Michael Munywe v. Mary Robnett

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 18 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL MUTHEE MUNYWE, No. 22-35786

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:21-cv-05604-RSM

v. MEMORANDUM* MARY ROBNETT, Prosecuting Attorney; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 18, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Appellant Michael Munywe appeals pro se from the district court’s

dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review dismissals for improper claim-splitting for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). abuse of discretion, Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th

Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904

(2008), but whether two actions involve the same claims and parties is a question

of law we review de novo, Mendoza v. Amalgamated Transit Union Int’l, 30 F.4th

879, 886 (9th Cir. 2022). We affirm.

The district court did not err in dismissing Munywe’s complaint as

duplicative. See Adams, 487 F.3d at 689 (“in assessing whether the second action

is duplicative of the first, we examine whether the causes of action and relief

sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same”; listing the

criteria for ascertaining whether causes of action are the same, the most important

of which is “whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of

facts”).

AFFIRMED.