Michael Perry v. Np Parc Chateaux, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 28, 2024
• Docket: 23-55211
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 28 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL MOSHE PERRY, No. 23-55211

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-05378-FLA-MAA

v. MEMORANDUM* NP PARC CHATEAUX, LLC, and Incorporated; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 26, 2024**

Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Michael Moshe Perry appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his action alleging claims related to his eviction. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Perry’s action for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Perry’s claims are a “de

facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment or are “inextricably intertwined” with

that judgment. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004)

(“[The] Rooker-Feldman [doctrine] prohibits a federal district court from

exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a

state court judgment.”); Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163 (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal

under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a

legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the

judgment of that court.”); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir.

2012) (explaining that Rooker-Feldman bars “inextricably intertwined” claims

where federal adjudication “would impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the

same issues” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declaring Perry a vexatious

litigant and entering a pre-filing review order against him because all of the

requirements were met. See Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles, 761

F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and requirements

2 23-55211 for pre-filing orders).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Perry’s motion to

disqualify the district court judge because Perry failed to show extrajudicial bias or

prejudice. See Thomassen v. United States, 835 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1987)

(setting forth standard of review and requirements to prevail on a disqualification

motion).

The district court properly denied as moot Perry’s motion to supplement the

complaint, as well as the motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise

respond to the complaint filed by NP Parc Chateaux, LLC, NP Parc Chateaux, Inc.,

Kevin Derosa, Christina Romero, and Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC, because

the action had already been dismissed. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v.

Corey, 913 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 2019) (standard of review).

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, or matters

not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett

v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Perry’s motion to file an oversized reply brief (Docket Entry No. 38) is

granted. The Clerk will file Perry’s reply brief received at Docket Entry No. 40.

3 23-55211 All other pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

4 23-55211