Michael Merritt Dickinson v. Lisa Fazzio Dickinson

Court of Appeals of Mississippi·Decided March 31, 2020·No. NO. 2018-CA-00827-COA·Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2018-CA-00827-COA

MICHAEL MERRITT DICKINSON APPELLANT v. LISA FAZZIO DICKINSON APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/14/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. D. NEIL HARRIS SR. COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MARK H. WATTS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: GARY L. ROBERTS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/31/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND TINDELL, JJ.

TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Michael Dickinson raises two issues on appeal relating to a decision of the Jackson County Chancery Court entered on April 20, 2017, which granted a divorce in favor of Lisa Dickinson on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Michael challenges the chancellor’s decision to grant the cruelty-based divorce and the chancellor’s valuation of the couple’s marital home. Upon review, we find that substantial evidence supports the chancellor’s findings, and we therefore affirm the chancellor’s judgment of divorce and valuation of the marital home.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Michael and Lisa were married on June 5, 1995, and lived together in Jackson County,

Mississippi, until their separation in early 2014.1 The couple had no children together, but Lisa had two daughters from a previous marriage. On April 4, 2014, Lisa filed for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative, due to irreconcilable differences. On April 23, 2014, Michael filed his answer and counterclaim for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. But Michael later withdrew his counterclaim on the first day of the couple’s divorce proceedings.

¶3. Bifurcated divorce proceedings occurred on January 14, 2015, and February 6, 2015; they concluded on October 5, 2015. The chancellor heard testimony from Lisa, Michael, and Lisa’s sister Laura Lindsey regarding Michael’s alleged habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. On the matter of equitable distribution, Lisa and Michael presented the chancellor separate valuations on their marital home of $126,170 and $500,000, respectively. After hearing all the evidence, on October 23, 2015, the chancellor entered his “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment of Law” and granted Lisa’s request for a divorce based on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The chancellor also found that the value of the couple’s marital home was $126,170 and awarded the home to Lisa.

¶4. Aggrieved, Michael appealed. This Court dismissed Michael’s first appeal, finding that the chancellor’s judgment did not constitute a final, appealable judgment. The chancellor then entered a ruling on April 20, 2017, and Michael raises two issues on this

1 In their briefs, the parties state that they separated in April 2014. However, the parties’ petitions for divorce and the chancellor’s judgment of divorce state that the couple separated in January 2014.

appeal.2 STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5. We apply a limited standard of review when examining a chancellor’s decision in domestic-relations matters. Williams v. Williams, 224 So. 3d 1282, 1284 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). “Chancellors are afforded wide latitude in fashioning equitable remedies in domestic[-]relations matters, and their decisions will not be reversed if the findings of fact are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.” Henderson v. Henderson, 757 So. 2d 285, 289 (¶19) (Miss. 2000). We review the facts involved in rendering a divorce decree “in a light most favorable to the appellee,” and unless the chancellor’s judgment was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard, the judgment should stand. White v. White, 208 So. 3d 587, 592 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). When reviewing a chancellor’s judgment of property division, we are required “to ensure that the chancellor followed the appropriate standards and did not abuse his discretion.” Wells v. Wells, 800 So. 2d 1239, 1243 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

ANALYSIS

2 Michael filed a notice of appeal following the chancellor’s final judgment on May 14, 2018. Although labeled a “final judgment,” the April 20, 2017 ruling did not “terminate the action,” see M.R.C.P. 54(b), because issues of personal property remained before the chancery court. On May 14, 2018, the chancellor determined the pending property rights, held Michael in contempt of court, and finalized an issue of attorney’s fees that the court had explicitly retained (in the April 20, 2017 ruling) as an unresolved matter. The chancellor clarified in the May 14, 2018 decree, “This is a final judgment.” The only issues on appeal relate to the April 20, 2017 decision.

I. Whether the chancellor erroneously granted a divorce based upon habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.

¶6. Michael first argues that the chancellor erred in granting Lisa a divorce based upon habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Mississippi law allows for a fault-based divorce upon the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1 (Rev. 2013). The burden of proving habitual cruel and inhuman treatment lays on the offended spouse, who “must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the offending spouse’s behavior either:

(1) endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger, rendering the relationship unsafe for the party seeking relief, or

(2) is so unnatural and infamous as to make the marriage revolting to the nonoffending spouse and render it impossible for that spouse to discharge the duties of marriage, thus destroying the basis for its continuance.”

Baggett v. Baggett, 246 So. 3d 887, 892 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). But “[t]he offending spouse’s conduct must exceed ‘unkindness or rudeness or mere incompatibility or want of affection’ and ‘must be shown to have been systematic and continuous.’” Id. (quoting Horn v. Horn, 909 So. 2d 1151, 1155 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). There must be some proof of “a causal connection between the offending spouse’s conduct and the impact on the offended spouse.” Id. “Such an inquiry is subjective, and ‘the focus is on the effect the conduct has on the particular spouse, not its effect on an ordinary, reasonable person.’” Id. (quoting Smith v. Smith, 90 So. 3d 1259, 1263 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)).

¶7. To establish a causal connection, the offended party must corroborate his or her

testimony of the alleged treatment. White, 208 So. 3d at 593 (¶13).3 “[C]orroborating evidence need not be sufficient in itself to establish habitual cruelty, but rather need only provide enough supporting facts for a court to conclude the [offended spouse]’s testimony is true.” Id. (quoting Smith, 90 So. 3d at 1263 (¶12)). On appeal, Michael argues that Lisa failed to provide the evidence and corroboration required for a chancellor to grant a habitual- cruel-and-inhuman-treatment divorce. Michael further argues that Lisa failed to prove that his alleged cruel and inhuman behavior had any causal effect on Lisa or prevented her from being able to continue their marriage.

¶8. At trial, the chancellor heard testimony from Lisa, Lisa’s sister Laura, and Michael regarding his conduct throughout the twenty-year marriage. Lisa testified that when their marriage began, Michael made Lisa and her daughters excited for “a new adventure” and a new family. But that excitement ended once Michael began living with Lisa and her

3 In 2017, the State Legislature revised section 93-5-1, allowing for corroboration in cases of spousal domestic abuse by “a single credible witness, who may be the injured party[.]” 2017 Miss. Laws ch. 427, §6 (S.B. 2680) (emphasis added). In its definition of “spousal domestic abuse,” the revised statute included cases where

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