Michael Ray Mangum v. Jane Doe

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 8th District (El Paso)
• Decided: January 5, 2026
• Docket: 08-24-00384-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS ————————————

No. 08-24-00384-CV ————————————

Michael Ray Mangum, Appellant

v.

Jane Doe, Appellee

On Appeal from the 83rd Judicial District Court Val Verde County, Texas Trial Court No. 2024-0084-CIV

M E MO RA N D UM O PI NI O N 1

This interlocutory appeal arises from a lawsuit initiated by Appellee Jane Doe against

Appellant Michael Ray Mangum based on allegations that he distributed intimate photographs and

1 This case was transferred pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001. We follow the precedent of the Fourth Court of Appeals to the extent it might conflict with our own. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3. videos of her. Mangum challenges the trial court’s order granting Doe’s application for injunctive

relief on grounds it does not comply with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and is void. We

vacate and dissolve the trial court’s order and remand the cause to the trial court for further

proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND In her petition, Doe claimed she and Mangum were in a romantic relationship for about a

year. When the relationship ended, Doe alleged Mangum threatened to, and did, distribute “certain

visual intimate material, depicting [her] in a sexual way.” According to Doe, Mangum distributed

the material to her family members, which also resulted in certain relatives suing her for child

abuse. Doe also alleged Mangum distributed the material on the internet and continued to torment

and harass her, causing her emotional distress.

Doe brought multiple claims against Mangum, including negligence per se for violating

several statutes 2, “Unlawful Disclosure or Promotion of Intimate Visual Material Chapter 98B the

Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code,” “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,” “Invasion

of Privacy by Publication of Private Facts,” and gross negligence. Mangum responded with a

general denial. Shortly after, Doe filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order

and temporary injunction. Following a hearing, the trial court signed an agreed order granting

Doe’s application for a “restraining order.” The order required Mangum to preserve his cell

phones, computers, social media accounts, assets, and property.

This interlocutory appeal followed.

2 Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code, Ch. 143: Harmful Access by Computer; Texas Penal Code Ann. § 33.02: Breach of Computer Security; Texas Penal Code Ann. § 33.02: Online Impersonation; Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code, Ch. 98B: Unlawful Disclosure or Promotion of Intimate Visual Material; Texas Penal Code § 42.07: Harassment; and Texas Penal Code Ann. § 21.19: Unlawful Electronic Transmission of Sexually Explicit Visual Material.

2 II. DISCUSSION In a single issue, Mangum argues the trial court abused its discretion in granting the order

because it (1) fails to identify why Doe will suffer irreparable harm absent its issuance; (2) fails to

include an order setting the case for trial; and (3) fails to fix the amount of security or bond.

A. The order is appealable.

As a threshold matter, we must first determine whether the challenged order is appealable.

The order here is titled, “Agreed Order Granting Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining

Order as to Defendant.” A trial court’s ruling on a temporary restraining order is generally not

appealable. In re Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n, 85 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex. 2002). While

an interlocutory appeal challenging the grant or denial of a temporary injunction is expressly

permitted, no statutory provision permits an appeal from a temporary restraining order. See Lesikar

v. Rappeport, 899 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

Code § 51.014 (specifically permitting appeal of order granting or denying temporary injunction,

but not including the grant or denial of a temporary restraining order). However, “[t]he fact that

the order is denominated as a temporary restraining order does not control whether the order is

appealable. Whether an order is a non-appealable temporary restraining order or an appealable

temporary injunction depends on the order’s characteristics and function, not its title.” In re Texas

Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n, 85 S.W.3d at 205. The Texas Supreme Court has explained the

roles the different orders serve:

A temporary restraining order is one entered as part of a motion for a temporary injunction, by which a party is restrained pending the hearing of the motion. A temporary injunction is one which operates until dissolved by an interlocutory order or until the final hearing.

Id. The trial court’s order here has the characteristics and function of a temporary injunction.

It requires Mangum to preserve his cell phones, computers, and his “social media accounts or

3 communications applications . . . on [his] cell phones or other devices,” and “enjoined and

restrained [Mangum] from destroying, deleting, altering, or in any way tampering with any”

content on his devices. The order further states that these restrictions “shall remain in effect until

further order of this Court[.]” And because “there is the potential for [Doe] to recover from

[Mangum] after a trial on the merits[,]” Mangum was required to “file notice of lis pendens in

order to provide constructive notice to the general public of pending litigation in any country where

[he] may own real property to ensure compliance with this Order.” The order also “enjoined” him

from “destroying, removing, concealing, encumbering . . . [or] transferring any assets that would

prevent [Doe] from recovering a monetary judgment.”

The order granted all requested temporary injunction relief to operate during the pendency

of the suit. It did not provide for its own dissolution. It also failed to set a hearing for temporary

injunction and therefore subjects Mangum to these restrictions during pendency of the litigation

or until further order of the court. The trial court’s order enjoined Mangum from reducing the value

of his assets in any way due to the “potential” of Doe recovering from him “after a trial on the

merits.” The signed order gave the restrictions immediate effect and allowed them to remain during

pendency of the suit.

In character and function, the trial court’s order grants a temporary injunction and is

appealable under § 51.014(a)(4) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Qwest

Commc’ns Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000) (“Because the trial court’s

order places restrictions on Qwest and is made effective immediately so that it operates during the

pendency of the suit, it functions as a temporary injunction.”). 3 We now turn to whether the order

is void.

3 Doe does not dispute that the order is a temporary injunction order.

4 B. The order does not comply with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and is void.

Mangum contends the order is void and should be dissolved because it “fails to meet certain

well established and mandatory requirements for a temporary injunction” under the Texas Rules

of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Mangum argues the order is void because it lacks findings on

irreparable harm, does not set a trial date on the merits, and does not fix the applicant’s bond

amount. Doe disagrees that the order fails to specify the irreparable harm she would suffer,

contends that “[i]t is appropriate for the Agreed Injunction Order to be read together with two prior

orders, which thereby establish[] a known and set date for trial,” and maintains that Mangum

“should not be allowed to simply ignore his own agreement to the form and substance of the

Agreed Injunction Order.” 4

The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require than an order granting injunctive relief, “set

forth the reasons for its issuance; [] be specific in terms; [and] describe in reasonable detail and

not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained[.]”

Tex. R. Civ. P. 683. It must also set the cause for trial on the merits. Id. The Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure further provide that the trial court must “fix the amount of security to be given by the

applicant.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 684. We review an order granting injunctive relief for abuse of

discretion. Abbott v. Harris Cnty., 672 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2023). Because a trial court has no

discretion to misapply the law, we review its legal determinations de novo. Texas Educ. Agency v.

4 Doe argues that “[t]o the extent [the order] lacks any specific findings, [fails to] set the matter for trial, or fix the amount of a security or bond, such defect would be merely voidable, rather than void, and has been waived” by Mangum when he agreed to the order to both form and substance. The San Antonio Court of Appeals has directly addressed this issue and explained that “[i]f the supreme court had meant that such a temporary injunction was voidable, we feel certain it would have used the word ‘voidable.’ Instead, the court has repeatedly used the word ‘void.’” In re Garza, 126 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (citing Qwest Comm. Corp v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000); InterFirst Bank San Felipe N.A. v. Paz Const. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1986). The San Antonio Court of Appels therefore held that “because the temporary injunction here failed to comply with rules 683 and 684, it is void.” Id. And because “[a] void order has no force or effect and confers no rights” our sister court concluded that “[a] party who agrees to a void order has agreed to nothing.” Id. at 271. We therefore reject Doe’s arguments.

5 Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 660 S.W.3d 108, 116 (Tex. 2023) (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d

833, 840 (Tex. 1992)).

The order here does not comply with the requirements of Rules 683 and 684 because it

does not specifically identify the harm Doe would have suffered had it not been issued, it does not

set a date for trial on the merits, and it does not fix the bond amount. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 683, 684.

The order states, “[Doe] will be irreparably injured from the spoilation of the evidence”[,]

and that “[Doe] will suffer imminent and irreparable harm if [Mangum]” were to transfer his real

property and assets which would prevent Doe “from recovering a monetary judgment.” We find

the order includes only conclusory statements regarding harm. See e.g., Kotz v. Imperial Capital

Bank, 319 S.W.3d 54, 56–57 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.) (finding conclusory

statements or mere recitals of harm as insufficient to satisfy Rule 683); see also Pebble Hills Plaza,

Ltd. v. ASLM, Ltd., No. 08-23-00157-CV, 2024 WL 866664, at *3 (Tex. App.—E Paso Feb. 29,

2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Merely stating that a party will ‘suffer irreparable harm’ or has

‘no adequate remedy at law’ does not meet Rule 683’s specificity requirement.”). Even if the order

met the specificity requirement of Rule 683, it still failed to satisfy other mandatory provisions.

The order does not set the cause for trial on the merits, and we reject Doe’s argument that

this requirement can be circumvented because there is a separate order setting a trial date. See

DeVoll v. Demonbreun, No. 04-13-00900-CV, 2014 WL 1494609, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

Apr. 16, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting argument that temporary injunction order that did not

comply with Rule 483 was not void because the trial court signed a separate order setting the cause

for trial on the same day it signed the temporary injunction order). As the San Antonio Court of

Appeals has explained:

There are at least two reasons for requiring a temporary injunction to include a trial date. One is to prevent the temporary injunction from effectively becoming

6 permanent without a trial. The second is for the order to be complete on its face and not “reference to the complaint or other document.

In re Garza, 126 S.W.3d 268, 272 n.3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (cleaned up).

“The requirements of Rule 683 are mandatory and must be strictly followed.” InterFirst

Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Const. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1986). A temporary injunction

order that does not adhere to the requirements of Rule 683 is subject to being declared void and

dissolved. Id.

The same is true of the requirement in Rule 684 that an order granting a temporary

injunction fix the amount of security to be given by the applicant. Qwest, 24 S.W.3d at 337; Tex. R.

Civ. P. 684. These procedural requirements are likewise mandatory, and an order granting a

temporary injunction that does not meet them is subject to being declared void and dissolved. Id.

(citing Paz Const. Co., 715 S.W.2d at 641).

Because the order fails to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Texas Rules of

Civil Procedure, it is void. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by issuing an order

that does not comply with the mandates of Rules 683 and 684. Mangum’s sole issue is sustained.

III. CONCLUSION We vacate and dissolve the order, and remand this cause to the trial court for further

MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice

January 5, 2026

Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ. Palafox, J., dissents without opinion.