Michael P. ONeill v. Martinez, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 MICHAEL P. ONEILL, Case No. 1:23-cv-01179-FRS (BAM) (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO 13 v. ACTION 14 MARTINEZ, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR 15 Defendants. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE TO OBEY COURT ORDER, AND FAILURE 17 (ECF No. 10) 18 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 19 20 I. Background 21 Plaintiff Michael P. Oneill (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil 22 rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 23 On January 27, 2026, the Court screened the complaint and found that it failed to state a 24 cognizable claim for relief. (ECF No. 10.) The Court issued an order granting Plaintiff leave to 25 file a first amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal within thirty (30) days. (Id.) 26 The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that the failure to comply with the Court’s order would 27 result in a recommendation for dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court 28 order and for failure to state a claim. (Id.) Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or 1 otherwise communicate with the Court, and the deadline to do so has expired. 2 II. Failure to State a Claim 3 A. Screening Requirement 4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 5 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 7 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 8 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 9 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 10 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 11 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 13 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 14 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 15 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 17 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 18 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 19 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 20 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 21 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 22 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 23 Plaintiff is currently housed at California Men’s Colony, East, in San Luis Obispo, 24 California. The events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff housed at 25 Corcoran State Prison in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) C/O L. 26 Martinez; (2) C/O R. Manning; (3) John Doe 1, Facility 3B ADA Sgt.; (4) John Doe 2, Facility 27 3B Security and Escort Correctional Officer; (5) John Doe 3, Facility 3B Security and Escort 28 Correctional Officer; (6) John Doe 4, Facility 3B Correctional Officer; and (7) John Doe 5, 1 Facility 3B CDCR Personnel. All defendants are employed at Corcoran State Prison. 2 Plaintiff alleges as follows: 3 Plaintiff is a forty-year-old inmate serving a determinate sentence. During his time, he 4 suffered from stage 3 colorectal cancer, which was treated with radiation and chemotherapy and 5 was cured. The after effects of the treatment were incontinence of stool. 6 On December 28, 2022, Plaintiff was having ADA/incontinent issues and urgently needed 7 to report back to his cell to privately utilize his ADA/incontinence supplies. Defendants L. 8 Martines, R. Manning, and several other unknown officers located inside the building (Facility 9 3B) (Housing Unit 1) wouldn’t let him return to his cell. They ignored Plaintiff’s efforts to get 10 the attention of the control booth officer (Defendant Manning). Plaintiff soiled himself and was 11 then afforded the opportunity to return to his cell afterwards. 12 Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, a trial by jury, monetary damages, injunctive relief 13 ordering the release of all body worn camera evidence of all seven defendants and the true 14 identities of John Does 1–5, and any other relief that the Court deems just and fair in accordance 15 with federal law. 16 C. Discussion 17 1. Linkage Requirement 18 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

19 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 20 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 21 redress. 22 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 23 the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See 24 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The 25 Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional 26 right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 27 affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 28 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 1 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to link any of the individual John Doe defendants to any 2 wrongful conduct. Although Plaintiff identifies these defendants individually as John Does 1–5 3 when listing the parties to this action, Plaintiff does not link these defendants to any specific act 4 or omission that violated Plaintiff’s rights. It is not sufficient for Plaintiff to state that the John 5 Doe defendants, as a group, violated his rights. 6 2. Eighth Amendment – Conditions of Confinement 7 The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 8 from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Morgan v. 9 Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, no matter where they are housed, prison 10 officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, 11 sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 12 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To establish a violation of the Eighth 13 Amendment, the prisoner must “show that the officials acted with deliberate indifference . . .” 14 Labatad v. Corrs. Corp. of Amer., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gibson v. Cty. of 15 Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)). 16 The deliberate indifference standard involves both an objective and a subjective prong. 17 First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 18 U.S. at 834. Second, subjectively, the prison official must “know of and disregard an excessive 19 risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837; Anderson v. Cty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th 20 Cir. 1995). The circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivations are critical in determining 21 whether the conditions complained of are grave enough to form the basis of a viable Eighth 22 Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2006). Mere negligence on the 23 part of a prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official's conduct must 24 have been wanton. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 25 1998). 26 Objectively, extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement 27 claim and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are 28 sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 1 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Although the Constitution “‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’” 2 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), “inmates are entitled to reasonably adequate 3 sanitation, personal hygiene, and laundry privileges, particularly over a lengthy course of time,” 4 Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989). 5 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim regarding his conditions of confinement. 6 Plaintiff alleges that, on a single occasion, he was denied access to his incontinence supplies, 7 resulting in him soiling himself, before he was permitted to clean himself. While it is not clear 8 from the complaint, it appears that approximately 30 minutes elapsed during the course of the 9 events at issue. These allegations are not objectively sufficiently serious to state an Eighth 10 Amendment violation. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9; see also Maestas v. CSATF Prison, Case No. 1:23- 11 cv-00419-EPG (PC), 2024 WL 201267, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2024) (denial of roll of toilet 12 paper on one occasion does not state Eighth Amendment violation); Cardenas v. Base, No. CV- 13 04-5080-RHW, 2006 WL 151937, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2006) (denial of toilet paper for 14 almost six hours does not meet objective test for cruel and unusual punishment); Gaston v. 15 Terronez, No. 1:08-cv-01629-SKO PC, 2010 WL 2991180, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2010) 16 (prison official who denied supply of diapers to incontinent inmate, resulting in inmate sitting in 17 his own feces for one week, sufficient to state claim under Eighth Amendment). 18 3. Fourteenth Amendment 19 a. Equal Protection 20 Plaintiff alleges a violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 21 Fourteenth Amendment. 22 The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 23 alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, (1985); Shakur v. 24 Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal protection claim may be established by 25 showing that defendants intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff based on his membership 26 in a protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 27 702– 03 (9th Cir. 2009); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), or that 28 similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship 1 to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601–02 (2008); 2 Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 3 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008). 4 Plaintiff has not shown that he was discriminated against because of his membership in 5 any protected class. To the extent Plaintiff asserts that he was discriminated against on the basis 6 of his disability, “the disabled do not constitute a suspect class” for equal protection purposes.” 7 Does 1–5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 8 440). Nor has Plaintiff shown that he was intentionally treated differently than other similarly 9 situated inmates without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Therefore, he has 10 not stated any claim for a violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause. 11 b. Due Process 12 While Plaintiff purports to raise claims against Defendants under the Due Process Clause 13 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not clear what process Plaintiff alleges was not afforded to 14 him. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege that he was deprived of his property, in the 15 form of his incontinence supplies, without due process, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim. 16 Prisoners have a protected interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 17 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). An authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under 18 the Due Process Clause. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. 19 Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435–36 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th 20 Cir. 1985). However, “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee 21 does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the 22 Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post deprivation remedy for the loss is available.” 23 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. 24 As pled, it appears Plaintiff is alleging an unauthorized, intentional deprivation of his 25 property by Defendants. As such, due process is satisfied if there is a meaningful post- 26 deprivation remedy available to Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation remedy 27 available under California law. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816–17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 28 Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810–95). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable due process claim 1 for the alleged deprivation of his property. 2 4. Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 3 The ADA provides, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 4 disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 5 activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. 6 § 12132. The ADA defines “qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual with a 7 disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the 8 removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary 9 aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the 10 participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” Id. § 12131(2). 11 To the extent Plaintiff intends to sue the individual named defendants for violation of his 12 rights under the ADA, he may not “bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official 13 in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA.” Vinson v. Thomas, 14 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002). The proper defendant in ADA actions is the public entity 15 responsible for the alleged discrimination. U.S. v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 153 (2006). State 16 correctional facilities are “public entities” within the meaning of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. 17 § 12131(1)(A) & (B); Pennsylvania Dep’t. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998); 18 Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997). 19 In order to state a claim under the ADA, the plaintiff must have been “improperly 20 excluded from participation in, and denied the benefit of, a prison service, program, or activity on 21 the basis of his physical handicap.” Armstrong, 124 F.3d at 1023. Plaintiff has alleged no facts 22 demonstrating such exclusion or denial. 23 5. State Law Claims 24 Plaintiff alleges a claim for gross negligence pursuant to California state law. California’s 25 Government Claims Act1 requires that a claim against the State2 or its employees “relating to a

26 1 This Act was formerly known as the California Tort Claims Act. City of Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 730, 741–42 (Cal. 2007) (adopting the practice of using Government Claims Act rather than California Tort Claims 27 Act).

28 2 “ ‘State’ means the State and any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission or agency of the 1 cause of action for death or for injury to person” be presented to the Department of General 2 Services’ Government Claims Program no more than six months after the cause of action 3 accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950–950.2. Presentation of a written 4 claim, and action on or rejection of the claim, are conditions precedent to suit. State v. Super. Ct. 5 of Kings Cty. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1245 (Cal. 2004); Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 6 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against a public entity or employee, a 7 plaintiff must allege compliance with the Government Claims Act. Bodde, 32 Cal. 4th at 1245; 8 Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th 9 Cir. 1988). 10 Plaintiff has attached a government claim form regarding this incident, dated June 9, 11 2023. (ECF No. 1, pp. 20–21.) However, Plaintiff does not allege that this form was filed with 12 the Government Claims Program or that he received an action on or rejection of the claim prior to 13 filing his complaint in this action. Plaintiff has therefore failed to allege compliance with the 14 claim presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act. 15 Furthermore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district 16 court has original jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all 17 other claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 18 controversy under Article III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “The district court 19 may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the 20 district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before 22 trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Amer. v. Gibbs, 23 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any cognizable federal claims. 24 It is therefore recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 25 Plaintiff’s state law claims. 26 /// 27 ///

28 State claims against which are paid by warrants drawn by the Controller.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 900.6. 1 6. Doe Defendants 2 Plaintiff names several John Doe defendants. “As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to 3 identify a defendant is not favored.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). 4 Plaintiff is advised that John Doe defendants (i.e., unknown defendants) cannot be served by the 5 United States Marshal until Plaintiff has identified them as actual individuals and amended his 6 complaint to substitute names for John Doe defendants. 7 III. Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Obey a Court Order 8 A. Legal Standard 9 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with 10 any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . 11 within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their 12 dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where 13 appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 14 court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, 15 failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 16 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 17 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring 18 amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987) 19 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). 20 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: 21 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 22 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 23 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 24 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 25 B. Discussion 26 Here, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is overdue, and he has failed to comply with the 27 Court’s order. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his 28 case. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 1 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a 2 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. 3 Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs against 4 dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 5 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose 6 responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes 7 progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products 8 Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 9 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 10 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 11 Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s January 27, 2026 screening 12 order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to file an amended complaint would result in a 13 recommendation of dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and 14 for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 10.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal 15 could result from his noncompliance. 16 Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that 17 would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further 18 unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in 19 this action, it appears that monetary sanctions will be of little use and the preclusion of evidence 20 or witnesses is likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case. 21 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 22 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a 23 District Judge to this action. 24 Furthermore, the Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY 25 RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim 26 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, for failure to obey a court order, and for Plaintiff’s failure to 27 prosecute this action. 28 /// 1 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 2 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 3 (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, the parties may file 4 written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 5 Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages 6 or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page number if already in 7 the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be 8 considered. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 9 result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on 10 appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 11 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

14 Dated: March 16, 2026 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15

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