardy argument.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-88 | July 20, 2026 Page 8 of 11 N.E.3d 212, 215 (Ind. 2017) (citing Bell v. State, 59 N.E.3d 959, 962 (Ind.

2016)). We will not reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. See

Flowers v. State, 154 N.E.3d 854, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[18] Restitution must be based on “property damages . . . incurred as a result of the

crime, based on the actual cost of repair (or replacement if repair is

inappropriate),” and “earnings lost by the victim . . . [while] participating in the

investigation or trial of the crime.” Ind. Code §§ 35-50-5-3(a)(1), (4). 5 The

injury, harm, or loss must come as “a direct and immediate result of the

criminal acts of a defendant.” Huddleston v. State, 764 N.E.2d 655, 657 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2002) (citing Vanness v. State, 605 N.E.2d 777, 783 (Ind. 1992)). “[T]he

trial court abuses its discretion in ordering restitution ‘only if no evidence or

reasonable inferences therefrom support the trial court’s decision.’” Archer, 81

N.E.3d at 216 (quoting Little v. State, 839 N.E.2d 807, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005))

(emphasis in original). “Evidence supporting a restitution order is sufficient ‘if

it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject the trier of

fact to mere speculation or conjecture.’” S.G. v. State, 956 N.E.2d 668, 683

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting T.C. v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2005)), trans. denied.

5 This statute also provides for restitution to victims of crimes that harmed a victim’s person. These sections are not applicable in this case.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-88 | July 20, 2026 Page 9 of 11 [19] Rodgers argues that Minnich’s ledger was insufficient to support the restitution

order. Rodgers contends that the restitution order is based solely on speculation

or conjecture. We conclude, however, that the evidence afforded a reasonable

basis for estimating the loss.

[20] In Guzman v. State, this Court found that a letter concerning restitution for

medical expenses was sufficient evidence to determine restitution when the

letter was submitted to the probation department, was written by the victim,

and was itemized by the amount and to whom the amount was due. 985

N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). As in Guzman, Minnich’s itemized list

enumerated each item that was missing from his property and the amount each

item was worth. This list was attached to Minnich’s Victim Impact Statement,

which was part of the Huntington County Probation Department’s pre-sentence

investigation report. We find that the itemized list afforded a reasonable basis

for estimating Minnich’s loss.

[21] Next, Rodgers argues that some of the items on Minnich’s list were not

specifically proven at trial. Additionally, he argues that some of the claims for

restitution were based on uncharged conduct, which he argues were not within

the trial court’s discretion to grant restitution. We disagree. In Smith v. State,

this Court affirmed a restitution order based on the victim’s testimony that,

following Smith’s theft, the victim was missing the items listed in the charging

information and unlisted items, including between 350–400 CDs and $120 cash.

990 N.E.2d 517, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. We found that the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-88 | July 20, 2026 Page 10 of 11 unlisted items demonstrated the extent of the victim’s loss attributable to the

entirety of the acts underlying Smith’s conviction. Id. Here, the list provided

by Minnich is based on charged conduct and demonstrates the extent of

Minnich’s losses that stemmed from Rodgers’ theft and burglary convictions.

Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in determining

its restitution order.

Conclusion [22] We find sufficient evidence to support Rodgers’ convictions. And, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion when it calculated its restitution order. We,

accordingly, affirm.

[23] Affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Kristina L. Lynn Lynn Law Office, P.C. Wabash, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana

Alexa R. Rojas Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-88 | July 20, 2026 Page 11 of 11