Michael Peterson v. Time Insurance Company

Ninth Circuit

Michael Peterson v. Time Insurance Company

562 F. App'x 566

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 13, 2014

Docket12-35505

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 562 F. App'x 566 (Michael Peterson v. Time Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Michael Peterson v. Time Insurance Company, 562 F. App'x 566 (9th Cir. 2014).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

1. The district court correctly held that Peterson’s claims against Aetna Life Insurance Company were preempted by ERISA. See Qualls v. Blue Cross of Cal., Inc., 22 F.3d 839, 843 n. 4 (9th Cir.1994).

2. With respect to Time Insurance Company, Assurant Health and John Alden Life Insurance Company (collectively, “Assurant”), the district court correctly held that Peterson’s claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress were barred by Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-242(3). See Brewington v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 297 Mont. 243, 992 P.2d 237, 239-41 (1999).

3. The district court correctly held that Peterson failed to plead his claims for constructive fraud/breach of fiduciary duty with the particularity required by Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b). Peterson failed to allege any specific false statements made by Assurant. See Town of Geraldine v. Montana Mun. Ins. Auth., 347 Mont. 267, 198 P.3d 796, 801 (2008) (requiring plaintiff to plead, inter alia, false representations); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir.2003) (“The plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We deny Peterson’s request for leave to amend because he has failed to explain what specific false statements he would allege by way of amendment.

4. The district court correctly held that Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”) does not create a private right of action for violations of subsections (2), *567 (3), (7) or (14) of Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-201. See Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-242(1).

5. The district court correctly held that Assurant satisfied its initial burden of showing that it complied with the insurance contract and the actionable subsections of UTPA, and that Peterson failed to offer evidence of noncompliance. See Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

6. Because the district court’s substantive holdings were all correct, we do not address Peterson’s argument that the magistrate judge should have been re-cused. We by no means imply that the magistrate judge showed any actual or apparent bias against Peterson or in favor of insurance companies.

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM ***

1. The district court correctly held that Peterson’s claims against Aetna Life Insurance Company were preempted by ERISA. See Qualls v. Blue Cross of Cal., Inc., 22 F.3d 839, 843 n. 4 (9th Cir.1994).

2. With respect to Time Insurance Company, Assurant Health and John Alden Life Insurance Company (collectively, “Assurant”), the district court correctly held that Peterson’s claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress were barred by Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-242(3). See Brewington v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 297 Mont. 243, 992 P.2d 237, 239-41 (1999).

3. The district court correctly held that Peterson failed to plead his claims for constructive fraud/breach of fiduciary duty with the particularity required by Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b). Peterson failed to allege any specific false statements made by Assurant. See Town of Geraldine v. Montana Mun. Ins. Auth., 347 Mont. 267, 198 P.3d 796, 801 (2008) (requiring plaintiff to plead, inter alia, false representations); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir.2003) (“The plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We deny Peterson’s request for leave to amend because he has failed to explain what specific false statements he would allege by way of amendment.

4. The district court correctly held that Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”) does not create a private right of action for violations of subsections (2), *567 (3), (7) or (14) of Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-201. See Mont.Code Ann. § 33-18-242(1).

5. The district court correctly held that Assurant satisfied its initial burden of showing that it complied with the insurance contract and the actionable subsections of UTPA, and that Peterson failed to offer evidence of noncompliance. See Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

6. Because the district court’s substantive holdings were all correct, we do not address Peterson’s argument that the magistrate judge should have been re-cused. We by no means imply that the magistrate judge showed any actual or apparent bias against Peterson or in favor of insurance companies.

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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562 F. App'x 566, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michael-peterson-v-time-insurance-company-ca9-2014.

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