Michael Ray Kennedy v. State

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 6, 2015
• Docket: 07-14-00353-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 07-14-00353-CR SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS AMARILLO, TEXAS 2/6/2015 9:21:24 AM Vivian Long, Clerk

THE APPELLANT WAIVES ORAL ARGUMENT FILED IN 7th COURT OF APPEALS NO. 07-14-00353-CR AMARILLO, TEXAS 2/6/2015 9:21:24 AM VIVIAN LONG IN THE COURT OF APPEALS CLERK FOR THE SEVENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT AMARILLO, TEXAS

MICHAEL RAY KENNEDY, Appellant

VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal in Cause No. 67,789-E In the 108th District Court of Potter County, Texas

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

DONALD F. SCHOFIELD ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 112 West 8th Avenue, Suite 530 Amarillo, Texas 79101 State Bar No. 17800500 Telephone No. (806) 373-0030 FAX No. (806) 379-6760 E-Mail: dsatty1@att.net

Office of RANDALL C. SIMS 47th District Attorney ATTORNEY FOR STATE 501 S. Fillmore, Suite 5A Amarillo, Texas 79101 NO. 07-14-00353CR

MICHAEL RAY KENNEDY, Appellant VS.

NAMES OF ALL PARTIES

JUDGE PRESIDING: APPELLANT: HONORABLE DOUGLAS WOODBURN MICHAEL RAY KENNEDY 108th Judicial District Court TDCJ NO. 01968578 Amarillo, Texas 79101 Byrd Unit 21 FM 247 Huntsville, Texas 77320

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT AT TRIAL: ON APPEAL: DAVID MARTINEZ DONALD F. SCHOFIELD 1663 Broadway Street 112 West 8th Avenue, Suite 530 Lubbock, Texas 79401 Amarillo, Texas 79101 E-Mail: dsatty1@att.net

ATTORNEY FOR STATE AT TRIAL AND ON APPEAL: RANDALL C. SIMS Potter County District Attorney 501 S. Fillmore, Suite 5A Amarillo, Texas 79101

JASON HORN, Assistant District Attorney

JOHN (JACK) OWEN, Assistant District Attorney i TABLE OF CONTENTS

NAMES OF ALL PARTIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii-iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

APPELLANT’S BRIEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

ISSUES PRESENTED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Issue One

The trial court abused its discretion and thereby deprived the Appellant of both due process and equal protection of law when it denied the Defense petition to allow the im- preachment of two witnesses with evidence of a prior crime or crimes of moral turpitude as permitted by Rule 609(a), Tex. Rules of Evidence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

ISSUE ONE (RESTATED). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-15

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

ii APPENDICES

APPENDIX A – Section 12.42, Tex. Penal Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 APPENDIX B – Section 22.02, Tex. Penal Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 APPENDIX C – Rule 609, Tex. Rules of Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

iii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Bensaw v. State, 88 S. W. 2d 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 1935). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Bryant v. State, 997 S. W. 2d 673 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Dallas County Bail Bond Bd. v. Mason, 773 S. W. 2d 586 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1989, no writ). . . . . . . . . . 15

Hardeman v. State,. 868 S. W. 2d 404 (Tex. App. – Austin 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,13

Lester v. State, 366 S. W. 3d 214 (Tex. App. – Waco 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Schmidt v. State, 373 S. W. 3d 856 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,15

Sherman v. State, 62 S. W. 2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1933). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Theus v. State, 845 S. W. 2d 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,13, 14 Texas Statutes and Code

Texas Penal Code Section 22.02. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Section 12.42. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Texas Rules of Evidence Rule 609(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,9,11

iv NO. 07-14-00353-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

AT AMARILLO, TEXAS

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

COMES NOW MICHAEL RAY KENNEDY, Appellant in Cause No.

67,789-E of the 108th Judicial District Court of Potter County, Texas, and submits

this brief in the trial, judgment and sentence of the Appellant, and in support thereof,

would respectfully show as follows:

1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 30, 2013, the Appellant was indicted for the second-degree felony

offense of “Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon” which case was twice

enhanced by prior felony convictions; therefore, the punishment range for the

offense as indicted and enhanced is 25 years to life/99 years imprisonment and a fine

of up to $10,000. (CR:7; for statue governing the offense see Section 22.02(a)(c),

Tex. Penal Code; for statute governing the punishment range see Sec. 12.42(d), Tex.

Penal Code.) The Appellant was appointed counsel on November 21, 2013 (CR:9)

which attorney was removed by substitution of retained counsel on February 6, 2014

(CR:11-14); then, on March 21, 2014, the Appellant retained another attorney

(CR:18, 22-23) which attorney remained with the Appellant throughout all

proceedings.

A trial on all issues was conducted before a jury on September 2 through

September 3, 2014 (Reporters Records). After hearing all evidence (the Appellant

electing not to testify), and with no objections by either party to the court’s charge

(RR3:8), the panel was instructed as to the law by the trial judge. Then, after

deliberation, a verdict of “guilty” was returned “as charged in the indictment.”

(RR3:52; CR:65) With the Appellant electing to have the jury assess punishment

(CR:74), after the reading of the two enhancement paragraphs and the Appellant’s

2 entry of pleas of “not true” to each, the panel heard evidence on the issues.

(RR3:54-58; Note: The Appellant did not testify during this portion of the

proceeding.) Again, with no objection to the charge, the trial court instructed the

panel as to the law on punishment; the jury then retired to deliberate and

subsequently returned a verdict of “29 years imprisonment” with a finding of “true”

as to each enhancement paragraph. (RR3:59, 75) The trial judge sentenced the

Appellant to the same term of imprisonment as assessed by the jury. (RR3:76; It

should be noted that the court’s Nunc Pro Tunc Judgment reflects a finding of a

“deadly weapon” -- as indicted – CR:78.)

On September 29, 2014, the Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial

(CR:90-91) with an Amended Motion for New Trial filed on October 2, 2014

(CR:92-133); the Amended Motion was denied by the trial court on October 8, 2014

(CR:138). A Notice of Appeal was filed by the Appellant on September 29, 2014,

2014 (CR:87-89) with the trial court certifying to the Appellant’s “right to appeal”

on September 5, 2014 (CR:60).

3 ISSUES PRESENTED

The trial court abused its discretion and thereby deprived the Appellant of both due process and equal protection of law when it denied the Defense petition to allow the impeachment of two witnesses with evidence of a prior crime or crimes of moral turpitude as permitted by Rule 609(a), Tex. Rules of Evidence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The State began its presentation of evidence by tendering an eye-witness to

the event who testified that she was in her yard with her husband and grandchildren

when she heard “yelling and arguing”. (RR2:112-113) She witnessed a male get

into a silver pick-up and drive off; the witness also testified that she observed the

male put what looked like a gun to a female’s head and threaten an assault.

(RR2:114) The State introduced the 911 call made by the witness (RR2:117;

RR4:St.Ex.No.1); the witness also testified that she did not want to testify as she was

“afraid” (RR2:121). On cross-examination the witness admitted to a prior theft

conviction (RR2:122) and agreed that she told the 911 operator that she, “did not see

the girl”. (RR2:122). This person also stated that the assailant shot the gun as he

drove off. (RR2:1223, 130) The Appellant was identified as the assailant.

4 (RR2:131)

The next witness to testify for the State was the husband of the previous

witness who stated that he “saw nothing”. (RR(134) This witness testified that

although he never saw a man or woman at the scene; he did, however, hear two

adults arguing. (RR2:137) The State’s next witness was a police officer who

investigated an incident between the Appellant and the alleged victim which witness

stated that the alleged victim appeared “upset, shaken and afraid” and believed that

the victim “had a small cut below the right eye”. (RR2:144) The witness

explained how he went to an address he was told the Appellant would be located but

only found the Appellant’s mother at the site. (RR2:149-150) The witness also

used photographs to point out a motor vehicle identified by the victim as belonging

to her which vehicle was damaged and had what appeared to be a bullet hole in the

headrest. (RR2:147-148, 152-153)

The alleged victim to the assault next testified and admitted to multiple

criminal convictions. (RR2:174-175) This witness testified that she was

dating the Appellant (RR2:176) and broke-up the relationship which upset the

Appellant. (RR2:177) The witness stated that the Appellant drove to the residence

that she and the Appellant occupied ; the Appellant damaged her vehicle and then

“pointed a gun at her and said he was doing to shoot”. (RR2:183-186) The

5 witness admitted that both she and the Appellant were “high” at the time of the

assault. (RR2:189) On cross-examination the witness admitted to other prior

convictions; however, the trial judge disallowed evidence of two prior misdemea-

nor offenses, one including an allegation of “possession of prohibited weapon”.

(RR2:192-200) The witness also testified that she was not injured on the date of the

alleged aggravated assault. (RR2:200-201)

The next witness was another investigating police officer who stated that he

responded to an “assault call” which, when he arrived at the scene of the reported

incident, he found the alleged victim “frantic and scared”. (RR2:206, 208) He

attempted to locate the Appellant and drove to a residence occupied by the

Appellant’s mother; however, the Appellant was not at the scene. (RR2:209-210)

The witness insisted that the place of the alleged aggravated assault could be seen

from the residence of the female eye-witness. (RR2:214, 216, 218) Another

police officer also testified and stated that the victim at first did not desire to talk as

she was “afraid of retaliation”. (RR2:223-224) This same witness also spoke with

the Appellant which interview was received into evidence without objection.

(RR2:226; RR4:St.Ex.No. 19) The witness recollected that the Appellant admitted

to an encounter with the alleged victim and admitted to jumping on the hood of the

victim’s motor vehicle. (RR2:226-227) The Appellant stated he may have

6 “pointed a finger at the victim”; however, he denied having a gun. (RR2:228)

The State then rested its case. (RR2:233)

The Defense began its presentation with the testimony of a female who stated

that she was with the Appellant on the day of the alleged assault and drove with him

to the site where the alleged victim was located. (RR2:234-236) This witness

stated that when she and the Appellant arrived at the scene the alleged victim

approached their truck screaming at the Appellant. (RR2:235-237) The alleged

victim attempted to spit on the witness at which time the witness “lost it” and “went

at her” (RR2:237) The witness testified that the only confrontation between the

Appellant and the alleged victim was the Appellant attempting to keep the witness

and victim apart from each other. (RR2:238) The witness admitted to being on

felony parole at the time of the incident. (RR2:239) She did not observe the

Appellant “pull a gun” on the victim. (RR2:242) The witness denied that the

Appellant told her to lie for him. (RR2:264)

The next witness to testify for the Appellant was the Appellant’s mother who

testified that on the date of the alleged offense the Appellant was working on the

repair of houses for her. (RR2:267) Again, the witness denied that the Appellant

asked her to falsify her testimony. (RR2:281, 284) Four photographs of the scene

of the incident were admitted through the testimony of this witness. (RR3:16-19;

7 RR4:Def.Ex.Nos.13, 14, 15, 16)

The Defense then rested its cases. (RR3:30)

After charging the jury as to the law, the parties gave argument and the panel

retired to deliberate. (RR3:21-51) A verdict of “guilty as charged in the

indictment” was subsequently returned by the jury. (RR3:52)

The trial court immediately began a Punishment Hearing at which two

enhancement paragraphs were read and to which the Appellant entered pleas of “not

true”. (RR3:54-55) The State then introduced without objection ten prior

conviction packets including evidence of the two offenses used to enhance the

indictment. (RR3:56-58; RR4:St.Ex.Nos.24-33) The State then rested its case as

did the Defense. (RR3:58) Then, after charging the jury as to the law, both

parties again argued their positions and the panel retired to deliberate. A verdict of

“true” to each enhancement paragraph was returned as was a judgment of

twenty-nine (29) years imprisonment in the Institutional Division, Texas

Department of Criminal Justice. (RR3:75)

8 ISSUE ONE (RESTATED)

The trial court abused its discretion and thereby deprived the Appellant

of both due process and equal protection of law when it denied the Defense

petition to allow the impeachment of two witnesses with evidence of a prior

crime or crimes of moral turpitude as permitted by Rule 609(a), Tex. Rules of

Evidence.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court improperly excluded from evidence prior misdemeanor

convictions of two material witnesses although the convictions met the criteria for

admission as set-out by Rule 609(a), Tex. Rules of Evidence.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

At a pre-trial hearing the trial judge heard from both the State and the

Defense on the issue of prior convictions relative to anticipated witnesses.

Relevant to the Appellant’s Point of Error, the State pointed out that an eye-witness

to the alleged offense, “has been previously arrested in the past several times for

Misdemeanor Class B theft by check; however, none of those were theft

convictions. All of those were actually reduced down to Class C, Issuance of a

Bad Check. . . .” (RR2:10)

9 The State objected to the use of the convictions as “not (being) a crime of moral

turpitude, and, therefore, would not be admissible” (RR2:10); the Defense argued

that, “I think issues of bad checks are crimes of moral turpitude. . . (RR2:11).” The

trial court agreed with the State and ruled that, “I’m not going to let them in. . .

(RR2:11; For copies of the three charging instruments and judgments disallowed by

the trial court see Appellant’s “Motion for New Trial”, CR:92-133 with attached

sworn affidavit of the trial attorney and exhibit nos. B, C, and D, respectively ).”

Then, during trial and on cross-examination of the alleged victim to the

assault the following exchange took place:

Q (by Defense attorney). Did you also get convicted of carrying a prohibited weapon in - -

MR. HORN (State’s Attorney): Objection, Your Honor. may we approach?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. MARTINEZ (Defense Attorney): Judge, this girl has two - - this young lady has two more - -

THE COURT: Well, we talked about this before this ever started and you said those are the only ones that you had.

MR. MARTINEZ: Right. And I found out she has two more; possession of prohibited weapon and substance - - prohibited weapon convictions in misdemeanor court and County Court at Law.

THE COURT: Okay. I’m not going to allow it. You’ve already said what you said. I’ll instruct the Jury 10 to disregard.

(Open court)

THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen, you’re instructed to disregard that last question.

(RR2:200; For a copy of the charging instrument and judgment addressed by the

trial court see Appellant’s “Amended Motion for New Trial”, CR:92-133 with

attached sworn affidavit by the trial attorney and attached exhibit no. E).

The Appellant asserts that the trial judge abused his discretion in both

instances when he sustained the State’s objection to the use of the prior convictions

(i.e., three “theft by check” convictions” of a material witness; and, the conviction

of “theft of property”, count II of a judgment against the alleged victim to the

assault) and thereby deprived the Appellant of both due process and equal

protection of law. Therefore, the Appellant’s conviction and sentence should be

overturned and the case remanded to the lower court for a new hearing.

* * *

Rule 609(a), Tex. Rules of Evidence, reads, in part, as follows:

Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime

(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record but only if the crime was a felony or involved moral turpitude, regardless of punishment, and the court deter- 11 mines that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interest of justice, that the probative value of the conviction sup- ported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

Of course, critical to the application of the above statute is an understanding

of what constitutes a “crime of moral turpitude”. In this regard, “ ‘Moral

turpitude’ has been defined as ‘the quality of a crime involving grave infringement

of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished from statutory mala

prohibita’.” Hardeman v. State, 868 S. W. 2d 404, 405 (Tex. App. – Austin

1993). Further refining this definition the Court of Criminal Appeals wrote, “The

impeachment value of crimes that involve deception is higher than crimes that

involve violence, as the latter have a higher potential for prejudice. Therefore,

when a party seeks to impeach a witness with evidence of a crime that relates more

to deception than not, the first factor weighs in favor of admission.” Theus v.

State, 845 S. W. 2d 874, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see also this Court’s

discussion of the application of the Theus criteria at Schmidt v. State, 373 S. W. 3d

856, 862-863 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2012). And “theft” has been held to be a

12 crime of moral turpitude. See Hardeman, ibid., citing Bensaw v. State, 88 S. W.

2d 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 1935); and, Bryant v. State, 997 S. W. 2d 673 Z(Tex. App.

– Texarkana 1999), citing Sherman v. State, 62 S. W. 2d 146, 150 (Tex. Crim. App.

1933). Considering the latter, what is the consequence to this Appellant.

Addressing first the alleged victim to the aggravated assault (i.e., the trial

court’s refusal to allow the questioning of the witness with a prior conviction for a

misdemeanor “theft of property” – see outline above and RR2:200, and, “Judgment

(count II)” at “Motion for New Trial”, pp. 116-118, CR:92-133, exhibit no.E),

clearly “count II” of the Judgment is a conviction for “theft of property”; therefore,

it is a “crime of moral turpitude” as defined by the Courts, above. Furthermore, the

conviction is within the ten-year prohibition outlined by the statute. Then,

applying the balance of the five-prong Theus test to the admission of the this

offense--in particular “no. 5 the importance of the credibility issue”--Theus 845 S.

W. 2d at 880--the impeachment is directed at the critical witness of the State’s case:

the alleged victim. If, as written in Theus, ibid. at 881, “As the importance of the

defendant’s credibility escalates, so will the need to allow the State an opportunity

to impeach the defendant’s credibility”, then why should this standard not also

apply to State’s witnesses, in particular to the alleged victim of an assaultive

13 Crime. To allow only the State to impeach would manifest lack of due process and

equal protection of law. Furthermore, there appears to be no reason for the trial

court to have denied the Defense its opportunity to impeach the witness with this

crime of theft other than that stated: “ we talked about this before this ever

started and you said those are the only ones (three other, prior convictions) that you

had.” (RR2:200) Considering the importance of the witness and that the

impeachable offense is “theft,” the Appellant urges that the trial court’s ruling is

outside “a zone of reasonable disagreement” and unsustainable. See discussion of

review issue at Theus, 845 S. W. 2d at 881.

As pertains to the State’s eye-witness to the alleged indicted offense, as

stated in the record by the State’s attorney, there is no State case known to the

Appellant that specifically classifies “issuance of a bad check” as a “crime of moral

turpitude.” (Note: Trial Defense counsel argued that the three contested offenses

alleged “intent to deprive” another of property; however, the each judgment waived

the count alleging this element and convicted the witness for the offense of

“issuance of a bad check,” only. See “Amended Motion for New Trial”,

CR:92-133, exhibit nos. B, C, and D.) However, if, “Offenses involving

‘dishonesty or false statement’ are crimes involving moral turpitude” as

acknowledged by the Court in Lester v. State, 366 S. W. 3d 214, 215 (Tex. App. –

14 Waco 2011) citing Dallas County Bail Bond Bd. V. Mason, 773 S. W. 2d 586, 589

(Tex. App. – Dallas 1989, no writ), do not dishonored checks fall within this

definition? Has not the person who issued the instrument acted “dishonestly” and

with “false intent”? Further, although one of the three convictions is outside the

10-year rule (i.e., the Judgment entered April 20, 2004, Exhibit No. E to

Appellant’s “Amended Motion for New Trial”), do not, “… intervening

subsequent convictions (attributable to this witness – i.e., other “bad check”

convictions) remove the taint of remoteness”. See Schmidt, 373 S. W. 3d at 863)?

The Appellant would answer in the affirmative.

The Appellant argues that for the above outlined reasons the trial court

abused its discretion when it failed to allow counsel to impeach two material State

witnesses with crimes of moral turpitude as understood by Rule 609(a), Tex. Rules

of Evidence. Therefore, the Appellant’s conviction should be reversed and a new

trial granted to the Appellant in all matters.

CONCLUSION and PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Appellant prays that this

Honorable Court find that the Trial Court erred as aforesaid argued by the Appellant

and that his conviction and sentence be vacated and that a judgment of acquittal be

15 entered, or, in the alternative, that this cause be remanded to the Trial Court for a

new hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Donald F. Schofield DONALD F. SCHOFIELD SBN: 17800500 112 West 8th, Suite 530 Amarillo, Texas 79101 Telephone: (806) 373-0030 FAX: (806) 379-6760 E-Mail: dsatty1@att.net ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing Brief was both E-Mailed and hand-delivered to:

OFFICE OF RANDALL C. SIMS, 47th District Attorney, Potter County Attn: JOHN (JACK) OWEN, Asst. District Attorney 501 S. Fillmore, Suite 5A Amarillo, Texas 79101

and mailed by Certified Mail to:

MICHAEL RAY KENNEDY TDCJ No. 01968578 Byrd Unit 21 FM 247 Huntsville, Texas 77320 Certified Mail No. 7014 1820 0001 1872 1779

on this 6th day of February , 2015.

/s/ Donald F. Schofield DONALD F. SCHOFIELD

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Rule 9.4, Tex. Rules of Appellant Procedure, I, DONALD F. SCHOFIELD, Attorney to the Appellant, Michael Ray Kennedy, do hereby certify that the Appellant’s Brief is a computer generated document that contains the following number of words: 3,091 words.

/s/ Donald F. Schofield DONALD F. SCHOFIELD 17 APPENDIX A

18 PUNISHME~TS l'!JNISHMENTS § 12.35 Title 3 THk 3 Note 9 asked if he understood that trial court had essarily use or exhibit a deadly weapon with- a felony described by Su: found enhancement allegations true. Sea- in the scope of the deadly weapon , 273.1(4) (App. 3 Dist. 2012) 368 S.W.3d 785, petition (i) under Section 4a.2; 12. Punishment for discretionary review granted, affirmed 43.23, Penal Code, punisl Person who commits criminally negligent 411 S.W.3d 498. Sentencing and Punishment (ii) under Section 20A homicide through an omission would not nee- '2:=o 80 Penal Code; (iii) under Section 20.( SUBCHAPTER D. EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCES offense \¥ith the intent tc § 12.41. Classification of Offenses Outside this Code (iv) under Section 30.r that section, if the defem Research References a felony described by Su Charlton, 6 Tex. Prac. Series App. A, Pe- (v) under the laws of ALR Library nal Code. tially similar to the elem 14 ALR 4th 227, Adequacy of Defense or (iv). Counsel's Representation of Criminal 50 Tex. Prac. Series § 1:11, Enhanced Of- fenses and Penalties for Dwi Con\·ic- (3) Notwithstanding Sub di Client Regarding Prior Convictions. tions. capital felony if it is show:r Encyclopedias 50 Tex. Prac. Series § 15:5, Evidence to otherwise punishable under ~ TX Juris, 3rd Criminal Law: Offenses Enhance Punishment. previously been finally convic. Against Public Health, Safety and Mor- DLx and Dawson, ,13A Tex. Prar. Series (A) an offense under S als § 130, Enhancement for Prior Con- § 116:79, Enhancement Under the Con- described bv Section 22.02 viction, Generally. trolled Substances Act. by Section Z2.02l(f)(2) and Treatises and Practice Aids Dix and Dawson, 43A Tex. Prac. Series (B) an offense that was ( Charlton, 6 Tex. Prac. Series § 8.2, Excep- § 46:95, Convictions for Offenses Out- (i) contains elements tional Sentences. side the Penal Code. offense under Section 22 (ii) was committed ag1 § 12.42. Penalties for Repeat and Habitual Felony Offenders on Trial committed against a vict for First, Second, or Third Degree Felony substantially similar to a (a) Except as provided by Subsection (c)(2), if it is shown on the trial of a felony (4) Notwithstanding Subdi of the third degree that the defendant has previously been finally convicted of a sion (3) for the trial of an felony other than a state jail felony punishable under Section l2,35(a), on conviction subdivision, a defendant shal the defendant shall be punished for a felony of the second degree. ment of Criminal Justice for (b) Except as provided by Subsection (c)(2) or (c)(4), if it is shown on the trial of a offense under Section 20A.o: felony of the second degree that the defendant has previously been finally convicted defendant on or after the of a felony other than a state jail felony punishable under Section 12.35(a), on previously been finally convic conviction the defendant ,;;hall be punished for a felony of the first degree. (A) an offense under Se1 (c)(l) If it is shovvn on the trial of a felony of the first degree that the defendant (B) an offense that was has previously been finally convicted of a felony other than a state jail felony contains elements that an punishable under Section 12.35(a), on conviction the defendant shall be punished by under Section 20A.03 or of imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal ,Justice for life, or for any terrn (5) A previous conviction of not more than 99 years or less than 15 years. In addition to imprisonment, an 12.35(a) may not be used individual may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000, (d) Except as provided by St (2) Notwithstanding Subdivision (1), a defendant shall be punished by imprison- felony offense other than a sta ment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life if: t.he defendant has previously t (A) the defendant is convicted of an offense: second previous felony convicti (i) under Section 20A.02(a)(7) or (8), 21.ll(a)(l), 22.021, or 22.011, Penal first previous conviction havirn Code; rnmished by imp1isonment in t (ii) under Section 20.04(a)(4), Penal Code, if the defendant committed the l'ur anv term of not more than ' offense with the intent to violate or abuse the victim sexually; or for a· state jail felony punisl: (iii) under Section 30.02, Penal Code, punishable under Subsection (d) of finhancement purposes under t: that section, if the defendant committed the offense >vith the intent to commit (1') Repealed by Acts 2011, 8

40 PUNISHMENTS l'L'NISHMENTS Title 3 Tille ;3 exhibit a deadly weapon ~ith­ a felony described by Subparagraph (i) or (ii) or a felony under Section 21.11, the deadly V.'eapon sentencing Penal Code; and rovision. Chambless v. State (B) the defendant has been previously convicted of an offense: 012) 368 S.W.3d 785, petition (i) under Section 43.25 or 43.26, Penal Code, or an offense under Section ry review granted, affirmed 43.2:3, Penal Code, punishable under Subsection (h) of that section; . Sentencing and Punishment (ii) under Section 20A.02(a)(7) or (8), 21.02, 21.11, 22.011, 22.021, or 25.02, Penal Code; \fTENCES (iii) under Section 20.04(a)(4), Penal Code, if the defendant committed the offense vvith the intent to violate or abuse the victim sexually; Code (iv) under Section 30.02, Penal Code, punishable under Subsection (d) of that section, if the defendant committed the offense with the intent to commit a felony described by Subparagraph (ii) or (iii); or Tex. Prac. Series App. A, Pe- (v) under the laws of another state containing elements that are substan- tially similar to the elements of an offense listed in Subparagraph (i), (ii), (iii), :. Series § 1:11, Enhanced Of- or (iv). d Penalties for D"'i Comic- (3) N ohvithstanding Subdivision (1) or (2), a defendant shall be punished for a capital felony if it is shown on the trial of an offense under Section 22.021 ic. Series § 15:5, Evidence to otherwise punishable under Subsection CD of that section that the defendant has Punishment. previously been finally convicted of: lWson, 43A Tex. Prac. Series (A) an offense under Section 22.021 that was committed against a victim !Jnhancement Under the Con- described by Section 22,021(f)(l) or was committed against a victim described bstances Act. by Section 22.021(f)(2) and in a manner described by Section 22.021(a)(2)(A); or nvson, 43A Tex. Prac. Series (B) an offense that was committed under the laws of another state that: Convictions for Offenses Out- (i) contains elements that are substantially similar to the elements of an 'enal Code. offense under Section 22.021; and (ii) was committed against a victim described by Section 22.021(f)(l) or was lony Offenders on Trial committed against a victim described by Section 22.021(f)(2) and in a manner ~lony substantially similar to a manner described by Section 22.021(a)(2)(A). 10wn on the trial of a felony (4) Notwithstanding Subdivision (1) or (2), and except as provided by Subdivi- been finally convicted of a sion (3) for the trial of an offense under Section 22.021 as described by that 3ction 12.35(a), on conviction subdivision, a defendant shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Depart- td degree. ment of Criminal Justice for life vvithout parole if it is shown on the trial of an f it is sho"'11 on the trial of a offense under Section 20A.03 or of a sexually violent offense, committed by the iously been finally convicted defendant on or after the defendant's 18th birthday, that the defendant has under Section 12.:35(a), on previously been finally convicted of: 1f the first degree. (A) an offense under Section 20A.03 or of a sexually violent offense; or st degree that the defendant CB) an offense that was committed under the laws of another state and that ier than a state jail felony contains elements that are substantially similar to the elements of an offense fendant shall be punished by under Section 20A.03 or of a sexually violent offense. 3tice for life, or for any term (5) A previous conviction for a state jail felony punishable under Section 1ddition to imprisonment, an 12.35(a) may not be used for enhancement purposes under Subdivision (2). )00. (d) Except as provided by Subsection (c)(2) or (c)(4), if it is shown on the trial of a rnll be punished by imprison- felony offense other than a state jail felony punishable under Section 12.35(a) that r life if: the defendant has previously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second pre\ious felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the J(l), 22.021, or 22.011, Penal first previous conviction having become final, on conviction the defendant shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life, or the defendant committed the for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years. A previous conviction ~timsexually; or for a state jail felony punishable under Section 12.35(a) may not be used for able under Subsection (d) of 1mhancement purposes under this subsection. nse with the intent to commit (e) Repealed by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 834 (H.B. 3384), § 6. 41 § 12.42 PUNISHMENTS PUNISHMENTS Title 3 Title 3 (f) For the purposes of Subsections (a), (b), and (c)(l), an adjudication by a an offense was C'Ommitted before the juvenile court under Section 54.03, Family Code, that a child engaged in delinquent tive date of thi:; Act if any element conduct on or after January 1, 1996, constituting a felony offense for which the child offense occurred before that date." is committed to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department under Section 54.04(d)(2), Acts 2011. 82nd Leg., ch. 834 (H.B (d)(3), or (m), Family Code, or Section 54.05(f), Family Code, or to a post- in the second heading added "on Tr adjudication secure correctional facility under Section 54.04011, Family Code, is a First, Second, or Third Degree Felo final felony conviction. the end; rewrote subsecs. (a) and (i (c)(l); added subsec. (c)(5); and in t (g) For the purposes of Subsection (c)(2): (cl) in the first sentence substituted "t (1) a defendant has been previously convicted of an offense listed under fendant" for "he''. and added the secor Subsection (c)(2)(E) if the defendant was adjudged guilty of the offense or entered tence; and repealed subsec. (e). Prior a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in return for a grant of deferred adjudication, to, subsecs. (a), (b), (c)(ll and (e) read: regardless of whether the sentence for the offense was ever imposed or whether "(a)(l) If it is sho'W11 on the trial of; the sentence was probated and the defendant was subsequently discharged from jail felony punishable under Seetion 1 community supervision; and that the defendant has pre;-iously beer ly convicted of two state jail feloni1 (2) a conviction under the laws of another state for an offense containing conviction the defendant shall be pu elements that are substantially similar to the elements of an offense listed under for a third-degree felony. Subsection (c)(2)(B) is a conviction of an offense listed under Subsection (c)(2)(B). "(2) lf it is shown on the trial of a st: (h) In this section, "sexually violent offense" means an offense: felony punishable under Section 12.35(: (1) described by Article 62.001(6), Code of Criminal Procedure; and the defendant has previously b('en convicted of two felonies, and the 1 (2) for which an affirmative finding has been entered under Article 42. 015(b) or previous felony conviction is for an o Section 5(e)(2), Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, for an offense other that occurred subsequent t<1 the first than an offense under Section 21.02 or 22.021. ous conviction having become final, on c Acts 1973, fi3rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., tion the defendant shall be punished p. 1750, ch. 339, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 582, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985; second-degree felony. Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 250, § 1, eff. "(3) Except as provided by Subs Sept. 1, 1995; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 262, § 78, eff. Jan. 1, 1996; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. (c)(2), if it is shovm on the trial of a sta 318, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1996; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 665, §§ 1, 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1997, felony punishable under Section 12.85 75th Leg., ch. 667, § 4, eff. Sept. I, 1997; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 62, § 15.01, eff. Sept. 1, on the trial of a third-dl:!gree felony th 1999; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 283, § 53, eff. Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1005, defendant has been once before convic § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 340, §§ 1 to 4, eff. Sept. 1, 2007; Acts 2007, a felony, on conviction he shall be pur 80th Leg., ch. 593, §§ 1.H to 1.16, eff. Sept. 1, 2007; Acts 2009, 8lst Leg., ch. 87, § 25.150, for a second-degree felony. eff. Sept. 1, 2009; Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 1 (S.B. 24), § 6.02, eff. Sept. l, 2011; Acts 2011, "Cb) Except as provided by Sub& 82nd Leg., ch. 122 (H.B. 3000), § 14, eff. Sept. 1, 2011; Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 834, (H.B. (c)(2). if it is shown on the trial of a se 3384), §§ 1 to 4, 6, eff. Sept. 1, 2011; Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 1119 (H.B. 3), §§ 3, 4, eff. degree felony that the defendant has Sept. 1, 2011; Acts 2013, &3rd Leg., ch. 161 (S.B. 1093), § 16.003, eff. Sept. 1, 2013; Acts 2013, once before convicted of a felonv. on c< 83rd Leg., ch. 668 (H.B. 1302), §§ 7 to 9, eff. Sept. 1, 2013; Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., ch. 1323 tion he shall be punished for a· flrst-d (S.B. 511), § 11, eff. Dec. 1, 2013. felony. "(c)(l) If it is shown on the trial of a Historical and Statutory Notes degTee felony that the defendant has 2011 Legislation date of this Act if any element of the offense once before convicted of a felony, on er Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 1 (S.B. 24) in occun·ed before that date." tion he shall be punished by imprisonmE subsec. (c)(2)(A)(i) and (B)(ii), inserted Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 122 (H.B. 3000) the Texas Department of Criminal Ji "20A.02(a)(7) or (8),". in subsecs. (c)(4)(intro.), (A) and (B) inserted for life, or for any term of not more th; Section 7.01 of Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 1 "20A.03 or". years or less than 15 years. In additi1 (S.B. 24) provides: Section 15 of Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 122 imprisonment, an individual may be pun "The change in law made by this Act ap- (H.B. 3000) pro;-ides: by a fine not to exceed $10,000." plies only to an offense committed on or after "The change in law made by this Act ap- "(e) A previous conviction for a stat the effective date [Sept. 1, 2011] of this Act. plies only to an offense committed on or after felony punished under Section 12.85(a) An offense committed before the effective the effective date [Sept. 1, 2011] of this Act. not be used for enhancement purposes i date of this Act is governed by the law in An offense committed before the effective ;-iuhs1~dion (b), (c), or (d)." effect on the date the offense was committed, date of this Act is governed by the law in ,'\('(.:; 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 1119 (H.B. and the former law is continued in effect for effect on the datB the offense was committed, .11ka·1-. (b) and (d), inserted "or (c)(4)"; that purpose. For purposes of this section, an and the former law is continued in effect for 111 ::11lna'('. (c)(4), inserted "or 22.021" I offense was committed before the effective that purpose. For purposes of this section, f fftH''' 42 APPENDIXB

19 § 22.011 OFFENSES AGAINST THE PER!"C 1:\i AS Note 90 Tilk " Ch. 2003) 2003 WL 21018335, Unreported. assistance of counsel; venire person st;11<, I Criminal Law e:> 194 7 unequivocally that he could follow tlll' I,, .. despite his personal prejudices, and, ;, Defense counsel's failure to challenge anv event, silent nature of record ;1·. I·· for cause venire person who announced, whv defense counsel decided not to st 1 ii · in voir dire examination, his personal bias ve~ire person precluded finding of indl1. against homosexuality, at trial in which tive assistance. Almendarez v. State (1\1 •1 · defendant, a male, stood accused of sexual 13 Dist. 2003) 2003 WL 1387208, 11111. assault of a male child, was not ineffective ported. Criminal Law ~ 190 I

§ 22.012. Deleted by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sl'Jll 1, 1994

Historical and Statutory Notes The deleted section, relating to inten- Leg .. ch. 1195, § 14 and Acts 1991, 7:1 .. 1 tionally exposing other persons to AIDS or Leg., ch. 14, § 284(10). HIV, was derived from Acts 1989, 71st

§ 22.015. Repealed by Acts 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 435, § 3, eff. Sept. I, 2009

Historical and Statutory Notes The repealed§ 22.015, relating to coerc- ship. was derived from Acts 1999, 'll•I!• ing, soliciting, or inducing gang member- Leg., ch. 708, § I.

111 I~ § 22.02. Aggravated Assault ilOI (a) A person commits an offense if the person commits assault .1 defined in§ 22.01 and the p~rson: Act l'l/ (l) causes serious bodily injury to another, including the per.suit I '12 spouse; or di. (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of 111 1 ;\, ·t

assault. '·"· l !)8 (b) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degn' (~n except that the offense is a felony of the first degree if: di ( 1) the actor uses a deadly weapon during the commission of 11,. !OU assault and causes serious bodily injury to a person whose relati<11• ship to or association with the defendant is described by Secti• 111 71.0021(b), 71.003, or 71.005, Family Code; 1\1

(2) regardless of whether the offense is committed under Sub~(• <.1 )( tion (a)(l) or (a)(2), the offense is committed: /\1 i ·' )(; (A) by a public servant acting under color of the servant's ollr. , ,,ffit or employment; '.

(B) against a person the actor knows is a public servant while 1I.. public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty, or in retalu 566 PERS( Ii\; ASSAULTIVE OFFENSES TH t.· § 22.02 erson :.Lil• low !lw I tion or on account of an exercise of official power or performance es, arnl of an official duty as a public servant; :con.I lot to ·"'' d (C) in retaliation against or on account of the service of another g Of itHI[, · as a witness, prospective witness, informant, or person who has ~Stall' (•'1·1· reported the occurrence of a crime; or 7208, t:111. (D) against a person the actor knows is a security officer while the officer is performing a duty as a security officer; or efl Sq11 (3) the actor is in a motor vehicle, as defined by Section 501.002, Transportation Code, and: (A) knowingly discharges a firearm at or in the direction of a habitation, building, or vehicle; 1991, 1 1nl (B) is reckless as to whether the habitation, building, or vehicle is occupied; and (C) in discharging the firearm, causes serious bodily injury to any person. f. Sept I, (c) The actor is presumed to have known the person assaulted was a public servant or a security officer if the person was wearing a distinc- 1ive uniform or badge indicating the person's employment as a public servant or status as a security officer. (d) In this section, "security officer" means a commissioned security officer as defined by Section 1702.002, Occupations Code, or a noncom- lllissioned security officer registered under Section 1702.221, Occupa- tions Code. tssault .1

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § l, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts pers<•11 1979, 66th Leg., p. 367, ch. 164, § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979; Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 1521, ch. 655, § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979; Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 349, ch. 79, § 1, <'ff Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 5311, ch. 977, § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; on of 1111 Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 223, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985; Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 18, § 3, eff. April 14, 1987; Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 1101, § 12, eff. Sept. 1, 1987; Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 939, §§ 1 to 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1989; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 334, § 2, cff. Sept. 1, 1991; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 903, § 1, <'ff. Sept. 1, 1991; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § LOI, eff. Sept. l, 1994; Acts )ll of 11,, 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1019, § 3, cff. Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 788. relati< 111 s 3, eff. Sept. 1, 2005; Acts 2009, 8lst Leg., ch. 594, § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2009. Secl!<111 Historical and Statutory Notes Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch. 164, in subsec. Acts 1983, 68th Leg., ch. 79, in the intro- (;1)(1) added ", including his spouse". ductory language of subsec. (a)(2) inserted Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch. 655, in subsec. "or a jailer or guard employed at a munic- tt' s offi, ' (;1)(2) deleted "in the lawful discharge of ipal or county jail or by the Texas Depart- nfficial duty" following "peace officer", in- ment of Corrections" and added ", jailer, ser~~d a colon following "is a peace offi- or guard", in subsec. (a)(Z)(A) inserted while 11,, cer , and added pars. (A) and (B); added a "jailer, or guard"; and in subsec. (a)(Z)(B) n retal1:1 new subsec. (a)(3), and renumbered for- b Ct d " " f "th ff ' " iner subsec. (a)(3) as (a)(4). su s 1 ute an or e peace o · .rcer s 567 APPENDIXC

20 Rule 608 RULES OF E"\1DEN< I Note 26 Defend.mt did not preserve challenge lo pn.is- general character for truthfulness. and 111 ecution 's c1-oss-exarnination of \Vitness under court eflcc:til'ck sustained that objection lr. I"' rule governing impeachment with c1 idencc of milting cross-examination under othc·r '"' 'sitncss's bias or interesl in a particular case, Rules of Crim.EdLL Rules 608(b), 612(bl u· where defendant's on!y specific ohjeetion was pealed). Dixon "· State (Cr.App. 19Yiil on ground that cross-examination was improper under rule governing impeachn1enl of \\'itncss's S.W.3d 263, on rehearing.

Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime (a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witrn evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitH'il :I elicited from the witness or established by public record but only if the cri11>1 was a felony or involved moral turpitude, regardless of punishment, and 11,, court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outwci1•l1 its prejudicial effect to a party. (b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissi I.J, if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the convict i"1' or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for t li,;1 conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in tl1. interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported I" specific facts and circumstances substantially outv..reighs its prejudicial effu 1 (c) Effect of Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation. J·:\ 1 dence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if: (1) based on the finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, t Ii. conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabil1 tation, or other equivalent procedure, and that person has not been convicted ,.1 a subsequent crime which was classified as a felony or involved moral turp1 tude, regardless of punishment; (2) probation has been satisfactorily completed for the crime for v,chich I iH person was convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subseque111 crime which was classified as a felony or involved moral turpitude, regardk"'" of punishment; or (3) based on a finding of innocence, the conviction has been the subject ()I a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure. (d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is not ad missible, except for proceedings conducted pursuant to Title III, Family Cock. in which the witness is a party, under this rule unless required to be admittc·d by the Constitution of the United States or Texas. (e) Pcndency of Appeal. Pendency of an appeal renders evidence of

460 ENCi WITNESSES Rule 609

1d 1r 1,d intent to use such evidence to provide the ad\·ersc party with a fair opportunity h\ !>Cl lo contest the use of sue h evidence. 111!1 hi (II, ~)l_l,'); Effective March 1, I 998.

Cross References Character of witness admissible to prove conduct, see Rules of Evid., Rule 404. Delinquency adjudications, Admissible if based upon felony violations. see Vernon's Ann. C.C.P. art. tr!(':,:,, 37.07. Penalty phase of trial, admissibility notwithstanding this rule, see Ver- ltcd it non's Ann. C.C.P. art. 37.07. Crl Ill< Pre\·ious sexual conduct of sexual assault victim, admissible under this rule. see id 1111 Rules of Evid., Rule 412.

Law Review and Journal Commentaries Admissibili!Y of Criminal Convictions in Civil en and Gary A. Udashen, 47 SMTJ L.Rev. 995 issibl( ( 'ases. Quentin Brogdon, 61 Tex. B.J. 1112 (1994) t I 998). ict io11 Annual survey of Texas law; Criminal proce- Crnss-examination under Texas rules of evi- ll 1;11 dure: Pretrial, trial and appeal. Robert Udash- dence. 2 I Houston Lawyer 32 (:Vlarch 1984). n t IH' ed I)\ Library References dlccl Witnesses ('?337(5), 345, 350, 359. Te:x.Prac., Texas Rules of Evidence; Westlaw Topic No. 410. Civil and Criminal, § 609.1 et bt C.J.S. Witnesses §§ 503, 507. 514, se4. 528.

d, th,· United States Supreme Court 1abili Prior criminal conviction, prncmptive test. see Green v. Bock Laundry ·tee.I ol introduclion of evidence, chal- Mach. Co., U.S.Pa.1989, 109 lenge of admission of evidence S.Ct. 1981. 490 U.S. 504. 104 turpi on appeal, see Ohler v. U.S., L.Ed.2d 557. 2000, 120 S.Ct. 1851. Prior felony convictions, impeachment :h the of civil witnesses, balancing ·quc11t rdlcs« Notes of Decisions In general Prejudice 21 Completion of probation 22 Presumptions and burden of proof 32 ect ol Controlled substance convictions, time limit 7 Probative value 15 Conviction 11 Purpose of rule 2 Correcting false impression 25 Relevance 16 Defendant as witness 28 Review 33 OLad Deferred adjudication J 4 Sentencing, time limit 9 Cock. Discretion of court 31 Similaritv 17 nitted DWI 29 Subsequ~nt convictions, time limit 6 Factors to balance 12 Time limit 3-9 Indictments 13 In general 3 Intoxication 30 Controlled substance convictions 7 of n Juvenile adjudications 20 Moral turpitude 4 Moral turpitude. generally 10 Sentencing 9 Moral turpitude, time limit 4 Subsequent convictions 6 timelv Necessitv 18 Waiver 8 Notice '23 Youthfulness of witness when convicted 5 :s, thl· Open door 26 Unadjudicated offenses 19 '.ice ol Pen packet 27 Variance 24 461