Michael R. McElroy v. Marilyn O. Stephens

• Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
• Decided: March 11, 2025
• Docket: 2023-0249-Appeal. and 2023-0256-Appeal.
• Status: Published

Opinion

Supreme Court

No. 2023-249-Appeal. No. 2023-256-Appeal. (WC 14-575)

Michael R. McElroy et al. :

v. :

Marilyn O. Stephens et al. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. Do the plaintiffs Michael R. and Christine

O. McElroy (plaintiffs or McElroys) maintain an express or implied easement upon

Seaweed Beach in Narragansett, Rhode Island, and if so, do the plaintiffs also

possess an express or implied easement to traverse over certain private properties

to reach Seaweed Beach? The private properties—three adjoining lots that abut

Seaweed Beach—are individually owned by Marilyn O. Stephens, Paul G. and

Nancy L. Anthony (collectively, defendants), and Vivian H. Lacroix.1

1 Although Vivian H. Lacroix was a defendant in the Superior Court, she did not file notices of appeal and therefore is not a party to these consolidated appeals. Our reference herein to defendants excludes Lacroix unless otherwise stated. Marilyn O. Stephens and her husband, Edward Stephens, III, purchased the Stephens property in 2010, and both were named as defendants in the Superior Court. Unfortunately, Edward Stephens, III passed away after this case was remanded to the Superior -1- This matter came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing

that the parties show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be

summarily decided. After examining the memoranda and arguments presented by

the parties, we conclude that cause has not been shown and proceed to decide the

appeal at this time. We affirm.

Factual Background

The present-day controversy can be traced to 1925, when Carrie M. Davis

acquired title to an existing lot (Lot 1) in fee simple from Susan E. Knowles, Sarah

B. Champlin, and Hattie S. Tucker. Lot 1 abutted Seaweed Beach to the south and

maintained fifty feet of frontage on Stanton Avenue to the north. Additionally,

approximately one year later, in 1926, Davis acquired title in fee simple to a second

lot (Lot 2) from Knowles, Champlin, and Tucker. Lot 2 bordered Lot 1 and retained

100 feet of frontage on Stanton Avenue to the north, but did not abut Seaweed Beach.

Together, Lots 1 and 2 became known as the Davis Heritage.

In 1929, Knowles, Champlin, Tucker, and John R. Champlin granted Davis

an easement upon Seaweed Beach, which they owned (the 1929 easement). The

1929 easement benefited the Davis Heritage as the dominant estate and burdened the

Court. Pursuant to Rule 25(a)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he death shall be suggested on the record and the action shall proceed in favor of or against the surviving parties.” Super. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(2). As such, we have removed Edward Stephens, III from the caption of this case. -2- Knowles-Champlin-Champlin-Tucker Seaweed Beach property as the servient

estate. The 1929 easement was recorded in the Narragansett land evidence records

(in Book 10, page 10) and granted Davis and her successors in the Davis Heritage,

the

“benefit and advantage, from time to time, and at all times, forever here-after, at her and their respective will and pleasure, and for all purposes connected with the lawful use of Grantee’s said lands, to pass and repass with horses, carts, wagons, and other carriages and vehicles, laden and unladen, and on foot, and also to drive cattle and other beasts, through and [over] the entire length and width of [Seaweed Beach].”

The 1929 easement also provided that “said right of way is hereby granted and the

premises to which said right is appurtenant.”

As time marched on, the property was divided. In 1944, the subdivision of

the Davis Heritage began when Davis (and her daughter, Martha) conveyed a portion

of the property to Walter H. Potter and Grace K. Potter, viz., the Stephens property.2

Many years later, this subdivision would have important practical and legal

consequences as presented through this litigation; namely, the Stephens property

continued to abut Seaweed Beach to the south but directly north an undivided portion

2 All subdivided properties are referenced according to the property owners at the time litigation commenced. Recognizing that “a picture is worth a thousand words,” a map depicting the relevant configuration of the Davis Heritage is attached to this opinion. See McElroy v. Stephens, 226 A.3d 1288, 1289 n.1 (R.I. 2020) (quoting Kilmartin v. Barbuto, 158 A.3d 735, 737 n.5 (R.I. 2017)). -3- of the Davis Heritage remained (eventually, subdivided to become the McElroy

property), which did not abut Seaweed Beach. The relevant quitclaim deed to the

Potters contained the following:

“Conveyance of the premises herein first described [the Potter Lot], and hereby conveyed, is made subject to all covenants and agreements, on the part of said Carrie M. Davis, her heirs and assigns, to be kept and performed, and all conditions and provisos, contained in said first mentioned deed. And the grant herein contained with respect to the premises herein last described is made subject to all covenants and agreements, on the part of said Carrie M. Davis, her heirs and assigns, to be kept and performed, and all conditions and provisos, contained in said last mentioned deed.”

This language confirmed the existence of the 1929 easement benefiting the Stephens

property.

In 1958, the property was conveyed to Conrad S. and Gail E. Darelius, by

warranty deed; and in 1965, Walter H. Potter executed a second warranty deed, once

again conveying the same property to the Dareliuses. The 1965 deed expressly

stated that the conveyance was “subject to all covenants and agreements, on the part

of said Carrie M. Davis, her heirs and assigns, to be kept and performed * * *.” The

Dareliuses subsequently transferred the property to the Gail E. Darelius Revocable

Trust in 2001. In 2010, the Trust conveyed the property to Edward and Marilyn O.

Stephens.

-4- In 1960, another portion of the Davis Heritage was subdivided—the McElroy

property—when Davis conveyed the parcel by warranty deed to Everett and Clara

Babcock (the 1960 warranty deed). The McElroy property abuts the Stephens

property on its southern border (at that time owned by the Dareliuses) and Stanton

Avenue on its northern border but did not abut Seaweed Beach. The 1960 warranty

deed contained the proviso “[s]ubject to restrictions of record” and was recorded in

Book 47, page 355 of the Narragansett land evidence records. In 1983, Letitia G.

Babcock conveyed the property to the Dareliuses by warranty deed (the 1983

warranty deed), which resulted in a merger by deed in which the Dareliuses owned

two contiguous parcels from the Davis Heritage, which at the time of trial were the

Stephens property and the McElroy property. The 1983 warranty deed contained

the following proviso: “Subject to restrictions, easements and right of way of

record.”

In 1986, the Dareliuses entered into a purchase and sales agreement with

plaintiffs for the McElroy property (the 1986 purchase and sales agreement). The

1986 purchase and sales agreement conveyed the parcel to the McElroys, “[t]ogether

with the rights, set forth in the deeds, to cross the lands of Mr. and Mrs. Darelius to

have access to the water.” The property was conveyed by warranty deed (the 1986

warranty deed), which did not contain the above-referenced language from the 1986

purchase and sales agreement, but instead conveyed the property “[t]ogether with

-5- and subject to all easements, rights of way and restrictions of record. (See Book 8,

page 528, Book 8, page 594, Book 10, page 10, Book 15, page 666 and Book 47,

page 355.).” (Emphases added.)

Two additional subdivisions of the Davis Heritage require brief discussion.

In 1944, Davis (and her daughter Martha) conveyed to Lawrence A. Wells and Irene

Wells a portion of the Davis Heritage (the Lacroix property). This parcel abutted

Seaweed Beach on its southern border and, after a series of owners, was conveyed

to Vivian H. Lacroix. The final relevant Davis Heritage parcel (the Anthony

property) was conveyed in 1992 by Martha Taylor (née Davis) and others to Gail E.

Darelius. In 2000, Darelius conveyed the property to the Anthonys. The Anthony

property borders the Stephens property to the west and the Lacroix property to the

east and abuts Seaweed Beach to the south.

The Prior Proceeding

On October 7, 2014, the McElroys filed this action in the Superior Court,

naming as defendants Edward and Marilyn O. Stephens. According to plaintiffs,

this action was precipitated by the Stephenses blocking access to their own

driveway, which provided the McElroys access to Seaweed Beach. On October 19,

2015, the McElroys filed an amended complaint, naming as defendants the

Stephenses, the Anthonys, and Vivian H. Lacroix. In relevant part, the McElroys

claimed an easement to access Seaweed Beach over the Stephens property, the

-6- Anthony property, and/or the Lacroix property. The plaintiffs sought (1) to quiet

title to the easement granting them access to Seaweed Beach; (2) a declaration that

they are the lawful owners and users of an easement over the Stephens property, the

Anthony property, and/or the Lacroix property; and (3) injunctive relief prohibiting

the Stephenses from obstructing, hindering, or preventing their use of the easement.

In due course, the Stephenses, the Anthonys, and Lacroix filed counterclaims,

seeking (1) to quiet title to their respective properties; (2) a declaration that each is

the true and lawful owner of their respective properties; and (3) injunctive relief

prohibiting plaintiffs from entering their respective properties.

The McElroys filed a motion for summary judgment and defendants,

including Lacroix, responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment. Although

plaintiffs based their claim of access to Seaweed Beach on three distinct theories—

easement appurtenant, easement by implication, and easement by necessity—the

hearing justice determined that only the easement appurtenant theory was

appropriate for summary judgment and the easement by implication and easement

by necessity theories required the development of a factual record. After hearing

arguments, the hearing justice concluded that, based upon the language in the 1929

easement, it was undisputed “that an easement was granted to that property” and that

the easement “survived all of the subsequent transfers of property.” McElroy v.

Stephens, 226 A.3d 1288, 1291 (R.I. 2020). The hearing justice also noted the

-7- absence of evidence indicating “any different intentions contained in any deeds that

would undercut plaintiffs’ claim that an easement ran through their property, to all

the defendants’ properties.” Id. (brackets omitted). Accordingly, the hearing justice

granted the McElroys’ motion for summary judgment and denied the cross-motion

for summary judgment. Id.

On appeal, we determined that “genuine issues of material fact remain,” and

we vacated the judgment. See McElroy, 226 A.3d at 1291-92. In so doing, we

explained:

“It is clear to us that, prior to dividing the property from the original larger parcels, the Davis Heritage enjoyed an easement appurtenant over Seaweed Beach. Although the hearing justice correctly stated that ‘an easement appurtenant will pass by deed of the dominant tenement even if the easement is not specifically mentioned within the deed’ and that ‘the owner of a dominant estate may extinguish an easement appurtenant only by specifically excluding it from the conveyance of the dominant tenement,’ he prematurely determined that plaintiffs enjoyed an easement to access Seaweed Beach. It is our opinion that the hearing justice should have first determined whether or not an implied easement or easement by necessity exists for plaintiffs to cross over defendants’ properties—in view of the fact that the McElroy property no longer directly abuts Seaweed Beach—and, if so, whether the easement was created by the original grant in 1929 or the 1986 deed.” Id. (brackets omitted).

Upon remand, a second justice of the Superior Court conducted a bench trial

and issued a well-reasoned and comprehensive forty-three-page written decision.

-8- The trial justice concluded that “the clear and unambiguous language of the 1929

easement deed granted Davis an express easement upon Seaweed Beach” and that

“[t]he express easement appurtenant benefitted the Davis Heritage—Lots 1 and 2—

as the dominant estate * * *.” The trial justice further found that after the 1929

easement, “subsequent conveyances included that easement because express

easements pass by deed of the dominant tenement ‘unless a different intention shall

clearly appear in the deed.’” (Brackets omitted) (quoting G.L. 1956 § 34-11-28).

Accordingly, the trial justice declared that the 1986 warranty deed, as well as all

predecessor deeds, incorporated the 1929 express easement by reference, and that

“the 1929 express easement upon Seaweed Beach survived the subdivision of the

Davis Heritage, because it was not specifically excluded from the deeds.” (Emphasis

added.)

The trial justice also examined whether plaintiffs possessed an implied

easement or an easement by necessity over defendants’ properties, including the

Lacroix property. In so doing, the trial justice concluded that the McElroys enjoyed

an implied easement over the Stephens property because, inter alia, the express

easement appurtenant upon Seaweed Beach “would be meaningless unless there is

some secondary easement or legal permission for the McElroys to reach Seaweed

Beach from an access point on their property.” Accordingly, the trial justice

determined that the McElroys were entitled to “judgment quieting title to the

-9- easement in and over the Stephens [p]roperty,” “a declaratory judgment establishing

that they are the ‘true, lawful and proper owners and users of the easement in and

over the Stephenses’ [p]roperty,’” and “injunctive relief enjoining [d]efendants from

interfering with [p]laintiffs’ use of the easement to cross the Stephens [p]roperty.”

(Brackets omitted.) For the same reasons, the trial justice concluded that the

Stephenses were not entitled to relief on their counterclaim.

With respect to the remaining counterclaims, the trial justice concluded that

the McElroys did not possess an implied easement over the Anthony property or the

Lacroix property. Thus, the trial justice declared that “Lacroix and the Anthonys are

entitled to a judgment quieting title to any easements to cross over the Anthony or

Lacroix properties,” that “Lacroix and the Anthonys are entitled to declaratory

judgment stating that [p]laintiffs do not possess any easements over the Lacroix or

Anthony properties,” and that “Lacroix and the Anthonys are entitled to injunctive

relief enjoining [p]laintiffs from interfering with * * * Lacroix’s and the Anthonys’

quiet enjoyment of their respective properties.” The trial justice also determined that

the McElroys did not possess an easement by necessity over any of defendants’

properties, including the Lacroix property.3 On January 31, 2023, judgment entered.

3 Because the McElroys have not cross-appealed this determination, we need not examine it. - 10 - In relevant part, the judgment provided that the McElroys possess “a

permanent easement appurtenant by express grant in and to Seaweed Beach, so

called, as set forth in Book 10 at Page 10 of the land evidence records of the Town

of Narragansett, including the right to use the road (currently a dirt road) located to

the east of [p]laintiffs’ property * * * and running south from said Stanton Avenue

(the ‘Dirt Road’) and over the Dirt Road running to and over the driveway and yard

on the property of [d]efendant, Marilyn O. Stephens * * *.”4 (Emphasis added.) The

judgment further declared that the McElroys possess “a permanent easement

appurtenant by implication to access Seaweed Beach, so called, by use of the Dirt

Road and over the Stephens’ Driveway and yard to said permanent easement

appurtenant in and to Seaweed Beach.” (Emphasis added.)

While judgment entered in favor of the McElroys and against the Stephenses,

on the remaining counterclaims judgment entered for the Anthonys and Lacroix,

declaring that “[e]xcept as otherwise set forth,” the McElroys “do not possess any

4 The trial testimony demonstrates that all parties commonly used the Dirt Road. For instance, Mr. McElroy testified that to reach the Stephens property (on his way to Seaweed Beach) he traversed the Dirt Road. Mr. McElroy explained that he was not aware that the roadway was owned by the Anthonys and “thought it was a roadway that was used by everybody in this little private area, by the Lacroixs, by the Anthonys, [and] by the Stephens[es] * * *.” Indeed, Ms. Lacroix’s husband, Matthew Lacroix, and Ms. Stephens testified that, because their properties did not border Stanton Avenue, they used the Anthonys’ roadway (which bordered Stanton Avenue) as a right-of-way to access their respective properties.

- 11 - easement in or across their respective properties and title thereto, is hereby quieted

in said [d]efendants.” (Emphasis added.) On February 8, 2023, the Stephenses and

the Anthonys filed a timely appeal.

The following day, on February 9, 2023, the Stephenses and the Anthonys

filed a motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59 of the Superior Court

Rules of Civil Procedure. Approximately two months later, the Stephenses and the

Anthonys filed a memorandum in support of the motion to amend the judgment,

arguing that the judgment was inconsistent with the trial justice’s written decision.

For instance, defendants averred that although the trial justice’s decision stated that

the McElroys did not possess an easement over the Anthony property, judgment

entered declaring that the McElroys had “a permanent easement * * * including the

right to use the [D]irt [R]oad running to the property of [d]efendant Marilyn O.

Stephens.” The Stephenses and the Anthonys added that the “[D]irt [R]oad is the

exclusive property of [the Anthonys].” After hearing oral argument, on May 19,

2023, the trial justice denied the motion to amend judgment. The defendants filed a

premature notice of appeal on June 2, 2023, and an order denying the motion to

- 12 - amend judgment entered on July 19, 2023.5 This Court consolidated the appeals on

October 13, 2023.

Standard of Review

“It is well established that the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without

a jury are accorded great weight and will not be disturbed unless the record shows

that the findings clearly are wrong or the trial justice overlooked or misconceived

material evidence.” Wellington Condominium Association v. Wellington Cove

Condominium Association, 68 A.3d 594, 599 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Hernandez v. JS

Pallet Co., 41 A.3d 978, 982 (R.I. 2012)); see also Hilley v. Lawrence, 972 A.2d

643, 648 (R.I. 2009) (“This Court will reverse the decision of a trial justice to grant

or deny a permanent injunction only ‘when it can be shown that the trial justice

misapplied the law, misconceived or overlooked material evidence or made factual

findings that were clearly wrong.’”) (quoting Holden v. Salvadore, 964 A.2d 508,

512-13 (R.I. 2009)). “If, as we review the record, it becomes clear to us that the

record indicates that competent evidence supports the trial justice’s findings, we

shall not substitute our view of the evidence for that of the trial justice even though

a contrary conclusion could have been reached.” Wellington Condominium

5 “It is well settled that this Court treats a premature appeal as timely filed.” McCormick v. Narragansett Improvement Company, Inc., 314 A.3d 963, 965 n.4 (R.I. 2024).

- 13 - Association, 68 A.3d at 599 (brackets omitted) (quoting Hernandez, 41 A.3d at 982).

We review a trial justice’s rulings on questions of law de novo. See Hilley, 972 A.2d

at 649.

“In litigation over asserted rights to an easement, the party claiming the

easement has a heightened burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence because

of the policy considerations against placing undue burdens upon property.”

Wellington Condominium Association, 68 A.3d at 599. “Indeed, ‘although a plaintiff

in a civil action normally must meet his burden by only a preponderance of the

evidence, the plaintiff must overcome a higher clear and convincing standard to

prove an easement.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Ondis v. City of Woonsocket ex

rel. Treasurer Touzin, 934 A.2d 799, 803 (R.I. 2007)).

Finally, a trial justice’s decision “on a Rule 59(e) motion following a bench

trial will be overturned only if he or she committed a ‘manifest error of law in the

judgment’—meaning an error that is ‘apparent, blatant, conspicuous, clearly evident,

and easily discernible from a reading of the judgment document itself.’”

Greensleeves, Inc. v. Smiley, 68 A.3d 425, 434 (R.I. 2013) (quoting American

Federation of Teachers Local 2012 v. Rhode Island Board of Regents for Education,

477 A.2d 104, 105, 106 (R.I. 1984)).

- 14 - Discussion

On appeal, defendants contend that the trial justice erred in four instances: (1)

finding that an express easement existed over their properties, (2) concluding that an

implied easement existed over their properties, (3) admitting into evidence the 1986

purchase and sales agreement, and (4) denying the motion to amend the judgment.

We disagree.

Express Easement

The defendants attack the trial justice’s conclusion that the McElroys possess

an express easement over their properties. Specifically, the Stephenses and the

Anthonys allege that “[t]here is no specific grant of an easement contained in the

Dareliuses[’] deed to the [p]laintiffs in the 1986 recorded deed” and that the 1986

warranty deed “did not contain the same specific language as the 1986 purchase and

sale agreement regarding any easement over the [Stephens] property.” They are

incorrect.

We have made clear that, “when construing an instrument that purportedly

creates an easement, it is this Court’s duty to effectuate the intent of the parties.”

Wellington Condominium Association, 68 A.3d at 600 (brackets and deletion

omitted) (quoting Hilley, 972 A.2d at 649). Thus, “when the written terms of an

agreement are clear and unambiguous, they can be interpreted and applied to the

undisputed facts as a matter of law.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Hilley, 972 A.2d

- 15 - at 649). “Additionally, where terms of an easement are clear and unambiguous,

neither oral testimony nor extrinsic evidence will be received to explain the nature

or extent of the rights acquired.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Hilley, 972 A.2d at

649).

In contrast to defendants’ appellate argument, the trial justice concluded that

the 1986 warranty deed incorporated the 1929 express easement. We agree with the

trial justice and conclude that the 1986 warranty deed clearly and unambiguously

incorporated the 1929 express easement upon Seaweed Beach. Specifically, the

1986 warranty deed conveyed the McElroy property, “[t]ogether with and subject to

all easements, rights of way and restrictions of record. (See Book 8, page 528, Book

8, page 594, Book 10, page 10, Book 15, page 666 and Book 47, page 355.).”

(Emphasis added.) It is undisputed that the citation to Book 10, page 10 references

the 1929 easement.

Moreover, the 1986 warranty deed also incorporated Book 47, page 355,

which was the 1960 warranty deed (from Davis to the predecessors in title, the

Babcocks). This warranty deed provided that the conveyance was “[s]ubject to

restrictions of record,” a clear and deliberate reference to the 1929 easement. It is

well established that “[i]n any conveyance of real estate all rights, privileges, and

appurtenances belonging or appertaining to the granted estate shall be included in

the conveyance, unless a different intention shall clearly appear in the deed, and it

- 16 - shall be unnecessary to enumerate or mention them either generally or specifically.”

Section 34-11-28. Accordingly, the McElroys possess an express easement upon

Seaweed Beach, and we reject defendants’ argument that “[t]here is no specific grant

of an easement contained in the Dareliuses[’] deed to the [p]laintiffs in the 1986

recorded deed.”

Implied Easement

Having determined that the 1986 warranty deed expressly incorporated the

1929 easement appurtenant upon Seaweed Beach, the trial justice declared “that

permission to cross the Stephens [p]roperty was a necessary incident to the

[McElroys’] enjoyment of the easement upon Seaweed Beach, which the Dareliuses

had the legal right to grant to the McElroys, and which is valid regardless of whether

it was expressly granted in the deed.” The defendants suggest that the McElroys

failed to present clear and convincing evidence demonstrating an implied easement

over their properties. Most notably, defendants claim that, when the McElroys

purchased the parcel in 1986, the property was “separated” and the McElroys “were

not part of any unity of ownership.” Without a unity of ownership, defendants assert,

there can be no implied easement. The defendants also claim that photographs

admitted into evidence failed to demonstrate an “apparent path or marker that

indicates any reasonable way to traverse [the Stephens] yard” and that “[t]he notion

- 17 - [of] continuous use was contested at trial * * *.” These arguments are lacking in

merit.

The law surrounding implied easements dictates that, “when land is divided,

the law will imply a grant of ‘all those continuous and apparent easements which

have in fact been used by the owner during the unity, though they have no legal

existence as easements.’” Hilley, 972 A.2d at 650 (quoting Catalano v. Woodward,

617 A.2d 1363, 1367 (R.I. 1992)); see also § 34-11-28. “An implied easement is

predicated upon the theory that when a person conveys property, he or she includes

or intends to include in the conveyance whatever is necessary for the use and the

enjoyment of the land retained.” Hilley, 972 A.2d at 650 (quoting Bovi v. Murray,

601 A.2d 960, 962 (R.I. 1992)). Indeed, “[i]f there is no unity of ownership, there

can be no implied easement.” Bovi, 601 A.2d at 962. “[T]he standard for an

easement by grant requires that the party claiming an easement show by clear and

convincing evidence that the claimed easement was (1) apparent, (2) permanent, and

(3) reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the claimant’s parcel prior to

severance.” Wellington Condominium Association, 68 A.3d at 603. “Because unity

of possession destroys existing easements, no easement can be created over a section

of land that is unified in the possession of one owner.” Catalano, 617 A.2d at 1367.

Here, the Dareliuses purchased the Stephens property in 1958 and the

McElroy property in 1983, unifying possession of these two contiguous Davis

- 18 - Heritage parcels in one owner and extinguishing any existing easements in this

unified property. See Catalano, 617 A.2d at 1367. Notwithstanding the dissolution

of any existing easements in this unified property, the Dareliuses conveyed the

McElroy property to plaintiffs through the 1986 warranty deed and, as discussed

herein, expressly incorporated the restrictions in Book 10, page 10, and in Book 47,

page 355. As explained by the trial justice, “[t]he grant of this [1929] easement

would be meaningless unless there is some secondary easement or legal permission

for the McElroys to reach Seaweed Beach from an access point on their property.”6

Indeed, the evidence is uncontroverted that at the time the Dareliuses owned

the Stephens and McElroy properties in 1983, the Dareliuses intended to convey to

the McElroys not only an easement upon Seaweed Beach but also an easement to

access Seaweed Beach. For instance, the 1986 warranty deed (from the Dareliuses

to the McElroys) incorporated the 1929 express easement upon Seaweed Beach, as

well as the 1960 warranty deed provision that the conveyance was “[s]ubject to

restrictions of record.” The inclusion of the 1929 express easement granting the

McElroys the use of Seaweed Beach, as well as the incorporation of the restriction

6 Additionally, because the 1929 express easement derived from the Knowles-Champlin-Champlin-Tucker Seaweed Beach property (as the servient estate) that separate property and easement were not subject to a merger by deed when the Stephens and McElroy properties unified in 1983. As such, the 1929 express easement continued to benefit the McElroy parcel (as the dominant estate) “at all times, forever here-after * * *.” - 19 - found in the 1960 warranty deed, would be superfluous if the Dareliuses did not

intend to convey to the McElroys an easement to reach Seaweed Beach. See Hilley,

972 A.2d at 650 (“An implied easement is predicated upon the theory that when a

person conveys property, he or she includes or intends to include in the conveyance

whatever is necessary for the use and the enjoyment of the land retained.”) (quoting

Bovi, 601 A.2d at 962); § 34-11-28. In addition, the trial justice noted Mr. McElroy’s

testimony that he conditioned purchase of the McElroy property on access to

Seaweed Beach and that the Dareliuses designated their driveway as the

right-of-way for the McElroys to reach Seaweed Beach.7

While defendants submit that some conflicting evidence was submitted

concerning the satisfaction of the implied easement requirements, these

discrepancies focused on events occurring after severance in 1986. Instead, “[t]he

proper inquiry for the existence of an easement by implication focuses on the facts

and circumstances at the time of severance.” Martin v. Wilson, 246 A.3d 916, 925

(R.I. 2021) (deletion omitted) (quoting Vaillancourt v. Motta, 986 A.2d 985, 988

(R.I. 2009)). In any event, the trial justice, as factfinder, resolved these discrepancies

in favor of the McElroys. The trial justice further determined that “[t]he credible

7 The language in the 1986 purchase and sales agreement further supports this intention, specifically, that the Dareliuses conveyed the property to the McElroys, “[t]ogether with the rights, set forth in the deeds, to cross the lands of Mr. and Mrs. Darelius to have access to the water.” (Emphasis added.) - 20 - evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the Dareliuses believed that access to

Seaweed Beach via the Stephens [p]roperty was reasonably necessary to the

convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the McElroy [p]roperty.”

On appeal, the trial justice’s factual findings “are accorded great weight and

will not be disturbed unless the record shows that the findings clearly are wrong or

the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence.” Wellington

Condominium Association, 68 A.3d at 599 (quoting Hernandez, 41 A.3d at 982).

The defendants failed to satisfy this heavy burden, and accordingly, we perceive no

error in the trial justice’s determination that the McElroys established by clear and

convincing evidence an implied easement to reach Seaweed Beach.

Parol Evidence Rule

The defendants contend that the trial justice’s admission into evidence of the

1986 purchase and sales agreement violated the parol evidence rule and was error.

“The parol evidence rule bars the admission of any previous or contemporaneous

oral or written statements that attempt to modify an integrated written agreement.”

Martin, 246 A.3d at 924 (brackets omitted) (quoting Fleet National Bank v. 175 Post

Road, LLC, 851 A.2d 267, 276 (R.I. 2004)). This rule is “grounded in the notion

‘that a complete written agreement merges and integrates all the pertinent

negotiations made prior to or at the time of execution of the contract.’” Id. (quoting

Management Capital, L.L.C. v. F.A.F., Inc., 209 A.3d 1162, 1174 (R.I. 2019)).

- 21 - “Once integrated, other expressions, oral or written, that occurred prior to or

concurrent with the integrated agreement are not viable terms of the agreement.” Id.

(quoting Management Capital, L.L.C., 209 A.3d at 1174).

As a threshold matter, we observe that in assessing whether the McElroys

maintained an express easement to use Seaweed Beach, the trial justice determined

that “[i]t is clear that the Dareliuses intended their actions to have the effect of

granting a valid easement to [p]laintiffs because the deed specifically referenced the

1929 Champlin easement grant.” (Emphasis added.) Having carefully reviewed the

trial justice’s decision, we are therefore satisfied that the express easement analysis

did not unduly rely upon the 1986 purchase and sales agreement.

With respect to the trial justice’s implied easement analysis, this Court has

previously recognized that “[s]uch an inquiry requires the consideration of extrinsic

evidence.” Martin, 246 A.3d at 925. “The proper inquiry for the existence of an

easement by implication focuses on the facts and circumstances at the time of

severance.” Id. (deletion omitted) (quoting Vaillancourt, 986 A.2d at 988). Indeed,

in our prior decision in this case, we instructed that upon remand, “the facts and

circumstances at the time of the subdivision of the Davis Heritage, as well as at the

time of the 1986 deed to the McElroy property, must be considered.” See McElroy,

226 A.3d at 1292 (emphasis added).

- 22 - Because the determination of an implied easement allows the consideration

of extrinsic evidence, we conclude that the trial justice did not err when she

considered the 1986 purchase and sales agreement. See Martin, 246 A.3d at 925. In

so doing, we recognize that the pertinent language of the 1986 purchase and sales

agreement—referencing “the rights, set forth in the deeds, to cross the lands of Mr.

and Mrs. Darelius to have access to the water”—is consistent with the 1986 warranty

deed, which incorporated the 1929 easement and the 1960 warranty deed.

Accordingly, admission of the 1986 purchase and sales agreement to examine

whether the McElroys possessed an implied easement did not violate the parol

evidence rule. See also Fram Corporation v. Davis, 121 R.I. 583, 589, 401 A.2d

1269, 1273 (1979) (“[E]vidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or

agreements is inadmissible to alter, vary, or contradict the terms of an integrated

written agreement.”) (emphasis added).

Motion to Amend Judgment

The defendants posit that the judgment entered in this case is “inconsistent

with the evidence offered at trial and the [trial justice’s] own [d]ecision.” They

explain that the trial justice “ordered [an] easement over the [D]irt [R]oad, and the

entrance gate, [which] are the property of the [Anthonys] who have been removed

from the case,” and that the Stephenses were ordered to “remove all obstructions”

even though “[b]ased on [i]nformation and belief, the Stephens[es] do not have the

- 23 - authority to remove any shoreline foliage without [Coastal Resources Management

Council] approval.”8 Stated differently, defendants request that this Court review

the trial justice’s written decision (and the trial evidence) for consistency with the

judgment. We decline to do so.

This Court has recognized that “a proper Rule 59(e) motion is directed at

correcting ‘a manifest error of law in the judgment—meaning an error that is

apparent, blatant, conspicuous, clearly evident, and easily discernible from a reading

of the judgment document itself.’” Paroskie v. Rhault, 241 A.3d 698, 701 (R.I. 2020)

(quoting Greensleeves, Inc., 68 A.3d at 434). This Court has stated that “if the error

is not obvious unless one reads the underlying decision, the error is not a manifest

error in our opinion.” Id. (quoting Bogosian v. Bederman, 823 A.2d 1117, 1119 (R.I.

2003)). Mindful of our limited “manifest error of law” standard of review, as well

as the necessity to review the underlying decision and/or evidence to assess

defendants’ argument, we are of the opinion that the trial justice did not err when

she denied the Rule 59(e) motion.

8 The defendants’ statement that the Anthonys “have been removed from the case” is incorrect. While judgment entered in favor of the Anthonys on their counterclaim, “[e]xcept as otherwise set forth,” the Anthonys filed notices of appeal and remain a party on appeal. - 24 - Conclusion

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment. The papers in this case are

remanded to the Superior Court.

Appendix A

te ASR Os

Stanton Avenue

The McElroy Property

The Stephens Property %

TOWW OF NARRAGANSETT TAX ASSESSORS PLAT N. SEALE -500. The Anthony Property

Seaweed The Lacroix Beach Property

- 25 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Michael R. McElroy et al. v. Marilyn O. Stephens et Title of Case al. No. 2023-249-Appeal. Case Number No. 2023-256-Appeal. (WC 14-575)

Date Opinion Filed March 11, 2025

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Source of Appeal Washington County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter

For Plaintiffs:

Justin T. Shay, Esq. Attorney(s) on Appeal For Defendants:

Matthew S. Dawson, Esq.